Full Opinion

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF FLORIDA _____________________________ No. 1D20-445 _____________________________ ASHLEIGH M. MOYE, n/k/a ASHLEIGH M. LIGGETT, Appellant, v. GREGORY D. MOYE, Appellee. _____________________________ On appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County. Daniel F. Wilensky, Judge. July 13, 2021 PER CURIAM. AFFIRMED. See § 61.13(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (“It is the public policy of this state that each minor child has frequent and continuing contact with both parents after the parents separate or the marriage of the parties is dissolved and to encourage parents to share the rights and responsibilities, and joys, of childrearing.”); cf. Schutz v. Schutz, 581 So. 2d 1290, 1293 (Fla. 1991) (recognizing “the father’s constitutionally protected ‘inherent right’ to a meaningful relationship with his children,” and characterizing “the state’s interest in restoring a meaningful relationship between the parties’ children and their father” as “at the very least substantial”); Yandell v. Yandell, 39 So. 2d 554, 555 (Fla. 1949) (“The privilege of visiting the minor children of the parties to a divorce proceeding should never be denied either parent so long as he or she conducts himself or herself, while in the presence of such children, in a manner which will not adversely affect the morals or welfare of such progeny.” (emphasis supplied)); Frazier v. Frazier, 147 So. 464, 466 (Fla. 1933) (noting “inherent rights of parents to enjoy the society and association of their offspring, with reasonable opportunity to impress upon them a father’s or a mother’s love and affection in their upbringing,” which are as important as the child’s welfare, “if not controlling,” in consideration of the respective custody as between parents); id. (“No relationship in life should be regarded as more sublime, nor should any inherent right of an individual be esteemed more highly, than that which arises out of the natural relationship of love and affection which normally exists between parent and child . . . .”); see also id. at 465–66 (explaining that conditions of custody ought not “to be materially amended or changed afterward, unless on altered conditions shown to have arisen since the decree, or because of material facts bearing on the question of custody and existing at the time of the decree, but which were unknown to the court” (emphasis supplied)). B.L. THOMAS, KELSEY, and TANENBAUM, JJ., concur. _____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331. _____________________________ Jason Scott Coupal of Ayo & Iken PLC, New Port Richey, for Appellant. D. Randall Briley of Briley & Deal, LLC, Jacksonville Beach, for Appellee. 2