In re Price
CourtDistrict of Columbia Court of Appeals
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
Docket26-BG-0565
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS
No. 26-BG-0565
IN RE AARON E. PRICE, SR., RESPONDENT.
A Member of the Bar of the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals
(Bar Registration No. 489057)
On Report and Recommendation of the Board on
Professional Responsibility Ad Hoc Hearing Committee
Approving Amended Petition for Negotiated Discipline
(BDN: 24-ND-011; DDN: 2022-D220)
(Decided November 19, 2026)
Before BECKWITH and DEAHL, Associate Judges, and WASHINGTON, Senior
Judge.
PER CURIAM: This decision is nonprecedential. Please refer to D.C. Bar R. XI,
§ 12.1(d), governing the appropriate citation of this opinion.
In this disciplinary matter, the Hearing Committee recommends approval of
the parties’ amended petition for negotiated attorney discipline. Respondent Aaron
E. Price, Sr., acknowledges that, in connection with serving as a court-appointed
guardian, he improperly exercised control over the ward’s real property, including
selling it without authority and not disclosing the proceeds to the court; made false
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statements and failed to inform the court of his actions with respect to the property
in various court filings, some of which were sworn; and knowingly included
incorrect information about the property when he eventually petitioned to be
appointed the ward’s conservator to try to correct the defect in title from having sold
the property in his capacity as the ward’s guardian. As a result, respondent admits
that he violated D.C. R. Pro. Conduct 1.1(a) and (b), 1.3(a), 3.3(a), and 8.4(c)
and (d). The proposed discipline consists of a 120-day suspension, stayed as to all
but 60 days, followed by one year of probation with conditions, and, if he does not
successfully complete his probation, a fitness requirement to be reinstated.
Having reviewed the Committee’s recommendation in accordance with our
procedures in these cases, see D.C. Bar R. XI, § 12.1(d), we agree that this case is
appropriate for negotiated discipline and “the agreed-upon sanction is justified,” In
re Mensah, 262 A.3d 1100, 1104 (D.C. 2021) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks
omitted), in light of reasonably analogous precedents. See, e.g., In re Johnson, 158
A.3d 913 (D.C. 2017); In re Thai, 987 A.2d 428 (D.C. 2009) (per curiam); In re
Parshall, 878 A.2d 1253 (D.C. 2005) (per curiam); In re Uchendu, 812 A.2d 933
(D.C. 2002); In re Ontell, 724 A.2d 1204 (D.C. 1999) (per curiam); In re Reback,
513 A.2d 226 (D.C. 1986) (en banc). Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that respondent Aaron E. Price, Sr., is hereby suspended from the
practice of law in the District of Columbia for 120 days, stayed as to all but 60 days,
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followed by one year of probation, with conditions that: (a) within the first 60 days
of the probationary period, he shall attend six hours of continuing legal education
courses in ethics and probate, approved by Disciplinary Counsel, and provide written
confirmation of his attendance; and (b) during the entire one-year period, he shall
not be found to have engaged in any misconduct in this or any other jurisdiction.
The one-year probationary term will begin immediately upon the issuance of
this opinion. If Disciplinary Counsel has probable cause to believe that respondent
has violated any condition of his probation, then Disciplinary Counsel may seek to
revoke his probation pursuant to D.C. Bar R. XI, § 3, and Bd. Pro. Resp. R. 18.3,
and request that he be required to serve the suspension previously stayed herein,
consecutive to any other discipline or suspension that may be imposed, and that his
reinstatement to the practice of law be conditioned upon proof of fitness.
Additionally, we direct respondent’s attention to D.C. Bar R. XI, § 14(g), which
requires the filing of an affidavit with this court for purposes of reinstatement in
accordance with D.C. Bar R. XI, § 16, and Bd. Pro. Resp. R. 9.9.
So ordered.