Marcia Stivelman v. Jacques Claudio Stivelman
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
Date FiledJuly 8, 2020
Docket3D20-0136
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed July 8, 2020.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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No. 3D20-136
Lower Tribunal No. 07-15687
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Marcia Stivelman,
Petitioner,
vs.
Jacques Claudio Stivelman,
Respondent.
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade
County, Ivonne Cuesta, Judge.
Lorenzen Law, and Dirk Lorenzen, for petitioner.
Nancy A. Hass, P.A., and Nancy A. Hass (Fort Lauderdale), for respondent.
Before EMAS, C.J., and HENDON and LOBREE, JJ.
HENDON, J.
Marcia Stivelman (“Former Wife”), seeks a writ of certiorari in order to quash
the December 17, 2019 order granting certain third parties’ motions for protective
orders and sanctions. As the Former Wife has not shown any irreparable harm
resulting from the orders, we dismiss the petition for certiorari.
In response to the former husband’s petition for a downward modification of
his monthly alimony obligation, the Former Wife responded with a counter-petition
seeking an upward modification of alimony. The parties agreed to set the trial for
December 2019, and the hearing on the parties’ pending unresolved motions was set
for November 2019. The Former Wife then subpoenaed various documents and
extensive records from certain corporate third parties, i.e., Township Plaza
Holdings, LLC, S2 Township Partners LLC, S2 Sunny Isles Capital Group, LLC,
S2 Downtown, LLC, S2 Development LLC, and Mark Schmulian (collectively
“Third Parties”), in an effort to obtain information regarding income that the former
husband might have received from these entities. The Former Wife sought to show
that the former husband had more assets than had been disclosed in the 2007 marital
dissolution agreement by proving that he might have additional sources of income.
The Third Parties, through their counsel, filed motions to quash the Former Wife’s
subpoenas duces tecum and moved for protective orders. At the motion hearing, the
Third Parties’ counsel argued that the Former Wife’s request for documents was
overbroad and not narrowly tailored to obtain appropriate information. Further, the
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Third Parties’ counsel stated that the Third Parties did not have any documents or
records that would show any source of equity or income to the Former Husband that
had not already been produced by the Former Husband, or that he had offered to
produce. The record showed that the Former Wife had not contacted the Third
Parties’ counsel about the records she wanted, nor had the former husband refused
to cooperate or disclose additional records.
The trial court granted the Third Parties’ motion for a protective order and
sustained all of the Third Parties’ objections to the production of documents. The
trial court ruled that the Former Wife was not entitled to any of the documents
requested in her subpoenas duces tecum. The court ordered the Former Wife to first
seek any records that needed to be produced from the former husband.
Despite the trial court’s protective order, and just days before the trial was set
to commence, the Former Wife issued trial subpoenas to the Third Parties for
substantially similar or identical documents to those previously subpoenaed for the
Third Parties’ depositions. The trial subpoenas further requested that the Third
Parties bring the exact records that the trial court previously ruled would not have to
be provided by the Third Parties to the Former Wife. Once again, the Third Parties
argued to the trial court that the Former Wife was attempting to engage in discovery
that had already been restricted by order of the trial court, amounting to meritless
litigation. The Third Parties sought another protective order to limit their testimony
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at the trial, as well as an order imposing sanctions against the Former Wife in the
form of attorney’s fees and costs, for having to defend against her conduct that went
contrary to the prior court orders. At the hearing on December 17, 2019, the parties
agreed to abate all further discovery until further order of the trial court. The trial
court granted the Third Parties’ motions for protective orders, motions in limine, and
the motion for sanctions. In the order imposing sanctions against the Former Wife,
the court awarded the Third Parties’ attorney’s fees in the amount of $850.00, which
represented two (2) hours of their attorney’s time for having to bring and prosecute
their motion. In response, the Former Wife filed this petition for Writ of Certiorari,
seeking to quash the trial court’s December 17, 2019 Order.
In seeking the extraordinary relief of certiorari, a petitioner must establish,
“(1) a material injury in the proceedings that cannot be corrected on appeal
(sometimes referred to as irreparable harm); and (2) a departure from the essential
requirements of the law.” Nader v. Fla. Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles,
87 So. 3d 712, 721 (Fla. 2012); see also Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Cook, 277 So.
3d 263, 264 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019).
The Former Wife has not shown that the protective orders will cause her
irreparable harm or that the trial court’s decision to modify an alimony award could
not be corrected on appeal. The record shows that the Former Wife has attempted to
circumvent the trial court’s orders regarding the documents she seeks from the Third
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Parties, that she has delayed the proceedings, and that she has not sought the specific
and narrowly tailored discovery from the former husband as she was instructed to
do by the trial court. Absent irreparable harm, that is, a material injury in the
proceedings that cannot be corrected on appeal, this Court is without certiorari
jurisdiction. Id. We therefore dismiss the petition for certiorari.
Petition dismissed.
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