Full Opinion

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF FLORIDA _____________________________ No. 1D21-135 _____________________________ ORLAN L. HAGINS, Petitioner, v. MARK S. INCH, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, Respondent. _____________________________ Petition for Writ of Certiorari—Original Jurisdiction. March 30, 2021 PER CURIAM. Orlan L. Hagins seeks review of the trial court’s dismissal of his complaint for a writ of mandamus. In that complaint, Hagins challenged his loss of gain time as the result of disciplinary proceedings conducted by the Florida Department of Corrections. The department had denied his administrative appeal on June 12, 2020, and by his own certification, Hagins placed the complaint in the hands of prison officials for filing on July 13, 2020. The trial court dismissed the complaint as time-barred. See § 95.11(8), Fla. Stat. (2020) (“Any court action challenging prisoner disciplinary proceedings conducted by the Department of Corrections pursuant to s. 944.28(2) must be commenced within 30 days after final disposition of the prisoner disciplinary proceedings through the administrative grievance process under chapter 33, Florida Administrative Code.”). Hagins filed this certiorari petition, ostensibly seeking second-tier appellate review. See Sheley v. Florida Parole Comm’n, 720 So. 2d 216, 218 (Fla. 1998) (holding that an inmate “is not entitled to a second plenary appeal of [an administrative] order in the district court” after he “has had a full review on the merits” in the circuit court, and that inmate then could only obtain review under the more limited certiorari standard). However, because the trial court did not dispose of Hagins’s complaint on the merits, he is entitled to plenary appellate review. See Green v. Moore, 777 So. 2d 425, 426 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). We in turn treat Hagins’s petition as seeking such review. See id.; Fla. R. App. P. 9.040(c). Even so, the legal arguments that Hagins sets out in his petition, which we treat as his initial brief, fail to demonstrate a preliminary basis for reversal of the trial court’s dismissal. Hagins does not dispute the two pertinent dates: the final denial of his administrative appeal on June 12 and his giving the complaint to prison officials for filing on July 13. July 13 was the thirty-first day after final disposition, so the complaint was time-barred. § 95.11(8), Fla. Stat. (“Any action challenging prisoner disciplinary proceedings shall be barred by the court unless it is commenced within the time period provided by this section.”). We summarily affirm the order on review. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.315(a). AFFIRMED. ROBERTS, ROWE, and TANENBAUM, JJ., concur. _____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331. _____________________________ 2 Orlan L. Hagins, pro se, Petitioner. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee; Lance Neff, General Counsel, Department of Corrections, Tallahassee, for Respondent. 3