Full Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida Opinion filed February 5, 2020. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing. ________________ No. 3D19-0704 Lower Tribunal No. 10-12821 ________________ Alon Ezra, Appellant, vs. Marian Mendelsohn Ezra, Appellee. An appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Monica Gordo, Judge. Oded Chayoun, P.A., and Oded Chayoun, for appellant. Florida Probate & Family Law Firm, and Brenda B. Shapiro, for appellee. Before SALTER, SCALES, and MILLER, JJ. MILLER, J. Appellant, Alon Ezra, the father, challenges an order rendered in the dissolution proceedings below, endowing appellee, Marian Mendelsohn Ezra, 1 the mother, with sole decision-making authority as to the educational and medical needs of the two minor children of the marriage. For the reasons set forth below, we discern no error and affirm. FACTS AND BACKGROUND The father and mother wed in 2004 and the union produced two children, a son now age thirteen and a daughter now age ten. The parties separated the day after their sixth wedding anniversary. In the spring of 2010, the wife filed for dissolution in the lower tribunal. As the action progressed, the mother disclosed she had suffered severe physical and emotional abuse at the hands of the father. She further reported a history of inappropriate, extreme disciplinary measures directed at the children. In early 2011, the trial court ratified a stipulated parenting plan establishing shared parental responsibility for the academic and health needs of the children. Later, that same year, the court dissolved the marriage, resolving all remaining contested issues and incorporating the parenting plan into a final adjudicatory order. 1 The mother requested, and the court granted, the restoration of her maiden name, Marian Mendelsohn. Nonetheless, the style of this case remains as stated. 2 Notwithstanding this fleeting resolution, the instant appeal emerges from the context of acrimonious postdecretal proceedings spanning almost a decade. Over the past several years, the financial situation of the father has purportedly deteriorated, ultimately culminating in a bankruptcy filing. As a result, his court- ordered support payments have been, at best, sporadic. The children have historically been enrolled in a private religious day school. Nonetheless, the current joint income of the parties is woefully insufficient to satisfy the tuition demands. Accordingly, the mother has sought to avail the children of scholarship funding. Rather than cooperate in this endeavor, the father has engaged in a pattern of indirect resistance, refusing to endorse enrollment contracts, mandatory passport forms, and financial assistance documents, absent court intervention. The oldest child has been diagnosed with a significant medical condition, thus requires the continuous, diligent administration of prescription pharmaceuticals. The father initially obstructed professional intervention, and has, as of late, unilaterally adjusted the dosage of the medication. In October of 2018, the mother sought a judicial imprimatur on the abdication of responsibility by the father to render educational and medical decisions for the children, through a request for modification of the court-ordered shared decision- making. An evidentiary hearing was conducted. After the proceedings concluded, 3 the lower tribunal considered the extensive litigation history and the facts adduced, and, ultimately, granted the mother unilateral authority over determinations involving the medical and educational needs of the children. The instant appeal ensued. STANDARD OF REVIEW “A trial court’s order modifying a parenting plan is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” Schot v. Schot, 273 So. 3d 48, 50 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019) (citing Wade v. Hirschman, 903 So. 2d 928, 935 (Fla. 2005)); see Cruz v. Domenech, 905 So. 2d 938, 941 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (applying the abuse of discretion standard when reviewing an order “transferring the ultimate decision-making authority . . . from the mother to the father”). “An abuse of discretion appears when the record reveals a lack of competent, substantial evidence to sustain the findings of the trial court.” Richardson v. Richardson, 442 So. 2d 1005, 1005 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). LEGAL ANALYSIS “[A] modification of a parenting plan and time-sharing schedule requires a showing of a substantial, material, and unanticipated change of circumstances.” § 61.13(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2019). “The ‘substantial change’ must not have been ‘reasonably contemplated at the time of the original judgment.’” Hollis v. Hollis, 276 So. 3d 77, 79 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019) (citation omitted). Further, for purposes of 4 modification, “the best interest of the child shall be the primary consideration.” 2 § 61.13(3), Fla. Stat. (2019); Schot, 273 So. 3d at 50 (“‘[M]odification of a parenting plan and time-sharing schedule requires a showing of a substantial, material, and unanticipated change of circumstances’ and that modification is in the ‘best interests of the child.’”) (quoting § 61.13(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2018)). Nonetheless, “[a] failure to communicate and [an] acrimonious relationship alone are insufficient to warrant modification.” Schot, 273 So. 3d at 50. Here, the record unequivocally establishes, in its totality, that subsequent to the ratification of the settlement agreement, the father has both passively and overtly hindered the mother’s arduous attempts to foster the happiness, mental health, academic prowess, and overall stability of the children. Further, despite neglecting his financial responsibilities and stipulating to religious day school enrollment, the father repeatedly impeded the registration process and actively sought to undermine efforts to procure financial aid. Finally, without consulting with a medical professional, the father has, on occasion, reduced his child’s prescription drug dosage. 2 A body of reported jurisprudence has “added to the substantial change test an implicit finding of detriment by the trial court.” Wade v. Hirschman, 903 So. 2d 928, 933 (Fla. 2005). Nonetheless, the Florida Supreme Court has recognized that “[r]equiring proof of detriment is inconsistent with [the] Court’s prior holdings and is not an element of the substantial change test necessary” for modification. Id. at 934. 5 We agree with the assessment by the trial court that the risk of destabilization associated with this enduring course of behavior is readily apparent. Consequently, the decision to afford the mother sole parental responsibility for the educational and medical needs of the children is well-supported by competent, substantial evidence, thus cannot be deemed “arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable.” Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1203 (Fla. 1980) (citation omitted). Hence, we decline to embrace any contention of error. Affirmed. 6