Bradford v. American Finance, LLC

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE DAMIEN CARL BRADFORD, ) ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) C.A. No.: K25A-05-001 RLG ) AMERICAN FINANCE, LLC, ) ) Appellee. ) OPINION Submitted: June 10, 2026 Decided: September 30, 2026 Upon Appellant’s Appeal from a Decision of the Court of Common Pleas – AFFIRMED. James J. Woods, Jr., Esquire, Grady & Hampton, LLC, Dover, Delaware, Attorney for Appellant. Tasha M. Stevens-Gueh, Esquire, Andrew & Stevens-Gueh, LLC, Georgetown, Delaware, Attorney for Appellee. GREEN-STREETT, J.  I. Introduction A man decided to finance his purchase of a truck. The creditor repossessed and sold the truck after payments ceased, leaving an unpaid balance on the man’s debt. The creditor sought and obtained a judgment against the man in Justice of the Peace Court. Five years later, the creditor attempted to revive the judgment, prompting the man to participate in the litigation for the first time. The Justice of the Peace Court granted that revival of the judgment. On appeal, the Court of Common Pleas affirmed. The man appealed to this Court, arguing the lower courts erred by failing to consider his defenses to the original judgment properly. As the Court of Common Pleas’s decision was free of legal error and supported by the record, its ruling is AFFIRMED. II. Factual and Procedural Background A. The underlying judgment In 2014, Appellant Damien Carl Herneisen (“Mr. Bradford”)1 entered a contract with Appellee American Finance, LLC (“AF”) to finance the purchase of a used truck.2 AF agreed to loan Mr. Bradford $13,261.00 at an annual interest rate of 1 Appellant subsequently changed his name to Damien Carl Bradford. See Opening Br. at 7. 2 Opening Br. at 5. 2 26.9%.3 Mr. Bradford purchased the truck on November 28, 2014, for a total price of $15,261.00.4 After the truck “began experiencing transmission problems,” Mr. Bradford discontinued repayment of the loan.5 AF repossessed the truck, using a repossession service to retrieve the truck from an address supplied by Mr. Bradford (the “Recovery Address”).6 The Recovery Address, however, differed from the address provided by Mr. Bradford when he entered into the finance agreement (the “Loan Address”).7 AF sold the truck back to the original dealership on March 4, 2016, for $6,501.00.8 AF sent notice of the sale to the Loan Address, not the Recovery Address.9 AF received that letter back as unclaimed.10 On April 1, 2016, AF sent a deficiency letter to Mr. Bradford, again using the Loan Address.11 After receiving no response from Mr. Bradford, AF filed suit in 3 Id. 4 Id. 5 Id. 6 Id. at 6. 7 Id. 8 Id. 9 Id. 10 Id. 11 Id. 3 Justice of the Peace Court (“JP Court”).12 JP Court sent notice of that suit to the Loan Adress.13 After that notice was returned unclaimed, JP Court mailed a second letter to the same address via certified mail.14 Mr. Bradford failed to respond to AF’s suit.15 Accordingly, JP Court granted default judgment against Mr. Bradford in the amount of $6,910.50, plus post- judgment interest, on August 16, 2021.16 JP Court mailed notice of the default judgment to Mr. Bradford at the Loan Address.17 Mr. Bradford did not respond to the default judgment.18 In July 2021, AF learned Mr. Bradford had purchased a new vehicle.19 AF attempted to secure a levy against Mr. Bradford’s personal property, but the levy could not be established because the name on the judgment no longer matched Mr. Bradford’s legal name.20 At that time, AF discovered Mr. Bradford had legally 12 Id. 13 Id. 14 Id. at 7. 15 Id. 16 Id. 17 Id. 18 Id. 19 Tr. of Jan. 27 CCP Hr’g, D.I. 13, at 13 (Jan. 27, 2025). 20 Id. at 14-15. 4 changed his name five years prior – on December 12, 2017.21 As part of that process, Mr. Bradford represented to the Court of Common Pleas (“CCP”) that there were no judgments against him.22 AF filed a motion in JP Court to change the name on the judgment against Mr. Bradford to reflect his new name.23 JP Court granted that motion on August 17, 2021.24 As five years had passed since JP Court entered the default judgment, AF filed a Motion to Revive Judgment on April 20, 2022.25 In response to that motion, Mr. Bradford began participating in the litigation, filing an Answer and Counterclaim.26 JP Court held hearings on the matter on November 3 and 4, 2022.27 JP Court found AF “[had] proven [it] complied with the service requirements pursuant to 10 Del. C. § 9524.”28 Accordingly, JP Court found the August 16, 2016 judgment 21 Id. at 13. 22 Id. at 7. 23 Id. at 17. 24 Opening Br. at 8. 25 Ans. Br. at 5. 26 Opening Br. at 8. 27 JP Court Decision, App.’s Ex. F, at 1 (Nov. 3, 2023). 28 Id. at 3. 5 qualified as a valid judgment.29 As to Mr. Bradford’s counterclaim, JP Court determined Mr. Bradford asserted only “claims which could have been plead [sic] at trial.”30 JP Court thus dismissed the counterclaim as untimely.31 Finding that the original default judgment was valid, JP Court revived AF’s judgment against Mr. Bradford.32 B. Mr. Bradford’s appeal to Court of Common Pleas Mr. Bradford filed a timely appeal to CCP of JP Court’s Order.33 In a letter dated June 21, 2024, CCP issued a ruling on the scope of Mr. Bradford’s appeal.34 CCP acknowledged that Mr. Bradford sought de novo review of: (1) the default judgment granted in August 2016; (2) the order granting Mr. Bradford’s name change on the judgment granted August 17, 2021; and (3) the granting of AF’s Motion to Revive Judgment.35 Based on the record available, CCP determined Mr. Bradford timely appealed the decision reviving the judgment only.36 CCP noted 29 Id. 30 Id. 31 Id. 32 Id. 33 Opening Br. at 9. 34 App.’s Ex. G. 35 Id. at 1. 36 Id. 6 appeals from JP Court to CCP must be filed “within 15 days from the entry of the final judgment, order, or disposition from which an appeal is permitted by law.”37 As Mr. Bradford failed to appeal either the default judgment or the change of name on the judgment within the applicable 15-day window, CCP held those orders could not be appealed.38 CCP conducted a remote hearing on October 28, 2024, to consider a Motion to Dismiss the Appeal filed by AF.39 CCP confirmed the only issue before it on appeal centered on the revival of the judgment.40 Mr. Bradford objected to that ruling, arguing his “belief [ ] that[,] by taking an appeal, we bring up all interlocutory orders below.”41 CCP reiterated its decision, explaining that Mr. Bradford failed to file a timely appeal of any order other than the Motion to Revive Judgment.42 After referencing decisional law it found to be instructive, CCP informed the parties it would hold a trial on the Motion to Revive.43 37 Id. at 2 (citing Ct. Com. Pl. Civ. R. 72.3(b)). 38 Id. 39 Tr. of Oct. 28 CCP Hr’g, D.I. 12, at 5 (Oct. 28, 2024). 40 Id. at 10. 41 Id. 42 Id. 43 Id. at 12. 7  On January 27, 2025, CCP held a trial regarding AF’s Motion to Revive.44 AF presented the testimony of Elizabeth Parsons, a legal assistant working in AF’s Collateral Recovery Department.45 Ms. Parsons testified regarding AF’s efforts to collect on the judgment against Mr. Bradford.46 Specifically, she testified about “skip tracing” methods employed by AF.47 These techniques allowed AF to “use either Facebook or any sort of public information to try to find work information or vehicles registered to the defendant, as well as paid vendor searches to search for employment.”48 Through her testimony, collection notes for Mr. Bradford’s account were introduced into evidence.49 After AF rested its case, Mr. Bradford provided an opening statement arguing CCP could “refuse to revive the judgment if there [was] any basis for concluding the continued enforcement of the judgment would be inequitable.”50 Mr. Bradford posited the amount of interest that accrued on the judgment “is now more than the 44 Tr. of Jan. 27 CCP Hr’g at 1. 45 Id. at 7-8. 46 Id. at 8-10. 47 Id. 48 Id. at 10-11. 49 Id. at 12. 50 Id. at 28. 8 judgment,” rendering enforcement of the judgment inequitable.51 When asked if Mr. Bradford admitted to the original amount of the judgment, counsel replied: We don’t admit the judgment, but Your Honor has ruled that you’re not going to hear any testimony about reopening the judgment or about the UCC or truth in lending defenses. So[,] given Your Honor’s rulings, we’re taking that [–] at this point in the proceedings [–] as the judgment is the judgment.52 Mr. Bradford testified he changed his name to honor the aunt and uncle who raised him as a child.53 He stated that, at the time of his name change, he was unaware of AF’s judgment against him.54 On cross-examination, Mr. Bradford acknowledged he did not do “any kind of search” to determine if there were any judgments against him.55 When asked if he ever attempted to contact AF, he replied, “Why would I reach out to American Finance?”56 Following the trial, CCP issued a “Final Decision and Order” on April 9, 2025.57 CCP recounted its prior ruling that it would only consider an “appeal 51 Id. 52 Id. at 29. 53 Id. at 31-32. 54 Id. 55 Id. at 35. 56 Id. 57 Pl.’s Notice of Appeal, Ex. A (hereinafter, the “CCP Decision”). 9 resulting from Appellee’s Motion to Revive (Scire Facias).”58 In its recitation of the facts, CCP listed the numerous times it found AF attempted to contact Mr. Bradford to execute on the judgment.59 Specifically, CCP noted: (1) at least 14 skip tracing attempts; (2) a “payment arrangement letter” sent to the Loan Address; (3) at least three phone calls to Mr. Bradford’s phone with accompanying voicemails; (4) a fourth phone call “to Mr. Bradford’s cellphone with no message able to be left;” (5) two phone calls to Mr. Bradford’s place of employment; (6) “a call to Vivent Solar to verify employment for Mr. Bradford on April 4, 2019, which was unsuccessful;” (7) two voicemails left with Delmarva Landscaping; and (8) “an email sent to Mr. Bradford LLC [sic] on August 3, 2017 directing him to contact American Finance.”60 CCP found appeals from JP Court “are governed by statute, specifically[,] 10 Del. C. § 9571.”61 Under 10 Del. C. § 9571(b), an appeal from JP Court “shall be taken within 15 days of the final order, ruling, decision[,] or judgment.” As Mr. Bradford only filed a timely appeal of the Motion to Revive Judgment, CCP found its jurisdiction in the matter was limited to consideration of the Motion to Revive 58 Id. at 3. 59 Id. at 4. 60 Id. at 4-5. 61 Id. at 7. 10 Judgment.62 CCP determined it could not review the merits of the judgment. Accordingly, CCP held it would review JP Court’s determination that “the judgment entered on August 6, 2016 was valid.”63 CCP further noted, “[t]he parties agreed [Mr. Bradford’s] name should be changed to [his] new name (Bradford).”64 CCP concluded, “[t]he Order granting the Motion to Revive [ ] was the only final judgment timely appealed by Mr. Bradford, and thus shall be the only matter reviewed de novo by [CCP].”65 CCP ultimately opined that Mr. Bradford failed to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the judgment should not be revived.66 CCP found the record before it showed AF attempted to contact Mr. Bradford to apprise him of the judgment.67 Further, CCP noted that, in the context of a rule to show cause proceeding regarding revival of a judgment, “Mr. Bradford’s lack of notice in JP Court [was] no longer a viable argument per Delaware Superior Court.”68 Finding 62 Id. at 7-8. 63 Id. at 7. 64 Id. at 7. 65 Id. at 8. 66 Id. at 9. 67 Id. at 10. 68 Id. (citing Dealer Servs. Corp. v. Albertson, 2024 WL 3064946, at *3 (Del. Super. June 18, 2024)). 11 that “Mr. Bradford’s argument appears to be challenging the merits of the original default action” – a challenge CCP held to be untimely – CCP concluded Mr. Bradford failed to demonstrate the judgment should not be revived.69 Accordingly, CCP affirmed the JP Court’s granting of the Motion to Revive Judgment.70 C. The instant appeal Mr. Bradford filed a timely appeal of the CCP Decision to this Court on May 5, 2025.71 He filed his Opening Brief on July 21, 2025.72 AF filed its Answering Brief on August 11, 2025.73 Mr. Bradford filed his Reply Brief on August 12, 2025.74 On August 18, 2025, an internal Superior Court switch of judicial officers was necessary.75 At an office conference on September 10, 2025, counsel alerted the Court to potential issues regarding the record – specifically, the lack of transcripts from the proceedings before CCP.76 On October 3, 2025, the Court signed an Order 69 Id. at 12. 70 Id. at 13. 71 D.I. 1 (May 5, 2025). 72 D.I. 7 (July 21, 2025). 73 D.I. 8 (Aug. 11, 2025). 74 D.I. 9 (Aug. 12, 2025). 75 D.I. 11 (Aug. 18, 2025). 76 D.I. 14 (Sept. 10, 2025). 12 requesting transcripts of the hearings held by CCP on October 28, 2024, and January 27, 2025.77 The Court received those transcripts on November 12, 2025.78 The Court heard oral argument on this matter on March 27, 2026.79 At that time, the Court requested supplemental filings from the parties.80 Mr. Bradford submitted his supplemental letter to the Court on April 7, 2026.81 AF filed its supplemental letter on April 30, 2026.82 The Court received the transcript of oral argument on June 10, 2026.83 III. Standard of Review Under 10 Del. C. § 1326(a), a party may appeal “[f]rom any final order, ruling, decision[,] or judgment” entered by the CCP “to the Superior Court of the State in the county in which said order, ruling, decision[,] or judgment was rendered.” 10 Del. C. § 1326(c) requires that “[t]he appeal shall be reviewed on the record and shall not be tried de novo.” This Court must examine CCP’s ruling and determine if 77 D.I. 17 (Oct. 3, 2025). 78 D.I. 19, D.I. 20 (Nov. 12, 2025). 79 D.I. 23 (Mar. 27, 2026). 80 Id. 81 D.I. 24 (Apr. 7, 2026). 82 D.I. 25 (Apr. 30, 2026). 83 D.I. 26 (Sept. 14, 2026) (the official transcript of this hearing was docketed on September 14, 2026). 13 its ruling “is free of legal error and supported by the evidence.”84 This Court will not disturb the lower court’s factual findings if “the record indicates that it is the product of an orderly and logical deductive process and supported by the evidence.”85 “Legal conclusions are reviewed de novo for errors in the formulation or application of legal precepts.”86 IV. Analysis In his appeal, Mr. Bradford raises seven grounds for the Court’s consideration.87 Three of those grounds assert defenses against the original judgment: (1) an allegation that AF violated the Truth in Lending Act; (2) an allegation that AF violated provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code; and (3) an assertion that those two defenses are not time-barred.88 As CCP found any challenges to the underlying judgment were not properly before it, CCP did not 84 Milbourne v. Swinton, 2025 WL 3044171, at *4 (Del. Super. Oct. 30, 2025) (citing Baker v. Connell, 488 A.2d 1303, 1309 (Del. 1985)). 85 Zhang v. Jack Lingo Inc. Realtor, 2024 WL 3791646, at *1 (Del. Super. Aug. 13, 2024) (citing Rufus v. Ramsey, 2004 WL 838612, at *1 (Del. Super. Apr. 13, 2004)). 86 Milbourne, 2025 WL 3044171, at *4 (citing Lopez-Vasquez v. State, 956 A.2d 1280, 1285 (Del. 2008)). 87 Opening Br. at 10. 88 Id. 14 consider those defenses.89 Accordingly, those grounds are not properly before this Court, and will not be considered on appeal. Mr. Bradford’s remaining four grounds center on CCP’s decision to limit the scope of his appeal to an examination of the Motion to Revive Judgment.90 He contends CCP erred by: (1) failing to grant a trial de novo on all issues raised by Mr. Bradford; (2) failing to find the original judgment was void based on AF’s failure to verify Mr. Bradford’s address; (3) refusing to allow Mr. Bradford to present equitable defenses; and (4) denying Mr. Bradford’s requests for discovery. AF counters that CCP correctly limited the scope of Mr. Bradford’s appeal.91 Further, AF argues Mr. Bradford “failed to identify any errors of law, [or] to challenge any findings of fact” within the CCP Decision.92 A. CCP properly limited the scope of Mr. Bradford’s appeal JP Court entered a default judgment against Mr. Bradford on August 16, 2016.93 Mr. Bradford did not file a timely appeal of that judgment, nor did he file a 89 The CCP Decision at 8. 90 Opening Br. at 10. 91 Ans. Br. at 10. 92 Id. at 12. 93 The CCP Decision at 4. 15 motion to vacate the judgment.94 Mr. Bradford did not participate in the litigation until AF filed its Motion to Revive Judgment.95 “[A] default judgment is a final judgment for all purposes as between the parties.”96 Under 10 Del. C. § 9571(b), an appeal of a final judgment from JP Court to CCP “shall be taken within 15 days of the final order, ruling, decision[,] or judgment.” § 9571 “is a jurisdictional statute governing the right of appeal from judgments recovered before a Justice of the Peace. If such a statute is not [followed,] the appellate court has no jurisdiction.”97 As Mr. Bradford did not comply with the requirements of 10 Del. C. § 9571(b), CCP could not entertain an appeal of the default judgment. Mr. Bradford argues that 10 Del. C. §9571(c)’s mandate that an appeal to CCP “shall be a trial de novo” required CCP to conduct a trial de novo of all orders from JP Court relevant to this litigation.98 Mr. Bradford, however, failed to file a timely 94 Opening Br. at 8 (noting that when Mr. Bradford began participating in the litigation against him, he filed an Answer and Counterclaim). 95 Id. 96 Werb v. D’Alessandro, 606 A.2d 117, 119 (Del. 1992) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting 6 James W. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 55.09 (2d ed. 1992)). 97 Williams v. Singleton, 160 A.2d 376, 378 (1960); see also Freibott v. Patterson Schwartz, Inc., 740 A.2d 4 (Del. Super. 1999) (“An appellant’s failure to comply with [10 Del. C. §§ 9571(a) and (b)] precludes the Court of Common Pleas from entertaining jurisdiction over the appeal.”). 98 Opening Br. at 11. 16 appeal of any order aside from the one concerning the Motion to Revive Judgment. Accordingly, 10 Del. C. § 9571(c) entitles him to a trial de novo on the JP Court’s order granting the Motion to Revive. It does not provide him with an opportunity to relitigate other final orders tied to the same litigation for which the appellate deadline has long since passed.99 Mr. Bradford cites Church v. Cottman100 and August v. Lin101 for the premise that “all issues litigated in the Justice of the Peace Court should have been heard afresh in the Court of Common Pleas.”102 Those cases, however, do not support Mr. Bradford’s argument. Specifically, in Church, the appellee succeeded on a motion to dismiss in JP Court after the appellant failed to provide a bill of particulars.103 On 99 See Ney v. Polite, 399 A.2d 527, 529 (Del. 1979) (Holding that an appeal from a JP Court decision denying a motion to vacate a default judgment could consider the merits of that denial, but not the original entry of default judgment: In the case before us, plaintiff’s liability became fixed and determined upon the magistrate’s denial of the application to vacate the nonsuit and default judgment; consequently, plaintiff’s right to appeal from that denial accrued from the date of that denial, not the date of entry of the nonsuit and default judgments themselves. However, we note that the appeal permits only review of the magistrate’s order denying relief and not of the nonsuit and default judgment themselves. (emphasis added)) 100 1998 WL 733753, at *2 (Del. Super. June 18, 1988). 101 2019 WL 3976040, at *1 (Del. Super. Aug. 20, 2019), aff’d sub nom. Aug. v. Jie Lin, 228 A.3d 408 (Del. 2020). 102 Opening Br. at 11. 103 Church, 1998 WL 733753, at *1. 17 appeal to CCP, the court limited the scope of its review to the motion to dismiss only.104 This Court reversed, holding that a trial de novo required “that the parties begin anew, as if proceedings in the lower court never took place.”105 Church presented a distinguishable procedural posture compared to Mr. Bradford’s appeal. In Church, the parties were still litigating the initial complaint when JP Court granted the motion to dismiss. Notably, before the motion to dismiss, a default judgment had been entered against the appellee for failing to appear.106 The appellee succeeded on a motion for relief from judgment, before the case was ultimately dismissed.107 Given that procedural posture, a trial de novo required CCP to consider the merits of the case without affording any deference to the JP Court’s decision to grant the motion to dismiss.108 Similarly, Mr. Bradford could have appealed the JP Court’s entry of default judgment against him, but failed to do so. By failing to make any attempt to secure relief from the judgment against him until AF filed its Motion to Revive Judgment, Mr. Bradford forewent his opportunity to attack the merits of that judgment. 104 Id. 105 Id. at *3. 106 Id. at *1. 107 Id. 108 Id. 18 Challenging the Motion to Revive Judgment at this stage does not permit Mr. Bradford to reopen all final orders entered in the litigation previously. In August, a pro se litigant appealed a JP Court decision to CCP by listing the potential ways JP Court erred.109 She failed, however, to state any allegations against the appellee when filing her appeal in CCP.110 CCP dismissed the appeal under Court of Common Pleas Civil Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.111 This Court affirmed that dismissal, finding that an appeal de novo required litigants appealing a decision of JP Court to CCP to provide “(1) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief and (2) a demand for judgment.”112 This Court delineated an appeal de novo, wherein the parties must begin litigating that issue anew, and a more traditional appeal wherein the parties focus their contentions to errors made by the lower court.113 August clarifies that an appeal de novo requires CCP to consider the merits 109 August, 2019 WL 3976949, at *3. 110 Id. 111 Id. 112 Id. at *5. 113 Id. 19 of the issue brought before it without deference to JP Court.114 Further, the parties must state their claims de novo for CCP to review.115 The August decision does not support the contention that an appeal of an order from JP Court requires, or even permits, CCP to reconsider all prior final orders in that litigation. Rather, August explains the requirements placed upon a party wishing to appeal a JP Court decision to CCP. A party appealing a JP Court decision must treat his CCP appeal as if the initial action had been filed in CCP. 116 In the instant case, that required the parties to relitigate the Motion to Revive Judgment, but not any of the prior final orders that Mr. Bradford declined to appeal within the statutorily-mandated timeframe. Thus, on appeal, CCP could only consider the JP Court’s decision to grant the revival of the judgment. CCP held a trial de novo on that issue.117 Mr. Bradford’s contention that CCP erred by refusing to expand the scope of its review runs contrary to statutory and decisional law. CCP correctly limited the scope of its review to the 114 Id. 115 Id. 116 Id. at *4. 117 The CCP decision at 3. 20 only issue properly before it, conducted the required trial de novo, and affirmed the JP Court’s decision. That process was free from legal error.118 B. CCP’s finding that the 2016 default judgment was valid is supported by the record Mr. Bradford asserts CCP erred by failing to void the original default judgment entered on August 16, 2016.119 In support of that assertion, Mr. Bradford argues that “AF did not act in good faith when it sued Mr. Bradford in 2016, because it knew[,] or had reason to know[,] he no longer lived at the [Loan Address], but it nevertheless gave that address to the Justice of the Peace Court.”120 Mr. Bradford posits CCP committed legal error by “not allowing Mr. Bradford any discovery on whether [AF] had ‘acted with diligence’” when trying to contact Mr. Bradford.121 Mr. Bradford contends AF’s alleged failure to utilize Mr. Bradford’s updated address constitutes a violation of “the obligation of good faith and fair dealing inherent in AF’s contract with Mr. Bradford.”122 118 See Zhang, 2024 WL 3791646, at *1 (affirming a Court of Common Pleas decision holding that a review de novo of a Justice of the Peace order encompassed only those orders that were appealed timely). 119 Opening Br. at 12. 120 Id. at 13. 121 D.I. 24 at 2. 122 Opening Br. at 13. 21  Based on the record before CCP, AF and JP Court both attempted to contact Mr. Bradford at the Loan Address.123 Other than using what Mr. Bradford characterizes as an outdated address, Mr. Bradford does not assert JP Court committed any error when it attempted to provide him notice, via certified mail, of the litigation against him.124 In proceedings before JP Court, Mr. Bradford testified the Loan Address utilized by both AF and JP Court belonged to his mother. 125 That address matched the address on Mr. Bradford’s license until at least 2019. 126 Mr. Bradford further testified his mother lived at that address until 2021.127 Mr. Bradford stated he did not change his address on his license as “any mail that went to my mom’s she always gives me [sic].”128 Although CCP conducted a de novo review of the JP Court’s decision, CCP was not required to disregard facts preserved by the JP Court’s record. Equipped with Mr. Bradford’s testimony, CCP concluded Mr. Bradford possessed adequate knowledge of the potential of litigation against him regarding his debt to AF.129 123 Id. at 6-7. 124 Id. at 7. 125 Ex. F to Opening Br. at 2. 126 Id. 127 Id. 128 Id. 129 Tr. of Oct. 28 CCP Hr’g at 11-12. 22 CCP’s conclusion is backed by sufficient evidence and results from a logical and orderly deductive process. Accordingly, this Court will not disturb that factual finding. C. CCP acted within its discretion by declining to find reviving the judgment against Mr. Bradford inequitable Mr. Bradford next argues that CCP erred by preventing him from arguing equitable defenses against the 2016 judgment.130 He posits Knott v. LVNV Funding, LLC131 requires Delaware courts permit debtors to raise “any equitable defense in a scire facias proceeding.”132 Mr. Bradford asserts that his defense of recoupment, as well as his counterclaims against AF for violations of the Uniform Commercial Code and the Truth in Lending Act, are equitable defenses that Knott mandated CCP must consider.133 In Knott, the Delaware Supreme Court evaluated – and affirmed – a Superior Court decision granting a motion to refresh a judgment after an elapse of five years since the initial entry of the judgment.134 In affirming, the Delaware Supreme Court 130 Opening Br. at 14-15. 131 95 A.3d 13, 19 (Del. 2014). 132 Opening Br. at 14. 133 Id. 134 Knott, 95A.3d at 13-14. 23 determined that statutory limitations on the timeframe in which a creditor can collect on a judgment did not function as a statute of limitations.135 Rather, the statutory requirement that a creditor file a motion to revive a judgment after five years elapsed “gives the Superior Court the discretion not to refresh a judgment if a creditor has not acted with diligence or if there is some bases for concluding that continued enforcement of the judgment would be inequitable.”136 Extending that holding to CCP’s review of a motion to revive a judgment, Knott affords CCP the discretion to consider whether reviving a judgment would be inequitable. Knott also proves instructive regarding the scope of a court’s review when considering a motion to revive a judgment. As explained in Knott, “the modern equivalent of a writ of scire facias is a rule to show cause.”137 In a scire facias action, the debtor “would have been required to appear and show cause why the [creditor] could not execute on the judgment.”138 Aside from a creditor failing to act with diligence to collect on a debt, Knott does not describe what type of scenario would form the basis for a court declining to revive a judgment because of inequity. 135 Id. at 14. 136 Id. at 19. 137 Id. at 17. 138 Id. at 21. 24  CCP heard testimony from AF about its attempts to contact Mr. Bradford regarding the judgment against him.139 CCP determined AF acted with sufficient diligence in attempting to collect on the judgment.140 Additionally, CCP heard argument from Mr. Bradford regarding the equity of reviving the judgment.141 Mr. Bradford argued that, “[i]t’s inequitable to continue to do this when a very long time ago … it would’ve been very easy for American Finance to determine exactly where Mr. Bradford lived and to serve him.”142 CCP considered that supposition, and declined to agree.143 In this appeal, Mr. Bradford contends CCP refused to address “Mr. Bradford’s position that he should be allowed to present his UCC and TILA claims in recoupment, as opposed to seeking an affirmative recovery from AF.”144 CCP did address that position, however, finding that those defenses could have been asserted “when the matter was originally filed [in 2016].”145 CCP correctly determined that 139 Tr. of Jan. 27 CCP Hr’g at 10-22. 140 The CCP Decision at 13 (“It was again, [Mr. Bradford’s] obligation to show that [AF] was dilatory in executing on its judgment, but [he] offered no evidence that [AF] had done so.”). 141 Tr. of Jan. 27 CCP Hr’g at 28. 142 Id. at 28-29. 143 The CCP Decision at 13. 144 Opening Br. at 15. 145 Tr. of Oct. 28 CCP Hr’g at 9. 25 the defenses Mr. Bradford sought to assert – aside from his argument that AF failed to make diligent efforts to execute the judgment – should have been raised before the entry of default judgment.146 A hearing on a Motion to Revive Judgment was not the appropriate time for Mr. Bradford to argue those defenses.147 CCP maintained the discretion to consider whether reviving the judgment would be inequitable, but Knott did not create an obligation for CCP to consider every equitable defense Mr. Bradford wished to raise after failing to do so at the appropriate and mandated time. CCP exercised its discretion, and declined to hear testimony on the merits of those defenses. CCP did not commit legal error in doing so. D. CCP acted within its discretion in denying Mr. Bradford discovery During the litigation before CCP, Mr. Bradford submitted a discovery request, prompting AF to file a motion to strike that discovery.148 CCP granted that motion to strike, and “disallowed any subsequent discovery requests without [CCP’s] 146 Id. 147 See Albertson, 2024 WL 3064946, at *3 (“Defenses in a scire facias proceeding are limited and do not included defenses on the merits that could have been raised in the court that entered the judgment. As a result, in a rule to show cause proceeding, the judgment-debtor may not challenge the merits of the original action.”). 148 The CCP Decision at 3. 26 permission.”149 CCP reasoned the discovery requests went beyond the scope of the Motion to Revive Judgment.150 Under Court of Common Pleas Civil Rule 26(b), a party “may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action.” Mr. Bradford “served discovery in November 2024, relevant to the recoupment defenses and also the steps AF took (if any) to try to get a current address for Mr. Bradford in the 2015-2022 period, but the Court of Common Pleas struck that discovery.”151 Given CCP’s finding that the only appeal properly before it concerned the Motion to Revive Judgment, any discovery “relevant to the recoupment defense,” or efforts to track Mr. Bradford before the entry of the default judgment, were beyond the scope of the appeal. Mr. Bradford further asserts that CCP’s denial of his discovery attempts “severely hampered [his] ability to cross-examine AF’s sole witness in the Court of Common Pleas.”152 Through that witness, AF introduced evidence of its attempts to contact Mr. Bradford after the entry of default judgment in 2016. 153 Logs of those 149 Id. 150 Tr. of Oct. 28 CCP Hr’g at 9; App. to Answering Br. at 14. 151 Opening Br. at 20. 152 Reply at 2. 153 See the CCP Decision at 4-5 (providing a summary of the efforts AF made to contact Mr. Bradford). 27 attempts were submitted as trial exhibits, to which Mr. Bradford had access before trial commenced.154 During cross-examination of AF’s sole witness, Ms. Parsons, Mr. Bradford inquired about the price of a specific type of skip tracing search.155 CCP sustained AF’s objection to that line of questioning, finding the cost of AF’s search efforts irrelevant to whether AF acted diligently to contact Mr. Bradford.156 Mr. Bradford did not question Ms. Parsons about the addresses or phone numbers utilized by AF in those efforts.157 Mr. Bradford’s argument regarding AF’s alleged lack of diligence centered on his conclusory contention that “it would have been very easy for [AF] to determine exactly where Mr. Bradford lived and to serve him.”158 Based on the record before this Court, CCP acted within its discretion when it held Mr. Bradford’s discovery requests exceeded the scope of a hearing on the Motion to Revive Judgment. Moreover, Mr. Bradford has not demonstrated the relevance of his discovery request in light of CCP’s holding that it would only 154 See Tr. of Jan. 27 CCP Hr’g at 5-6 (wherein counsel for AF indicated the parties had reached agreement on the admissibility of most of AF’s exhibits but disagreed about the admissibility of an exhibit containing AF’s “account notes.” Ultimately, that exhibit was not entered into evidence). 155 Id. at 25. 156 Id. at 26. 157 See id. at 27. 158 Id. at 28-29. 28 consider an appeal of the Motion to Revive Judgment. Mr. Bradford similarly failed to provide any explanation for how that holding “severely hampered any cross- examination of AF’s lone witness.”159 E. CCP did not err in concluding Mr. Bradford admitted to owing the debt Mr. Bradford’s final argument alleges CCP committed an evidentiary error finding that Mr. Bradford “admitted to owing the principal debt of $6,216.77.”160 During the hearing on the Motion to Revive Judgment before CCP, the court asked Mr. Bradford, “[s]o you admit to the amount, the original amount of the judgment. What you are opposed [sic] is the amount of the interest that’s being applied?”161 Mr. Bradford responded: We don’t admit the judgment, but Your Honor has ruled that you’re not going to hear any testimony about reopening the judgment or about the UCC or truth in lending defenses. So[,] given Your Honor’s rulings, we’re taking that [–] at this point in the proceedings [–] as the judgment is the judgment.162 159 Opening Br. at 20-21. 160 The CCP Decision at 10. 161 Tr. of Jan. 27 CCP Hr’g at 29. 162 Id. 29  Faced with CCP’s declination to consider any argument for reopening the judgment, Mr. Bradford agreed “the judgment is the judgment.”163 Inclusive of his attempts to raise defenses against the judgment, Mr. Bradford did not make any argument against the calculation behind the amount of the original judgment – only the validity of the judgment itself. Thus, CCP did not err by finding Mr. Bradford “admitted” to the amount of the principal debt.164 V. Conclusion CCP correctly limited the scope of Mr. Bradford’s appeal to a review de novo of the Motion to Revive Judgment. CCP’s factual findings are supported by the record, and represent the product of a logical and orderly deductive process. CCP’s legal conclusions are free from legal error. Accordingly, CCP’s decision is AFFIRMED. IT IS SO ORDERED. 163 Id. 164 The CCP Decision at 10. 30