Rickman v. Delaware Department of Justice
CourtSuperior Court of Delaware
Date FiledOctober 27, 2026
DocketS26M-02-001 MHC
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
PATRICIA D. RICKMAN, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
v. ) C.A. No: S26M-02-001 MHC
)
DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF )
JUSTICE, )
)
Respondent. )
)
ORDER
Submitted: October 22, 2026
Decided: October 27, 2026
Upon Consideration of Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss, GRANTED.
Patricia D. Rickman, Pro se.
Jennifer Kate Aaronson, Esquire, and Jennifer M. Herrmann, Esquire, Deputy
Attorneys General, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorneys for Respondent.
CONNER, J.
Before the Court is the Department of Justice’s (“Respondent”) Motion to
Dismiss Patricia Rickman’s (“Petitioner”) Petition for Writ of Mandamus. Upon
consideration of the Motion to Dismiss filed by Respondent and submissions of the
parties, it appears to the Court that:
1. On February 2, 2026, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Mandamus in this
Court.
2. Petitioner’s claims are grounded in the Crime Victims’ Bill of Rights under 11
Del. C. § 9401 et seq., specifically the amendments brought forth in Senate
Bill 17.
3. Petitioner requests this Court to order the Department of Justice to: (1)
investigate the Protection from Abuse Hearings in the Sussex County Family
Court; (2) investigate the cessation of Delaware State Police report intakes
from Petitioner; (3) investigate and correct material errors in the Sussex
County Family Court review of the Commissioner’s Order dated June 12,
2023; (4) review retaliatory litigation and coercive control through the court
process; and (5) review the admission of Nancy Martino into the Delaware
Mental Health Court diversion program.1
4. Respondent filed the instant Motion to Dismiss on March 9, 2026.
5. Petitioner filed her response to the Motion to Dismiss on March 24, 2026.
1
Pet. for Writ of Mandamus, D.I. 1, at 14-18.
2
6. Respondent filed its reply brief on April 1, 2026.
7. Petitioner filed a second response on April 9, 2026.
8. The Respondent’s motion was initially noticed to be heard on April 17, 2026.
It was re-noticed to be heard on May 15, 2026. The Petitioner requested a
continuance of the May 15 date which was granted. It was then scheduled to
be heard on July 30, 2026. Again, the Petitioner requested a continuance
which was also granted. The Respondent has re-noticed the motion for
November 6, 2026. However, upon further review of the parties’ submissions,
the Court is deciding the matter on the papers. This is the Court’s decision on
the Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss.
The Petition for Writ of Mandamus
9. Under Count I, Petitioner seeks a Writ of Mandamus to order the Respondent
to “review, investigate, and issue written findings explaining how and why
Nancy Martino (“Martino”) was permitted to participate in a Sussex County
Family Court Zoom mediation on ‘October 25, 2022, . . . .’”2 Petitioner
alleges that during this time, Martino had active felony warrants, and was
actively threatening Petitioner and her minor child.3 Petitioner states that the
investigation is necessary to determine whether mandatory victim-protection
2
Id. at 14.
3
Id.
3
duties, outlined under 11 Del. C. § 9403, were violated, and whether the Court
process was improperly abused to facilitate coercion.4
10. Under Count II, Petitioner seeks a Writ of Mandamus to order the Respondent
to investigate and issue written findings regarding a supervisory directive
from October 21, 2022, which allegedly instructed the Delaware State Police
to cease accepting complaints from Petitioner.5 Petitioner states that the
review is required to determine whether Respondent fulfilled its duty to ensure
lawful intake, documentation, coordination, and victim notification.6
11. Under Count III, Petitioner seeks a Writ of Mandamus to order Respondent
to investigate and issue written findings on alleged factual errors in an Order
from the Family Court dated June 12, 2023.7 The Supreme Court of Delaware
reviewed and affirmed the Family Court Order. In March of 2025, Petitioner
allegedly supplied the Family Court with documentary proof of the alleged
factual errors, and the Family Court issued an Amended Review, which was
not considered by the Supreme Court.8 Petitioner states that mandamus relief
is required to compel Respondent to comply with its duty to ensure the
4
Id.
5
Id. at 15.
6
Id.
7
Id. at 16.
8
Id.
4
accuracy of records, and to provide transparency and correction when material
errors are identified.9
12. Under Count IV, Petitioner seeks a Writ of Mandamus to order Respondent
to formally investigate whether court processes were used in a retaliatory or
coercive manner in the proceedings involving Petitioner, from 2022 through
January 21, 2026.10 Petitioner states that this request seeks the enforcement
of mandatory transparency and victim-protection duties.11
13. Under Count V, Petitioner seeks a Writ of Mandamus to order Respondent to
review, investigate, and issue written findings, explaining why Martino was
admitted into Delaware’s Mental Health Court diversion program, when the
record reflects that Martino should have been disqualified from the program.12
Petitioner states that this request seeks compliance with the statutory
eligibility standards and Senate Bill 17’s victim-protection mandates.13
Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss
14. In the Motion to Dismiss, Respondent brings forth several arguments to
support its Motion. First, Respondent argues that Counts I and II are barred
9
Id.
10
Id. at 16-17.
11
Id. at 17.
12
Id. at 17.
13
Id. at 18.
5
by the Statute of Limitations.14 Second, the Petition must be dismissed
because the 2025 amendments to the Crime Victims’ Bill of Rights are not
retroactive.15 Third, the Petitioner is not entitled to the extraordinary remedy
of a Writ of Mandamus because granting the writ would be useless and
Petitioner has other remedies available.16 Lastly, Petitioner has no clear legal
right under the Crime Victims’ Bill of Rights to the relief sought.17
Counts I and II are Barred by the Statute of Limitations
15. Respondent argues that Counts I and II are barred by the statute of limitations.
16. Under 10 Del. C. § 8106, a three-year statute of limitation is placed on a cause
of action based on a statute.18
17. Count I is a cause of action based on a statute. Petitioner claims that the
alleged conduct violated 11 Del. C. § 9401, Senate Bill 17, and 10 Del. C. §
1041. Count I derives from a Family Court Zoom mediation on October 25,
2022.
18. Count II is also based on a statute. Petitioner claims that the alleged conduct
violated 11 Del. C. § 9401-9403, 10 Del. C. § 1045, and Senate Bill 17. Count
II derives from a supervisory directive from October 21, 2022.
14
Respondent’s Mot. to Dismiss, D.I. 4, at 4.
15
Id. at 5.
16
Id. at 6-10.
17
Id. at 11.
18
Giles v. Town of Elsmere, 2023 WL 6323758, at *5 (Del. Super. Ct. 2023).
6
19. Petitioner filed the Petition on February 2, 2026.
20. Both Count I and Count II are time-barred because the three-year statute of
limitations had run prior to Petitioner filing the Petition on February 2, 2026.
21. However, Petitioner argues that Counts I and II are not time-barred because
the harm is ongoing.19 This argument is misplaced. Delaware courts have
held that “[t]he statute of limitations begins to run when the Plaintiff’s claim
accrues, at the moment of the wrongful act, or breach.”20 Respondent
correctly asserts that “[a] continuing violation is occasioned by continual
unlawful acts, not continual ill effects from an original violation.”21 Petitioner
has not alleged continual unlawful acts, as the unlawful acts stem from closed
cases.
22. Therefore, the statute of limitations on Count I began to run on the day of the
zoom mediation, October 25, 2022, and ended on October 25, 2025. The
statute of limitations on Count II began to run on the day of the alleged
supervisory directive, October 21, 2022, and ended on October 21, 2025.
23. For these reasons, Counts I and II are time-barred by the statute of limitations.
19
Petitioner’s Resp. to Mot. to Dismiss, D.I. 6, at 3.
20
Trott v. Delaware Div. of Child Support Servs., 2025 WL 816768, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct.
2025), reargument denied, 2025 WL 1009418 (Del. Super. Ct. 2025), and aff'd, 350 A.3d 1247
(Del. 2025).
21
Respondent’s Reply Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss, D.I. 7, at 1 (quoting Moelis & Co. v. W.
Palm Beach Firefighters' Pension Fund, 2026 WL 184868 (Del. 2026)).
7
The 2025 Amendments to the Crime Victims’ Bill of Rights are not
Retroactive
24. As aforementioned, Respondent argues that the Petition must be dismissed
because the 2025 amendments do not apply retroactively.
25. Petitioner filed this Petition, requesting the Court to issue a Writ of
Mandamus to compel Respondent to “perform mandatory, nondiscretionary
duties owed to crime victims under the Delaware Crime Victims’ Bill of
Rights, 11 Del. C. § 9401 et. seq., as strengthened and clarified by Senate Bill
17.”22
26. Senate Bill 17 introduced amendments to the Delaware Crime Victims’ Bill
of Rights. The relevant amendment involves § 9402, Compliance with
Chapter. Prior to the amendments of Senate Bill 17, the Delaware Crime
Victims’ Bill of Rights did not provide a right to file a Writ of Mandamus.
Senate Bill 17 amended the Crime Victims’ Bill of Rights to allow the
petitioner to file a Writ of Mandamus under § 564 of Title 10, to require
compliance with the chapter. Senate Bill 17 became effective on August 20,
2025.
27. Under Delaware law, there is a presumption against retroactive application of
legislation.23 Delaware Courts have found that “[l]aws apply retroactively
22
Pet. for Writ of Mandamus, D.I. 1, at 1.
23
Rutledge v. Clearway Energy Grp. LLC, 2026 WL 548504, at *13 (Del. 2026).
8
only where the General Assembly has made its intent plain and
unambiguous.”24
28. Senate Bill 17 does not include language to indicate that it applies
retroactively.
29. As aforementioned, Count I derives from a Family Court Zoom meeting on
October 25, 2022, which is before the effective date of Senate Bill 17.
30. Similarly, Count II is based on a supervisory directive instructing the
Delaware State Police to cease accepting complaints from Petitioner, which
allegedly occurred on October 21, 2022. Similarly, this occurred prior to the
effective date of Senate Bill 17.
31. Count III requests an investigation into the Family Court Order, dated June
12, 2023. Petitioner allegedly provided the Family Court with additional
materials on March 3, 2025, which led the Family Court to issue an amended
review. Both of these events occurred prior to Senate Bill 17’s effective date.
32. Count IV seeks to require Respondent to investigate whether court processes
were used in a manner constituting retaliation or coercive control from 2022
through January 21, 2026. It is unclear which sections of the Crime Victims’
Bill of Rights were allegedly violated from 2022 through January 21, 2026,
however, this will be addressed in a later section. Nonetheless, Senate Bill 17
24
Id.
9
cannot be applied to any event that occurred prior to its effective date of
August 20, 2025.
33. Lastly, Count V seeks a formal review of Martino’s admission into
Delaware’s Mental Health Court diversion program, which according to
Petitioner, occurred on or about February 20, 2023. This event occurred prior
to Senate Bill 17’s effective date.
34. Petitioner argues that she is not seeking retroactive application, but rather,
she is seeking to enforce present, ongoing, statutory duties.25 Petitioner claims
that she submitted complaints, which were not addressed by Respondent.
However, Petitioner does not provide a complaint to the Court. Instead,
Petitioner attaches numerous email exchanges between her and various staff
members at the Department of Justice, where she expressed her dissatisfaction
with the State, or requested updates. However, the emails concern events or
conduct that occurred before August 20, 2025. While the Crime Victims’ Bill
of Rights does not provide a template for how to submit a complaint with a
law-enforcement agency, there is no indication in the emails that Petitioner
was filing a formal complaint. Additionally, in the Petition, Petitioner does
not assert that her emails constitute formal complaints, or that she filed a
complaint. This argument is presented for the first time in her Responses to
25
Petitioner’s Resp. to Mot. to Dismiss, D.I. 9, at 2.
10
Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss. Therefore, Petitioner’s argument does not
prevail.
35. Petitioner also argues that the “record identified by Petitioner” continues to
be referenced in subsequent proceedings.26 Even so, the reported events
occurred prior to the Senate Bill 17 amendments.
36. For these reasons, the amendments in Senate Bill 17 do not apply
retroactively. Therefore, Counts I, II, III, and V, as well as parts of Count IV,
must be dismissed.
Based on the Facts Outlined in the Petition, Petitioner Is Not Entitled to a
Writ of Mandamus
37. Respondent argues that even if the Crime Victims’ Bill of Rights applied
retroactively, Petitioner has not demonstrated that she is entitled to a Writ of
Mandamus.
38. A Writ of Mandamus “may be issued by the Superior Court to command a
lower court, agency, or public official to perform a duty ‘to which the
petitioner has established a clear legal right.’”27 Mandamus “is an exceptional
remedy that is not available as a matter of right, but rather, is issued only
26
Id. at 4.
27
Brittingham v. Town of Georgetown, 113 A.3d 519, 524 (Del. 2015).
11
according to the ‘sound judicial discretion’ of the court in which mandamus
is sought.”28
39. The Court may deny a petition where: (1) the legal duty is unclear; (2) the
petitioner has another remedy available; (3) issuing the writ would be
inequitable; (4) the necessity of the writ is moot; or (5) issuing a writ would
be useless. The majority of states have held that “mandamus is not the proper
remedy to compel the undoing of acts already done or the correction of errors
or wrongs already perpetrated....”29
40. First, granting the Petition would be futile.
41. In Count I, Petitioner seeks a review of a Family Court Proceeding.
Specifically, Petitioner requests written findings as to “how and why” Martino
was able to attend a Family Court mediation on Zoom on October 25, 2022.30
In Count III, Petitioner seeks an investigation into the alleged factual errors
contained in the Family Court Order dated June 12, 2023. Additionally, in
Count V, Petitioner seeks an investigation into “how and why” Martino was
admitted into Delaware’s Mental Health Court diversion program.31
28
Id.
29
Id. at 529.
30
Pet. for Writ of Mandamus, D.I. 1, at 14.
31
Id. at 17.
12
42. Counts I, III, and V seek an investigation into various Court decisions, not
conduct by the Department of Justice. A Writ of Mandamus is an available
remedy to enforce the Department of Justice to comply with the requirements
under the Crime Victims’ Bill of Rights. A Writ of Mandamus would be
useless for Counts I, III, and V because Respondent does not have the
authority to investigate or supervise the decisions of the Court.
43. Second, Petitioner has other remedies available.
44. “A Writ of Mandamus will not issue, however, unless the petitioner can
establish that there is no other adequate remedy available.”32 In this case,
Petitioner has not established that there is no other adequate remedy available.
45. Under Count II, Petitioner requests an investigation into the alleged cessation
of Delaware State Police Report intake. As aforementioned, Senate Bill 17
does not apply retroactively. However, if Petitioner has a current complaint
with a law-enforcement agency, she may file a complaint with the law-
enforcement agency, as stated in 11 Del. C. § 9402(a). It is required that each
law-enforcement agency “[d]esignate a supervisor who shall “receive, review,
and promptly address complaints of noncompliance with this chapter.”33
32
Brittingham, 113 A.3d at 524.
33
11 Del. C. § 9402(a)(1).
13
There is no evidence that Petitioner filed a formal complaint with the
respected law-enforcement agency.
46. Petitioner has another adequate remedy available under Count III as well.
Petitioner appealed the Family Court Order, which was affirmed by the
Suprreme Court. Petitioner could have brought these arguments in her appeal.
A Writ of Mandamus is not the appropriate remedy to investigate an Order
that was affirmed by the Supreme Court. Additionally, Respondent does not
have supervisory authority over Court decisions.
47. Petitioner has another adequate remedy under Count IV. Under Count IV,
Petitioner seeks a Writ of Mandamus to order Respondent to conduct a review
into alleged retaliatory or coercive court processes. Petitioner is not entitled
to a Writ of Mandamus because she may pursue a lawsuit against Martino if
she believes Martino is abusing the court process and filing frivolous lawsuits.
48. As aforementioned, the Court has discretion to grant a Writ of Mandamus,
and the Court may deny a petition if the granting of the writ would be useless,
or if the petitioner has another adequate remedy.
49. For these reasons, the Court finds that Petitioner is not entitled to a Writ of
Mandamus.
14
The Relief Petitioner Seeks Is Not a Right Afforded Under the Delaware
Crime Victims’ Bill of Rights
50. Lastly, Respondent argues that Petitioner has no clear legal right under the
Delaware Crime Victims’ Bill of Rights to the relief sought. This Court
agrees.
51. The rights of crime victims are outlined under 11 Del. C. § 9403.
52. Delaware law is clear. A Writ of Mandamus “is extraordinary and appropriate
only when a plaintiff is able to establish a clear legal right to the performance
of a non-discretionary duty.”34
53. Petitioner argues that Respondent has not complied with its duties under the
Delaware Crime Victims’ Bill of Rights, including duties of victim
notification, transparency, interagency coordination, reasonable protection,
written explanation when safety-related concerns are raised, and protection
from retaliation where state processes were being used to perpetuate harm.35
Petitioner claims that she put Respondent on notice of facts triggering these
duties, and Respondent failed to provide Petitioner with “written explanations,
victim notifications, or any meaningful response regarding whether perjury,
stalking, extortion, abuse of process, or retaliatory litigation would be
34
Darby v. New Castle Gunning Bedford Ed. Ass'n, 336 A.2d 209, 210 (Del. 1975).
35
Pet. for Writ of Mandamus, D.I. 1, at 9-10.
15
investigated or addressed.”36 These alleged duties are not set forth in the
Delaware Crime Victims’ Bill of Rights.
54. Petitioner broadly cites to the Delaware Crime Victims’ Bill of Rights, but
fails to identify the sections that set forth the duties Petitioner alleges
Respondent violated. No such duties exist under the current version of the
Delaware Crime Victims’ Bill of Rights, or the earlier versions.
55. For these reasons, Petitioner has not established a right to relief under the
Delaware Crime Victims’ Bill of Rights.
Conclusion
56. In Conclusion, Counts I and II are time-barred.
57. The 2025 amendments to the Delaware Crime Victims’ Bill of Rights do not
apply retroactively, and therefore, Counts I, II, III, and V must be dismissed,
as well as parts of Count IV.
58. The Court may deny the petition for Writ of Mandamus because the granting
of the writ would be futile, and there are adequate alternate remedies available
to Petitioner.
59. Petitioner has not established a clear legal right to relief under the Delaware
Crime Victims’ Bill of Rights.
36
Id. at 9.
16
60. For these reasons, the Court GRANTS Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss
Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Mandamus.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Mark H. Conner
Mark H. Conner, Judge
oc: Prothonotary
17