Full Opinion

SIXTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF FLORIDA _____________________________ Case No. 6D2025-1639 Lower Tribunal No. 2023-CF-016118 _____________________________ JULIO VELAZQUEZ, Appellant, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee. _____________________________ Appeal from the Circuit Court for Lee County. Nicholas Thompson, Judge. November 6, 2026 PRATT, J. Appellant appeals his judgment and sentence for two non-capital felonies and argues that this Court should reverse and remand for a new trial because Florida’s six-person jury requirement for non-capital felony cases purportedly violated his right to a trial by a twelve-person jury under the United States Constitution. We reject Appellant’s argument and affirm.1 1 We affirm as to all other arguments raised by Appellant without further discussion. “Since 1877, Florida has permitted trial by six-person juries in non-capital cases.” Rogers v. State, 51 Fla. L. Weekly D1313, 2026 WL 1862160, at *1 (Fla. 6th DCA June 29, 2026) (citations omitted). “[I]n Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 103 (1970), the United States Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of Florida’s jury size and concluded that ‘[the] petitioner’s Sixth Amendment rights, as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, were not violated by Florida’s decision to provide a six-man rather than a 12-man jury.’” Id. “Recently, the United States Supreme Court granted a petition for a writ of certiorari in Kian v. Florida, No. 25-6623, 2026 WL 1718018, at *1 (U.S. June 15, 2026), that requested the Court reconsider its holding in Williams.” Id. However, unless and until the United States Supreme Court overrules Williams, it remains “current and binding precedent” that all lower courts—including this Court—must continue to follow. Rogers, 2026 WL 1862160, at *2; see, e.g., Mullins v. State, 51 Fla. L. Weekly D1876, 2026 WL 2651638, at *1 (Fla. 2d DCA Sept. 9, 2026) (“[Appellant’s] argument is . . . directed to the wrong court. She asks us to anticipate that the Supreme Court will overrule Williams in Kian[]. But a grant of certiorari decides nothing and overrules nothing. Unless and until the Supreme Court overrules Williams, we must follow it. Likewise, we may not depart from controlling Florida law authorizing six-person juries in noncapital cases.” (citations omitted)); Serrano- Delgado v. State, 392 So. 3d 251, 253 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024) (“Williams is binding 2 precedent and indisputably remains good law. We must follow it.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). See generally, e.g., McDaniels v. State, 419 So. 3d 1180, 1188 (Fla. 1st DCA 2025) (“[T]he United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the federal Constitution is ‘the supreme Law of the Land,’ and we are bound to follow it.”); U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.”). Because Appellant’s twelve-person jury argument is unpreserved, he seeks relief by way of the narrow route of fundamental error. But because Williams remains binding precedent, Appellant hasn’t shown any error, much less fundamental error. See, e.g., Mullins, 2026 WL 2651638, at *1 (“The trial court followed the law it was bound to apply. That is not error, much less fundamental error. We therefore affirm.”); Jack v. State, 349 So. 3d 925, 927 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022) (“Appellant . . . argues that he was entitled to trial by a twelve-person jury. Appellant did not make this argument before the trial court and as such it was not preserved. [E]xcept for fundamental error, we cannot consider an unpreserved argument on appeal. Appellant claims the six-person jury deprived him of a fair trial, amounting to fundamental error. We disagree. Williams[] approved Florida’s six-person jury 3 scheme for noncapital cases and remains binding law. Thus, no fundamental error occurred when Appellant was tried and convicted by a six-person jury on noncapital charges.” (citations omitted)). He is entitled to no relief. 2 We are not permitted to disregard the binding precedent of Williams. We therefore affirm Appellant’s judgment and sentence.3 AFFIRMED. NARDELLA and KAMOUTSAS, JJ., concur. Blair Allen, Public Defender, and Emily Ross-Booker, Special Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant. 2 Even assuming for the sake of argument that Appellant had preserved his twelve-person jury argument, he would still be entitled to no relief because Williams remains “current and binding precedent.” Rogers, 2026 WL 1862160, at *2. 3 We will not speculate regarding what the United States Supreme Court may or may not do in Kian, and any potential implications thereof for those cases such as this one that are pending on direct review or otherwise not final. See Rogers, 2026 WL 1862160, at *2 (“[C]laims based on a higher court’s granting certiorari review of a case that may potentially change the governing law are speculative and premature. The parties involved do not know the outcome of Kian nor the ramifications. Indeed, even assuming, arguendo, that the United States Supreme Court concludes that Florida’s six-person jury system is unconstitutional, questions regarding the applicability of harmless error versus structural error remain. Further, if a new rule of law is announced after this appeal becomes final, the question of retroactivity must be resolved. In that instance, Appellant could seek post-conviction relief to the same extent as any other person convicted of a felony by a six-person jury prior to the issuance of the decision.” (citations omitted)); see also Mullins, 2026 WL 2651638, at *1 n.1 (“We express no opinion concerning the effect that any future merits decision in Kian may have on this or another case that remains pending on direct review.”). 4 James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Marena S. Ramirez, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee. NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF TIMELY FILED 5