Jennifer Mary Donley York v. State of Florida
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
Date FiledDecember 2, 2020
Docket2D19-4057
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING
MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
OF FLORIDA
SECOND DISTRICT
JENNIFER MARY DONLEY YORK, )
)
Appellant, )
)
v. ) Case No. 2D19-4057
)
STATE OF FLORIDA, )
)
Appellee. )
___________________________________)
Opinion filed December 2, 2020.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for
Hillsborough County; Melissa M. Polo,
Judge.
Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and
Pamela H. Izakowitz, Assistant Public
Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General,
Tallahassee, and Johnny T. Salgado,
Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for
Appellee.
KHOUZAM, Chief Judge.
Jennifer Mary Donley York appeals her judgment and sentence for
misdemeanor battery. She challenges the sufficiency of the evidence at trial as well as
the propriety of the trial court's sentencing procedure. We affirm the conviction without
comment, writing only to discuss a clear sentencing error that has since been rendered
moot.
The record shows that as soon as the jury left the courtroom after giving
its verdict, the court announced Ms. York's sentence and declined to entertain any
argument on the sentencing despite defense counsel's repeated requests:
THE COURT: All right. Ms. York, I'm adjudicating you guilty of
Misdemeanor Battery. And in accordance with the
jury's verdict, after adjudicating you guilty, I'm
sentencing you to 60 days in the Hillsborough County
Jail, followed by six months of probation.
[DEFENSE]: Judge, can the defense be heard as to sentencing?
THE COURT: I will reserve ruling on restitution.
[STATE]: Your Honor, could you order restitution but just
reserve as to the amount?
THE COURT: No, I'm reserving as to restitution.
[STATE]: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Yes, sir?
[DEFENSE]: Judge, if the Court would be inclined to reconsider,
we would ask the Court to consider a full probation
period. She does have a good job. She is gainfully
employed and she's working. We would ask that the
Court consider that because it was a mutual fight, that
the Court could consider that the victim was a willing
participant as a mitigating factor. And we would be
prepared to provide more mitigation if the Court will so
find.
THE COURT: I didn't hear any evidence that this was a mutual fight.
[DEFENSE]: Okay.
THE COURT: Court's adjourned.
(Emphasis supplied.)
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The court's failure to hold a sentencing hearing and consider evidence or
argument on Ms. York's sentence was error. Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.720
provides that "[a]s soon as practicable after the determination of guilt and after the
examination of any presentence reports, the sentencing court shall order a sentencing
hearing." Subsection (b) of that rule provides further that, at the sentencing hearing,
"[t]he court shall entertain submissions and evidence by the parties that are relevant to
the sentence." Under this rule, the defendant is "entitled to make a statement and
present argument to the court." See Davenport v. State, 787 So. 2d 32, 32 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2001).
"Failure to comply with Rule 3.720(b) is reversible error." Compere v.
State, 262 So. 3d 819, 822 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019) (citing State v. Munson, 604 So. 2d
1270, 1271 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)). Indeed, "[a] trial court's refusal to hear evidence and
argument regarding a sentence constitutes a denial of due process and is fundamental
error." Smith v. State, 268 So. 3d 831, 834 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) (citing Davenport, 787
So. 2d at 32).
Here, the trial court sentenced Ms. York immediately after the jury left the
courtroom, without holding the sentencing hearing required by rule 3.720. Further, the
court refused to do so even after the defense expressly requested to be heard on
sentencing and asked the court to reconsider its refusal. This denied Ms. York due
process and constitutes reversible error.
Ordinarily, we would reverse the sentence and remand for a new
sentencing hearing pursuant to rule 3.720. See Davenport, 787 So. 2d at 32. But the
parties have notified this court that, during the pendency of this appeal, Ms. York
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completed serving her sentence. Where a sentence has been completed, any errors in
that sentence are typically rendered moot. See Vazquez v. State, 930 So. 2d 860, 861
(Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (dismissing appeal "because Vazquez raises an issue which is
rendered moot by the fact that he has served his sentence in its entirety and is no
longer on probation"); Williams v. State, 549 So. 2d 734, 735 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)
(dismissing appeal because "[a]ny error in the scoring of [appellant's] prior convictions
on the scoresheet has been rendered moot" as "the defendant has served both of his
sentences and has been released"); see also Casiano v. State, 280 So. 3d 105, 106-07
(Fla. 4th DCA 2019) ("When a defendant challenges a sentence that has been served,
the appeal is dismissed as moot."), rev. granted, 2020 WL 132511 (Fla. 2020).
Accordingly, despite the clear error in sentencing Ms. York, we are
compelled to conclude that the sentencing error is moot.
Affirmed in part; dismissed in part.
VILLANTI and SMITH, JJ., Concur.
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