Heather M. Shavers v. Bradley M. Shavers
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
Date FiledAugust 31, 2022
Docket2D21-3190
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
SECOND DISTRICT
HEATHER M. SHAVERS,
Appellant,
v.
BRADLEY M. SHAVERS,
Appellee.
No. 2D21-3190
August 31, 2022
Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.130 from the Circuit Court for
Polk County; Kelly P. Butz, Judge.
Debra J. Sutton of Sutton Law Firm, Bartow, for Appellant.
Jean M. Henne of Jean M. Henne, P.A., Winter Haven, for Appellee.
PER CURIAM.
The appeal from the circuit court's order denying a motion to
set aside a signed mediation memorandum in a pending dissolution
is dismissed as from a nonfinal, nonappealable order.1 See Fla. R.
App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(C); see also Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(1)(B). The
order is not an order modifying the temporary support order in
place, nor does the face of the memorandum reflect a change in the
temporary orders in place. Furthermore, although the order
addresses timesharing and reflects that the parties came to an
agreement about timesharing, the trial court has approved but not
yet evaluated or agreed to the terms of the parties' agreement.
Finally, it is not an order that invalidates a marital settlement
agreement.
We note that the agreement memorialized in the memorandum
expressly states that the temporary order in effect at the time of
mediation shall remain in place following the agreement reached at
mediation. Therefore, nothing in this dismissal should be
construed as reflecting an alteration of the temporary order in place
until such time as ratification and final judgment or further order of
1 This handwritten memorandum accompanied the report
submitted by the mediator to the trial court and was signed by all
parties memorializing the agreed results of the mediation. Although
the parties disputed the meaning and extent of this agreement, the
trial court recognized it as a mediation agreement.
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the circuit court modifying that temporary order. See, e.g., Dent v.
Dent, 851 So. 2d 819, 820 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) ("[G]enerally, 'absent
compelling circumstances,' an order for temporary support is 'final
during its lifespan.' " (quoting Kraus v. Kraus, 749 So. 2d 513 (Fla.
2d DCA 1999))).
Dismissed.
MORRIS, C.J., and VILLANTI and SMITH, JJ., Concur.
Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.
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