Reese v. Wells Fargo
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
Docket25-11021
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
Case: 25-11021 Document: 99 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/19/2026
REVISED 11/18/2026
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
____________ FILED
November 19, 2026
No. 25-11021
Thomas B. Plunkett, III
Summary Calendar Clerk
____________
Wendell Reese; Karen Reese,
Plaintiffs—Appellants,
versus
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.; Breckenridge Property Fund
2016 LLC; Bank of the West; Robert Forster, Substitute
Trustee; Barrett Daffin Frappier Turner & Engel, L.L.P.;
US Bank National Association,
Defendants—Appellees.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 3:25-CV-26
______________________________
Before Stewart, Richman, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam: *
Wendell and Karen Reese appeal the dismissal of their civil action as
barred by res judicata. We review de novo whether the district court erred in
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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No. 25-11021
dismissing the complaint for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Sacks v. Tex. S. Univ., 83 F.4th 340, 344 (5th
Cir. 2023). The res judicata effect of the judgment in the previous case, Reese
v. Wells Fargo Bank NA, No. 3:23-cv-524-N-BN, 2024 WL 3927886 (N.D.
Tex. Aug. 5, 2024), adopted by 2024 WL 3933296 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 23, 2024)
(Reese II), is a question of law we review de novo. See id. They do not dispute
that the district court in Reese II had jurisdiction and entered a final judgment
on the merits.
They argue the district court erred in finding the parties in the two
cases were in privity. Here, they added: (1) U.S. Bank National Association,
the bank to which Wells Fargo assigned the lien; (2) Bank of the West, which
provided a revolving line of credit to Breckenridge based on the property as
collateral; (3) Barrett Daffin Frappier Turner & Engel LLP, the law firm
retained by Wells Fargo to handle the foreclosure proceedings; and
(4) Robert Forster, the substitute trustee who signed the deed transferring
the property to Breckenridge at the foreclosure sale. The district court did
not err in finding the parties in the two cases were in privity. See Procter &
Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., 376 F.3d 496, 499 (5th Cir. 2004).
Next, the Reeses argue the district court erred by not applying Taylor
v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008). Although the Supreme Court rejected
“virtual representation” in Taylor, it recognized six exceptions to the rule
against nonparty preclusion, including one for parties who have a substantive
legal relationship. 553 U.S. at 893-95. The four new defendants in this case
have substantive legal relationships with either Wells Fargo or Breckenridge,
the defendants in Reese II. Thus, the Reeses have not shown the district court
erred by not applying Taylor or that applying Taylor would have resulted in a
different outcome. See Sacks, 83 F.4th at 344.
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The Reeses also argue the district court erred in finding the two cases
were based on the same nucleus of operative fact. They have not shown that
their complaint alleged claims based on actions that occurred after Reese II
was filed in January 2023. Because both actions concerned the loan on the
Reeses’ property, the foreclosure, and any possible post-foreclosure relief,
the district court did not err in finding the two lawsuits were based on the
same nucleus of operative fact, see OJSC Ukrnafta v. Carpatsky Petrol. Corp.,
957 F.3d 487, 504 (5th Cir. 2020), or in dismissing their claims as barred by
res judicata, see Sacks, 83 F.4th at 344.
Further, they argue the district court erred by failing to consider
whether their complaint plausibly stated their claims. The res judicata bar
was apparent from the instant complaint and the record in Reese II, and the
Reeses did not challenge the defendants’ failure to plead res judicata as an
affirmative defense. See Anderson v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 953 F.3d 311,
314 (5th Cir. 2020). Because the claims were subject to the res judicata bar,
it was unnecessary for the district court to determine whether the complaint
plausibly stated the claims. See id.
They also argue the district court abused its discretion in dismissing
their complaint without granting them leave to amend. Because they did not
move for leave to amend their complaint in the district court and did not
state, in the district court or in their opening brief on appeal, what additional
facts they would have alleged in an amended complaint to cure any
deficiencies, the district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing their
complaint without allowing leave to amend. See Edionwe v. Bailey, 860 F.3d
287, 294 (5th Cir. 2017).
Finally, they argue the district court abused its discretion in dismissing
their complaint without holding a hearing. Because they did not move for a
hearing in the district court and have not cited legal authority to support their
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No. 25-11021
argument, they have not shown the district court abused its discretion by not
holding a hearing. See Norman v. Stephens, 817 F.3d 226, 235 (5th Cir. 2016).
AFFIRMED.
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