Jonathan S. Cohen v. Carolyn Corporation, Inc.
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
Date FiledJune 11, 2021
Docket2D20-0671
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
SECOND DISTRICT
JONATHAN S. COHEN, and AAA BRONZE STATUES & ANTIQUES,
INC.,
Appellants,
v.
CAROLYN CORPORATION, INC.,
Appellee.
No. 2D20-671
June 11, 2021
Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.130 from the Circuit Court for
Hillsborough County; Gregory P. Holder, Judge.
Randall O. Reder, of Randall O. Reder, P.A., Tampa, for Appellants.
Steven E. Gurian and Anthony M. Lopez, of Marin, Eliajek, Lopez &
Martinez, P.L., Coconut Grove, for Appellee.
PER CURIAM.
On March 4, 2021, this court directed appellants to show
cause why this appeal should not be dismissed as moot in light of
the fact that appellee has since obtained a judgment against
appellant AAA Bronze Statues & Antiques, Inc., thereby obviating
the need for the temporary injunction at issue in this appeal. In
response, appellants argue that although the issue concerning
entitlement to the funds held in escrow is now moot, this appeal
should not be dismissed because there are collateral legal
consequences regarding attorney's fees associated with this appeal
and in related case number 2D21-537. See Godwin v. State, 593
So. 2d 211, 212 (Fla. 1992) (noting that an otherwise moot case will
not be dismissed when "collateral legal consequences that affect the
rights of a party flow from the issue to be determined"). We
disagree.
The only request for attorney's fees in connection with this
appeal is appellee's motion for appellate attorney's fees, which is
based on the fee provision contained in the note. Even assuming
this court granted appellee's request for appellate attorney's fees,
any such award would be contingent upon appellee prevailing in the
proceedings below. The mere possibility that appellee might receive
fees in connection with this appeal—or that either party might
receive fees in any related appeal—is too speculative to preclude
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dismissal of this appeal on mootness grounds. See, e.g., Kendall
Healthcare Grp., Ltd. v. Pub. Health Tr. of Miami-Dade Cnty., 296 So.
3d 533, 535 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) ("A mere possibility that one might
receive fees if successful is insufficient to be deemed a
'consequence' flowing from a claim."). Accordingly, to the extent
that this appeal challenges the temporary injunction, it is dismissed
as moot.
Furthermore, to the extent that this appeal challenges the
portion of the trial court's order granting proceedings
supplementary, it is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See Fla. R.
App. P. 9.130(a)(3); cf. Schron v. Nunziata, 136 So. 3d 684, 686 (Fla.
2d DCA 2014) (distinguishing nonfinal orders impleading parties in
proceedings supplementary that determine personal jurisdiction,
which are appealable under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure
9.130(a)(3)(C)(i), from similar nonappealable orders which do not
determine personal jurisdiction).
Dismissed.
KHOUZAM, C.J., and LUCAS and STARGEL, JJ., Concur.
Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.
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