Consumers' Research v. FCC
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Date FiledOctober 15, 2026
Docket25-60535
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
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United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
____________ FILED
October 15, 2026
No. 25-60535
Thomas B. Plunkett, III
____________ Clerk
Consumers’ Research; Cause Based Commerce,
Incorporated; Edward J. Blum; Kersten Conway;
Suzanne Bettac; Robert Kull; Kwang Ja Kirby; Tom
Kirby; Joseph Bayly; Jeremy Roth; Deanna Roth; Lynn
Gibbs; Paul Gibbs; Rhonda Thomas; James Romeo; Cody
Carnett; Phillip Aronoff; Jacqueline Klein,
Petitioners,
versus
Federal Communications Commission; United States of
America,
Respondents.
______________________________
Petition for Review of an Order
of the Federal Communications Commission
Agency No. 96-45
______________________________
1 Before Elrod, Chief Judge, and Clement and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
2 Edith Brown Clement, Circuit Judge:
3 In pursuit of “universal service,” the Federal Communications
4 Commission (“FCC”) collects billions of dollars from telecommunications
5 companies each year through “required payments, called contributions,”
6 which “subsidize basic communications services for consumers in certain
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7 underserved communities—particularly, rural and low-income areas.” FCC
8 v. Consumers’ Rsch., 606 U.S. 656, 663–64 (2025). To that end, the FCC
9 established a private corporation, the Universal Service Administrative
10 Company (“USAC”), to collect contributions and disburse payments via
11 the Universal Service Fund. Petitioners challenge the Fourth Quarter 2025
12 contribution factor—a figure the FCC calculated by relying on data from
13 USAC—which set the amount that each telecommunications company had
14 to pay into the Fund for that quarter. They raise several constitutional and
15 statutory arguments, but we address only one: whether the FCC had the
16 statutory authority to establish USAC. Because Congress never specifically
17 authorized the FCC to establish USAC, we hold that the agency violated
18 the Government Corporation Control Act (“GCCA”) by creating the
19 corporation. Thus, when the FCC relied on USAC to set the contribution
20 factor, it exceeded its statutory authority. We therefore GRANT the
21 petition for review, VACATE the Fourth Quarter 2025 contribution factor,
22 and REMAND for further proceedings.
23 I
24 A
25 In 1934, Congress created the FCC with the goal “to make available,
26 so far as possible, to all the people of the United States, . . . a rapid, efficient,
27 Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio communication service with
28 adequate facilities at reasonable charges.” 47 U.S.C. § 151. Early on, when
29 AT&T was a regulated monopoly, the FCC “used a combination of implicit
30 and explicit subsidies to achieve its goal” of universal service. Tex. Off. of
31 Pub. Util. Couns. v. FCC, 183 F.3d 393, 406 (5th Cir. 1999). But when
32 Congress deregulated the telecommunications sector in 1996, it
33 “overhauled” this patchwork of subsidies, eliminated implicit subsidies
34 altogether, and “substituted a plan for explicit transfer payments to ensure
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35 that basic communications services extend across the country.” Consumers’
36 Rsch., 606 U.S. at 666.
37 Section 254 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 sets forth the
38 modern framework for universal service. 47 U.S.C. § 254. Congress directed
39 the FCC to establish “specific, predictable and sufficient Federal and State
40 mechanisms to preserve and advance universal service.” Id. § 254(b)(5). The
41 statute broadly defines “universal service” as “an evolving level of
42 telecommunications services that the Commission shall establish periodically
43 under this section, taking into account advances in telecommunications and
44 information technologies and services.” Id. § 254(c)(1). When deciding what
45 services to support with its universal-service support mechanisms, the FCC
46 is to consider a set of four factors, id. § 254(c)(1)(A)–(D), and six principles,
47 id. § 254(b)(1)–(6). The FCC may also base policies on any additional
48 principles it deems “necessary and appropriate for the protection of the
49 public interest, convenience, and necessity.” Id. § 254(b)(7). And beyond the
50 “general” services the FCC can support under § 254(c)(1), it may fund
51 additional support mechanisms to provide “advanced” services to “schools,
52 libraries, and health care providers.” Id. § 254(c)(3), (h)(2).
53 The FCC currently operates four universal-service programs.
54 Consumers’ Rsch., 606 U.S. at 668. The first, Lifeline, “gives low-income
55 consumers a markdown on their monthly phone bills, usually of $9.25 per
56 month.” Id. (first citing 47 U.S.C. § 254(j); and then citing 47 C.F.R.
57 §§ 54.400–54.424). Second, the High Cost program “furnishes carriers with
58 funds enabling them to provide basic communications services in ‘rural,
59 insular, and [other] high cost areas’ at costs comparable to those charged in
60 urban areas.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 254(b)(3))
61 (citing 47 C.F.R. §§ 54.302–54.322). Third, the “E-Rate program subsidizes
62 communications services for schools and libraries across the country, with
63 greater discounts going to facilities in rural or low-income areas.” Id. (first
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64 citing 47 U.S.C. § 254(b)(6), (h)(1)(B); then citing 47 C.F.R. §§ 54.500–
65 54.523; and then citing Wis. Bell, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Heath, 604 U.S.
66 140, 143–46 (2025)). Fourth, “the Rural Health program supports rural
67 hospitals and other health care facilities, enabling them to use telemedicine
68 in caring for far-flung patients and ensuring that they receive the needed
69 communications services at roughly the rates urban facilities pay.” Id. (first
70 citing 47 U.S.C. § 254(b)(6), (h)(1)(A); and then citing 47 C.F.R. §§ 54.600–
71 54.633).
72 To pay for these services, Congress requires “[e]very
73 telecommunications carrier that provides interstate telecommunications
74 services [to] contribute, on an equitable and nondiscriminatory basis, to the
75 specific, predictable, and sufficient mechanisms established by the
76 Commission.” 47 U.S.C. § 254(d). The FCC determines the amount
77 carriers must pay into the Universal Service Fund by calculating a quarterly
78 “contribution factor.” Consumers’ Rsch., 606 U.S. at 668 (citing 47 C.F.R.
79 § 54.709(a)). “That factor is a fraction, expressed as a percentage,” the
80 numerator of which “is the Fund’s projected expenses for the upcoming
81 quarter (the subsidy payments it will make plus overhead) and” the
82 denominator of which “is the total projected revenue of contributing carriers
83 during that same period.” Id. at 668–69 (citing § 54.709(a)(2)). A carrier
84 must pay “an amount equal to its own projected revenue multiplied by the
85 contribution factor,” id. at 669 (citing § 54.709(a)(3)), and it “may then pass
86 along to its customers the cost of its contributions,” id. (citing § 54.712(a)).
87 When calculating the contribution factor, the FCC relies on financial
88 projections produced by USAC. Id. USAC “is a private, not-for-profit
89 corporation owned by an association of carriers.” Id. To assist the FCC in
90 setting the contribution factor, USAC “estimates the Fund’s expenses,”
91 “adds up the estimates it receives from individual carriers about their
92 revenues,” and “then submits those figures, along with supporting
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93 documentation, to the Commission for approval and eventual use in
94 calculating required contributions.” Id. at 669–70 (citing § 54.709(a)(2)–
95 (3)).
96 Moreover, since 1998, USAC has served as “permanent
97 Administrator of the federal universal service support mechanisms.” 47
98 C.F.R. § 54.701(a). As administrator, USAC manages the “day-to-day
99 operations” of the Fund. Wis. Bell, 604 U.S. at 144. It “bills and collects
100 contributions from carriers,” id. (citing 47 C.F.R. § 54.702), and “distributes
101 the resulting pot of money, as FCC rules provide, to program beneficiaries,”
102 id. (citing § 54.702(b)). In addition, USAC’s directors sit on committees
103 that “oversee the administration” of the four universal-service programs. 47
104 C.F.R. § 54.705(a)(1), (b)(1), (c)(1). These committees “have [the] authority
105 to make decisions concerning” the operation of the programs, from
106 developing and administering applications to auditing beneficiaries.
107 Id. § 54.705(a)(1)(ii)–(iii), (x); id. § 54.705(b)(1)(ii)–(iii), (viii); id.
108 § 54.705(c)(ii)–(iv).
109 B
110 In August 2025, USAC sent the FCC the Fund’s projected expenses
111 and program demand for the fourth quarter of 2025: $2.25 billion.
112 Petitioners—Consumers’ Research (a nonprofit organization that aims to
113 educate consumers); Cause Based Commerce, Inc. (a reseller of
114 telecommunications services that pays directly into the Fund); and several
115 individual consumers—filed a comment with the FCC challenging this
116 projection. They argued that various aspects of the Fund are unlawful, so the
117 contribution factor should be set at 0.0% or at least reduced to account for
118 “any unlawful portions” of the factor.
119 After USAC sent the FCC the total projected revenue of
120 contributing carriers for the quarter, the FCC issued a public notice
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121 proposing a Fourth Quarter 2025 contribution factor of 38.1%. See Proposed
122 Fourth Quarter 2025 Universal Service Contribution Factor, 40 FCC Rcd. 7160,
123 7160 (2025); 47 C.F.R. § 54.709(a)(3). To reach this figure, the FCC largely
124 adopted USAC’s projections. It did, however, “direct[] USAC to apply
125 $100 million in unused Schools & Libraries (E-Rate) program funds to offset
126 the $628.68 million projected E-Rate program demand,” thus reducing the
127 contribution factor “to a level below what [it] would have been based on
128 USAC’s filings.” Id. The factor was therefore calculated by dividing
129 USAC’s adjusted expenses ($2,153,410) by USAC’s projection of the
130 participating telecommunications companies’ relevant revenue ($5,659,892)
131 and rounding up to the nearest tenth of a percentage: 38.1%. Id. at 7161–62.
132 The same day the FCC issued its notice, Petitioners filed another
133 comment, asserting the same arguments they raised in their first notice. The
134 FCC took no action in response, so the proposed contribution factor was
135 deemed approved fourteen days later. Id. at 7162–63.
136 Petitioners then filed a timely petition for review in this court. The
137 Supreme Court recently rejected Petitioners’ prior challenge to § 254,
138 holding that the statute as a whole does not violate the nondelegation
139 doctrine. Consumers’ Rsch., 606 U.S. at 698. But now, Petitioners contend
140 that the specific provisions of § 254 authorizing the FCC to fund
141 “advanced” and “additional” services for schools, hospitals, and libraries
142 impermissibly delegate legislative power to the FCC. See id. at 687 n.9
143 (declining to “address any nondelegation issues raised by Sections 254(c)(3)
144 and (h)(2) in particular”); see also id. at 733 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting)
145 (inviting parties to “attack . . . the constitutionality of whatever
146 contributions the FCC demands for its subsection (c)(3) and (h)(2)
147 programs”). Petitioners further argue that the FCC violated the
148 Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) by failing to consider the Supreme
149 Court’s decision in Consumers’ Research or respond to their comment when
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150 setting the contribution factor. Lastly, they challenge the FCC’s reliance on
151 USAC in setting the contribution factor, asserting that the FCC established
152 the corporation in violation of the GCCA and that USAC’s directors are
153 appointed in violation of the Appointments Clause.
154 Because Petitioners’ GCCA challenge is dispositive, we do not
155 address their alternative arguments.
156 II
157 Under the APA, we must “hold unlawful and set aside agency
158 action” that is “not in accordance with law” or “in excess of statutory
159 jurisdiction, authority, or limitations.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (C). We review
160 issues of statutory interpretation de novo. Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo,
161 603 U.S. 369, 412 (2024) (“Courts must exercise their independent
162 judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory
163 authority, as the APA requires.”).
164 III
165 We begin by assessing our jurisdiction, both constitutional and
166 statutory. See United States v. Pedroza-Rocha, 933 F.3d 490, 493 (5th Cir.
167 2019) (per curiam) (“This court has a continuing obligation to assure itself
168 of its own jurisdiction, sua sponte if necessary.” (citing Bass v. Denney, 171
169 F.3d 1016, 1021 (5th Cir. 1999))).
170 A
171 To establish Article III standing, at least one petitioner must have had
172 standing when the petition was filed. Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U.S. 477, 489
173 (2023) (“If at least one plaintiff has standing, the suit may proceed.”); see
174 Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 191
175 (2000) (evaluating a plaintiff’s standing “at the time the action
176 commence[d]”). Thus, a petitioner “must have suffered an injury in fact—a
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177 concrete and imminent harm to a legally protected interest, like property or
178 money—that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct and likely to be
179 redressed by the lawsuit.” Nebraska, 600 U.S. at 489 (citing Lujan v. Defs. of
180 Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)).
181 For the same reasons our en banc court discussed in Petitioners’
182 previous challenge, we are satisfied that at least one petitioner—Cause Based
183 Commerce—had Article III standing when the petition was filed. Consumers’
184 Rsch. v. FCC, 109 F.4th 743, 752–53 (5th Cir. 2024) (en banc), rev’d on other
185 grounds, 606 U.S. 656 (2025); accord Consumers’ Rsch. v. FCC, 67 F.4th 773,
186 783–84 (6th Cir. 2023). Cause Based Commerce “incurred a classic
187 pocketbook injury” because it was required to contribute directly to the
188 Fund. Consumers’ Rsch., 109 F.4th at 753. That injury is fairly traceable to the
189 Fourth Quarter 2025 contribution factor, which dictates how much Cause
190 Based Commerce was required to pay into the Fund. Id. And at the time the
191 petition was filed, a favorable decision vacating the contribution factor would
192 have redressed this injury. Id.
193 Further, even though Cause Based Commerce has already paid into
194 the Fund for the fourth quarter of 2025, this action is not moot because the
195 quarterly contribution factor is “capable of repetition, yet evading review.”
196 Consumers’ Rsch., 606 U.S. at 671 n.1 (quoting Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v.
197 United States, 579 U.S. 162, 170 (2016)). Thus, this action is justiciable.
198 B
199 As for our statutory jurisdiction, Intervenor National
200 Telecommunications Cooperative Association (“NTCA”) argues that we
201 lack jurisdiction over Petitioners’ GCCA claim under the Hobbs Act. The
202 Hobbs Act grants the courts of appeals “exclusive jurisdiction to enjoin, set
203 aside, suspend (in whole or in part), or to determine the validity of” certain
204 “final orders” of the FCC. 28 U.S.C. § 2342(1); see 47 U.S.C. § 402(a)
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205 (requiring “[a]ny proceeding to enjoin, set aside, annul, or suspend any order
206 of the Commission under this chapter” to be brought under the Hobbs Act).
207 A party aggrieved by a final order must file a petition for review within sixty
208 days of the order’s entry. 28 U.S.C. § 2344; see also City of Arlington v. FCC,
209 668 F.3d 229, 237 (5th Cir. 2012) (noting that this requirement is
210 jurisdictional). Because Petitioners challenge the establishment of USAC,
211 which was established in 1997,NTCA argues that their claim is barred by the
212 Hobbs Act’s sixty-day time limit.
213 But this sixty-day limit does not bar review of agency action that is
214 “capable of continuing application.” Functional Music, Inc. v. FCC, 274 F.2d
215 543, 546 (D.C. Cir. 1958). The Hobbs Act “cut[s] off review directly from
216 the order promulgating a rule,” but it does not foreclose review of subsequent
217 agency actions applying that rule. Id.
218 When the FCC uses USAC’s projections to set the quarterly
219 contribution factor, it effectively reapplies its prior action establishing the
220 corporation. Thus, the FCC’s action establishing USAC has “continuing
221 application.” Id. That means that each time the FCC approves a new
222 contribution factor, it “restarts the sixty-day clock.” Consumers’ Rsch., 67
223 F.4th at 786; accord Consumers’ Rsch. v. FCC, 88 F.4th 917, 922 (11th Cir.
224 2023). Petitioners filed their petition for review two days after the Fourth
225 Quarter 2025 contribution factor was deemed approved by the FCC. Thus,
226 their challenge is timely, and we proceed to the merits.
227 IV
228 The federal government has a “long history” of creating and
229 participating in corporations “for the achievement of governmental
230 objectives.” Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 386 (1995).
231 “The first was the Bank of the United States,” created in 1791, and while the
232 federal government continued to charter private corporations throughout the
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233 nineteenth century, the “first large-scale use of Government-controlled
234 corporations came with the First World War.” Id. at 386–88. “These entities
235 were dissolved after the war ended,” but not long after, the Great Depression
236 spurred the creation of longer-lasting government corporations “primarily
237 directed to stabilizing the economy and to making distress loans to farms,
238 homeowners, banks, and other enterprises.” Id. at 388. Congress created
239 many—but not all—of these corporations. Id. While entities like the Federal
240 Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Tennessee Valley Authority were
241 established by statute, Congress also empowered the Reconstruction Finance
242 Corporation “to create corporations without specific congressional
243 authorization.” Id. It did so “with gusto.” Id. at 389. Other government
244 entities also started forming corporations “without even the general
245 congressional authorization granted the [Reconstruction Finance
246 Corporation].” Id.
247 “By the end of World War II,” recognizing that these governmental
248 corporations “had gotten out of hand, in both their number and their lack of
249 accountability,” Congress “moved to reestablish order” by enacting the
250 Government Corporation Control Act of 1945, 31 U.S.C. §§ 9101–9110.
251 Lebron, 513 U.S. at 389. Under the GCCA, government corporations must
252 submit budgets for congressional approval, 31 U.S.C. § 9103, and be audited
253 by the Comptroller General, id. § 9105. Relevant here, the GCCA also
254 provides that an “agency may establish or acquire a corporation to act as an
255 agency only by or under a law of the United States specifically authorizing
256 the action.” Id. § 9102.
257 For USAC to fall within § 9102’s ambit, the FCC must have
258 “establish[ed]” or “acquire[d]” it “to act as an agency.” Id. If it did, and
259 Congress did not “specifically authoriz[e] the action,” then the FCC
260 violated the GCCA by establishing USAC. Id.
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261 A
262 The parties do not contest that the FCC established USAC. In the
263 early days of the modern universal service regime, the FCC appointed the
264 National Exchange Carrier Association, Inc. (“NECA”)—which it
265 established in 1983, see 47 C.F.R. § 69.601(a)—as temporary administrator
266 of the universal-service support mechanisms, In re Fed.-State Joint Bd. on
267 Universal Serv., 12 FCC Rcd. 8776, 8798 (1997). Two months later, the FCC
268 directed NECA “to create an independently functioning, not-for-profit
269 subsidiary, to be designated the Universal Service Administrative Company
270 (USAC) that will administer temporarily the universal service support
271 mechanisms.” In re Changes to the Bd. of Dirs. of the Nat’l Exch. Carrier Assoc.,
272 Inc., 12 FCC Rcd. 18400, 18415 (1997). In September 1997, the FCC
273 approved the “proposed incorporation documents” submitted by NECA
274 and instructed NECA to file those documents “with the Secretary of State
275 of the State of Delaware on behalf of USAC.” Comm’n Approves
276 Incorporation Documents for Universal Serv. Admin. Co., Schs. and Librs. Corp.,
277 & Rural Health Care Corp., 12 FCC Rcd. 14094, 14094 (1997).
278 In short, USAC was incorporated under Delaware law by NECA—
279 which itself was established by the FCC—at the behest of the FCC. Thus,
280 we conclude that it was “establish[ed]” by the FCC for purposes of the
281 GCCA. 31 U.S.C. § 9102.
282 We turn, then, to whether the FCC established USAC “to act as an
283 agency.” Id. The original text of the GCCA prohibited federal agencies from
284 “creat[ing], organiz[ing], or acquir[ing]” any corporation “for the purpose
285 of acting as an agency or instrumentality of the United States” absent “an Act
286 of Congress specifically authorizing such action.” Government Corporation
287 Control Act, ch. 557, § 304(a), 59 Stat. 597, 602 (1945) (emphasis added).
288 When Congress codified Title 31 in 1982, it revised this section to omit “or
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289 instrumentality,” leaving the currently operative language that requires
290 specific authorization for an agency to “establish or acquire a corporation to
291 act as an agency.” Act of Sept. 13, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-258, sec. 1, § 9102,
292 96 Stat. 877, 1042 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 9102). But Congress made clear
293 that although it rephrased this provision, it did so “without substantive
294 change.” Id. sec. 4(a), 96 Stat. at 1067 (“Those [restated] sections may not
295 be construed as making a substantive change in the laws replaced.”); see also
296 In re Benjamin, 932 F.3d 293, 297 (5th Cir. 2019) (describing the
297 “recodification canon, which states that ‘when legislatures codify the law,
298 courts should presume that no substantive change was intended absent a
299 clear indication otherwise’” (quoting In re Bayou Shores SNF, LLC, 828 F.3d
300 1297, 1314 (11th Cir. 2016)). Confirming this, Congress defined “agency” to
301 mean “a department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States
302 Government” throughout Title 31. 31 U.S.C. § 101.
303 Thus, even if USAC does not otherwise act as a freestanding federal
304 agency, it still falls within the GCCA’s ambit if the FCC established it to act
305 as an instrumentality.
306 When the GCCA was enacted in 1945, “instrumentality” meant a
307 “means” or “agency” used to reach an end. Federal Instrumentality,
308 Black’s Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1951) (“A means or agency used by
309 the federal government.”); see also 5 Oxford English Dictionary
310 357 (1933) (defining “instrumentality” as “[t]he quality or condition of being
311 instrumental; the fact or function of serving or being used for the
312 accomplishment of some purpose or end; agency”). So if the FCC
313 established USAC as a means to achieve a governmental purpose, then it
314 established the corporation “to act as an agency.” 31 U.S.C. § 9102; cf.
315 Lebron, 513 U.S. at 399 (“[A] corporation is an agency of the Government,
316 for purposes of the constitutional obligations of Government . . . , when the
317 State has specifically created that corporation for the furtherance of
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318 governmental objectives, and not merely holds some shares but controls the
319 operation of the corporation through its appointees.”).
320 The FCC originally established USAC to “administer temporarily
321 the universal service support mechanisms for high-cost areas and low-income
322 consumers, as well as perform billing and collection functions associated with
323 the universal service support mechanisms for schools and libraries and rural
324 health care providers.” In re Changes to the Bd. of Dirs., 12 FCC Rcd. at 18415.
325 It tasked USAC, as temporary administrator, with both “collecting
326 contributions” and “disbursing universal service support funds,” as well as
327 “determin[ing] quarterly projected demand” for the programs and using that
328 projection to “calculate the . . . contribution factor.” Id. at 18424–26. And it
329 reserved to its chairman the power to “select the members of the USAC
330 Board,” along with ensuring that that USAC would “be directly accountable
331 to the [FCC] for the performance of [its] respective responsibilities.” Id. at
332 18415, 18424.
333 A year later, the FCC appointed USAC “the permanent
334 Administrator” of the Fund and made it responsible for “administering the
335 universal service support mechanisms in an efficient, effective, and
336 competitively neutral manner.” 47 C.F.R. § 54.701(a). The FCC established
337 USAC to administer the universal-service support mechanisms in a manner
338 accountable to the FCC, meaning that USAC was established to act as an
339 instrumentality of the FCC.
340 A 2024 memorandum of understanding between the FCC and
341 USAC bolsters this conclusion. That memorandum describes USAC’s
342 “sole purpose” as “assist[ing] the FCC in the administration of the
343 [universal-service] programs (and such other programs as agreed upon and
344 directed by the FCC), as an agent and instrumentality of the FCC.”
345 Memorandum of Understanding Between the Federal Communications
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346 Commission and the Universal Service Administrative Company 2 (Oct. 17,
347 2024).
348 The FCC argues that when it comes to calculating the contribution
349 factor, USAC does not act as an agency because it gives recommendations
350 to the FCC in a strictly “advisory role.” But even in this capacity, USAC
351 acts as an instrumentality of the FCC. The FCC uses USAC as a means to
352 calculate the quarterly contribution factor, relying on its projections to
353 determine both the Fund’s expenses and carriers’ revenues. Consumers’
354 Rsch., 606 U.S. at 669–70. It is true, as the FCC notes, that “[a]s long as an
355 agency . . . retains decision-making power,” it “may rely on advice and
356 assistance from private actors” without running afoul of the Constitution. Id.
357 at 692. But if that private actor is a corporation established by the agency,
358 such reliance can still run afoul of the GCCA absent specific congressional
359 authorization.
360 In sum, we conclude that the FCC established USAC to act as an
361 agency to administer the universal-service programs. The GCCA therefore
362 applies, which means that Congress must have “specifically authoriz[ed]”
363 the FCC to establish USAC. 31 U.S.C. § 9102.
364 B
365 Respondents point to three sources of congressional authorization for
366 the FCC’s creation of USAC. We consider each in turn.
367 1
368 First, NTCA asserts that Congress expressly authorized the FCC to
369 establish USAC via 47 U.S.C. § 154(i). That provision grants the FCC
370 authority to “perform any and all acts, make such rules and regulations, and
371 issue such orders, not inconsistent with this chapter, as may be necessary in
372 the execution of its functions.” 47 U.S.C. § 154(i). We have explained that
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373 this “necessary and proper” provision “suppl[ies] the FCC with ancillary
374 authority to issue regulations that may be necessary to fulfill its primary
375 directives contained elsewhere in the statute.” Tex. Off. of Pub. Util. Couns.
376 v. FCC, 183 F.3d 393, 443–44 (5th Cir. 1999) (alteration in original) (quoting
377 Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753, 795 (8th Cir. 1997), aff’d in part, rev’d
378 in part sub nom. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999)). Since
379 § 254 tasks the FCC with implementing “specific, predictable, and
380 sufficient . . . mechanisms to preserve and advance universal service,” 47
381 U.S.C. § 254(b)(5), and § 154(i) grants the FCC ancillary authority to fulfill
382 that directive, NTCA argues that these provisions authorized the FCC to
383 establish USAC to administer the Universal Service Fund.
384 This argument is unavailing. True, we have recognized that § 154(i)
385 grants “the FCC broad authority to implement” § 254. Tex. Off. of Pub. Util.
386 Couns., 183 F.3d at 444. But § 154(i) “is not infinitely elastic.” N. Am.
387 Telecomms. Ass’n v. FCC, 772 F.2d 1282, 1292 (7th Cir. 1985). That
388 provision’s broad, generalized grant of authority does not provide the specific
389 congressional authorization the GCCA requires.
390 2
391 Next, the FCC and NTCA advance an implied-authorization theory.
392 To unpack this argument, we must consider the historical involvement of
393 USAC and its parent entity, NECA, in administering universal-service
394 programs.
395 Before Congress enacted the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the
396 FCC tasked NECA with calculating the charges that telecommunications
397 carriers paid into the Universal Service Fund. 47 C.F.R. § 69.116 (1996).
398 NECA was also responsible for billing and collecting those contributions, as
399 well as disbursing revenue to beneficiaries. Id. § 69.116(b). In a separate
400 section of the Code of Federal Regulations, the FCC assigned NECA the
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401 same duties—calculating, billing, and collecting the charge and disbursing
402 revenue—with regard to the Lifeline program in particular. 47 C.F.R.
403 § 69.117(b) (1996). When Congress enacted the 1996 Act, it specifically
404 authorized the FCC to continue using NECA to administer the Lifeline
405 program; the statute provides, “Nothing in this section shall affect the
406 collection, distribution, or administration of the Lifeline Assistance Program
407 provided for by the Commission under regulations set forth in section 69.117
408 of title 47, Code of Federal Regulations, and other related sections of such
409 title.” 47 U.S.C. § 254(j).
410 Thus, the FCC and NTCA assert that “Congress was aware of
411 NECA’s role when it adopted section 254, which affirmed and expanded the
412 Commission’s authority to direct the administration of universal service and
413 therefore, implicitly affirmed the Commission’s authority to employ an
414 independent entity to administer universal service.” In re Changes to the Bd.
415 of Dirs. of the Nat’l Exch. Carrier Assoc., Inc., 13 FCC Rcd. 25058, 25066
416 (1998) (footnote omitted). In other words, because Congress authorized the
417 FCC to use NECA to administer the Lifeline program, they argue it
418 implicitly authorized USAC, a later-formed subsidiary of NECA, to
419 administer the Universal Service Fund.
420 But § 254(j) does not provide the specific congressional authorization
421 the FCC needed to establish USAC. Authorization for one private entity to
422 administer a single universal-service program does not amount to specific
423 authorization for another private entity to administer the entirety of the
424 multi-billion-dollar Universal Service Fund. “If anything, the text of § 254
425 suggests Congress actually meant to preclude private entities from
426 administering [universal-service] programs other than Lifeline.” Consumers’
427 Rsch., 109 F.4th at 777 (emphasis in original); see also Consumers’ Rsch., 88
428 F.4th at 933 n.4 (Newsom, J., concurring) (“[I]t strains credulity to read
429 subsection (j) as authorizing USAC’s participation in the universal-service
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430 scheme.”). Congress expressly authorized NECA to continue administering
431 Lifeline as provided in 47 C.F.R. § 69.117, “but it conspicuously did not
432 reference § 69.116,” the neighboring provision authorizing NECA to
433 administer the pre-1996 Fund. Consumers’ Rsch., 109 F.4th at 777. Section
434 254(j) demonstrates that Congress knew how to speak clearly to authorize a
435 private entity to administer certain universal-service programs. That it chose
436 not to do so with respect to § 69.116 supports the inference that Congress did
437 not intend to empower private entities to administer other programs or the
438 Fund as a whole. Cf. United States v. Vargas, 74 F.4th 673, 686 (5th Cir. 2023)
439 (en banc) (describing the expressio unius canon of construction, which
440 “teaches that the expression of one thing implies the exclusion of others”
441 (cleaned up)).
442 3
443 Lastly, the FCC and NTCA submit that even if the FCC lacked the
444 authority to establish USAC in 1997, Congress ratified the agency’s action
445 by authorizing it to use USAC to administer two temporary programs
446 created during the COVID-19 pandemic.
447 The first, the Affordable Connectivity Program, discounted the cost
448 of “broadband service and connected devices” for “eligible low-income
449 households.” In re Affordable Connectivity Program Emergency Broadband
450 Benefit Program, 37 FCC Rcd. 484, 485 (2022). Congress authorized the
451 FCC to “avail itself” of USAC’s services “to implement the Affordable
452 Connectivity Program, including developing and processing reimbursements
453 and distributing funds to participating providers.” 47 U.S.C. § 1752(i)(5).
454 The second program, the Emergency Connectivity Fund, provided funding
455 for schools and libraries to purchase “connected devices and broadband
456 connection for use by students, school staff, and library patrons.” In re
457 Establishing Emergency Connectivity Fund to Close the Homework Gap, 36 FCC
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458 Rcd. 8696, 8697 (2021). Congress authorized both the FCC and USAC to
459 administer this fund. American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, § 7402(c)(2)(A)(ii),
460 135 Stat. 4, 109 (2021). According to the FCC, these authorizations are
461 “inexplicable” if Congress “doubted the propriety” of the FCC appointing
462 USAC as administrator of the Universal Service Fund.
463 It is “a long-settled principle” that Congress can ratify and “give the
464 force of law to official action unauthorized when taken.” Kovac v. Wray, 109
465 F.4th 331, 340 (5th Cir. 2024) (quoting Swayne & Hoyt, Ltd. v. United States,
466 300 U.S. 297, 301–02 (1937)). “Ratification may occur, for example, when
467 ‘Congress has not just kept its silence by refusing to overturn the
468 administrative construction, but has ratified it with positive legislation.’”
469 Nat’l Religious Broads. v. FCC, 138 F.4th 282, 294 (5th Cir.