Chappell v. Association of Owners for Ocean View Condominium
CourtSuperior Court of Delaware
Date FiledNovember 17, 2026
DocketS23C-04-022 RHR
StatusPublished
📰 News Coverage: Read the LAWS.com news report on this case
Full Opinion
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
JEFFREY L. CHAPPELL, )
)
Plaintiff, ) C.A. No.: S23C-04-022 RHR
)
v. )
)
ASSOCIATION OF OWNERS FOR )
OCEAN VIEW CONDOMINIUM, )
PAUL HANDLER, CONNIE HANDLER; )
and THOMAS J. LEAVEY, JR., )
Defendants, )
)
and )
)
ASSOCIATION OF OWNERS FOR )
OCEAN VIEW CONDOMINIUM, )
Third-Party Plaintiff, )
)
v. )
)
DAVID J. CHAPPELL, )
)
Third-Party Defendant. )
Submitted: August 4, 2026
Decided: November 17, 2026
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Upon Consideration of Defendants Association of Owners for Ocean View
Condominium, Paul Handler, Connie Handler, and Thomas J. Leavey, Jr.’s
Motion for Summary Judgment,
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part,
and Plaintiff Jeffrey L. Chappell and Third-Party Defendant David J. Chappell’s
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
Dean A. Campbell, Esq., LAW OFFICE OF DEAN A. CAMPBELL, P.A., Milton,
Delaware, Attorney for Plaintiff Jeffrey L. Chappell and Third-Party Defendant
David J. Chappell.
Jennifer A. Sutton, Esq., Adam Yanoff, Esq., O’HAGAN MEYER PLLC,
Wilmington, Delaware, Attorneys for Defendants Association of Owners for Ocean
View Condominium, Paul Handler, Connie Handler, and Thomas J. Leavey, Jr.
Robert J. Valihura, Jr., Esq., Caren L. Sydnor, Esq., MORTON, VALIHURA &
ZERBATO, LLC, Greenville, Delaware, Attorneys for Counterclaim Plaintiff and
Third-Party Plaintiff, Association of Owners for Ocean View Condominium.
Robinson, J.
2
Jeffrey Chappell filed suit against the Association of Owners for Ocean View
Condominium, Paul Handler, Connie Handler, and Thomas J. Leavey, Jr.
(collectively “Ocean View”), on April 21, 2023, asserting the following claims: (1)
declaratory judgment, (2) intentional interference with business relations and/or
prospective business relations, (3) abuse of process, (4) malicious prosecution, (5)
slander of title; and (6) action to recover attorney’s fees. On cross-motions for
summary judgment, this court grants Ocean View’s motion for summary judgment
in part on Chappell’s tort claims and denies the remaining relief sought. This court
also grants Chappell and his brother David Chappell’s (collectively, the
“Chappells”) motion for partial summary judgment in part for declaratory relief and
denies the relief sought for the tort claims. As a result, Ocean View’s debt action
counterclaim is moot. Attorney’s fees will not be awarded to either party.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Ocean View Condominium, located in Dewey Beach, Delaware, was
established in 1981.1 It is made up of ten units and is governed by a declaration and
code of regulations (collectively, the “governing documents”) that were recorded on
June 15, 1981. It has a board, referred to as the Council, that is made up of
individuals elected by the unit owners pursuant to the governing documents who are
responsible for managing the business operations and affairs of Ocean View. When
1
D.I. 50, Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. A at 10-11.
3
acting as a group, the unit owners are referred to as the Association of Owners (the
“Association”).
The governing documents cover a broad range of topics including the proper
use of units, responsibility for repairs, amendment processes, and other rules and
regulations. Several amendments to the governing documents were created over the
years. An amendment in 2004 expanded the interest provision in the code of
regulations to include interest rates and late fee amounts. An amendment in 2007
created a means of imposing a fine on unit owners who misuse the common
elements. These amendments, and others not relevant here, were properly created
pursuant to the procedures set forth in the governing documents.
Additionally, the Council has the authority to adopt rules and regulations
necessary for the enjoyment of the condominium, provided they do not conflict with
the Delaware Uniform Property Act (“DUPA”) or the governing documents. The
Council is also given authority to make or amend rules and regulations regarding the
use of the property.
The Chappells acquired title to condominium unit number nine in the complex
as joint tenants with right of survivorship on June 7, 2000.2 The deed included
standard language that subjected unit owners to the governing documents and the
2
D.I. 74, Counterclaimant and Third-Party Pl.’s Answering Br. in Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot., Ex. A at 2.
4
DUPA.3 For over a decade, Chappell leased the unit over the summer months with
assistance from realtor Carla Riddle. Riddle would find tenants for the unit and
ensure it was maintained.
All the units in the complex had jalousie windows installed as part of the
original construction. Through the years, many unit owners changed the windows to
traditional double-hung windows, but Chappell kept the original jalousie windows.
This dispute originated from Chappell’s refusal to replace these windows.
The earliest record of there being an issue with Chappell’s windows is noted
in a proposal requested by a Council member to do various maintenance and repairs
to several units on June 1, 2015.4 In this proposal, a quote was provided to remove
Chappell’s jalousie windows and install four double hung windows.5 Chappell did
not have this work performed.
A Council member sent Chappell a letter dated March 21, 2016, to inform him
that there were issues with his unit.6 The letter noted that the floor by the toilet was
rotting and causing a support joist to rot. The letter referenced Chappell’s porch
windows but provided no other details.
3
Id. at 2-3.
4
D.I. 52, Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. C.
5
Id. (“Remove Jalousie window and install (4) four double hung white window with screens and
Low E Glass in Unit #9.”).
6
D.I. 53, Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. D.
5
On December 4, 2020, the Council emailed Chappell following a fire
extinguisher inspection in his unit.7 The Council told Chappell that there were
various issues with his unit including: (1) rotting exterior steps, (2) missing window
screens, (3) a rusted air conditioner cover, (4) water damaged flooring around the
toilet, (5) rotting joists under the toilet due to the water damage, and (6) two holes
in the bathroom floor creating an opening to the outdoors.8 The email also mentioned
that Chappell’s “bad/temporary” repair done to the jalousie window needed to be
done correctly, “without taping them in.”9 The email included photographs of the
areas needing repair. The primary focus of the email was the bathroom floor and
joist issue and the Council noted that it had called these issues to Chappell’s attention
previously. The Council stated it had not followed up on the issues but that they
would not be ignored any longer. This email contained the first reference to taking
legal action if the issues were not remedied and informed Chappell that he would be
charged with the Council’s legal fees.
An attorney for the Council began sending letters on the Council’s behalf to
Chappell and Riddle on or about April 7, 2021.10 The letter sent to Riddle on that
date appeared to be in response to an email that suggested some of the work was
7
D.I. 54, Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. E at 2.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
D.I. 55, Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. F.
6
being done.11 The letter explained that the exterior steps, window screens, air
conditioner cover, and bathroom floor needed to be repaired or replaced, and the
damaged jalousie windows needed to be replaced, all before the upcoming Memorial
Day weekend. The Council stated it would accept a completed order form for the
jalousie windows, that is paid for within two weeks, and a letter from a reputable
contractor promising installation. Otherwise, the letter stated, the Council would
take necessary action against Chappell, such as preventing the rental of the unit for
the summer.
Chappell emailed the Council’s attorney on April 29, 2021, to ask where the
governing documents stated that the Council had the authority to make him order
new windows.12 The Council’s attorney responded with statements such as “[y]ou
can read for yourself what obligations you have in your governing documents as an
owner to maintain your Unit,” and “I can assure you that such authority exists, and
[Council’s] resolve is demonstrated by my retention.”13 The Council’s attorney
encouraged Chappell to work with the Council as it had offered Chappell a generous
extension of time to remedy the issues.
11
Id. at 2.
12
D.I. 56, Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. G at 2.
13
Id.
7
On April 30, 2021, the Council adopted a resolution titled “Costs Attributable
to a Unit Owner or Unit Owners.”14 This resolution established that if the Council
incurred fees or expenses arising out of the acts or requests of a unit owner, and the
Council deemed that those fees or expenses should be attributed to the unit owner,
it would be assessed to that owner in a proportion determined by the Council.15 This
resolution stated that those fees or expenses would be treated as “assessments”
pursuant to the code of regulations, and collected accordingly.16
The Council started charging the Chappells with its attorney’s fees as of May
24, 2021.17 On that date, the Council charged the Chappells $691.50 in attorney’s
fees with the explanation of “unit 9 non conform to repairs.”18 It continued to charge
the Chappells with attorney’s fees as they accrued.
Letters were sent to the Chappells19 and Riddle20 on June 1, 2021, stating that
the Chappells had until June 11, 2021, to replace the jalousie windows, fix the
bathroom floor, and obtain a rental permit. The letters warned that failure to
complete this work would result in a $100 fine and an additional $25 fine per day
14
D.I. 50, Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. A at 55.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
D.I. 51, Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. B.
18
Id. at 2.
19
D.I. 57, Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. H.
20
D.I. 58, Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. I.
8
until the Chappells complied.21 The letter included a ten-day period where the
Chappells could contest the fines in writing, which would entitle them to a hearing.
The letter to Riddle warned that unless she was able to convince the Chappells to
make the repairs, she and everyone from her agency would be banned from entering
the Ocean View premises beginning on June 12, 2021. A letter was also sent to the
tenants or occupants of the unit on that date, stating that their privileges to use the
common areas such as parking places and other open spaces would be suspended on
June 11, 2021.22
Although the Council stated in the June letter that it would not assess fines
until June 12, it issued a $100 fine against the Chappells on June 5, 2021.23 The
billing statement shows that this fine was made for “failure to comply by 6/4/21.”24
The Council also started charging the $25 daily fine on June 6, 2021, and charged
$225 on that date for the period of June 6 through June 14.25
21
D.I. 57, Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. H (“Council has determined that you have until Friday,
June 11, 2021 to take action to replace your windows, fix the flooring in the bathroom and to
obtain the appropriate rental permit. If you do not do so on or before that date, a fine in the amount
of $100.00 will be levied against you, and a further fine of $25.00 per day until all obligations are
completed, has been determined by the Council to be levied, and will be imposed beginning on
Saturday, June 12, 2021, and will continue until such time as you comply with your obligations.”).
22
D.I. 71, Opening Br. in Supp. of Pl.’s and Third-Party Def.’s Mot. for Partial Summ. J., Ex. G
at 58.
23
D.I. 51, Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. B at 2.
24
Id.
25
Id. (“Fine: $25 per diem until comply – 6/6/21-6/14/21”).
9
The Council began imposing interest at 2% per month beginning on June 30,
2021.26 Although the Chappells paid the standard condominium dues and other
assessments, the Council would subtract those payments from the total amount
owed, charge the Chappells a $75 late fee, and continue to charge interest.27
On July 2, 2021, the Association filed a notice and statement of lien for unpaid
maintenance fees and assessments with the Sussex County Recorder of Deeds.28 The
notice stated that the Association sought the lien for unpaid maintenance fees and
assessments, in addition to interest, reimbursement of costs, and attorney’s fees. The
amount due at the time of filing was $1,515.34, which included the cost for filing
the notice. The notice stated that the lien would not be terminated unless the total
was paid. The Association also filed with the Recorder of Deeds a notice of
continuing violation of declaration of covenants, conditions and restrictions on the
same day.29 The Association stated in this notice that the Chappells had violated the
governing documents “because replacement of the windows of the Unit [have] not
been made.”30 The notice was only to be terminated upon fixing the violation and
paying the Association’s filing fee.
26
Id.
27
See D.I. 27, Defs.’ Answer, at 15 (Ocean View claimed that all monies were applied to the oldest
outstanding balance, which would render dues and assessments as late even if paid on time).
28
D.I. 59, Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. J.
29
D.I. 71, Opening Br. in Supp. of Pl.’s and Third-Party Def.’s Mot. for Partial Summ. J., Ex. H
at 62.
30
Id.
10
On January 3, 2022, the Council’s attorney sent a letter to Riddle stating that
the ban against her and her agency from entering the premises was effective as of
the date of the letter.31 It stated that the ban was to run until the windows were
replaced, the bathroom flooring was fixed, and the rental permit was obtained.
The Council’s attorney sent a letter to the Chappells on March 31, 2022,
demanding payment of the “outstanding biannual assessments, late fees and other
charges,” owed in the amount of $12,093.15, which included the attorney fees for
preparing and mailing the letter.32 This letter placed emphasis on the Chappells’
failure to pay monthly assessments. It concluded that the continued failure to pay
could result in the institution of foreclosure proceedings on the unit.
On April 21, 2022, in response to a letter from an attorney on behalf of the
Chappells, the Council gave formal notice to inspect the unit on May 6, 2022.33 The
letter stated the Council was surprised to see the extent of work performed by the
Chappells, which was done without the Council’s approval. It also noted that the
window violation still existed, explaining that the window remained broken and in
the same condition it had been in for six years.
31
D.I. 60, Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. K.
32
D.I. 61, Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. L.
33
D.I. 62, Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. M.
11
The inspection report discussed the jalousie windows and noted additional
problems with the unit.34 For the issues with the jalousie windows, the inspection
report stated that the window at the southwest corner did not close, and the
windowpanes did not appear to stay in the metal frame. Additionally, the living room
jalousie windows did not have locking mechanisms. The report also noted that the
remedial repairs done to the bathroom flooring were not compliant with the standard
building code.
On May 17, 2022, the Council sent a cease-and-desist letter that stated that
the Chappells could not rent the unit until all the safety violations, including the
windows, were fixed.35 The Council claimed that the additional issues discovered in
the inspection were not only safety hazards, but also violations of the Dewey Beach
Rental Regulations.
On May 24, 2022, the Council adopted another resolution, which was titled
“Rental Rules.”36 This resolution provided various remedies for the Council in the
event a unit owner or his tenant were to violate certain rules. Those rules applicable
to this case stated that if a unit owner failed to pay any assessments or charges within
34
D.I. 63, Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. N (New problems with the unit included: (1) no GFCI
protection for the kitchen countertop electric receptacles, (2) the double-hung windows in the
bedroom and living room did not lock, (3) the double-hung window in the bathroom did not open,
(4) the smoke alarm in the hallway was not operational, (5) no smoke alarms were in the bedroom;
and (6) no grounded electric receptacle was in the kitchen).
35
D.I. 64, Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. O.
36
D.I. 50, Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. A at 57.
12
twenty days of its due date, or if the unit owner had an unresolved violation of the
governing documents, the unit could not be rented.37 If the unit was rented in spite
of the ban, the Council could take various actions including imposing a daily fine on
the unit owner at an amount determined by the Council until the tenant vacated.38
The resolution also entitled the Counsel to assess any fees or costs incurred relating
to the rental rules against the unit owner and, if the unit owner challenged the
enforceability of the rental rules, he would be liable to advance the Association’s
legal fees.39
The Association filed a collections suit in the Justice of the Peace Court
against the Chappells on June 15, 2022, seeking $17,029.35.40 On January 13, 2023,
the Association moved to dismiss the claim because the amount sought had
continued to accrue and exceeded the court’s jurisdictional limit.41 The court
dismissed the suit without prejudice.
The Chappells had their own inspection of the unit performed on February 2,
2023, which found many of the same issues as were found in the previous
inspection.42 In reference to the jalousie windows, the report stated that they had
37
Id. at 58-59.
38
Id. at 59.
39
Id. at 59-60.
40
D.I. 71, Opening Br. in Supp. of Pl.’s and Third-Party Def.’s Mot. for Partial Summ. J., Ex. I at
65-66.
41
D.I. 67, Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. R at 2.
42
D.I. 65, Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. P.
13
insect screens and only one windowpane needed to be re-installed. This inspection
agreed with the findings regarding the absence of locks on the jalousie windows,
repairs needed on the bathroom flooring, and the other newly discovered problems.
It made note, however, that many of the Council’s inspection report’s references to
the Town of Dewey Beach Safety Certificate or building code were incorrect or
could not be found.
Chappell filed suit against Ocean View on April 21, 2023, asserting the
following claims: (1) declaratory judgment, (2) intentional interference with
business relations and/or prospective business relations, (3) abuse of process, (4)
malicious prosecution, (5) slander of title; and (6) action to recover attorney’s fees.43
It filed an amended complaint on April 26. The Council filed a motion to dismiss
that this court denied. Ocean View then filed an answer, counterclaim, and a third-
party complaint adding David Chappell on November 17, 2023.44 The counterclaim
against Jeffrey Chappell and the third-party complaint against David Chappell
consisted of a debt action for the unpaid assessments and fees, including attorney
fees.
Ocean View filed a motion for summary judgment with an opening brief on
September 18, 2025.45 The Chappells filed a motion for partial summary judgment
43
D.I. 1, Compl.
44
D.I. 27, Defs.’ Answer.
45
D.I. 48, Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J.
14
with their opening brief, also on September 18, 2025.46 The Chappells filed an
answering brief to Ocean View’s motion on October 14, 2025.47 Ocean View filed
an answering brief to the Chappells’ motion on October 20, 2025.48 The Association,
in its capacity as a counterclaimant and third-party plaintiff, filed an answering brief
to the Chappells’ motion on that date also.49 Ocean View filed a reply brief in support
of its motion on November 3, 2025.50 The Chappells submitted a reply brief in
support of their motion on November 3, 2025.51 Oral argument was heard by the
court on June 4, 2026.52 On August 4, 2026, after a request for clarification from this
court, the Chappells confirmed that they were withdrawing their claims for abuse of
process and slander of title.53
THE PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS
A. Ocean View’s Claims in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment.
Ocean View asserts that its governing documents, the DUPA, and the
Delaware Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act (“DUCIOA”) grant it the
power to levy fines and assessments to force the Chappells to make the necessary
repairs to their unit. Ocean View contends that after many years of attempting to
46
D.I. 70, Pl. and Third-Party Def.’s Mot. for Partial Summ. J.
47
D.I. 72, Pl. and Third-Party Def.’s Answering Br. in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot.
48
D.I. 75, Defs.’ Answering Br. in Opp’n to Pl. and Third-Party Def.’s Mot.
49
D.I. 74, Counterclaimant and Third-Party Pl.’s Answering Br. in Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot.
50
D.I. 79, Defs.’ Reply Br. in Supp. for their Mot. for Summ. J.
51
D.I. 82, Pl. and Third-Party Def.’s Reply Br. in Supp. of their Mot. for Partial Summ. J.
52
D.I. 89.
53
D.I. 92.
15
work toward a solution with the Chappells, it only began to levy fines to gain their
cooperation. It states that its actions are not just an issue with the windows, but about
years of noncompliance with repairs. It asserts that it has maximum flexibility to
gain compliance and its authority to levy fines is inherent in its power as the fiduciary
of owners to manage the business and affairs of the condominium. Ocean View
states it is the public policy of Delaware to allow fines as appropriate to gain
compliance, and it cites to the DUCIOA for support.
In arguing that it did not act in an arbitrary or capricious manner, Ocean View
states that it began to assess fines against the Chappells after five years of warnings
and with notice and an opportunity to be heard. Ocean View further argues that the
Chappells were aware that the unit was in disrepair since 2016, and that this disrepair
did not meet the code requirements to obtain a rental permit for the Town of Dewey
Beach.
On the matter of attorney’s fees, Ocean View asserts that determination of
whether assessment of said fees is arbitrary and capricious or are being used in an
overbearing or harmful manner is a question of fact.
As for the lien, Ocean View claims that it filed the lien in response to the
Chappells’ failure to pay the condominium dues, assessments, expenses, costs, fees,
and interest. Ocean View claims that the governing documents, the DUPA, and the
16
DUCIOA allow it to pursue liens to enforce payment or compliance with governing
documents.
B. Ocean View’s Response to the Chappell’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
Ocean View states that Chappell’s declaratory judgment claim should be
dismissed because it has demonstrated that no controversy exists as to its right to
impose assessments, fees, costs, and fines, and to pursue liens. Ocean View argues
that the governing documents, the DUPA, and the DUCIOA all support Ocean
View’s ability to collect assessments, levy fines, and pursue liens
Ocean View alleges that Chappell’s interference with a business opportunity
claim should be dismissed because it lacks factual support. Ocean View argues that
Chappell made no effort to identify a specific party that was dissuaded from entering
a business relationship with Chappell because of Ocean View. Ocean View contends
that rather than intentionally interfering, it tried to work with the Chappells to
remedy the problems. It states that the Chappells’ failure to make the proper repairs
is the reason why it restricted their ability to rent the unit pursuant to the governing
documents.
As to Chappell’s abuse of process claim, Ocean View alleges that it was fully
authorized to legally assess fines against unit owners and to file and execute liens.
Ocean View states that the DUPA and the DUCIOA support these actions, thus, this
claim should also be dismissed.
17
Ocean View alleges that Chappell’s malicious prosecution claim should be
dismissed because he presented no facts or evidence to support it. Ocean View
explains that the action filed in the Justice of the Peace Court was not dismissed in
the Chappells’ favor, but rather it was dismissed without prejudice because the
amount in controversy was greater than the jurisdictional limit for that court.
On Chappell’s slander of title claim, Ocean View contends that this claim
cannot stand because Chappell has not provided evidence showing that the lien or
alleged amounts owed were inaccurate or without legal basis. Ocean View argues
that it has shown that it had the right to assess fines, costs, and attorney’s fees, and
to execute a lien. Again, Ocean View states that its governing documents, the DUPA,
and the DUCIOA support these contentions. Ocean View alleges that Chappell also
has not asserted special damages, which is required for this claim.
Finally, Ocean View argues that its governing documents and the DUCIOA
allow a prevailing party to an action to be awarded attorney’s fees. Ocean View
concludes that because Chappell cannot succeed on any of his claims, Ocean View
will prevail and is entitled to attorney’s fees.
Although Ocean View heavily relied on the DUCIOA in its briefings, it
admitted at oral argument that the DUCIOA does not apply because it was never
adopted by the governing documents. Nonetheless, it still maintained that its
arguments were supported by the governing documents and the DUPA.
18
C. The Chappells’ Response to the Council’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
The Chappells’ argument rests primarily on Ocean View’s lack of support in
the governing documents and statutory authority to charge fines and attorney’s fees.
Likewise, the Chappells also state that the lien filed was done without authority or
merit. It is the Chappells’ position that Ocean View’s efforts rest on an insistence of
replacing the jalousie windows, not on maintenance or repairs, to the point that such
efforts constitute bullying.
The Chappells argue that the governing documents and statutes do not give
Ocean View the authority it claims to have. The parties have stipulated that the
windows are not considered common elements, therefore, the Chappells state that
there are no provisions giving Ocean View the authority to demand replacement of
the jalousie windows with a type of window preferred by the Council. There are also
no provisions that give Ocean View the authority to impose fines or collect
attorney’s fees. The Chappells argue that they were unable to find any provision
under the governing documents that would give Ocean View the authority to stop a
unit owner from renting the unit or prohibit guests from using it.
The Chappells address many of the letters and arguments raised by Ocean
View. The Chappells state that the initial quote for the window replacements in 2015
was requested by a Council member, but there was no information about the
windows being in a dangerous or deteriorating condition. Further, the Chappells
19
argue that the gap in time from the 2016 email to the 2020 email can infer that the
issues were either not serious or were repaired.54 The Chappells contend that the
2020 email shows that the windows were repaired, but it was not to Ocean View’s
satisfaction. The Chappells claim they were never given the option to simply repair
the windows because Ocean View always demanded replacement.
The Chappells additionally included a copy of their rental permit from the
Town of Dewey Beach that was effective and valid from April 1, 2021, through
April 30, 2022.55 The Chappells argue that this permit indicates that the unit was safe
to rent, despite Ocean View’s contentions that the windows were a safety and
maintenance issue.
The Chappells state that an inspection of the unit was never performed until
one year after the bullying began. They assert that the inspection did not call for the
replacement of the windows but instead referenced a need for repair. The Chappells
argue that this inspection should be excluded from the court’s review because Ocean
View did not identify any expert witnesses to testify.
The Chappells also assert that Ocean View uses the term assessments in a way
that incorporates all fines, attorney’s fees, and regularly incurred dues and
assessments. They allege that the term is defined in the governing documents and
54
See D.I. 72, Pl. and Third-Party Def.’s Answering Br., Ex. K at 64 (Chappell’s account statement
shows he replaced two panels on a front jalousie window on November 13, 2020).
55
Id., Ex. J at 62.
20
the DUCIOA as “common expenses of the community as assessed to the owners.”56
The Chappells argue that they were never behind in paying the condominium dues
or assessments. Rather, they refused to pay the fines, attorney’s fees, and interest
that Ocean View included under the assessments label. The Chappells state this was
evident from the billing statement Ocean View produced as an exhibit.
D. The Chappells’ Motion for Summary Judgment.
The Chappells seek summary judgment on the declaratory judgment claim.
The Chappells argue that there is an actual controversy because Ocean View
recorded a lien and asserted a debt action against them, which they claim is not owed.
The Chappells request this court to declare that the fines, attorney’s fees, and the
lien that Ocean View imposed are improper. The Chappells state that if the court
finds in their favor on this claim, they will be entitled to attorney’s fees as the
prevailing party pursuant to the governing documents and the DUCIOA.
The Chappells also seek summary judgment on the intentional interference
with business relations and malicious prosecution claims and further seek to dismiss
Ocean View’s counterclaim and third-party claims. The Chappells do not discuss the
abuse of process claim in their opening brief or responsive briefs and do not address
the slander of title claim in their opening brief. The Chappells note, however, that
success on the tort claims depends on the success of declaratory judgment.
56
D.I. 72, Pl. and Third-Party Def.’s Answering Br., at 16.
21
The Chappells allege they have sufficiently proven the elements of intentional
interference with business relations. The Chappells assert that they consistently used
the unit as a rental property, producing $8,100 in gross rental income in 2020. The
Chappells allege that the letters sent demanding rent to stop were intentionally sent
for the purpose of obtaining their compliance in replacing the windows. The
Chappells state that this was the proximate cause of their loss of income and caused
damages as a result.
The Chappells allege that they have also sufficiently met the necessary
elements for malicious prosecution. The Chappells claim that the first three elements
were met by Ocean View filing suit in the Justice of the Peace Court based on fines
and attorney’s fees, which it subsequently dismissed. The Chappells state the fourth
and fifth elements are met because Ocean View did not have the authority to assess
fines or attorney’s fees against them. Therefore, Ocean View’s filing of suit was
unjustified and used to force the Chappells to replace the jalousie windows. The
Chappells state they suffered damages as a result.
At oral argument, it appeared the Chappells were not opposed to and were
willing to withdraw their claims of abuse of process and slander of title. This
withdrawal was confirmed in a letter from their counsel dated August 4, 2026.57
57
D.I. 92.
22
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Upon a motion for summary judgment under Superior Court Civil Rule 56(c),
the movant must establish “that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” 58 The movant
bears the initial burden of “demonstrating that the undisputed facts support its claims
or defenses.”59 Once this burden is met, it will shift to the “non-moving party to
show that there are material issues of fact to be resolved by the ultimate fact-
finder.”60 The court must examine the record in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party, however, “when the facts permit a reasonable person to draw but one
inference, the question becomes one for decision as a matter of law.”61 Further, “the
mere filing of a cross motion for summary judgment does not serve as a waiver of
the movant’s right to assert the existence of a factual dispute as to the other party’s
motion.”62
DISCUSSION
The cross-motions before this court rest on the question of whether Ocean
View acted within its authority when it imposed fines and attorney’s fees based on
the Chappells’ refusal to replace the jalousie windows and repair other hazards in
58
Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c); see, e.g., Quality Elec. Co., Inc. v. E. States Constr. Serv., Inc., 1995
WL 379125, at *2 (Del. 1995).
59
Landing v. Builders FirstSource, Inc., 2025 WL 2320341, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 12, 2025).
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
United Vanguard Fund, Inc. v. TakeCare, Inc., 693 A.2d 1076, 1079 (Del. 1997).
23
their unit. Because the Chappells’ tort claims can be disposed of at this stage, the
court will address those first. The declaratory relief sought by the Chappells,
however, must be granted. As a result, Ocean View’s debt action is moot and neither
party will be awarded attorney’s fees.
A. The Chappells’ Tort Claims.
Because the Chappells have withdrawn their abuse of process and slander of
title claims, the court is left to consider the remaining intentional interference with
business relations and malicious prosecution claims. The court finds that certain
elements have not been met for both claims and, therefore, partially grants Ocean
View’s motion for summary judgment.
1. Intentional Interference with Business Relations
The elements for a claim of intentional interference with business relations or
prospective contractual relations include: “(a) the reasonable probability of a
business opportunity, (b) the intentional interference by defendant with the
opportunity, (c) proximate causation, and (d) damages.”63
Regarding the reasonable probability element, prospective business relations
include those which have potential, pecuniary value to a plaintiff. 64 A “mere
perception of a prospective business relationship or contract will not form the basis
63
Lipson v. Anesthesia Services, P.A., 790 A.2d 1261, 1285 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 3, 2001).
64
Id.
24
of a bona fide expectancy.”65 A plaintiff “must identify a specific party who was
prepared to [enter] into a business relationship but was dissuaded from doing so by
the defendant . . . .”66
In Lipson v. Anesthesia Services, P.A., the court determined that the plaintiffs
identified several viable prospective business relations.67 For example, the plaintiffs
identified nine surgeons who requested their services and were consistently
prevented from scheduling with them.68 The plaintiffs also identified candidates
seeking employment that were threatened and given misinformation by the
defendant about the plaintiffs.69
In contrast, the court found in Kimbleton v. White that the plaintiff did not
meet the reasonable probability element.70 The plaintiff alleged that the defendants
interfered with a class of “all prospective home buyers.”71 The court reasoned that
the plaintiff did not identify any specific contracts with prospective home buyers that
were lost as a result of the defendant’s actions, “and fails to cite any case where such
a nebulous, unascertainable class was found sufficient to satisfy the first element of
the tortious interference claim.”72
65
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
66
Organovo Hldg., Inc. v. Dimitrov, 162 A.3d 102, 122 (Del. Ch. 2017).
67
790 A.2d at 1286.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
2014 WL 4386760, at *8 (D.Del. 2014).
71
Id.
72
Id.
25
Here, as in Kimbleton, the Chappells have not identified any specific tenant
they planned to enter business relations with that were halted by Ocean View’s
actions. Rather, the Chappells infer that a prospective business expectation exists
due to their previous success in renting the unit. Without identification of a specific
prospective tenant, however, this element cannot be met. Therefore, the claim cannot
stand.
2. Malicious Prosecution
Delaware courts disfavor malicious prosecution claims and carefully
scrutinize them.73 For these claims, a plaintiff must prove: “1) the institution of civil
proceedings; 2) without probable cause; 3) with malice; 4) termination of the
proceedings in the aggrieved party’s favor; and 5) damages which were inflicted
upon the aggrieved party by seizure of property or other special injury.”74 On the
element of probable cause, “[a] person has probable cause for bringing a civil suit if
he reasonably believes that he has a good chance of establishing it to the satisfaction
of the Court or the jury.”75 To meet the element of malice, “the act must have been
done with a wrongful or improper motive or with a wanton disregard for the rights
of that person against whom the act is directed.”76 “The bare allegation that
73
Nix v. Sawyer, 466 A.2d 407, 411 (Del. Super. Ct. July 21, 1983).
74
Id.
75
Nevins v. Bryan, 2005 WL 2249520, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 8, 2005).
76
Id. (