Justin Morales v. United States
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Date FiledAugust 10, 2026
Docket25-1354
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 25-1354
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Justin Thomas Morales,
lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant,
v.
United States of America,
lllllllllllllllllllllRespondent - Appellee.
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the District of South Dakota - Southern
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Submitted: March 20, 2026
Filed: August 10, 2026
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Before COLLOTON, Chief Judge, GRUENDER and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
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COLLOTON, Chief Judge.
Justin Morales was convicted of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine in
2018. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846. At sentencing, the district court* applied an
increased punishment under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (2010), because Morales had
*
The Honorable Karen E. Schreier, United States District Judge for the District
of South Dakota.
sustained a prior conviction for a “felony drug offense” in Kansas in 2003. Morales
later moved to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on the ground that he
received ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing. Morales argued that his
counsel was deficient for failing to argue that his prior conviction did not qualify as
a “felony drug offense.” The district court denied the motion, and we affirm.
Morales was convicted in 2003 under Kan. Stat. Ann. § 65-4162(a) for
possession of marijuana after a prior conviction. The district court in this federal case
applied enhanced punishment on the ground that the Kansas offense constituted a
prior “felony drug offense,” i.e., a felony offense “that prohibits or restricts conduct
relating to narcotic drugs, marihuana, anabolic steroids, or depressant or stimulant
substances.” 21 U.S.C. § 802(44).
Morales observes that whether his prior offense qualified as a felony drug
offense depends on a “categorical approach” to the Kansas statute. See United States
v. Wright, 163 F.4th 469, 476 (8th Cir. 2025). Under that approach, the federal court
examines only the statutory definition of the prior state offense to determine whether
it falls within the definition of “felony drug offense” under federal law. Id. “If the
state offense sweeps more broadly, or punishes more conduct than the federal
definition, the conviction does not qualify as a predicate offense.” Id.
Morales maintains that the Kansas drug statute under which he was convicted
is broader than the federal definition. On that basis, he contends that his counsel in
the federal criminal case was ineffective for failing to argue that his prior conviction
in Kansas did not qualify as a federal drug offense. He asserts that because counsel
failed to advance this position, the district court erroneously applied enhanced
punishment under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), and that he was prejudiced at least on
the supervised release part of his sentence. See Morales v. United States, No. 21-
2363, 2023 WL 2608009, at *2 (8th Cir. Mar. 23, 2023) (per curiam) (unpublished).
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The parties agree that the Kansas statute taken as a whole is broader than the
definition of “felony drug offense,” because the Kansas law forbids possession of
three drugs that are not included on the federal drug schedule. See Kan. Stat. Ann.
§§ 65-4105(g), 4111(g) (2003). But if the Kansas statute is divisible, and comprises
multiple, alternative elements that create different offenses, then federal courts apply
the “modified categorical approach” to determine which alternative element was the
basis for Morales’s conviction. Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500, 505-06 (2016).
If the Kansas statute is divisible by type of drug, then Morales’s conviction for
possession of marijuana after a prior conviction qualifies as a “felony drug offense,”
because the federal definition specifically includes “conduct relating to . . .
marihuana.” 21 U.S.C. § 802(44).
We conclude that Morales’s counsel was not ineffective because the proposed
argument against enhanced punishment had no merit. The better conclusion is that
the Kansas statute is divisible, so the suggested argument that Morales’s prior offense
in Kansas was not a felony drug offense would have failed.
This court’s decision in Rincon v. Garland, 70 F.4th 1080, 1083 (8th Cir.
2023), is instructive. There, we analyzed Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-5706(a), a Kansas law
that criminalized the possession of “any opiates, opium, or narcotic drugs, or any
stimulant designated in K.S.A. 65-4107(d)(1), (d)(3) or (f)(1), and amendments
thereto, or a controlled substance analog thereof.” We recited the conclusion from
State v. Thompson, 200 P.3d 22 (Kan. 2009), that “the gravamen of the offense” was
“possession of each specified controlled substance in the statute.” 70 F.4th at 1084
(quoting Thompson, 200 P.3d at 30) (emphasis added in Rincon). Because the statute
forbade possession of “any” listed drug, the Kansas court in Thompson reasoned that
a defendant could be convicted under that statute for possession of each separate
drug. That each drug type established a different unit of prosecution showed that
drug type was an essential element of the offense. Because the only differentiating
element between two prosecutions under § 21-5706(a) was the type of drug, the
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Kansas court “implicitly told us that the identity of the substance possessed is an
element” of the offense. Id. at 1085 (quoting Guillen v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 910 F.3d
1174, 1182 (11th Cir. 2018)); see State v. Housworth, No. 115,836, 2017 WL
2834502, at *14 (Kan. Ct. App. June 30, 2017) (unpublished) (“The word ‘any’
generally leads Kansas courts to conclude that a statute provides for multiple units of
prosecution in cases involving the possession of multiple prohibited items.”); State
v. Graham, No. 83,214, 2000 WL 36746390, at *1 (Kan. Ct. App. July 14, 2000) (per
curiam) (unpublished) (holding that where statute prohibited possession of “any
opiates, opium or narcotic drugs, or any stimulant,” “[t]he crimes of possession of
cocaine, possession of amphetamine, and possession of methamphetamine do not
have the same elements.”).
Morales was convicted under a textually similar statute that criminalized the
possession of “[a]ny depressant . . . any stimulant . . . any hallucinogenic drug . . . any
substance designated in subsection (g) of K.S.A. 65-4105 . . . or any anabolic
steroids.” Kan. Stat. Ann. § 65-4162(a) (2003) (emphases added). For the reasons
discussed in Rincon, it follows that each drug type constitutes a separate unit of
prosecution under § 65-4162(a), and the identity of the substance possessed is an
element of the offense.
Kansas’s approved jury instructions, which are “strongly recommended” for
use in the Kansas courts, State v. Dunn, 820 P.2d 412, 416 (Kan. 1991), support this
understanding. If jury instructions “use a single umbrella term” that encompasses all
of the statutory alternatives, it is a clear indication that each alternative is only a
possible means of commission, not an element that the prosecutor must prove beyond
a reasonable doubt. Mathis, 579 U.S. at 519. Conversely, where jury instructions
require the prosecution to prove a specific statutory alternative to exclusion of all
others, each alternative listed in the statute is likely an element of the offense. Id.
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The approved instruction for Morales’s offense states that “[t]he defendant is
charged with the crime of unlawfully (possessing) (controlling) insert name of
stimulant, depressant, hallucinogenic drug, controlled substance, or anabolic
steroid,” and to establish this charge, the prosecution must prove that the “defendant
(possessed) (had under [his][her] control) insert name of stimulant, depressant,
hallucinogenic drug, controlled substance, or anabolic steroid.” PIK Crim. 3d 67.16
(2003 Supp.). That the jury should be instructed to determine whether the defendant
possessed a particular drug such as marijuana tends to confirm that drug type is an
element of the offense. See Rincon, 70 F.4th at 1085.
Morales contends that State v. Stotts, No. 101,828, 2011 WL 6382737 (Kan.
Ct. App. Dec. 16, 2011) (unpublished), suggests the opposite conclusion, but Stotts
involved a different statute with materially different text. There, a statute prohibited
the possession with intent to use “any drug paraphernalia” to introduce “a controlled
substance” into the human body. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 65-4152(a)(2) (2006). The trial
court did not specify a particular controlled substance in the jury instruction, and the
court of appeals wrote that “it can’t be said that identifying the substance as
marijuana was an essential element of the crime.” Stotts, 2011 WL 6382737, at *9.
But the statute in Stotts prohibited the possession of “any drug paraphernalia,” and
a separate element required proof that the paraphernalia would be used to ingest a
controlled substance. The statute’s reference to ingestion of “a controlled substance”
in that context is not analogous to the prohibitions on possession of “any” controlled
substance at issue in Rincon and in this case.
Because identity of the controlled substance is an element of the Kansas statute
under which Morales was convicted, the district court properly concluded that he
sustained a prior conviction for a “felony drug offense,” and his counsel was not
ineffective for declining to argue the contrary. Even if we might be incorrect in our
understanding of Kansas law, moreover, the law certainly was not settled in favor of
Morales’s current position. Given the absence of precedent holding that the Kansas
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statute was indivisible, and the suggestions in text, court decisions, and approved jury
instructions that it was divisible by drug type, the performance of Morales’s counsel
in the federal criminal case was objectively reasonable. Kelly v. United States, 819
F.3d 1044, 1050-51 (8th Cir. 2016); Anderson v. United States, 393 F.3d 749, 754-55
(8th Cir. 2005).
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
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