Raimundo Antonio Hogan v. State of Florida
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
Date FiledMarch 19, 2021
Docket1D20-3245
StatusPublished
📰 News Coverage: Read the LAWS.com news report on this case
Full Opinion
FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
_____________________________
No. 1D20-3245
_____________________________
RAIMUNDO ANTONIO HOGAN,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
_____________________________
On appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County.
Adrian G. Soud, Judge.
March 19, 2021
PER CURIAM.
Raimundo Antonio Hogan seeks review of the trial court’s
order dismissing his collateral attack on his 1995 judgment and
sentence. Hogan sought relief by petition for writ of error coram
nobis. The trial court treated the petition as a motion filed under
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 and summarily denied
the motion as untimely.
“[T]he writ of error coram nobis no longer exists in Florida.”
See Schofield v. State, 244 So. 3d 154, 156 (Fla. 2018); see also
Woods v. State, 750 So. 2d 592, 594–95 (Fla. 1999) (holding that
the writ of error coram nobis is no longer available under Florida
law, but explaining that for those cases in which guilt was
adjudicated before the opinion, those defendants would still have
two years from the date of the opinion to file claims traditionally
cognizable under coram nobis). For Hogan to have petitioned for
such a writ, he had to file the petition no later than 2001. See id.
Because he waited until 2020 to file the petition, the writ was
unavailable for him to seek correction of his judgment and
sentence.
Even so, the trial court treated Hogan’s petition as a motion
seeking postconviction relief under rule 3.850. But because Hogan
filed his motion twenty-three years after his judgment and
sentence became final in 1997, and he argued no exception to the
two-year limitation for filing such a motion under rule 3.850, the
trial court summarily dismissed the motion as untimely. See Fla.
R. Crim. P. 3.850(b); see also Flowers v. State, 278 So. 3d 899, 902
(holding that postconviction claims “filed more than two years
after the judgment and sentence become final are procedurally
barred as untimely unless they fall within an exception to the two-
year deadline”). Finding no error by the trial court, we AFFIRM.
ROWE, MAKAR, and OSTERHAUS, JJ., concur.
_____________________________
Not final until disposition of any timely and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
_____________________________
Raimundo Antonio Hogan, pro se, Appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
2