Minnie Sarwal v. Nephrosant, Inc.
CourtCourt of Chancery of Delaware
Date FiledOctober 27, 2026
DocketC.A. No. 2026-0756-LM
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
COURT OF CHANCERY
OF THE
STATE OF DELAWARE
LOREN MITCHELL LEONARD L. WILLIAMS JUSTICE CENTER
MAGISTRATE IN CHANCERY 500 N. KING STREET, SUITE 11400
WILMINGTON, DELAWARE 19801
Date Submitted: October 2, 2026
Confidential Final Report: October 19, 2026
Public Version 1: October 27, 2026
Via File & ServeXpress
Michael A. Pittenger, Esquire Thomas Uebler, Esquire
Nicholas D. Mozal, Esquire Kathleen A. Murphy, Esquire
Callan R. Jackson, Esquire Terisa A. Shoremount, Esquire
Charles P. Wood, Esquire McCollom D’emilio Smith Uebler LLC
Ryan M. Ellingson, Esquire 2751 Centerville Road, Suite 401
Lauren Angelina, Esquire Wilmington, DE 19808
Potter Anderson & Corroon LLP
1313 North Market Street Hercules
Plaza, 7th Floor
Wilmington, DE 19801
RE: Minnie Sarwal v. Nephrosant, Inc.
C.A. No. 2026-0756-LM
Dear Counsel:
This letter resolves the pending cross-motions for summary judgment. The
cross motions present three issues under the parties’ Indemnification Agreement: (1)
whether Section 12(d)’s success requirement limits Plaintiff’s right under Section 8
to advancement of expenses incurred in defending claims asserted by the Company;
1
This report was originally issued under seal and the parties were given an opportunity to
request redactions within five (5) days. To date, neither party has requested redactions of
the final report. Thus, this report is being reissued publicly with the same findings and
recommendations.
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(2) whether Plaintiff may receive advancement for work that supported both her
affirmative claims and her defense of the Company’s claims; and (3) the extent to
which Plaintiff may recover fees incurred enforcing her advancement rights in this
action.
For the reasons explained in this letter, I find that Section 12(d)’s success
requirement governs only the ultimate indemnification of expenses incurred in
enforcing rights under the Agreement. It does not make success in an underlying
action a condition to advancement under Section 8. Plaintiff is therefore entitled to
advancement of the fees and expenses she has reasonably incurred defending claims
the Company asserted against her, subject to her undertaking to repay those amounts
if it is ultimately determined that she is not entitled to indemnification. That includes
fees for work that also advanced her affirmative claims, to the extent the work was
reasonably necessary to her defense. She is not entitled to advancement of fees
attributable solely to her affirmative claims.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is granted in part.
Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment is granted only to the extent it
seeks a determination that fees attributable solely to Plaintiff’s affirmative claims
are not advanceable and is otherwise denied. Plaintiff is entitled to fees-on-fees in
proportion to her success in this action. This is my final report.
Minnie Sarwal v. Nephrosant, Inc.,
C.A. No. 2026-0756-LM
October 19, 2026
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I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Nephrosant, Inc. (“Defendant” or the “Company”) is a Delaware corporation
that was formed to develop and commercialize a non-invasive urine test known as
QSant.2 Dr. Minnie Sarwal (“Plaintiff”) formed the Company on March 7, 2017, and
began serving on the Company’s Board of Directors (the “Board”) and as Chief
Executive Officer (“CEO”).3
A. The Indemnification Agreement
Plaintiff and the Company executed an Indemnification Agreement (“the
Agreement”) on October 29, 2020.4 The Agreement identifies Plaintiff as the
“Indemnitee” and states that the Company will indemnify and advance expenses5
2
Docket Item (“D.I.”) 1 ¶ 19; D.I. 15 at 2.
3
D.I. 1 ¶ 19; D.I. 13 at 14.
4
D.I. 1 ¶5.
5
See D.I. 16, Ex. 1( The Agreement defines expenses (hereinafter “Expenses”) as “all
reasonable and actually incurred attorneys’ fees, retainers, court costs, transcript costs, fees
and costs of experts, witness fees, travel expenses, duplicating costs, printing and binding
costs, telephone charges, postage, delivery service fees, and all other disbursements or
expenses of the types customarily incurred in connection with prosecuting, defending,
preparing to prosecute or defend, investigating, being or preparing to be a witness in, or
otherwise participating in, a Proceeding. Expenses also include (i) Expenses incurred in
connection with any appeal resulting from any Proceeding, ’’’, and (ii) for purposes of
Section 12(d), Expenses incurred by Indemnitee in connection with the interpretation,
enforcement or defense of Indemnitee’s rights under this Agreement or under any directors’
and officers’ liability insurance policies maintained by the Company… .”).
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incurred by Plaintiff in any Proceeding 6, subject to certain limitations and
exclusions. Section 3 of the Agreement addresses indemnification where Plaintiff is,
or is threatened to be made, a party to a Proceeding by or in the right of the Company.
Section 3 of the Agreement states:
The Company shall indemnify Indemnitee in accordance with the
provisions of this Section 3 if Indemnitee is, or is threatened to be made,
a party to or a participant in any Proceeding by or in the right of the
Company to procure a judgment in its favor. Pursuant to this Section 3,
Indemnitee shall be indemnified to the fullest extent permitted by
applicable law against all Expenses actually and reasonably incurred by
Indemnitee or on Indemnitee’s behalf in connection with such
Proceeding or any claim, issue or matter therein, if Indemnitee acted in
good faith and in a manner he or she reasonably believed to be in or not
opposed to the best interests of the Company. No indemnification for
Expenses shall be made under this Section 3 in respect of any claim,
issue or matter as to which Indemnitee shall have been adjudged by a
court of competent jurisdiction to be liable to the Company, unless and
only to the extent that the Delaware Court of Chancery or any court in
which the Proceeding was brought shall determine upon application
that, despite the adjudication of liability but in view of all the
6
See D.I. 16, Ex. 1 at 3 (The Agreement defines ‘Proceeding’ broadly to include “any
threatened, pending or completed action, suit, arbitration, mediation, alternate dispute
resolution mechanism, investigation, inquiry, administrative hearing or proceeding,
whether brought in the right of the Company or otherwise and whether of a civil, criminal,
administrative or investigative nature, including any appeal therefrom… in which
Indemnitee was, is or will be involved as a party, a potential party, a non-party witness or
otherwise by reason of (i) the fact that Indemnitee is or was a director or officer of the
Company, (ii) any action taken by Indemnitee or any action or inaction on Indemnitee’s
part while acting as a director or officer of the Company, or (iii) the fact that he or she is
or was serving at the request of the Company as a director, trustee, general partner,
managing member, officer, employee, agent or fiduciary of the Company or any other
Enterprise….”).
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circumstances of the case, Indemnitee is fairly and reasonably entitled
to indemnification for such expenses as the Delaware Court of
Chancery or such other court shall deem proper. 7
Section 8 of the Agreement addresses when the Company is obliged to make
advancements to Plaintiff and states:
The Company shall advance the Expenses incurred by Indemnitee in
connection with any Proceeding prior to its final disposition, and such
advancement shall be made as soon as reasonably practicable, but in any event
no later than 90 days, after the receipt by the Company of a written statement
or statements requesting such advances from time to time (which shall include
invoices received by Indemnitee in connection with such Expenses but, in the
case of invoices in connection with legal services, any references to legal work
performed or to expenditure made that would cause Indemnitee to waive any
privilege accorded by applicable law shall not be included with the invoice).
… Indemnitee hereby undertakes to repay any advance to the extent that it is
ultimately determined that Indemnitee is not entitled to be indemnified by the
Company. This Section 8 shall not apply to the extent advancement is
prohibited by law and shall not apply to any Proceeding (or any part of any
Proceeding) for which indemnity is not permitted under this Agreement, but
shall apply to any Proceeding (or any part of any Proceeding) referenced in
Section 7(b) or 7(c) prior to a determination that Indemnitee is not entitled to
be indemnified by the Company.8
The Agreement also identifies circumstances where Plaintiff is
excluded from receiving indemnification and advancement. Section 7 of the
Agreement states:
7
D.I. 16, Ex. 1 at 4.
8
D.I. 16, Ex. 1 at 5-6.
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Notwithstanding any provision in this Agreement, the Company
shall not be obligated under this Agreement to make any indemnity in
connection with any Proceeding (or any part of any Proceeding): (a) for
which payment has actually been made to or on behalf of Indemnitee
under any statute, insurance policy, indemnity provision, vote or
otherwise, except with respect to any excess beyond the amount paid;
… (d) initiated by Indemnitee, including any Proceeding (or any part of
any Proceeding) initiated by Indemnitee against the Company or its
directors, officers, employees, agents or other indemnitees, unless (i)
the Company’s board of directors authorized the Proceeding (or the
relevant part of the Proceeding) prior to its initiation, (ii) the Company
provides the indemnification, in its sole discretion, pursuant to the
powers vested in the Company under applicable law, (iii) otherwise
authorized in Section 12(d) or (iv) otherwise required by applicable
law; or (e) if prohibited by applicable law. 9
The relevant portions of Section 12 of the Agreement sets out other
conditions and limitations to indemnification or advancement, and states:
(a) Subject to Section 12(e), in the event that (i) a determination is
made pursuant to Section 10 of this Agreement that Indemnitee
is not entitled to indemnification under this Agreement, (ii)
advancement of Expenses is not timely made pursuant to Section
8 or 12(d) of this Agreement, (iii) no determination of
entitlement to indemnification shall have been made pursuant to
Section 10 of this Agreement within 90 days after the later of the
receipt by the Company of the request for indemnification or the
final disposition of the Proceeding, (iv) payment of
indemnification pursuant to this Agreement is not made (A)
within ten days after a determination has been made that
Indemnitee is entitled to indemnification or (B) with respect to
indemnification pursuant to Sections 4, 5 and 12(d) of this
Agreement, within 30 days after receipt by the Company of a
9
D.I. 1, Ex. A at 5.
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written request therefor, or (v) the Company or any other person
or entity takes or threatens to take any action to declare this
Agreement void or unenforceable, or institutes any litigation or
other action or proceeding designed to deny, or to recover from,
Indemnitee the benefits provided or intended to be provided to
Indemnitee hereunder, Indemnitee shall be entitled to an
adjudication by a court of competent jurisdiction of his or her
entitlement to such indemnification or advancement of
Expenses….
(b) … In the event that a determination shall have been made
pursuant to Section 10 of this Agreement that Indemnitee is not
entitled to indemnification, any judicial proceeding or arbitration
commenced pursuant to this Section 12 shall be conducted in all
respects as a de novo trial, or arbitration, on the merits, and
Indemnitee shall not be prejudiced by reason of that adverse
determination. In any judicial proceeding or arbitration
commenced pursuant to this Section 12, the Company shall, to
the fullest extent not prohibited by law, have the burden of
proving Indemnitee is not entitled to indemnification or
advancement of Expenses, as the case may be.
(c) …
(d) To the extent not prohibited by law, the Company shall
indemnify Indemnitee against all Expenses that are incurred by
Indemnitee in connection with any action for indemnification or
advancement of Expenses from the Company under this
Agreement or under any directors’ and officers’ liability
insurance policies maintained by the Company to the extent
Indemnitee is successful in such action, and, if requested by
Indemnitee, shall (as soon as reasonably practicable, but in any
event no later than 90 days, after receipt by the Company of a
written request therefor) advance such Expenses to Indemnitee,
subject to the provisions of Section 8.
(e) Notwithstanding anything in this Agreement to the contrary, no
determination as to entitlement to indemnification shall be
Minnie Sarwal v. Nephrosant, Inc.,
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required to be made prior to the final disposition of the
Proceeding.10
B. The First Delaware Action
On March 11, 2022, Plaintiff resigned from her position as CEO and became
the Company’s Chief Scientific Advisor, pursuant to a transition agreement between
the parties. 11 The next month, the Company’s Board of Directors created a special
committee to investigate issues concerning the QSant test (the “Investigation”).12
Plaintiff alleges that the Investigation produced no adverse findings or action against
Plaintiff. 13 Defendant alleges that the Investigation found that Plaintiff committed
serious wrongdoing and caused significant harm to the Company.14 The
investigation concluded in June 2022 and, the next month, Plaintiff resigned from
her positions as Chief Scientific Advisor and as a director of the Company.15
On February 21, 2023, Plaintiff, represented by Bayard P.A., and later Potter
Anderson & Corroon LLP (“PAC”), filed a claim against the Company in this Court,
10
D.I. 16, Ex. 1 at 9-10.
11
D.I. 1 ¶ 19.
12
D.I. 15 at 7.
13
D.I. 1 ¶ 20.
14
D.I. 13 at 15.
15
D.I. 1 ¶ 19.
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seeking indemnification for legal fees and expenses incurred related to the
Investigation (the “First Delaware Action”). 16 The Company responded on March
27, 2023, asserting counterclaims (the “Counterclaims”), alleging that: (1) Plaintiff
did not act in good faith and in the best interests of the Company regarding the
Investigation; (2) the Company is entitled to set off any amount owed to Plaintiff;
and (3) Plaintiff breached fiduciary duties owed to the Company. Defendant also
asserted a counterclaim alleging that Plaintiff committed computer-related offenses
under 11 Del. C. §§ 931 et seq. but later removed this claim after the Court dismissed
it.17 A trial was held on May 26 and 27, 2026 in the First Delaware Action.18
Subsequently, the parties participated in a post-trial oral argument on October 9,
2026. 19
The Company’s Board of Directors did not authorize the First Delaware
Action before Plaintiff’s initiation of the action.20
16
D.I. 1 ¶ 21.
17
D.I. 1 ¶ 21; D.I. 15 at 7.
18
D.I. 15 at 10.
19
D.I. 15 at 10.
20
D.I. 15 at 7.
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C. The California Action
On February 21, 2023, Plaintiff, represented by Alto Litigation, initiated
arbitration proceedings in California in order to seek severance benefits from the
Company (the “California Action”).21 On November 12, 2024, the Company
responded by filing a cross-complaint and asserting eight cross-claims (the “Cross-
Claims”), including (i) declaratory relief, (ii) breach of contract, (iii)
misappropriation of trade secrets, (iv) unauthorized computer access and fraud, (v)
violation of Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, (vi) conversion, (vii) breach of
fiduciary duties, and (viii) unfair competition. 22 The Company filed an additional
Cross-Claim on December 30, 2024, asserting tortious interference with prospective
economic advantage.23
The Company’s Board of Directors did not authorize the California Action
before Plaintiff’s initiation of proceedings.24
21
D.I. 1 ¶ 23; D.I. 15 at 8.
22
D.I. 1 ¶ 23; D.I. 15 at 8.
23
D.I. 1 ¶ 23; D.I. 15 at 8.
24
D.I. 16 at 8.
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D. The Demands for Advancement
On February 26, 2026, PAC, on behalf of Plaintiff, made a letter demand for
advancement upon the Company, seeking $221,286.62 for legal fees and expenses
incurred in defending against the Counterclaims in the First Delaware Action. 25 PAC
also sought advancement of legal fees and expenses incurred in defending against
the Cross-Claims in the California Action.26 The letter stated that Plaintiff was not
seeking advancement of fees and expenses related to Plaintiff’s affirmative claims
for indemnification in the First Delaware Action, at the time. 27
Between March and June of 2026, Plaintiff made four additional demands for
advancement upon the Company, seeking attorneys’ fees and expenses incurred in
defending against the Counterclaims in the First Delaware Action and the Cross-
Claims in the California Action.28 The demands were respectively dated: March 13,
2026; March 17, 2026; April 17, 2026; and June 2, 2026.29
25
D.I. 1 ¶ 27; D.I. 1, Ex. B.
26
D.I. 1 ¶ 27. Ex. 6.
27
D.I. 1 ¶ 28; D.I. 15 at 8-9.
28
D.I. 1 ¶¶ 30– 36; D.I. 15 at 9.
29
D.I. 1 ¶¶ 30– 36; D.I. 15 at 9.
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On May 29, 2026, the Company responded to Plaintiff’s demands by denying
that Plaintiff was entitled to indemnification due to bad faith conduct and because
Plaintiff initiated the proceedings at issue. 30 Plaintiff alleges that the Company’s
stated reasons for denial are without merit. 31
E. Procedural Posture
Plaintiff initiated this action on June 8, 2026, seeking advancement and
indemnification of expenses incurred from the First Delaware Action and the
California Action (together, the “Underlying Actions”), as well as fees-on-fees.32
Defendant filed an Answer on July 2, 2026, asserting that the Complaint failed to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, that Plaintiff’s claims are barred
under the Agreement, and that Plaintiff’s claims are not yet ripe. 33
On August 21, 2026, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and
Defendant cross-moved for Summary Judgment.34 On October 2, 2026, the Court
30
D.I. 16 at 9-10.
31
D.I. 1 ¶ 35.
32
See D.I. 1.
33
See D.I. 13.
34
See D.I. 15; D.I. 16.
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October 19, 2026
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held oral argument on the parties’ Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment and took
the matter under advisement. 35
II. ANALYSIS
A. Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment
Plaintiff and the Company agree that the Underlying Actions fall within the types
of Proceedings that may be advanced under the Agreement, and that the attorney’s
fees and costs incurred in the Underlying Actions fall within the types of Expenses
that may be advanced under the Agreement. 36 The parties divide the attorneys’ fees
and expenses for which Plaintiff seeks advancement into three categories: (1) solely
related to affirmative claims in the Underlying Actions (“Affirmative Fees”); (2)
addressing both Plaintiff’s affirmative claims and the Counterclaims and Cross-
Claims asserted in the Underlying Actions (“Mixed Fees”); and (3) solely related to
the Counterclaims and Cross-Claims asserted in the Underlying Actions (“Defensive
Fees”).37 At oral argument, the parties asked the Court to determine (i) whether
Plaintiff is entitled to advancement for Expenses incurred in connection with the
First Delaware Action; (ii) whether Plaintiff is entitled to Mixed-Fees; and (iii)
35
D.I. 27.
36
Transcript of Oral Argument (“Tr.”) at 5.
37
Tr. at 26-27.
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whether Plaintiff is entitled to fees-on-fees for this proceeding.38 The parties also
agree that under Section 12(b) of the Agreement, the Company bears the burden to
show that Plaintiff is not entitled to advancement. 39
1. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is only appropriate where the record shows no genuine issue
of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.40
Under Court of Chancery Rule 56(i), where parties have cross-moved for summary
judgment, without disputing any material fact, the Court may consider the motions
as a stipulation for decision on the merits based on the record submitted with the
motions.41 For advancement claims, the scope of such proceedings is generally
summary in nature and limited to entitlement based on the “corporation’s own
uniquely crafted advancement provisions.”42
38
Tr. at 5-6.
39
Tr. at 5.
40
Ct. Ch. R. 56(c); LaPoint v. AmerisourceBergen Corp., 970 A.2d 185, 191 (Del. 2009).
41
Ct. Ch. R. 56(i).
42
Homestore, Inc. v. Tafeen, 888 A.2d 204, 213 (Del. 2005); see AHS N.M. Holdings, Inc.
v. Healthsource, Inc., 2007 Del. Ch. at *11, 2007 WL 431051; Rhodes v. bioMerieux, Inc.,
2024 WL 669034, at *7 (Del. Ch. Feb. 19, 2024) (“Summary judgment is an appropriate
way to resolve advancement disputes because ‘the relevant question turns on the
application of the terms of the corporate instruments setting forth the purported right to
advancement and the pleadings in the proceedings for which advancement is sought.’”).
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2. Delaware Law Allows Corporations To Create Contractual
Prerequisites To Advancement
Corporations may specify terms and conditions upon which officials may receive
advancement through contract.43 “In determining whether to award advancement,
the Court will look to the plain meaning of the advancement provisions in the
governing instruments.” 44 Accordingly, when analyzing a corporation’s agreement
to provide advancement, a court applies the same principles used in construing and
interpreting other contracts.45 The right to advancement is contractual, governed by
the terms of the parties’ operative agreement.46 As such, whether a party is entitled
to advancement will depend on the language that the parties chose to include in the
governing agreement. 47 Those provisions, however, are read against the settled
principle that advancement is a right distinct from, and narrower than,
indemnification: it is a right to have defense expenses paid as they are incurred,
before the merits are resolved, subject to repayment if the indemnitee is ultimately
43
Gorodetskiy v. Honeywell International Inc., 2026 WL 1091872, at *3 (Del. Ch. Feb. 3,
2026)(citing Homestore, 888 A.2d at 212).
44
Rhodes v. bioMerieux, Inc., 2024 WL 669034, at *7 (Del. Ch. Feb. 19, 2024).
45
Gorodetskiy, 2026 WL 1091872, at *3.
46
Shawn T. Kaleta v. GSP Prime Holdings, LLC, 2026 WL 1481878 at *8.
47
Id.
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found not entitled to indemnification.48 Because that right exists to fund a defense
while the merits remain unresolved, the Court will not read lightly an advancement
provision to require the indemnitee to prevail on the merits first.
The Court will determine whether the advancement sought falls within the
advancement provisions the parties adopted.49 Here, Plaintiff and the Company
dispute whether Plaintiff’s claim for advancement in connection with the First
Delaware Action satisfies the requirements set by the Agreement.50 Resolution of
that issue will turn on the language of the relevant provisions and the nature of the
claims asserted in the Underlying Actions.
3. The Structure Of The Indemnification Agreement
The Agreement establishes a framework governing advancement of Expenses.
Section 8 of the Agreement obligates the Company to advance Expenses for covered
Proceedings to Plaintiff, once Plaintiff makes a written request for such
advancement. 51 Section 7(d) relieves the Company of its obligations with respect to
48
Homestore, 888 A.2d at 212; Kaung v. Cole Nat’l Corp., 884 A.2d 500, (Del. 2005);
Reddy v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 2002 WL 1358761, at *5 (Del. Ch. June 18, 2002), aff’d,
820 A.2d 371 (Del. 2003).
49
Homestore, Inc., 888 A.2d at 212.
50
D.I. 21 at 11.
51
See D.I. 16, Ex. 1 at 5-6.
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any Proceeding, “or any part of any Proceeding,” initiated by Plaintiff without prior
Board authorization, unless, among other exceptions, the indemnity is “otherwise
authorized in Section 12(d).”52 Section 8, in turn, provides that the advancement
obligation does not apply to any Proceeding “(or any part of any Proceeding)” for
which indemnity is not permitted under the Agreement. 53 Section 12(d) requires the
Company to indemnify Plaintiff for Expenses incurred in actions she brings to
enforce her rights to indemnification or advancement under the Agreement “to the
extent [that Plaintiff] is successful in such action[.]”. 54 Finally, Section 12(e)
provides that, “[n]otwithstanding anything in this Agreement to the contrary,” “no
determination as to entitlement to indemnification shall be required to be made prior
to the final disposition of the Proceeding.” 55
The nature of the parties’ dispute is based on how these provisions interact.
Plaintiff contends that Section 8 and Section 12 entitle her to advancement of
attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in connection with any action for indemnification
or advancement of Expenses from the Company, without a showing of success on
52
D.I. 16, Ex. 1 at 5.
53
See D.I. 16, Ex. 1 at 5; D.I. 16, Ex. 1 at 10.
54
D.I. 16, Ex. 1 at 10.
55
D.I. 16, Ex. 1 at 10.
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the merits in the Underlying Actions.56 Plaintiff argues that this entitlement stems
from the language contained in Section 8, which states that the Company shall
advance Expenses for a covered Proceeding prior to its final disposition, and the
language of Section 12(e), which states that “no determination as to entitlement to
indemnification shall be required to be made prior to the final disposition of the
Proceeding.”57
Defendant argues that the contract should be read as a whole and that, although
Plaintiff may have a Section 8 right to advancement in certain Proceedings, she may
not automatically receive advancement for Proceedings for indemnification that she
herself initiated against the Company.58 Defendant argues that the carveout
provisions of Section 7(d) and Section 12(d), when read together, do not require the
Company to advance Expenses to Plaintiff unless she is successful in the underlying
First Delaware Action. 59
The Court is not persuaded by the Company’s reading. As applied here, the
Agreement distinguishes between the portions of the Underlying Actions initiated
56
Tr. at 7-8.
57
Id.; D.I. 16, Ex. 1 at 5-6.; D.I. 16, Ex. 1 at 10.
58
See Tr. at 27-29; D.I. 16, Ex. 1 at 5-6.
59
See Tr. at 27-29; D.I. 16, Ex. 1 at 5; D.I. 16, Ex. 1 at 10.
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by Plaintiff and the claims initiated by the Company. 60 Section 7(d), read with
Section 8, excludes advancement for the unauthorized portions initiated by
Plaintiff. 61 Section 12(d) separately conditions ultimate indemnification of
enforcement Expenses on Plaintiff’s success. 62 Section 12(d) requires the Company
to “indemnify” Plaintiff for Expenses incurred in enforcing her rights under the
Agreement “to the extent [she] is successful in such action.” 63 The subject of Section
12(d) is the fees Plaintiff incurred in this action to enforce her rights to
indemnification or advancement, i.e., fees-on-fees. Delaware courts routinely
enforce such provisions and award fees-on-fees in proportion to the indemnitee’s
success.64 Section 12(d) specifically addresses Expenses incurred in an action
seeking indemnification or advancement from the Company.65 Its success
requirement concerns indemnification of those enforcement Expenses. The
60
D.I. 16, Ex. 1 at 5.
61
Id.; D.I. 16, Ex. 1 at 5-6.
62
D.I. 16, Ex. 1 at 10.
63
Id.; see supra note 4 (defining Expenses, “for purposes of Section 12(d),” to include
Expenses incurred “in connection with the interpretation, enforcement or defense of
Indemnitee’s rights under this Agreement”).
64
Stifel Fin. Corp. v. Cochran, 809 A.2d 555, 561-62 (Del. 2002); Fasciana v. Elec. Data
Sys. Corp., 829 A.2d 178, 185 (Del. Ch. 2003).
65
D.I. 16, Ex. 1 at 10.
Minnie Sarwal v. Nephrosant, Inc.,
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October 19, 2026
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provision does not impose a success requirement on advancement under Section 8
of Expenses incurred defending the Counterclaims or Cross-Claims.
The Company’s reading would is difficult to reconcile with Section 8’s timing
and repayment provisions. Section 8 requires the Company to advance Expenses
“prior to [the Proceeding’s] final disposition,” no later than 90 days after a written
request, and conditions advancement on Plaintiff’s undertaking “to repay any
advance to the extent that it is ultimately determined that Indemnitee is not entitled
to be indemnified.”66 An undertaking to repay presupposes that payment is made
before entitlement is determined. Section 12(e) confirms the point. Its prefatory
clause, “[n]otwithstanding anything in this Agreement to the contrary,” gives Section
12(e) priority over conflicting provisions; it does not subordinate Section 12(e) to
them. 67 Conditioning advancement of defense Expenses on success in an Underlying
Action would postpone payment until after disposition and would leave little
operative role for Section 8’s repayment undertaking. Section 8 also does not
identify success in the underlying proceeding as the event triggering its 90-day
66
D.I. 16, Ex. 1 at 5–6.
67
D.I. 16, Ex. 1 at 5.
Minnie Sarwal v. Nephrosant, Inc.,
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payment period. As such, the Court declines to adopt a reading that renders those
provisions surplusage. 68
The provision that actually limits advancement for proceedings Plaintiff initiated
is Section 7(d), read together with Section 8. Section 7(d) excludes any Proceeding
“or any part of any Proceeding” initiated by Plaintiff without prior Board
authorization, and Section 8 does not apply to any Proceeding “(or any part of any
Proceeding)” for which indemnity is not permitted.69 The Board did not authorize
either Underlying Action.70 Expenses attributable solely to Plaintiff’s affirmative
claims are not advanceable under Section 8 because those claims were initiated by
Plaintiff without prior Board authorization and fall within Section 7(d).71 Such
Expenses may qualify for indemnification under Section 12(d) only to the extent she
succeeds in the applicable enforcement action. 72 Section 7(d) applies to a
‘Proceeding (or any part of any Proceeding)’ initiated by Plaintiff. Plaintiff initiated
her affirmative claims, but the Company initiated the Counterclaims and Cross-
68
See Osborn ex rel. Osborn v. Kemp, 991 A.2d 1153, 1159 (Del. 2010).
69
D.I. 16, Ex. 1 at 5–6.
70
D.I. 15 at 7; D.I. 16 at 8.
71
D.I. 16, Ex. 1 at 5–6; D.I. 15 at 7; D.I. 16 at 8.
72
D.I. 16, Ex. 1 at 10.
Minnie Sarwal v. Nephrosant, Inc.,
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October 19, 2026
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Claims.73 The fact that those Company claims were asserted in actions Plaintiff
commenced does not, by itself, make Plaintiff the initiator of those claims. The
exclusion therefore applies to Plaintiff’s affirmative claims but not to her defense of
the Counterclaims and Cross-Claims. Delaware courts apply “initiated by”
exclusions claim by claim, and an indemnitee who defends claims brought by the
corporation is not the initiator of those claims merely because she commenced the
litigation in which they were asserted.74
The Company’s assertion that Plaintiff did not act in good faith does not defeat
advancement at this stage. Section 3 makes good faith relevant to ultimate
Indemnification for a Proceeding by or in the right of the Company, while Section 8
provides for advancement before final disposition, subject to repayment is ultimately
determined not to be entitled to Indemnification. 75 The Company’s protection
against advancing funds to an indemnitee who is ultimately found not entitled to
73
D.I. 1 ¶ 21
See Citadel Hldg. Corp. v. Roven, 603 A.2d 818, 822-24 (Del. 1992); see also Zaman v.
74
Amedeo Hldgs., Inc., 2008 WL 2168397, at *33-37 (Del. Ch. May 23, 2008); Paolino v.
Mace Sec. Int’l, Inc., 985 A.2d 392, 401-03(Del. Ch. 2009).
75
D.I. 16, Ex. 1 at 4.
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indemnification is the undertaking to repay in Section 8. 76 Accordingly, the Court
declines to adopt the Company’s interpretation of the Agreement.
4. Section 12(d)’s Success Requirement Does Not Condition
Advancement
Plaintiff contends that she is entitled to advancement, regardless of her success
in the Underlying Actions, based on Delaware advancement law.77 In Plaintiff’s
Answering Brief in Opposition to Nephrosant’s Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment, she cites to Reddy v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., to argue that requiring
Plaintiff to demonstrate her success on the merits at the advancement stage would
“largely vitiate” her contractual advancement rights. 2002 WL 1358761, at *5 (Del.
Ch. June 18, 2002).78 Plaintiff argues that this is not a proper consideration at the
advancement stage. 79 The Court agrees. As recognized in Reddy, requiring an
indemnitee to demonstrate success on the merits at the advancement stage would
“largely vitiate” the advancement right, whose purpose is to fund the defense while
the merits are being litigated. 80
76
See Homestore, 888 A.2d at 212; Reddy, 2002 WL 1358761, at *5.
77
See Tr. at 40; D.I 22 at 2.
78
D.I 22 at 2.
79
Id.
80
Reddy v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 2002 WL 1358761, at *5 (Del. Ch. June 18, 2002).
Minnie Sarwal v. Nephrosant, Inc.,
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The Company’s reliance on Section 12(d) does not change that result. Section
12(d) addresses actions to enforce the Agreement and requires the Company to
“indemnify [Plaintiff]….to the extent [Plaintiff] is successful in such action.” 81 That
is a condition on indemnification of the Expenses Plaintiff incurs enforcing her rights
under the Agreement. It does not condition advancement under Section 8 of the
Expenses she incurs defending claims the Company asserted against her. 82 Where
advancement is a contractual right, the Court will enforce the right as provided in
the governing document.83 Here, the Agreement provides for advancement before
final disposition, subject only to Plaintiff’s undertaking to repay.
5. Plaintiff Is Entitled To Advancement Of Mixed Fees To The
Extent Necessary To Her Defense
Having addressed the contractual interpretation of the Agreement, the Court will
now address the application of the Agreement provisions to the specific
advancement sought by Plaintiff. Plaintiff does not seek a determination of
entitlement to Affirmative Fees in this action, and the parties agree she is entitled to
81
D.I. 16, Ex. 1 at 10.
82
Id.
83
Gorodetskiy, 2026 WL 1091872, at *3.
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Defensive Fees. The remaining question is whether, and to what extent, Plaintiff is
entitled to advancement of Mixed Fees.84
The Company argues that, under the Agreement, it need not advance fees for
actions Plaintiff initiated against it unless she succeeds in the underlying action.85
Plaintiff asserts that Section 12(d)’s success requirement does not apply to Mixed
Fees.86 The Company has not carried its burden under Section 12(b). 87 For the
reasons above, Section 12(d) does not condition advancement on success, and
Section 7(d) excludes only the part of each Underlying Action that Plaintiff initiated:
her affirmative claims. The Company must therefore advanced Mixed Fees, but the
question remains on how much. 88
The parties contend that there is a “complete overlap” between their claims in the
First Delaware Action. 89 Plaintiff argues that such overlap requires the Company to
advance all fees incurred in the First Delaware Action.90 The Company argues that
84
Tr. at 47.
85
D.I. 21 at 18.
86
D.I. 22 at 17.
87
D.I. 16, Ex. 1 at 9.
88
D.I. 21 at 18-22; D.I. 22 at 16-19.
89
D.I. 22 at 18.
90
D.I. 21 at 18