Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE FAIRSTEAD CAPITAL MANAGEMENT LLC and FCM AFFORDABLE LLC, Plaintiffs, v. C.A. No. 2022-0673-JTL WILLIAM BLODGETT, Defendant. OPINION ADDRESSING MOTION TO EXCLUDE Date Submitted: November 2, 2026 Date Decided: November 18, 2026 Ryan D. Stottmann, Thomas P. Will, Alec F. Hoeschel, MORRIS, NICHOLS, ARSHT & TUNNELL LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; Michael B. Carlinsky, Evan Forbes, QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN, LLP, New York, New York; Attorneys for Plaintiffs. David E. Ross, Roger S. Stronach, Holly E. Newell, A. Gage Whirley, ROSS ARONSTAM & MORITZ LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; Jacob W. Buchdahl, Elisha Barron, Zach Fields, SUSMAN GODFREY LLP, New York, New York; Attorneys for Defendant. LASTER, V.C. The defendant has moved for an order precluding the plaintiffs from relying at trial on (i) three experts belatedly swapped in long after the expert disclosure deadline and (ii) documents belatedly produced so the plaintiffs’ experts could rely on them. This decision grants the motion. I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND The facts are drawn from the submissions in connection with the motion. 1 What follows are not formal factual findings, but rather how the record appears at this stage of the case. A. Fairstead Terminates Blodgett. Between 2013 and 2021, Stuart Feldman, Jeffrey Goldberg, and William Blodgett co-owned and operated an affordable housing business under the trade name “Fairstead.” 2 Fairstead sponsored affordable housing deals and received a carried interest in those investments. As part of his compensation, Blodgett received a portion of Fairstead’s carried interest. Fairstead allocated its carried interest through two vehicles: plaintiffs 1 Citations in the form “Opp. ¶” refer to the plaintiffs’ opposition brief. Dkt. 253. Citations in the form “Ex.” refer to exhibits submitted in support of the defendant’s motion. Dkts. 251, 255. Page references cite internal pagination whenever possible. 2 The fund complex comprised a variety of entities, including Fairstead Capital Management LLC, FSC Realty Management LLC, FSC EF&F LLC, Fortitude Properties LLC, FSC-JD2 Member LLC, FCM-JD2 LLC, and special purpose vehicles for each project. For simplicity, this decision uses the term “Fairstead” to refer to the business collectively. Fairstead Capital Management LLC and FCM Affordable LLC (the “LLCs”). Blodgett received member interests in the LLCs. After the relationship between the parties soured, Fairstead purported to terminate Blodgett for cause and cancel his interests in the LLCs. B. The Arbitration And This Litigation Blodgett responded by demanding arbitration under his employment agreement. Blodgett contended that Feldman, Goldberg, and Fairstead breached his employment agreement by (i) terminating him without contractually valid grounds and (ii) canceling his equity interests. It takes a measure of cooperation to start an arbitration, and Fairstead moved slowly. On the day before the answer was due, Fairstead asked for an extension. Barely one week later, on June 10, 2022, Fairstead served an answer stating that the respondents would be filing suit in Delaware. Between June 16 and July 7, 2022, JAMS personnel repeatedly emailed Fairstead to confirm the status of the case and to collect the initial arbitration fee. JAMS made four separate requests. No one responded. On July 6, Blodgett paid Fairstead’s share of the fee. On July 21, 2022, Fairstead’s lawyers notified JAMS that Fairstead had retained new counsel. Blodgett had been preparing to seek to compel arbitration in New York state court. After conferring with Fairstead’s new counsel, he agreed to delay his filing by five days. When Fairstead remained recalcitrant, he filed a petition in the New York State Supreme Court for the County of New York to compel arbitration pursuant to C.P.L.R. 7503(a). 2 On August 1, 2022, Fairstead caused the LLCs to file this action. Among other relief, they sought declarations that they had properly cancelled Blodgett’s interests. The parties disputed whether the claims in this case should be arbitrated. The court held that disputes arising under Blodgett’s employment agreement had to be arbitrated but that any claims under the LLCs’ governing agreements had to proceed here.3 C. The General Scheduling Order The parties initially planned to litigate this case to trial while simultaneously pursuing the arbitration. In April 2023, Blodgett served requests for production of documents. Knowing the value of his interests would be at issue, Blodgett asked for documents “sufficient to show” (i) “the value of all assets [Fairstead] claim[s] to have cancelled”4 and (ii) the “assets” and “value” of each plaintiff LLC.5 Fairstead objected that Blodgett’s valuation-related requests were overly broad. Because those requests asked for documents “sufficient to show,” those objections were unfounded and should not have been made. Fairstead nevertheless agreed to produce documents subject to those objections and provided some valuation-related discovery. 3 Fairstead Cap. Mgmt. LLC v. Blodgett, 288 A.3d 729 (Del. Ch. 2023). 4 Ex. 1, RFP 49 (“the value of all assets Plaintiffs claim to have cancelled”). 5 Id. at RFPs 58–59 (“assets” and “value” of “Fairstead Capital Management LLC” and “FCM Affordable LLC”). 3 Blodgett also sought documents “concerning Stuart Feldman’s capital contributions to Fairstead.”6 Fairstead refused to produce documents in response to that request, claiming the capital contributions were “not at issue” and therefore the discovery was irrelevant.7 The parties agreed to a fact-discovery cutoff of June 14, 2024. On July 25, with fact discovery complete, the parties submitted a proposed schedule designed to bring this action to trial in December 2024 (the “General Scheduling Order”). That order memorialized the already passed fact-discovery cutoff.8 The General Scheduling Order called for the identification of expert witnesses on July 26, 2024.9 It envisioned exchanges of expert reports and the completion of the expert discovery phase by October 2024. On July 26, 2024, the court granted the General Scheduling Order. That same day, in compliance with the General Scheduling Order, both sides identified their experts. Fairstead identified Scott Drago and Mark Dunec, the same experts Fairstead was relying on in a factually overlapping case involving John C. Tatum, III, a former Fairstead employee who worked with Blodgett. 6 Id. at RFP 47. 7 Ex. 2, Response to RFP 47. 8 Dkt. 169. 9 Id. 4 In accordance with the deadlines in the General Scheduling Order, Blodgett sought leave to move for summary judgment. Over Fairstead’s opposition, the court granted leave on September 19, 2024. On the same day, the court entered a minute order asking about the prospect of a trial in December 2024. The minute order stated: The court is puzzled why it would try this case until after (i) a decision in the arbitration and (ii) a decision in the factually related case involving Tatum. It seems logical that factual findings from the arbitration will be binding on the parties and that factual findings in the Tatum action would have collateral estoppel effect on Fairstead. Within 14 days, the parties will submit a joint letter of up to 3,000 words stating their positions on deferring trial until after both (i) and (ii).10 The court thus envisioned deferring the trial until after the arbitration and the Tatum litigation. The court did not refer to or contemplate modifying any other deadlines in the General Scheduling Order. Nor did the court refer to or contemplate reopening any phases of the litigation that the parties had already completed, such as fact discovery. In October 2024, the parties submitted a joint letter in which they agreed to defer the trial in this case until after the arbitration and the Tatum litigation. The parties also agreed to “extend the schedule for expert discovery consistent with any deferral of the trial date.”11 The parties did not reference any other modifications to 10 Dkt. 177. 11 Dkt. 180 at 4. 5 the General Scheduling Order. They did not contemplate reopening any already- completed phases of the litigation, such as fact discovery. From the court’s standpoint, this case was informally paused at that point pending the outcome of the arbitration and the Tatum action.12 But the litigation was not formally stayed, and the parties continued with some tasks. Blodgett, for example, followed up on discovery that Fairstead had agreed to provide subject to objections. The parties also briefed and argued the motion for partial summary judgment. After hearing argument, the court held that the LLCs’ governing agreements did not authorize the LLCs to cancel Blodgett’s interests. 13 D. The Award And The Cross-Motions For Summary Judgment On April 2, 2025, the arbitrator issued an award. Based on the arbitrator’s rulings, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. As part of its motion, Fairstead asked the court to revisit its earlier grant of summary judgment. Those motions remained pending in October 2025, when the court issued its post-trial decision in the Tatum litigation.14 That decision rejected Dunec’s valuation because, among other things, Dunec “did not appraise the properties himself,” offered 12 See Dkt. 239 at 19 (“The court stayed this litigation so that the arbitration could go first.”). 13 See Dkts. 198, 199. 14 Tatum v. Fairstead Affordable LLC, 347 A.3d 1221 (Del. Ch. 2025). 6 “criticisms of [the opposing expert’s report that] were often unsupported,” and “lacked comparable experience with [relevant types of] partnerships.”15 Meanwhile, Blodgett continued to follow up on discovery that Fairstead agreed to produce subject to objections. Among other things, Blodgett sought to confirm that Fairstead did not have additional valuation materials relating to a group of assets known as the “NYS8 Portfolio.” Fairstead represented that it had conducted a diligent search and that “all documents in Fairstead’s possession, custody, or control responsive to these requests have been produced.”16 E. The Summary Judgment Opinion And The Damages Phase In May 2026, the court issued an opinion granting Blodgett’s motion for summary judgment. In the concluding paragraph, the court stated: The court believes that the next step in the litigation involves crafting a remedy for Fairstead’s improper forfeiture of Blodgett’s interests in non- pending deals. The parties must prepare a joint letter that either proposes a schedule for litigating the remedy or identifies other issues that must be addressed and proposes a schedule for litigating them as well.17 When issuing the opinion, the court did not delve into how far the litigation had already progressed. The court expected the parties to cooperate on a path forward. 15 See id. at 1257. 16 Ex. 4 at 1. 17 Fairstead Cap. Mgmt. LLC v. Blodgett, 359 A.3d 598, 624 (Del. Ch. 2026), appeal refused, 2026 WL 2664355 (Del. Sep. 10, 2026). 7 Blodgett contacted Fairstead and proposed that the parties accept the valuation findings from the Tatum litigation. He offered to confer on any remaining issues and a schedule for resolving them. Fairstead declined to confer. The parties were scheduled to submit a joint letter to the court on June 12, 2026. Four minutes before the deadline, Fairstead provided Blodgett with its position on the damages phase. In essence, Fairstead proposed staying the damages phase pending an interlocutory appeal from the summary judgment opinion. The parties submitted their joint letter and outlined their competing views. They also attached competing forms of order to implement the summary judgment opinion. Blodgett proposed “that the parties confer and identify any remaining issues that need to be resolved in connection with calculating Blodgett’s damages, exchange positions on those issues, and—if necessary—submit reports and briefing on those issues followed by a short evidentiary hearing.” 18 Fairstead predicted a “costly damages phase.” 19 Fairstead stated that it would seek to appeal the summary judgment ruling immediately, but that if the court wished to set a schedule for a damages phase, “it should follow the standard expert discovery process in this Court’s 18 Dkt. 242 at 3. 19 Id. at 4. 8 sample scheduling stipulation: opening expert reports, rebuttal expert reports, and expert depositions.”20 Neither party proposed additional fact discovery. Neither party proposed a date for revisiting their prior identification of experts. Both sides implicitly recognized that they had completed fact discovery and identified their experts. When making those tactical choices, Fairstead already had the benefit of the post-trial decision in the Tatum litigation and its assessment of Dunec’s testimony. The court adopted Blodgett’s proposed form of implementing order for the summary judgment ruling. The parties then negotiated a scheduling order for the damages phase. Believing that fact discovery was complete and that the parties had identified their experts, Blodgett proposed to serve his expert report just two weeks later. Fairstead agreed to that schedule without mentioning any possibility of changing its experts or producing additional documents. On July 30, 2026, the parties submitted their agreed-upon form of scheduling order. It provided as follows: (a) Blodgett to Exchange Opening Expert Report and production of all materials August 14, 2026 relied upon by Expert and not produced previously by parties (b) Fairstead to exchange Rebuttal Expert Report and production of all materials September 15, 2026 relied upon in Rebuttal Expert Report and not produced previously by parties 20 Id. at 5. 9 (c) Blodgett to Exchange Reply Expert Report and production of all materials October 5, 2026 relied upon by Expert and not produced previously by parties (d) Completion of expert discovery, including expert depositions (except for any expert discovery subject to a October 26, 2026 motion to compel or motion for a protective order pending on this date) (e) Blodgett to file Opening Brief November 9, 2026 (f) Fairstead to file Answering Brief December 10, 2026 (g) Blodgett to file Reply Brief December 23, 2026 (h) Hearing/Trial on Damages To be scheduled by the Court The court entered the schedule as an order (the “Damages-Phase Scheduling Order”).21 F. Fairstead Produces Additional Documents And Changes Its Experts. On Saturday, August 8, 2026, four business days before Blodgett’s opening expert report was due, Fairstead made a surprise production of approximately 2,400 pages of documents (the “Additional Materials”). 22 The documents included (1) governance agreements, (2) income statements and balance sheets from January 2015 to December 2023, (3) membership interest purchase agreements, and (4) tax returns for various entities in the Fairstead complex. Fairstead also produced a 21 Dkt. 250. 22 Ex. 7. 10 spreadsheet identifying expenditures that Feldman claimed were capital contributions. That was precisely the type of documentation that Blodgett sought in fact discovery, more than three years earlier. To justify its late production, Fairstead described the Additional Materials as information that its “experts intend to rely upon.” 23 Blodgett objected to that characterization and the production in its entirety. On August 14, 2026, Blodgett served his expert report in compliance with the Damages-Phase Scheduling Order. Three days later, Fairstead served an “amended” disclosure that replaced Drago and Dunec with three new experts: Jeffrey W. Kopa, Johnny J. Lee, and Amanda Aaron. Fairstead offered no explanation for the belated expert swap. After Blodgett objected, Fairstead claimed that the switch was proper because Fairstead had reserved its “right to supplement and amend” its expert designation.24 Fairstead also provided an additional reason why its late production of the Additional Materials was purportedly proper. According to Fairstead, its experts had identified the Additional Materials as part of “the natural course of rebuttal expert work” and “found documents necessary” to rebut Blodgett’s “evolv[ing]” damages theories.25 23 Id. 24 Ex. 12 at 1. 25 Id. at 2. 11 On August 26, 2026, Blodgett moved to preclude Fairstead from relying on its new experts or the late production. On September 3, Fairstead amended its expert disclosure a second time. This time, Fairstead replaced Aaron with Blair Kincer. II. LEGAL ANALYSIS Blodgett contends that Fairstead failed to comply with the court’s scheduling order and seeks preclusion as a consequence. This decision grants the relief sought. “Parties must be mindful that scheduling orders are not merely guidelines but have the same full force and effect as any other court order.” 26 “Deadlines are particularly important when conducting discovery and preparing for trial.” 27 The Delaware Supreme Court “has long recognized that the purpose[s] of discovery [are] to advance issue formulation, to assist in fact revelation, and to reduce the element of surprise at trial.”28 Transparency also promotes settlement by enabling parties to assess their claims and defenses more accurately.29 It therefore conserves party and 26 In re ExamWorks Gp., Inc. S’holder Appraisal Litig., 2018 WL 1008439, at *6 (Del. Ch. Feb. 21, 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). 27 Goldstein v. Denner, 2024 WL 1599501, at *3 (Del. Ch. Apr. 1, 2024) (ORDER). 28 Levy v. Stern, 687 A.2d 573, 1996 WL 742818, at *2 (Del. Dec. 20, 1996) (TABLE). 29 See In re Appraisal of Dole Food Co., Inc., 114 A.3d 541, 560 (Del. Ch. 2014) (“Discovery into the petitioners’ analyses also should help promote settlement.”); see generally Caskey v. Man Roland, Inc., 83 F.3d 418, 1996 WL 197370, at *7 (5th Cir. 1996) (Dennis, J., dissenting) (“[O]ne of the purposes of open discovery is to promote settlement.”); Bond v. Dist. Ct., In & For Denver Cty., 682 P.2d 33, 40 (Colo. 1984) (“The purposes of pretrial discovery include: . . . the promotion of expeditious 12 judicial resources and contributes to “the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every proceeding.”30 Scheduling orders and discovery cutoffs further these policies by ensuring that parties provide fact and expert discovery in a timely manner. 31 Rule 6(b), titled “Enlargement,” addresses when and how a party can obtain additional time or otherwise modify a deadline. It states: (1) In General. When an act may or must be done within a specified time, the Court may, for good cause shown, extend the time: (A) with or without motion or notice if the Court acts, or if a request is made, before the time or its extension expires; or (B) on motion made after the time has expired if the party failed to act because of excusable neglect. (2) Exceptions. The Court must not extend the time for taking any action under Rule 59(b), (d), or (e), except to the extent and under the conditions stated in them.32 Rule 6(b) thus puts the onus to address a deadline on the party who has missed or anticipates missing it. If the deadline has not yet passed, then a party may move to modify the deadline, or the court may act without a motion. If a deadline has already settlement of cases.”); Martin v. Long Island R. Co., 63 F.R.D. 53, 54 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (“Meaningful settlement discussions will be facilitated if the . . . parties can evaluate possible evidence. An overwhelming percentage of civil cases are settled. It is as important to have fair procedures for this kind of disposition as it is for trials.”). 30 Ct. Ch. R. 1. 31 IQ Hldgs., Inc. v. Am. Com. Lines Inc., 2012 WL 3877790, at *2 (Del. Ch. Aug. 30, 2012). 32 Ct. Ch. R. 6(b). 13 passed, then a party must move for relief and show excusable neglect.33 Regardless of when the motion arrives, moving the deadline requires good cause.34 Good cause means a legitimate, sufficient, and persuasive reason. It does not require “extraordinary circumstances” or a “highly unusual set of facts.” 35 The standard is more burdensome than the “freely given” test but less onerous than a test requiring “manifest injustice.”36 “‘[G]ood cause’ is likely to be found when the moving party has been generally diligent, the need for more time was neither foreseeable nor its fault, and refusing to grant the continuance would create a substantial risk of unfairness to that party.”37 A court may consider prejudice to the other side, but a lack of prejudice alone does not establish good cause.38 A. The New Experts Blodgett seeks an order precluding Fairstead from relying on the experts it disclosed in August 2026, three days after Blodgett served his opening expert report, 33 Of course, parties can modify a court-ordered deadline by submitting a stipulation for the court’s approval. That is usually the proper approach. 34 Ct. Ch. R. 6(b)(1). 35 State v. Ponzo, 302 A.3d 1006, 1028 (Del. Super. 2023). 36 3 Moore’s Federal Practice § 16.14[1][a], Lexis (database updated 2026); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4) advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment (describing test). 37 Coleman v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLC, 902 A.2d 1102, 1107 (Del. 2006). 38 3 Moore’s Federal Practice, supra, § 16.14[1][b]. 14 and in September 2026, after Blodgett filed this motion. That relief is granted. Fairstead may rely on the experts it disclosed in July 2024. 1. Precedent Addressing Late Expert Disclosure Failing to disclose an expert in timely fashion generally warrants the expert’s exclusion. As now-Justice, then-Vice Chancellor Zurn incisively observed when excluding an expert, “[d]eadlines matter.”39 Citing Rule 6, the court faulted the late- disclosing party for failing to “seek an extension” before the deadline or “show excusable neglect” for missing the disclosure deadline by six days.40 Another decision from this court likewise excluded a belatedly disclosed expert’s report and precluded the expert from testifying at trial, relying solely on the party’s failure to meet the disclosure deadline.41 For a post-deadline modification, this court has required a threshold showing of excusable neglect. In Encite, Chancellor Chandler held that counsel’s reasonable belief that an oral extension had been given did not support a finding of excusable 39 S’holder Representative Servs., LLC v. Alexion Pharms., Inc., 2023 WL 2632477, at *1 (Del. Ch. Mar. 23, 2023) (ORDER). 40 Id. 41 Strong v. Chae, 2024 WL 4583092, at *1 (Del. Ch. Oct. 23, 2024) (noting that the plaintiff failed to timely disclose the identity of an expert, that his “testimony and report should be excluded on that basis alone,” and that the expert “will not be permitted to testify at trial, and his report is excluded”); accord McCulley v. Thornton, 2023 WL 5310442, at *2 (Del. Super. Aug. 16, 2023) (barring expert disclosed five months late because “the Court cannot allow Plaintiff to ignore clear pretrial scheduling order deadlines in an effort to change his theory of the case”). 15 neglect because “a reasonably prudent person would have made sure—in writing— that such agreement was, in fact, reached, and then counsel would have submitted that agreement and a proposed revised Scheduling Order to the Court for approval, ideally all before the expiration of the specified time period.”42 Chancellor Chandler noted that plaintiff’s counsel “had plenty of time and multiple opportunities to notify opposing counsel and the Court about this alleged agreement and their request for modification of the Scheduling Order,” yet failed to do so.43 In addition to finding that excusable neglect did not exist, Chancellor Chandler held that the plaintiff had not shown good cause for an extension. When evaluating good cause, Chancellor Chandler observed that the plaintiff had gained an unfair advantage by identifying its expert after reviewing the defendants’ report and deposing their expert. He also noted that the defendants would be prejudiced because (1) they would have less time to identify a rebuttal expert and prepare a rebuttal report and (2) other case deadlines would have to be modified. The case had already been pending for an extended period of time, and Chancellor Chandler concluded that “any further delay and even mild showing of prejudice to defendants ‘weighs against a finding of ‘good cause’ necessary for a modification.’”44 42 Encite LLC v. Soni, 2011 WL 1565181, at *2 (Del. Ch. Apr. 15, 2011) (emphasis in original) (giving counsel the benefit of the doubt on this dispute of fact). 43 Id. at *3. 44 Id. at *4 (quoting Candlewood Timber Gp. LLC v. Pan Am. Energy LLC, 2006 WL 258305, at *5 (Del. Super. Jan. 18, 2006)). 16 Encite relied on Candlewood, a Delaware Superior Court decision. There, the plaintiff moved to amend the scheduling order three months after the deadline for submitting expert reports had passed so that the plaintiff could identify a different expert and submit his report. The plaintiff stated only that the original expert had become “unavailable.” 45 The plaintiff did not try to explain why the expert had become unavailable until oral argument.46 Under the Superior Court Rules, the only question was whether the plaintiff had shown good cause for the amendment. The plaintiff had not offered any reason why it could not have met the original deadline through diligent efforts. 47 The plaintiff also had not offered any explanation for its expert’s unavailability until oral argument, which deprived the defendant of the ability to respond. 48 The court also considered prejudice, concluding that the plaintiff’s delay harmed the defendant by limiting the time the defendant had to respond to a new expert report. Finding that the plaintiff had failed to show good cause, the court declined to modify the scheduling order and precluded the plaintiff from relying on the belatedly disclosed expert. 49 45 Candlewood, 2006 WL 258305, at *1. 46 Id. 47 Id. at *5. 48 Id. 49 Id. 17 2. Applying The Precedent Fairstead’s belated disclosure goes beyond the precedents that have granted exclusion. The General Scheduling Order required the disclosure of experts on July 26, 2024. Fairstead met that deadline. The General Scheduling Order did not contemplate that parties could change their experts. The Damages-Phase Scheduling Order did not contemplate that either. Fairstead’s amended disclosure identifying three new experts missed the expert deadline by more than two years. After Blodgett moved to preclude the new experts, Fairstead amended its disclosure again to replace one of its new experts with yet another expert. Fairstead did not identify its new experts until after seeing Blodgett’s report. Fairstead offered no explanation for its actions when serving its amended expert disclosure. It was not until Blodgett objected to the belated identification that Fairstead claimed (1) the belated disclosure was fair because Fairstead had reserved its rights to amend its disclosure, (2) Blodgett’s evolving damages theories warranted the expert switch, and (3) Blodgett would not be prejudiced. It was not until oral argument that Fairstead represented that its original expert had grown concerned about testifying in this case after the court questioned his opinions in the Tatum litigation. Even during oral argument, Fairstead never said that the original expert would not testify, only that he made it known that he preferred not to testify. Fairstead never moved to amend either the General Scheduling Order, which contained the expert identification deadline, or the Damages-Phase Scheduling 18 Order, which did not contemplate identifying different experts. When Blodgett moved to preclude Fairstead’s new experts, Fairstead did not argue excusable neglect or good cause. Fairstead claimed it acted properly and asserted that Blodgett would not be prejudiced. Fairstead incorrectly contends that Delaware law permits expert swapping. For that proposition, Fairstead cites Dole, where the court permitted the defendants to substitute an expert “to avoid the prejudice that the defendants would suffer if forced to proceed without an expert.”50 In Dole, the expert submitted his report in the name of his firm. The court held that an entity could not serve as an expert, only a natural person. The court allowed the human who had prepared the report to adopt it as his own. There was no substantive change in either the identity of the human who would be testifying or the opinions being offered. Fairstead also quotes Merion Capital for the supposed principle that “[g]enerally speaking, an expert can replace another expert who must drop out.” 51 That is a misleading partial quotation. What Merion Capital actually says is “[g]enerally speaking, an expert can replace another expert who must drop out as a result of illness.”52 Setting aside the problems associated with submitting a partial 50 In re Dole Food Co., Inc. S’holder Litig., 110 A.3d 1257, 1263–64 (Del. Ch. 2015). 51 Opp. ¶ 30. 52 Merion Cap., L.P. v. 3M Cogent, Inc., 2013 WL 3793896, at *10 (Del. Ch. July 8, 2013) (emphasis added). 19 quotation where the omission changes the meaning of the authority,53 Fairstead has not suggested that either of its original experts cannot proceed because of illness. In the parties’ pre-motion exchanges, Fairstead’s original justification for the expert swap was that it had reserved its right to do so. In Goldstein, both sides purported to reserve their rights to list additional fact or expert witnesses, yet the scheduling order provided a set deadline for identifying all witnesses. The defendants identified three new fact witnesses six weeks after the deadline. The court held that the “dual ‘reservation of rights’” could not “amend the scheduling order.”54 Instead, the defendants had the burden to show excusable neglect, which they did not try to do. The same is true here. Assuming for the sake of argument that the reservation of rights was mutual, it would not justify Fairstead’s tardy expert swap. 55 A unilateral 53 Cf. Leiske v. Kidd, 2026 WL 3459553, at *3 (Del. Ch. Nov. 13, 2026) (explaining that an attorney who signs a pleading “must ensure that the underlying authorities have been reviewed and support the propositions for which they are cited”); id. at *4 (“That existing law may generally support a party’s ultimate position does not excuse . . . mischaracterized holdings.”). In Leiske, counsel fell short after relying on generative AI. The principle applies regardless of the source of error. 54 Goldstein, 2024 WL 1599501, at *4. 55 See also Encite, 2011 WL 1565181, at *2–3 (holding counsel’s belief that the other side had agreed to an extension to be insufficient to modify the date for disclosure identified in the scheduling order; concluding the plaintiff failed to show excusable neglect because a reasonably prudent person would have sought to document the agreement in writing and then “would have submitted that agreement and a proposed revised Scheduling Order to the Court for approval” (emphasis in original)). In a related argument, Fairstead contends that this case is different because the General Scheduling Order “permits amendment by written agreement, without Court involvement.” Opp. ¶ 27 & n.5. There was no written agreement, and 20 reservation of rights cannot even claim the status of an agreement. It is a purported reservation of the right to violate a court order—a contumacious nullity. During the parties’ pre-motion exchanges, Fairstead next asserted that it switched its experts to address Blodgett’s changing damages theories. But Blodgett’s theories did not change. Blodgett reduced the scope of the projects for which he sought damages and proposed to rely on collateral estoppel for issues addressed in the Tatum litigation. His opening report made it easier for Fairstead to respond, not harder. When opposing Blodgett’s motion, Fairstead suggests that its failure to name its experts earlier was reasonable because the parties treated this action as stayed after the court asked in September 2024 why the parties were proceeding to trial before decisions in the arbitration and the Tatum litigation. For expert disclosure, that makes no sense. The General Scheduling Order mandated expert disclosure on July 26, 2024, and both parties complied with that deadline. That part of the case was over well before the court’s question about deferring trial. In response, the parties agreed to defer trial and address expert discovery at a later date. The parties never said anything about a new expert disclosure deadline, precisely because that disclosure had already been made. Encite demonstrates that an agreement between counsel has no effect on a court order until the court adopts it. 2011 WL 1565181, at *2–4. 21 In its opposition, Fairstead also tried to justify switching experts by asserting that one of its experts had a scheduling conflict.56 At oral argument, Fairstead backed off that representation and would say only that Dunec had cold feet about testifying. As in Candlewood, Fairstead’s failure to disclose that explanation until oral argument prejudiced Blodgett by preventing him from meaningfully addressing it. Fairstead waived its ability to rely on Dunec’s apprehensions by not raising them earlier. 57 Regardless, an expert’s vague and indeterminate uneasiness does not establish good cause. If Fairstead wanted to change an expert, Fairstead needed to raise the issue with Blodgett in early 2026. Fairstead should have mentioned any expert discomfort months before the unilateral expert swap that precipitated the motion.58 If Blodgett declined to agree to any modification, then Fairstead should have moved promptly for relief under Rule 6(b). At a minimum, Fairstead should have raised the issue when 56 See Opp. ¶¶ 4, 15. 57 See Candlewood, 2006 WL 258305, at *5 (finding movant failed to show good cause where “Candlewood, in its original motion, merely asserted that Ponisio is ‘unavailable’ without giving any explanation; it was not until oral argument that Candlewood presented Romero’s affidavit purporting to explain the circumstances surrounding Ponisio’s ‘unavailability’ depriving Pan American of the ability to address the ‘unavailability’ issue in its response to the motion”). 58 The ostensible reason for Dunec’s discomfort was this court’s Tatum decision, which the court issued on October 27, 2025. Fairstead did not switch up its experts until August 17, 2026. 22 the parties were discussing the Damages-Phase Scheduling Order. Once again, if the parties could not agree, then Fairstead should have moved promptly under Rule 6(b). Fairstead never made any proactive effort. Fairstead never raised the new- expert issue before serving its amended notice. Fairstead made its decision to swap experts after seeing Blodgett’s opening report and provided no explanation when making its swap. Fairstead only offered justifications when Blodgett objected and in response to Blodgett’s motion, and those justifications were a moving target. After Blodgett moved to preclude the new experts, Fairstead swapped one of its experts again. Fairstead seems to think that deadlines only apply to Blodgett. Its serial failures warrant preclusion. Although a lack of prejudice does not establish good cause, a court can consider prejudice when evaluating whether good cause exists. As in Encite and Candlewood, Fairstead gained an unfair advantage by not acting until after seeing Blodgett’s opening expert report. Fairstead argues that its belated expert swap “changed only the name on the report” because its new experts “will testify on the identical subject matter disclosed in July 2024: the value of assets in which Blodgett claims an interest.”59 But that description does not accurately capture the implications of the expert swap. The court heard Dunec testify in the Tatum litigation and commented on his opinions in its decision. Blodgett could use the Tatum trial record and this 59 Opp. ¶ 2; see also id. ¶ 31 (“Every case Blodgett cites involved adding witnesses on new subject matter or failing to identify them at all—not substituting testifiers on topics already disclosed.”). 23 court’s comments when cross-examining Dunec and arguing the merits. By swapping in new experts, Fairstead sought to negate that advantage, wipe the credibility slate clean, and get a second bite at the valuation apple. Fairstead also argues that Blodgett can simply address the new experts’ opinions in expert depositions and a reply report, but those curative steps cannot address the larger implications of Fairstead’s machinations. Because of the swap, Blodgett will have to research, evaluate, and seek to undermine entirely new experts. Moreover, as Chancellor Chandler observed in Encite, Blodgett will have to scramble to do so in a compressed timeframe. Any additional time would only provide a partial fix, and it would impose further delay on Blodgett, who seeks to bring this case to a conclusion. Fairstead’s belated identification has already caused the part