Justin Derlic McGee v. Yolanda Joyce McGee
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
Date FiledNovember 17, 2026
Docket5D2025-3728
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
_____________________________
Case No. 5D2025-3728
LT Case No. 16-2023-DR-1874-FM
_____________________________
JUSTIN DERLIC MCGEE,
Appellant,
v.
YOLANDA JOYCE MCGEE,
Appellee.
_____________________________
On appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County.
Maureen T. Horkan, Judge.
Justin D. McGee, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, pro se.
No Appearance for Appellee.
November 17, 2026
PER CURIAM.
Justin D. McGee (“Former Husband”), who is proceeding pro
se in this appeal, challenges various rulings made by the trial court
in his dissolution of marriage litigation with Yolanda McGee
(“Former Wife”). More specifically, and according to his amended
notice of appeal, Former Husband is appealing the: (1) final
judgment of dissolution of marriage; (2) amended final judgment
of dissolution of marriage after rehearing; (3) post-judgment order
denying Former Husband’s emergency motion for temporary
custody of the parties’ minor child; and (4) order denying his
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b) motions to vacate the final
judgment, as amended. For the reasons discussed below, we
dismiss Former Husband’s appeal of the final judgment, amended
final judgment, and the order denying his motion for emergency
temporary custody because Former Husband did not timely invoke
our jurisdiction. We affirm the trial court’s order denying Former
Husband’s motion to vacate the final judgment.
JURISDICTION
We begin our analysis by acknowledging that neither party
has raised the question of our jurisdiction to consider the merits of
this appeal. 1 Nevertheless, as an appellate court, we are required
to address jurisdiction, even when not raised by the parties.
Bialostozky v. GAHC3 Mount Dora FL MOB II, LLC, 397 So. 3d
793, 797 (Fla. 5th DCA 2024) (citing Nacius v. One W. Bank, FSB,
211 So. 3d 152, 153 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017)). Stated slightly
differently, an appellate court has the independent duty to
determine if it has jurisdiction over an appeal. Shassian v.
Riverwalk Park, LLC, 365 So. 3d 484, 486 (Fla. 6th DCA 2023)
(citing Medeiros v. Firth, 200 So. 3d 121, 122 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016)).
Under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.110(b), the
jurisdiction of the district courts of appeal to review final orders or
final judgments of the lower tribunal is invoked by the filing of a
notice with the clerk of the lower court within thirty days of
rendition of the order to be reviewed. The chronology of events
described below shows that we lack jurisdiction to review all but
the order denying Former Husband’s post-judgment motions to
vacate the amended final judgment.
a. The final judgment of dissolution and amended
final judgment of dissolution of marriage after
rehearing
The trial court, pursuant to Florida Family Law Rule of
1 Former Wife has not filed a brief, nor has she otherwise
appeared in this appeal.
2
Procedure 12.490, referred this case to be heard by a general
magistrate. Following a contested hearing on issues of alimony,
child support, attorney’s fees, and costs, 2 the magistrate,
consistent with Rule 12.490(e)(1), submitted her report to the trial
court recommending entry of the final judgment of dissolution of
marriage prepared by her that included findings of fact and
conclusions of law.
On December 2, 2024, the trial court rendered its final
judgment dissolving the parties’ marriage in which the court
approved, ratified, and confirmed the report of the general
magistrate. The final judgment also adopted and incorporated the
parties’ mediated settlement agreement and their parenting plan.
Among other things, Former Husband was ordered to pay Former
Wife durational alimony for seven years in the amount of $1,801
per month.
Citing Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.530, 3 Former
Husband timely moved for a rehearing of this final judgment.
Pertinent to our jurisdictional analysis, this motion tolled the
rendition of the December 2, 2024 final judgment until Former
Husband either withdrew his motion by written notice or the
motion was resolved by rendition of an order. See Fla. R. App. P.
9.020(h)(1)–(2).
The trial court held a hearing on Former Husband’s motion,
after which, on March 18, 2025, it rendered an “amended final
judgment of dissolution of marriage after rehearing.” This
amended final judgment, which Former Husband is presently
2 The parties had separately entered into a mediated
settlement agreement concerning their vehicles, personal
property, and health insurance, together with a parenting plan
involving their various parental responsibilities and timesharing
of their minor child.
3 Because this was a family law case, the proper reference for
the rehearing motion would have been to Florida Family Law Rule
of Procedure 12.530. However, for our purposes, there is no
substantive difference between the two rules.
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appealing, made various material changes to the original final
judgment, including a reduction in Former Husband’s monthly
durational alimony payments to Former Wife from $1,801 to $900.
“[I]n cases where a trial court makes a material amendment
to the final judgment, the time to file a notice of appeal runs from
the date of the amendment, rather than the date of the original
final judgment.” Giroux v. Giroux, 51 Fla. L. Weekly D2088,
D2091 (Fla. 3d DCA Oct. 7, 2026) (emphasis removed) (citing
DeGale v. Krongold, Bass & Todd, 773 So. 2d 630, 631 (Fla. 3d
DCA 2000)). To be more precise, Former Husband had until April
17, 2025, to timely file his notice of appeal.
Former Husband did not meet this deadline. Instead, he
waited until December 9, 2025, to file his notice of appeal. In fact,
Former Husband filed two notices of appeal that day. Former
Husband’s first notice appealed only a December 8, 2025 order of
the trial court that had denied his later Rule 1.540(b)(4) motions
to vacate the final judgment. Former Husband’s second notice
indicated that he was also appealing the amended final judgment
dissolving his marriage. Nine days later, on December 18, 2025,
Former Husband filed an amended notice of appeal that showed
that he was also appealing the original final judgment from
December 2024, as well as an order of the trial court that had
denied his post-judgment emergency motion for temporary custody
of the parties’ minor child.
Former Husband’s notice of appeal as to the amended final
judgment of dissolution of marriage, filed months after the thirty-
day deadline under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.110(b),
is plainly untimely, resulting in what has been referred to as “an
irremediable jurisdictional defect.” Tedder v. Est. of Tedder, 200
So. 3d 123, 124 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016) (quoting Bak v. Bak, 110 So.
3d 523, 524 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)).
Accordingly, because Former Husband did not timely invoke
the jurisdiction of this court to challenge either the amended final
judgment dissolving his marriage or the original final judgment,
we dismiss this aspect of his appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See
Hawks v. Walker, 409 So. 2d 524, 525 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)
(dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because “[a] timely
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notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days in order for this court
to have jurisdiction; late filing is a defect no one can correct, not
even the court” (citations omitted)).
b. The order denying Former Husband’s
emergency motion for temporary custody of the
parties’ minor children
Five months after the rendition of the amended final
judgment of dissolution of marriage, Former Husband filed an
“emergency motion for temporary custody (ex parte)” in which he
requested, among other things, that the trial court “immediately
award [him] temporary custody of the [parties’] minor child.” The
trial court concluded that no emergency existed and, on August 20,
2025, rendered an order denying the motion. Former Husband did
not appeal this order until his December 18, 2025 amended notice
of appeal.
To the extent that the order denying Former Husband’s
emergency motion for temporary custody was an appealable
nonfinal order under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure
9.130(a)(3)(C)(iii)b., Former Husband’s notice of appeal of this
order had to have been filed within thirty days of its rendition. See
Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(b). Former Husband failed to do so.
Alternatively, if the trial court’s August 20, 2025 order denying
Former Husband’s motion for emergency temporary custody can
be construed as a final appealable order, his appeal was untimely
under Rule 9.110(b) because it was not filed within thirty days of
its rendition.
Accordingly, because Former Husband did not timely invoke
our jurisdiction, we dismiss his appeal of the August 20, 2025 order
denying his emergency motion for temporary custody.
THE DECEMBER 8, 2025 ORDER
On December 8, 2025, the trial court rendered an order
denying Former Husband’s separate and several Florida Rule of
Civil Procedure 1.540(b) motions to vacate the final judgment of
5
dissolution of marriage. 4 This order is separately appealable
under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(5); and, unlike
Former Husband’s appeal of the amended final judgment of
dissolution of marriage and the order denying his emergency
motion for temporary custody, he did timely invoke our jurisdiction
to consider this December 8, 2025 order.
Former Husband argued in his various post-judgment Rule
1.540(b)(4) motions that the final judgment dissolving his
marriage was void. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.540(b)(4) (stating that the
trial court may relieve a party from a final judgment that is void).
The trial court’s denial order now on appeal provided that Former
Husband’s motions were denied “as previously described in
paragraph 8 of the amended final judgment of dissolution of
marriage after rehearing.”
ANALYSIS
In appellate proceedings, the decision of the trial court is
presumed correct, see Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee,
377 So. 2d 1150, 1152 (Fla. 1979), and Former Husband, as the
appellant, has the burden here to show how the trial court
reversibly erred. See Figueroa v. Kossiver, 336 So. 3d 1260, 1262
(Fla. 5th DCA 2022) (citation omitted). To do so, Former Husband,
though not an attorney, must nevertheless adequately present his
arguments on appeal. Walker v. Est. of Yee, 376 So. 3d 758, 758
(Fla. 4th DCA 2024) (“In Florida, pro se litigants are bound by the
same rules that apply to counsel.” (quoting Stueber v. Gallagher,
812 So. 2d 454, 457 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002))).
Former Husband’s initial brief raises a number of arguments
directed towards either the final judgment or amended final
judgment of dissolution of marriage, or the order that denied his
4 Because this matter involved family law litigation, Former
Husband should have filed his motions to vacate under Florida
Family Law Rule of Procedure 12.540(b). This, however, is not
dispositive as our court has recognized that “Rule 12.540(b) is
‘substantively identical’ to rule 1.540.” Martin v. Sater, 427 So. 3d
76, 80 n.3 (Fla. 5th DCA 2025) (citing Macar v. Macar, 803 So. 2d
707, 709 n.4 (Fla. 2001)).
6
emergency motion for temporary custody. For the reasons
previously explained, we are unable to consider the merits of any
of these arguments because Former Husband did not timely invoke
our jurisdiction to allow us to do so.
However, as to Former Husband’s appeal of the denial order
of his Rule 1.540(b)(4) motions for which this court does have
jurisdiction, the burden is on him, as the appellant, to submit an
initial brief that, in addition to acquainting this court with the
material facts of the case, sufficiently sets forth the points of law
involved and the legal arguments supporting his position. See
Polyglycoat Corp. v. Hirsch Distribs., Inc., 442 So. 2d 958, 960 (Fla.
4th DCA 1983) (citations omitted). And, “[w]hen points, positions,
facts and supporting authorities are omitted from the brief, a court
is entitled to believe that such are waived, abandoned, or deemed
by counsel to be unworthy.” Id.; see also Figueroa, 336 So. 3d at
1264 (applying the Polyglycoat principles to a pro se litigant’s
brief). Former Husband’s initial brief is infirm in this regard as he
provides little, if any, analysis as to how or why the order itself
denying his Rule 1.540(b) motions was erroneous. See Lynn v. City
of Ft. Lauderdale, 81 So. 2d 511, 513 (Fla. 1955) (“[T]he duty rests
upon the appealing party to make error clearly appear.” (citation
omitted)).
The trial court’s order denying Former Husband’s Rule
1.540(b)(4) motions to vacate the amended final judgment is
affirmed.
APPEAL DISMISSED as to Amended Final Judgment and Final
Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage and Order Denying
Emergency Motion for Temporary Custody. AFFIRMED as to the
order denying Former Husband’s Rule 1.540(b) motions to vacate.
MAKAR and KILBANE, JJ., concur.
LAMBERT, J., specially concurs, with opinion.
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_____________________________
Not final until disposition of any timely and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
_____________________________
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Case No. 5D2025-3728
LT Case No. 16-2023-DR-1874-FM
LAMBERT, J., specially concurring.
I fully concur in the majority opinion but write separately to
expand upon the reasons Former Husband was unsuccessful in
this appeal.
It is not fully apparent from the record or from his initial brief
why Former Husband chose to wait until December 9, 2025, to
appeal the amended final judgment of dissolution of marriage.
Perhaps Former Husband concluded that he needed to wait until
after the trial court addressed his then-pending Rule 1.540(b)(4)
motions to vacate the final judgment, which the court did with its
December 8, 2025 denial order. Former Husband’s delay, however,
was fatal to his appeal of the amended judgment dissolving his
marriage because the trial court’s resolution of these motions did
not toll or stop the time for Former Husband to appeal the
amended final judgment. To the point, Rule 1.540(b) specifically
states that “[a] motion under this subdivision does not affect the
finality of a judgment, decree, or order or suspend its operation.”
See also Stubbs v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 250 So. 3d 151, 152 (Fla.
2d DCA 2018) (recognizing that a Rule 1.540 motion does not toll
the time under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.020(h)(1) for
taking an appeal from a final judgment because it does not affect
the finality of the judgment).
Applying these principles, Former Husband’s first of his five
Rule 1.540(b) motions was filed after the rendition of the December
2, 2024 final judgment but prior to the trial court entering its
amended final judgment. Former Husband essentially alleged in
this motion that his ex-wife had entered into a supportive
relationship with another man; therefore, his monthly durational
alimony obligation to her should be reduced or terminated. This
motion which, as an aside, differed from Former Husband’s four
subsequent post-amended final judgment Rule 1.540(b)(4) motions
claiming the judgment was void, had no effect on the finality of the
final judgment. This motion did not toll the thirty days Former
Husband had to timely appeal from the amended final judgment.
9
Former Husband’s delay in appealing unfortunately (for him)
caused our court not to have jurisdiction to consider this aspect of
the appeal.
Former Husband’s next four Rule 1.540 motions, brought
under subsection (b)(4) of this rule, were filed several months after
the rendition of the March 18, 2025 amended final judgment. The
trial court entered one order denying Former Husband’s motions.
These motions did not alter, nor chronologically could they have,
the thirty-day time period for Former Husband to have appealed
from the March 18, 2025 amended final judgment.
Turning to the trial court’s August 20, 2025 order denying
Former Husband’s emergency motion for temporary custody, if
this order is construed to be a final, appealable order then, for the
reasons just discussed, Former Husband’s Rule 1.540(b)(4)
motions that were actually filed within thirty days of this denial
order did not toll the time for Former Husband to appeal this order.
Resultingly, Former Husband’s December 18, 2025 amended
notice of appeal of this order was untimely; and, as the majority
rightly holds, we lack jurisdiction to consider this aspect of the
appeal. And to the extent that the August 20, 2025 order was an
appealable nonfinal order, his Rule 1.540(b)(4) motions were not
authorized, see Lawrence v. Marina Tower of Turnberry Isle Condo.
Ass’n, 323 So. 3d 271, 273 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021), and thus did not
alter the time in which to appeal.
Lastly, I agree with the majority opinion that Former
Husband did not sufficiently brief his claim that the trial court
reversibly erred in denying his Rule 1.540(b)(4) motions. However,
assuming that Former Husband’s brief was sufficient, the trial
court’s ruling was correct; and affirmance is the proper disposition.
Former Husband’s dominant theme in his numerous post-
judgment Rule 1.540(b)(4) motions was that the final judgment
was void because he never received a copy of the general
magistrate’s report and recommended final judgment prior to the
trial court rendering the final judgment approving, ratifying, and
confirming the magistrate’s report. Former Husband contended
that this failure constituted a “structural” defect and thus per se
reversible error. Former Husband essentially argued throughout
these motions that his right to due process was violated.
10
Former Husband’s argument lacks merit because it is based
upon an earlier version of Florida Family Law Rule of Procedure
12.490. Effective April 1, 2022, the Florida Supreme Court
amended Rule 12.490(e) and deleted the former subparagraph (f)
of the rule that required a general magistrate to serve copies of his
or her report and recommendation on all parties and provide the
parties with ten days in which to file exceptions to the report. See
In re: Amends. to Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.490 & 12.491, & Forms
12.920(a)–(c), 346 So. 3d 1053, 1054–55 (Fla. 2022).
The version of Rule 12.490(e) applicable in this case required
the general magistrate to submit a recommended order directly to
the court, which the court must review and promptly enter unless
it finds the recommended order to be facially or legally deficient.
Id. The magistrate was not required to first send copies of her
report to the parties. As recently explained by our court, “as
amended, the rule replaced the [previous requirement of the]
parties’ filing of exceptions before the magistrate’s
recommendations were adopted by the court with a motion to
vacate filed after the court enters the magistrate’s order as its
own.” Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 434 So. 3d 120, 123 (Fla. 5th DCA
2026) (citing Wells v. Wells, 392 So. 3d 235, 236 (Fla. 1st DCA
2024)).
Here, the general magistrate complied with Rule 12.490(e).
The magistrate submitted her report recommending entry of final
judgment directly to the trial court. Contrary to Former
Husband’s argument, this was not a denial of due process. The
trial court thereafter promptly approved, ratified, and rendered
the final judgment, copies of which were provided to each party.
Under Rule 12.490(e)(3), Former Husband then had fifteen days to
file a motion to vacate the final judgment, which he did not timely
do. Nevertheless, as discussed in the majority opinion, Former
Husband, citing to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.530, did move
for rehearing of the final judgment; and he was, in fact, partially
successful as the trial court amended the final judgment which
granted Former Husband some financial relief.
Because the amended final judgment was not void, the trial
court reached the right result in denying Former Husband’s Rule
1.540(b)(4) motions, albeit its reasoning was erroneous.
11
Nevertheless, affirmance is appropriate under the tipsy coachman
doctrine, which “allows an appellate court to affirm a trial court
that ‘reaches the right result, but for the wrong reasons’ so long as
‘there is any basis which would support the judgment in the
record.’” Garcon v. W. Palm Beach Police Dep’t, 112 So. 3d 768,
770 & n.2 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (quoting Robertson v. State, 829 So.
2d 901, 906 (Fla. 2002)).
Lastly, Former Husband’s initial brief raises arguments about
the trial court failing to rule on his motions for contempt, not
terminating his alimony based on Former Wife being in a
supportive relationship, and allegedly improperly applying the res
judicata doctrine during a later hearing on Former Husband’s
request for temporary custody of the parties’ minor child. Contrary
to Former Husband’s apparent position, these matters are not
before us in this specific appeal. Our record shows that at the time
Former Husband filed his notices of appeal, his separate
supplemental petition for modification of alimony based upon his
ex-wife allegedly being in a supportive relationship was pending,
as was his substantive post-judgment claim for temporary custody.
Also, there is no clear record indication that Former Husband had
brought his motions of contempt for hearing. Because judicial
labor appeared to be required below on these matters, we lack the
present jurisdiction to consider them. See generally S.L.T.
Warehouse Co. v. Webb, 304 So. 2d 97, 99 (Fla. 1974).
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