Full Opinion

Case: 26-2066 Document: 14 Page: 1 Filed: 10/23/2026 NOTE: This order is nonprecedential. United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ______________________ NATRESHA T. DAWSON-PASCHALL, Plaintiff-Appellant v. UNITED STATES, Defendant-Appellee ______________________ 2026-2066 ______________________ Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims in No. 1:26-cv-00207-SSS, Judge Stephen S. Schwartz. ______________________ ON MOTION ______________________ Before CHEN, LINN, and CUNNINGHAM, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM. ORDER Natresha T. Dawson-Paschall moves for leave to pro- ceed in forma pauperis. The United States moves for sum- mary affirmance. Ms. Dawson-Paschall opposes and moves for remand, or in the alternative, to stay the appeal pend- ing the trial court’s decision on a motion for relief from the appealed-from judgment. Case: 26-2066 Document: 14 Page: 2 Filed: 10/23/2026 2 DAWSON-PASCHALL v. US Ms. Dawson-Paschall, a former federal government employee, brought this suit in the United States Court of Federal Claims asserting claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act and the Civil Rights Act of 1871. Ms. Dawson- Paschall further alleged that she was recklessly subjected to human trafficking and falsely accused of terrorism. 1 The Court of Federal Claims granted the United States’s mo- tion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491, grants the Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction only over claims for money damages against the United States based on money-man- dating sources of law. See United States v. Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. 287, 290 (2009). It expressly omits from that 1 Ms. Dawson-Paschall previously sued her former employer regarding her removal in the United States Dis- trict Court for the District of Columbia, and the defendant’s motion for summary judgment was granted, see Dawson v. Reukauf, 751 F. Supp. 2d 146, 147, 154 (D.D.C. 2010), and the judgment was later affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, Daw- son v. Special Counsel, No. 11-5014, 2011 WL 2618211 (D.C. Cir. June 7, 2011). To the extent she was seeking review of those decisions in the Court of Federal Claims, that court clearly lacks such review authority. See Shinnecock Indian Nation v. United States, 782 F.3d 1345, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“Binding precedent establishes that the Court of Federal Claims has no jurisdiction to review the merits of a decision rendered by a federal district court.”); Joshua v. United States, 17 F.3d 378, 380 (Fed. Cir. 1994); see also Pueschel v. United States, 297 F.3d 1371, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“[T]he Court of Federal Claims does not have jurisdiction over a case that could be heard by the” Merit Systems Protection Board regarding federal employment disputes.). Case: 26-2066 Document: 14 Page: 3 Filed: 10/23/2026 DAWSON-PASCHALL v. US 3 court’s jurisdiction claims that “sound[] in tort.” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). Moreover, consistent with its “gap-filling role,” the Tucker Act does not apply in those circumstances in which Congress has provided “a precisely drawn, de- tailed statute” that “contains its own judicial remedies.” United States v. Bormes, 568 U.S. 6, 12–13 (2012). The trial court’s determination that Ms. Dawson-Pas- chall failed to raise a claim within that limited jurisdiction was “so clearly correct as a matter of law that no substan- tial question regarding the outcome of the appeal exists,” making summary affirmance appropriate here. Joshua, 17 F.3d at 380. The Court of Federal Claims was clearly cor- rect that it lacked jurisdiction over her allegations of hu- man trafficking and being falsely accused of terrorism which sound in tort or involve criminal matters outside that court’s jurisdiction. See id. at 379 (no criminal review authority); Rick’s Mushroom Serv., Inc. v. United States, 521 F.3d 1338, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The Court of Federal Claims was also clearly correct that her civil rights claims and FTCA claims are outside of its limited review authority because federal district courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over those claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (vesting jurisdiction with federal district courts to hear civil rights claims); 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (vesting district courts with FTCA claims); U.S. Marine, Inc. v. United States, 722 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“If a tort claim is brought under the FTCA, it plainly cannot be adjudicated in the Claims Court, because . . . the district court [has] exclusive jurisdiction over such claims.”). Fi- nally, the Court of Federal Claims correctly held that none of the complaint’s scattered mentions of constitutional pro- visions were money mandating such as to convey jurisdic- tion. United States v. Connolly, 716 F.2d 882, 887 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (First Amendment); Brown v. United States, 105 F.3d 621, 623 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (Fourth Amendment); Trafny v. United States, 503 F.3d 1339, 1340 (Fed. Cir. Case: 26-2066 Document: 14 Page: 4 Filed: 10/23/2026 4 DAWSON-PASCHALL v. US 2007) (Eighth Amendment); LeBlanc v. United States, 50 F.3d 1025, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Fourteenth Amendment). We have considered Ms. Dawson-Paschall’s arguments and find them unpersuasive. In particular, Ms. Dawson- Paschall attempts to label her claims as for illegal exac- tions, see e.g., ECF No. 11 at 11–13, but ultimately the claims are for torts and are challenges to prior judicial de- cisions, see id. (alleging “illegal exaction without due pro- cess” stemming from individuals “et al of Obama’s terrorist organization . . . threatening/bullying Appellant’s cowork- ers/supervisors, deciding officials, including judges to ob- tain unwarranted/unmerited case decisions”). As discussed above, the Court of Federal Claims clearly lacks jurisdiction over such allegations. Nor do we see any basis to stay our decision, as the Court of Federal Claims may address Ms. Dawson-Paschall’s pending motion for relief from this judgment separately from the outcome of this ap- peal. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED THAT: (1) The United States’s motion is granted. The judg- ment of the Court of Federal Claims is summarily affirmed. (2) All other pending motions are denied. (3) Each party shall bear its own costs. FOR THE COURT October 23, 2026 Date