In Re: G6 Hospitality Property
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket26-40371
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Case: 26-40371 Document: 70-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/20/2026
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
____________ Fifth Circuit
FILED
No. 26-40371 November 20, 2026
____________
Thomas B. Plunkett, III
Clerk
In re G6 Hospitality Property, L.L.C.,
Petitioner.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
USDC No. 1:25-CV-29
______________________________
PUBLISHED ORDER
Before Graves, Ho, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:
Treating the petition for rehearing en banc as a petition for panel
rehearing, the petition for panel rehearing is GRANTED. No member of
the panel nor judge in regular active service of the court having requested
that the court be polled on rehearing en banc (Fed. R. App. and 5th Cir. R.
40), the petition for rehearing en banc is DENIED. The panel order in this
case originally filed on July 27, 2026, is WITHDRAWN and the following
order is SUBSTITUTED in its place:
Petitioner seeks a writ of mandamus regarding the district court’s
failure to certify its order denying judgment on the pleadings for interlocutory
appeal. We find that mandamus is inappropriate in the present case;
however, we urge the district court to reconsider its order immediately.
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No. 26-40371
Our jurisdiction ordinarily only reaches the final decisions of district
courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “A final decision is typically one by which a
district court disassociates itself from a case.” Mohawk Indus., Inc. v.
Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 106 (2009) (citation modified). Because the district
court has not yet resolved petitioner’s case, we have no jurisdiction under
§ 1291. Thomas v. Scott, 47 F.3d 713, 714 (5th Cir. 1995).
When, however, a district court’s order “involves a controlling
question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of
opinion” and “an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance
the ultimate termination of the litigation,” the district court may certify that
question for immediate interlocutory appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
Petitioner sought certification of one question: “whether a hotel
defendant’s repeated rental of rooms to a trafficker, when it knew or should
of known of the trafficking, amounts to ‘participation in a venture.’” This
question is a central element of a claim under the Trafficking Victims
Protection Reauthorization Act (“TVPRA”). The district court denied
certification.
Applying the standard in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), the question passes
muster for certification.
First, the sufficiency of a complaint is a question of law. See, e.g.,
Fernandez-Montes v. Allied Pilots Ass’n, 987 F.2d 278, 284 n.9 (5th Cir. 1993)
(“The dismissal of a complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is a question
of law.”). It is not “a factual argument dressing up as a question of law.”
Petitioner’s question for certification strikes at the core of whether a
complaint is sufficient to state a claim under the TVPRA. Thus, the first
prong is met.
Next, there is a significant difference of opinion as to the applicable
pleading standard under the TVPRA. See Doe #1 v. Red Roof Inns, Inc., 21
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F.4th 714 (11th Cir. 2021); Doe 1 v. Apple Inc., 96 F.4th 403 (D.C. Cir. 2024);
Mueller v. Deutsche Bank Aktiengesellschaft, 185 F.4th 307 (2d Cir. 2026).
Finally, establishing the pleading standard for such claims would likely
materially advance the termination of this litigation and the other TVPRA
suits currently pending against petitioner in district court. All three prongs
of 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) are met.
When a district court fails to certify an issue under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b) that “squarely meets the criteria for certification,” remand for
immediate reconsideration is appropriate. See In re Trump, 781 F. App’x 1, 2
(D.C. Cir. 2019) (citation modified). Courts generally are loath to compel
certification under § 1292(b) via mandamus. See In re Ford Motor Co., 344
F.3d 648, 654 (7th Cir. 2003) (listing cases). We instead give the district
court another opportunity to resolve the § 1292(b) question. As a result,
petitioners have another avenue to secure their requested relief, making
mandamus inappropriate. In re Willy, 831 F.2d 545, 549 (5th Cir. 1987); see
also In re Mesaros, No. 23-50593 (5th Cir. Aug. 28, 2023) slip op. at 9-10. If
petitioner renews its § 1292(b) motion and again loses in the district court, it
is free to renew its request for mandamus relief. See In re McClelland Eng’rs,
Inc., 742 F.2d 837, 839 (5th Cir. 1984).
IT IS ORDERED that the petition for a writ of mandamus is
DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this panel will retain
jurisdiction only over the decision whether to grant any petition for
permission to appeal, should the district court grant certification pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) upon remand, or any subsequent petition for writ of
mandamus, should the district court deny certification upon remand.
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James C. Ho, Circuit Judge, concurring:
If a district court refuses to certify an order for interlocutory appeal,
contrary to the express terms of 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), we can simply ask the
district court to reconsider its mistake, rather than issue a writ of mandamus
ourselves.
That’s what our court does today. I am pleased to concur.
I.
When an order of a district court “involves a controlling question of
law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion,” and
“an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate
termination of the litigation,” the district judge “shall so state in writing in
such order.” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (emphasis added).
Congress imposed this directive on district courts for one simple
reason: to enable courts of appeals to grant interlocutory appeals in our
“discretion.” Id. So if a district court declines to do so, that prevents the
judiciary from fulfilling our Congressional mandate to “materially advance
the ultimate termination of the litigation.” Id.
And when that occurs, we have the option of asking the district court
to reconsider, in lieu of granting a writ of mandamus.
In In re McClelland Engineers, Inc., 742 F.2d 837 (5th Cir. 1984), “the
trial judge refused to certify his interlocutory order for appeal.” Id. at 837.
We determined that the “refusal to certify in the circumstances presented
constitutes an abuse of discretion.” Id. at 837. So we “vacate[d] that order.”
Id. at 837–38.
Rather than grant a writ of mandamus, however, we simply
“request[ed] that the district court certify its interlocutory order for
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appeal”—while making clear that “[t]he denial of mandamus is without
prejudice.” Id. at 839.
II.
Our order today follows the example of McClelland Engineers. That is,
we rely on comity, rather than commandment, to ensure adherence to
§ 1292(b). See also, e.g., In re Landry, 83 F.4th 300, 308 & n.1 (5th Cir. 2023)
(Ho, J., concurring) (collecting cases where we have held that “a district
court erred” while “stopping short of issuing a writ of mandamus”).
I’m pleased to concur. But in so doing, I recognize the risk in our
merely expressing disagreement, without ordering any actual relief. See, e.g.,
id. at 308 n.1 (“if our court’s experience . . . teaches us anything, it’s that
sometimes you need a writ, not a warning”).
Judges are, after all, first and foremost, human. And different people
can “react in different ways when others disagree with them.” Planned
Parenthood of Greater Texas, Inc. v. Kauffman, 981 F.3d 347, 384 (5th Cir.
2020) (en banc) (Ho, J., concurring).
“One option is to be offended.” Id. “But another is to be thankful.”
Id. “Thankful that, as human beings, judges sometimes make mistakes, but
strive to do better. Thankful that our Constitution not only tolerates
disagreement, but celebrates it—because we believe in debate, the
adversarial process, and issue percolation, both within and across the courts
of appeals. Thankful that our legal system affords us the opportunity to make
course corrections, because we all agree that it is more important to get the
law right than to guard our self-esteem.” Id.
As I’ve observed in acknowledging my own past mistakes, “[t]here’s
no shame in admitting error. There’s only shame in not admitting error.”
Lopez v. Ramirez, 181 F.4th 593, 599 (5th Cir. 2026) (Ho, J., dissenting from
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the denial of rehearing en banc). Put another way, “[a]ny judge who claims
that he or she has never made a mistake is a judge I wouldn’t trust.” Id.
“‘Whoever hates correction is stupid.’” Id. (quoting Proverbs 12:1).
“But ‘rebuke the wise and they will love you.’” Id. (quoting Proverbs
9:8).
***
I am hopeful that today’s ruling will be sufficient—and that further
mandamus proceedings in this case will be unnecessary—consistent with
“the judiciary’s longstanding tradition of comity, both within and across the
circuits, as repeatedly demonstrated by district courts nationwide.” Defense
Distributed v. Platkin, 48 F.4th 607, 607 (5th Cir. 2022) (Ho, J., concurring).
Most of all, I’m especially grateful for the comity displayed by my
panel colleagues in issuing today’s order. See also Order at 1 n.1, In re G6
Hospitality Property, L.L.C., No. 26-40371 (July 27, 2026) (citing
McClelland). I’m pleased to concur.
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