Full Opinion

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF FLORIDA _____________________________ No. 1D19-364 _____________________________ VANCE G. RUSSELL, Former Husband, Appellant, v. ANDREA M. RUSSELL, Former Wife, Appellee. _____________________________ On appeal from the Circuit Court for Walton County. Jeffrey E. Lewis, Judge. April 9, 2020 PER CURIAM. Appellant Vance Russell, the former husband, appeals the final judgment of dissolution of marriage on several grounds. We affirm in part and dismiss in part. The parties were married for a little over twelve years at the time the petition for dissolution of marriage was filed by Appellee. The final judgment equitably distributed the marital property, awarded Appellee durational alimony for ten years, and directed that the Appellee was entitled to an award of attorney’s fees but reserved jurisdiction to set the amount. Here, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the findings of fact on the statutory factors for equitable distribution and alimony, but those claims are unpreserved for review. See Mize v. Mize, 45 So. 3d 49 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010); Owens v. Owens, 973 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). The final judgment included the trial court’s detailed findings on each of the factors listed in section 61.08(2), Florida Statutes (2015), regarding alimony. And although the court’s findings under section 61.075(1), Florida Statutes (2015), to support its equitable distribution scheme are not listed discretely in alphabetical order, the only factors not found in the text of the judgment are inapplicable to the facts of this case. No children are involved, there were no allegations that one party interrupted his or her personal career or education to contribute to the career or education of the other, and the parties never lived together in Florida in a marital home. See § 61.075(1)(d), (1)(e), (1)(h), Fla. Stat. Even if these issues had been properly preserved, Appellant failed to establish a lack of evidence to support the court’s findings or any harmful error in the omission of child-related factors where no children were born of the marriage. See, e.g., Brock v. Brock, 229 So. 3d 425 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017); Mize, 45 So. 3d at 49. Appellant also challenges the trial court’s admission of evidence and determinations of the weight and credibility of the respective expert witnesses and their reports. But no abuse of the trial court’s discretion is shown in accepting one expert opinion over another. See Kearney v. Kearney, 129 So. 3d 381, 391 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013). Next, there is an apparent discrepancy on the face of the final judgment between the court’s recognition of the filing date as the proper valuation date for the marital personal property and the different dates used for valuation in the equitable distribution scheme attached and incorporated into the final judgment. In paragraph 7.a. of the final judgment, the filing date is presumed to be the valuation date for marital assets. But the financial report adopted and incorporated into the final judgment uses various valuation dates for the parties’ cash, investment, and retirement accounts. Like the claim of insufficient factual findings discussed above, our cases on preservation preclude us from addressing the apparent discrepancy in valuation dates. As we stated in Williams v. Williams, 152 So. 3d 702, 704 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014), “[W]here an error by the court appears for the first time on the face of a final 2 order, a party must alert the court of the error via a motion for rehearing or some other appropriate motion in order to preserve it for appeal.” See also Eaton v. Eaton, 2020 WL 1329673 (Fla. 1st DCA Mar. 20, 2020); Smith v. Smith, 273 So. 3d 1168, 1171 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019). Since this issue was not preserved, we must affirm. Finally, Appellant’s challenge to the ruling that the former wife is entitled to attorney’s fees under section 61.16, Florida Statutes (2015), but reserving jurisdiction to determine the amount of fees, is dismissed. That ruling is a non-final, non- appealable provision in the final judgment. McGee v. McGee, 264 So. 3d 1087, 1089 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019). AFFIRMED in part and DISMISSED in part. ROBERTS, ROWE, and BILBREY, JJ., concur. _____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331. _____________________________ Daniel W. Uhlfelder, Santa Rosa Beach, for Appellant. No appearance for Appellee. 3