Gregg Colton v. Lime Rock Resources GP V, LP
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
Docket25-3542
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 25-3542
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Gregg B. Colton, on behalf of himself and a class of similarly situated persons
Plaintiff - Appellant
v.
Lime Rock Resources GP V, LP; Lime Rock Resources III-A GP, LLC; Lime
Rock Resources III-A, LP; Lime Rock Resources IV-A GP, LLC; Lime Rock
Resources IV-A, LP; Lime Rock Resources Operating Company, Inc.; Lime Rock
Resources V-A, LP
Defendants - Appellees
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Sandy River Energy, LLC; Sandy River Resources, LLC
Amici on Behalf of Appellant(s)
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the District of North Dakota - Western
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Submitted: October 21, 2026
Filed: November 16, 2026
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Before KELLY, BENTON, and JUSTIN D. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
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BENTON, Circuit Judge.
Gregg B. Colton sued Lime Rock Resources GP V, LP, and related entities
(together Lime Rock) for himself and two classes. The district court 1 struck the class
allegations from the second amended complaint. The court entered a stipulated
judgment, filed by the parties, awarding Colton full damages on his individual
claims. He appeals the order striking class allegations. Because this court lacks
Article III jurisdiction, the appeal is dismissed.
I.
Colton sued Lime Rock on behalf of a class of mineral-interest owners,
asserting Lime Rock failed to pay statutory interest on late royalty payments in
violation of N.D.C.C. § 47-16-39.1. Colton amended the complaint, adding a second
class of owners and alleging Lime Rock breached mineral-interest leases by
deducting post-production costs of natural gas from oil royalties. He asserted a
declaratory judgment claim for each class. Lime Rock moved to dismiss the
declaratory judgment claims and to strike the class allegations in the first amended
complaint. The district court granted the motion.
Colton filed a second amended complaint, revising the class definitions and
reasserting violations of N.D.C.C. § 47-16-39.1 and breach of contract. He did not
reassert the dismissed declaratory judgment claims. Lime Rock moved to strike the
class allegations. The district court agreed, finding the classes could not satisfy
typicality and predominance under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(3) and
(b)(3). Colton did not appeal the order under Rule 23(f).
Four months later, the parties submitted to the court a stipulation for entry of
judgment. It said, “the parties hereby stipulate to entry of judgment in the amount
1
The Honorable Daniel L. Hovland, United States District Judge for the
District of North Dakota.
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of Twenty Dollars ($20.00) in favor of Colton and against Lime Rock, which
represents the full measure of damages claimed by Colton on his individual claims
in the Second Amended Complaint.” The parties agreed: “Judgment shall be without
an award of costs or fees to any party.” They further agreed, “the parties do not
intend to waive their right to appeal any order previously entered by the Court in this
case, including Colton’s right to appeal the Court’s order Granting Lime Rock’s
Motion to Strike the Class Allegations.”
The district court adopted the stipulation and entered judgment, awarding
Colton $20.00. Colton appeals, challenging only the order striking class allegations
from the second amended complaint.
II.
Lime Rock contends Colton’s appeal is moot. This court’s “first task in any
case [] is to ensure [it] ha[s] jurisdiction over an appeal.” Taff v. DeBuc, 187 F.4th
1008, 1010 (8th Cir. 2026). Article III limits “federal-court jurisdiction, to ‘Cases’
and ‘Controversies.’” United States Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388,
395 (1980). A case becomes moot “when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’
or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Id. at 396, quoting
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969). This requires a “continuing
personal stake.” Potter v. Norwest Mortg., Inc., 329 F.3d 608, 611 (8th Cir. 2003).
The parties contest whether Colton has a continuing personal stake in the class
allegations after the stipulated judgment favorably resolved his individual claims.
Relying on two Supreme Court cases, Colton argues he has a continuing
personal stake because he did not voluntarily dismiss his claims by settlement. In
Roper, the defendant offered plaintiffs the damages they could recover, then the
district court entered judgment in their favor, dismissing the action over their
objections. Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 329–30 (1980). The
Court held that the appeal of the denial of class certification was not moot under
these facts “so long as [plaintiffs] retained an economic interest in class
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certification.” Id. at 332–33. The Court noted that factual context “is important”:
“At no time did the named plaintiffs accept the tender in settlement of the case;
instead, judgment was entered in their favor by the court without their consent and
the case was dismissed over their continued objections.” Id. at 332. The Court was
also concerned that denying the right to appeal merely because a defendant tried to
buy off the named plaintiffs “would be contrary to sound judicial administration.”
Id. at 339.
In Geraghty, a federal inmate challenged parole guidelines on behalf of a
class. Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 390. The district court denied class certification, and
he was released from prison during the appeal. Id. The Supreme Court held “an
action brought on behalf of a class does not become moot upon expiration of the
named plaintiff’s substantive claim.” Id. at 404. The Court relied on the inmate’s
“claim that he is entitled to represent a class” and the involuntary expiration of the
claim. Id. at 402, 404. The Court took “no view as to whether a named plaintiff
who settles” could appeal a denial of class certification. Id. at 404 n.10.
To decide if a class-certification appeal is moot, this court distinguishes
between voluntary and involuntary termination of claims. A named plaintiff who
voluntarily settles his claims no longer has a personal stake, mooting any appeal of
class-certification issues. See Potter, 329 F.3d at 615; Anderson v. CNH U.S.
Pension Plan, 515 F.3d 823, 827 (8th Cir. 2008). When the termination of claims
is involuntary, Roper and Geraghty control. See Ruppert v. Principal Life Ins. Co.,
705 F.3d 839, 843 (8th Cir. 2013) (“In two cases, the Supreme Court permitted an
appeal of an order denying class certification even after the named plaintiff no longer
could pursue his individual substantive claim. In both instances, however, the
termination of the plaintiff’s substantive claim was involuntary.”).
This case asks whether a stipulated judgment without an accompanying
settlement agreement is “voluntary” and thus terminates the named plaintiff’s
personal stake in the class allegations. When parties consent to judgment, “it is the
parties’ agreement that serves as the source of the court’s authority to enter any
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judgment at all.” See Local No. 93 v. Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 522 (1986) (referring
to consent decrees). Colton’s consent to judgment, like a voluntary settlement, is
not like cases where claims are involuntarily terminated. See Anderson, 515 F.3d at
825 (entering “agreed final judgment” based on settlement); Ruppert, 705 F.3d at
840 (entering “consent judgment” based on settlement). Colton has no personal
stake because the court adopted the parties’ jointly proposed stipulation of judgment.
This appeal is moot.
Colton believes that because he still owns Lime-Rock mineral interests, he
has a personal stake. While a named plaintiff may maintain a personal stake “where
the claim may arise again with respect to that plaintiff,” Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 398,
this principle does not apply here where Colton voluntarily ended his claims. This
follows from the requirement that “the challenged action was in its duration too short
to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration.” Whitfield v. Thurston,
3 F.4th 1045, 1047 (8th Cir. 2021) (emphasis added). Colton’s interest ended
because he stipulated to judgment, not because the challenged actions were too short
in duration to litigate.
For the first time at oral argument, Colton claimed he has an interest in shifting
litigation costs to a class. This argument is waived. Twin Cities Galleries, LLC v.
Media Arts Grp., Inc., 476 F.3d 598, 602 n.1 (8th Cir. 2007) (“Because this point
was raised for the first time at oral argument, and has not been briefed, it is
waived.”). Regardless, the argument is foreclosed by precedent. See Ruppert, 705
F.3d at 844 (holding appeal “moot in the Article III sense” when plaintiff asserted
only “an economic interest in shifting litigation costs to a class”).
Colton argues the stipulated judgment reserves his right to appeal the order
striking class allegations. “[P]arties may not by agreement confer jurisdiction.”
Potter, 329 F.3d at 614. “This principle would not be protected if the parties could
preserve appellate review of the district court’s denial of class certification by
including a clause in their settlement agreement . . . .” Id. at 614 n.3. Appeal was
available under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f) before the stipulation of
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judgment was entered. See Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, 582 U.S. 23, 34 n.7 (2017)
(“An order striking class allegations is ‘functional[ly] equivalent’ to an order
denying class certification and therefore appealable under Rule 23(f).”).
Colton voluntarily stipulated to a judgment that awarded him the full measure
of damages on his individual claims. Even assuming Colton had a continuing
personal interest in his declaratory judgment claims, he did not appeal the dismissal
of those claims. Under these circumstances, Colton has no continuing personal stake
in the class allegations. This appeal is moot. 2
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The appeal is dismissed for lack of Article III jurisdiction.
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2
This court need not reach the merits of the class allegations. The motion to
take judicial notice—addressing the merits—is denied.
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