Gallo v. Schwalb

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Atlantic and Maryland Reporters. Users are requested to notify the Clerk of the Court of any formal errors so that corrections may be made before the bound volumes go to press. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS No. 25-CV-0060 ALEXANDER GALLO, APPELLANT, V. BRIAN SCHWALB, et al., APPELLEES. Appeal from the Superior Court of the District of Columbia (2024-CAB-007842) (Donald W. Tunnage, Judge) (Submitted June 4, 2026 Decided September 10, 2026) Alexander Gallo, pro se. Brian L. Schwalb, Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Caroline S. Van Zile, Solicitor General, Ashwin P. Phatak, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Thais-Lyn Trayer, Deputy Solicitor General, and Jeremy R. Girton, Assistant Attorney General were on the brief for appellees Brian Schwalb and the District of Columbia. Abid R. Qureshi, Parag Dharmavarapu, and Mobeen Chaudhry were on the brief for appellee Latham & Watkins LLP. Before BECKWITH, EASTERLY, and SHANKER, Associate Judges. SHANKER, Associate Judge: Appellant Alexander Gallo, acting pro se, sued appellees Latham & Watkins LLP, the District of Columbia, and D.C. Attorney  2 General Brian Schwalb in Superior Court, alleging that they committed certain litigation misconduct in a prior case. Mr. Gallo also moved for a preliminary injunction. After the preliminary injunction motion was fully briefed, the Superior Court, unprompted and without holding a hearing or otherwise considering Mr. Gallo’s position, dismissed without prejudice Mr. Gallo’s complaint for failure to state a claim in a brief order that included no explanation of how Mr. Gallo’s complaint was deficient. We reverse, and we take this opportunity to emphasize the importance of a basic precept of procedural fairness: a trial court cannot sua sponte dismiss a plaintiff’s complaint under Superior Court Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) without providing the plaintiff notice and an opportunity to respond. I. Background In May 2020, during the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic, Mr. Gallo sought to evict Andre Hopkins, a “foreclosed homeowner” who refused to leave a property that Mr. Gallo had purchased. See Gallo v. District of Columbia, No. 1:21- cv-03298, 2023 WL 7552703, at *1 (D.D.C. Nov. 14, 2023). Because of an eviction moratorium imposed in response to the pandemic, however, Mr. Gallo was unable to do so. See id. at *2. Mr. Gallo filed a lawsuit against the District in Superior Court asserting claims under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, the Constitution’s  3 Contract Clause, and D.C.’s writ of waste statute, D.C. Code § 42-1601. See id. at *2-*4. The case was removed to federal court and the United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted the District’s motion to dismiss. Id. at *7. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit appointed Latham as amicus curiae “to present arguments in support of [Mr.] Gallo’s position that amicus deemed potentially meritorious.” Gallo v. District of Columbia, No. 23-7158, 2025 WL 1446283, at *2 (D.C. Cir. May 20, 2025). Latham “agree[d] with the District that [Mr.] Gallo ha[d] failed to state a claim under the Contracts Clause and ha[d] not stated a Takings Clause claim [as to Mr. Hopkins],” but it argued that Mr. Gallo had “allege[d] sufficient facts to state a takings claim as to tenants other than [Mr.] Hopkins.” Id. The D.C. Circuit affirmed the dismissal of all of Mr. Gallo’s claims, id. at *7, and that judgment is now final, see Gallo v. District of Columbia, 146 S. Ct. 302 (2025) (denying certiorari). Mr. Gallo’s current lawsuit arose from his previous one. In December 2024— after the dismissal of his complaint at the trial level but before the D.C. Circuit affirmed that decision—he sued Latham, the District of Columbia, and Attorney General Schwalb for “injunctive relief and damages” based on alleged “vexatious  4 litigation tactics” and “misrepresentation[s]” in the first case, including allegedly “fraud[ulent]” filings. 1 He requested the following relief: 1[.] Order the Attorney General and Latham & Watkins to remove the ejectment fraud from their briefs in federal court and amend their pleadings[.] 2[.] Enjoin Defendants from stating in federal court that Plaintiff “could have” evicted Andre Hopkins during the Moratorium or that the ejectment statute is not actionable in Landlord Tenant Branch[.] These repeated attempts to induce federal courts to corruptly and collaterally overturn state law to dodge a compensation clam should be enjoined[.] 3[.] Order Defendants to stipulate in federal courts in all cases concerning Andre Hopkins that his tenancy-at-will was terminated on May 5, 2020[.] The matter is res judicata[.] 4[.] Award Plaintiff damages for his time spent countering these frauds, in an amount to be ascertained at an evidentiary hearing, regardless of the outcome of the case at law[.] 5[.] In the event defendants procure a judgment of the DC Circuit tainted by ejectment fraud[,] declare here that it is void as fraud and order Defendants to file a motion to vacate it[.] 6[.] In the event Plaintiff’s claim at law for the value of Andre Hopkins’[s] occupancy is lost due to the fraud 1 Because the District of Columbia and Mr. Schwalb, in his capacity as Attorney General, have acted together at every stage of the case, for the sake of brevity we refer to briefs filed by both the District of Columbia and Mr. Schwalb as being filed by “the District.”  5 herein described, award Plaintiff compensatory damages for fraud (the value of the occupancy) in equity jointly and severally against Defendants[.] . . . 7[.] Award pre judgment interest for all damages[.] Mr. Gallo moved for a preliminary injunction on the same day he filed his complaint. He asked for “relief items #1-3” in his complaint, which corresponded to his requests that the defendants amend their pleadings and briefs in federal court and that they be required to stipulate that Mr. Hopkins’s tenancy was terminated. In opposing the motion, the District argued that none of the four factors courts consider when deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunction weighed in Mr. Gallo’s favor. Latham did not respond to Mr. Gallo’s motion. The trial court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction and also sua sponte dismissed Mr. Gallo’s complaint without prejudice under Superior Court Civil Rule 12(b)(6). The court explained its decision as follows: Pending before the Court is [Mr. Gallo’s motion for a preliminary injunction]. Upon review of the Motion, Plaintiff’s Complaint, [the District’s opposition brief], [Mr. Gallo’s reply brief], and the entire record herein, the Court concludes that the Complaint in its present form is not sufficiently ple[d] pursuant to the requirements of Super. Civ. Ct. R. 8(a) and Super. Civ. Ct. R. 12(b)(6). Therefore, the Court sua sponte dismisses Plaintiff’s Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may granted, Plaintiff’s request  6 for injunctive relief cannot meet its burden of establishing a substantial likelihood of success on the merits and, accordingly, the Motion is denied. Mr. Gallo timely appealed. II. Analysis Mr. Gallo, who is still proceeding pro se, challenges only the trial court’s Rule 12(b)(6) ruling. He argues that the sua sponte dismissal of his complaint for failure to state a claim is reversible error because the trial court failed to provide him with notice of its intent to dismiss and an opportunity to respond. The District and Latham argue that the dismissal was procedurally proper even if no party had moved to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) because Mr. Gallo was put on notice that such a dismissal was possible by the District’s argument, in its brief opposing a preliminary injunction, that Mr. Gallo was not likely to succeed on the merits of his claims. The appellees separately argue that we can affirm because Mr. Gallo’s claims fail on their merits under the 12(b)(6) standard. 2 2 The District also argues that “[Mr.] Gallo’s principal request for relief—to enjoin the District and Latham from making certain arguments in the D.C. Circuit litigation—is now moot” because “[f]ollowing the D.C. Circuit’s resolution of the merits of [Mr.] Gallo’s appeal, there is nothing left to be enjoined.” “As a general rule, the mootness doctrine prevents courts from deciding cases when the issues  7 Normally, we review de novo the dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), and we confine ourselves to the legal question whether the allegations in the complaint plausibly state a claim for relief. Tingling-Clemmons v. District of Columbia, 133 A.3d 241, 245 (D.C. 2016). But we do not reach that legal question here, and we express no view on the legal sufficiency of Mr. Gallo’s complaint. Instead, we focus on the trial court’s antecedent choice to consider, and then dismiss, Mr. Gallo’s complaint under the 12(b)(6) standard sua sponte without providing him with either notice of what it intended to do and why or an opportunity to respond. Because we agree that the trial court erred by doing so, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. presented are no longer live or when the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Re’ese Adbarat Debre Selam Kidest Mariam Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church, Inc. v. Habte, 300 A.3d 784, 794 (D.C. 2023) (citation modified). And “an appeal should be dismissed when, by virtue of an intervening event, a court of appeals cannot grant any effectual relief whatever in favor of the appellant.” Id. (citation modified). That is not the case here. In addition to the injunctive relief identified by the District, Mr. Gallo’s complaint asks for “compensatory damages for fraud.” The District itself characterizes this request for damages as “non-moot relief,” and we likewise conclude that Mr. Gallo’s apparent fraud claim, at the very least, gives him “a concrete interest in the outcome of this litigation,” notwithstanding the status of his D.C. Circuit case. Id. at 795. Therefore, this appeal is not moot. See id. at 794-96.  8 A. Sua Sponte Dismissal Under Rule 12(b)(6) Without Notice and an Opportunity to Respond Is Reversible Error. The Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure and our case law on the inherent power of the Superior Court do not appear to authorize the sua sponte dismissal of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) at all. But at the very least, it is reversible error for the Superior Court to dismiss a complaint sua sponte without providing the plaintiff with notice and an opportunity to respond. 3 To start, the Rules of Civil Procedure do not expressly empower the Superior Court to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim sua sponte. See In re Paul, 292 A.3d 779, 784 (D.C. 2023) (explaining that we interpret court rules by looking to the ordinary meaning of their text). The text of Rule 12 refers to “failure to state a claim” as a “defense” that a “party may assert” by “motion”; it does not provide that a court may probe the legal sufficiency of a complaint on its own. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 12(b)(6). Rule 12(h)(2) bolsters this reading: it lists the circumstances under 3 Not every sua sponte dismissal is necessarily a sua sponte dismissal without prior notice and an opportunity to respond, because “sua sponte” simply means that the trial court initiated the process leading to the dismissal without “prompting or suggestion” by a party. Sua sponte, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). As discussed below, we do not think that the Superior Court Civil Rules or our case law permit sua sponte consideration of dismissal for failure to state a claim. Nevertheless, the nature of the dismissal in this case—sua sponte and without notice and an opportunity to be heard—dictates our holding here.  9 which the “failure to state a claim” defense “may be raised,” and sua sponte court action is not among them. See id. R. 12(h). Comparing Rule 12(b)(6) to other rules that do authorize unprompted court action puts this conclusion in even sharper relief. For example, Rule 12(f)(1) provides that a court may “strike from a pleading” certain defenses or statements “on its own.” Id. R. 12(f)(1). Rule 41 provides that “[i]f the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with these rules or a court order . . . the court may, on its own initiative, enter an order dismissing the action or any claim.” Id. 41(b)(1). And Rule 56(f) authorizes the Superior Court to grant summary judgment “independent of the motion” if it “giv[es] notice and a reasonable time to respond.” Id. R. 56(f). Thus, when the Civil Rules authorize sua sponte court action, they do so with express language. Rule 12(b) does not contain any such language with respect to the defense that a complaint “fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted.” Id. R. 12(b)(6). Therefore, the Rules themselves do not authorize the sua sponte dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim. Nor does our precedent endorse such sua sponte action. We have acknowledged that the Superior Court possesses certain unenumerated powers flowing from its inherent authority as a trial court. See, e.g., Yeh v. Hnath, 294 A.3d 1081, 1089 (D.C. 2023). But even where we permit the exercise of this inherent  10 authority—to sanction parties for bad faith litigation conduct, for example—we have urged that it “must be exercised with restraint and discretion” because of its “potency.” Id. (quoting In re M.L.P., 936 A.2d 316, 323 (D.C. 2007)). For this reason, our prior cases addressing sua sponte dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6) have disapproved of the practice, and no case has explicitly sanctioned a sua sponte dismissal for failure to state a claim. In Dormu v. Gill, we reversed where the trial court sua sponte dismissed a pro se plaintiff’s complaint during a pretrial conference “in the face of disputed allegations” of fact. 277 A.2d 104, 106 (D.C. 1971). We stated in dicta that “[i]t may be that where pre-trial admissions and pleadings show that no issue of fact remains to be determined, the court has the power to decide the questions of law and enter summary judgment thereon.” Id. (citation modified). But nowhere did we indicate that sua sponte dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) was appropriate. Next, in McBryde v. Amoco Oil Co., we likewise reversed the sua sponte dismissal of a case during a pretrial conference, cautioning that “a complaint should not be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) because the court doubts that the plaintiff will prevail in the action.” 404 A.2d 200, 203 (D.C. 1979) (per curiam). In dicta about dicta, we stated that “[t]o the extent that [Dormu] . . . suggests that a judge conducting a pretrial conference  11 may, [s]ua sponte, summarily dispose of a case, we believe that procedure should be used very infrequently and with an abundance of caution.” Id. Later, in Epps v. Vogel, we concluded that “the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the complaint sua sponte, on appellants’ own unanswered motion for default, without inquiring whether appellants would seek leave to amend . . . or stating reasons why dismissal, in any event, is appropriate.” 454 A.2d 320, 325 (D.C. 1982). Although in dicta we cited McBryde for the proposition that “[s]ua sponte dismissal of a complaint should occur only infrequently and with an abundance of caution,” id. at 325 n.9, we did not state that such dismissal is contemplated by the Civil Rules; and, as noted, McBryde itself only noted that Dormu “suggest[ed]” in “[d]icta” that “a judge conducting a pretrial conference may, [s]ua sponte, summarily dispose of a case,” 404 A.2d at 203. Moreover, although in Epps we agreed with the trial court that the complaint failed to state a claim, we nevertheless reversed. See 454 A.2d at 324-25. Rule 12 and our cases, then, cast significant doubt on a trial court’s authority to sua sponte dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim. Even to the extent a trial court is permitted in some circumstances to sua sponte consider dismissal of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), however, we hold that basic principles of procedural  12 fairness require notice to the plaintiff and an opportunity to respond before the court can order dismissal. In our adversary system, the parties “frame the issues for decision,” leaving “to courts the role of neutral arbiter of matters the parties present.” United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. 371, 375 (2020) (quoting Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 243 (2008)). As a result, litigants reasonably do not expect a trial court to stage a “takeover” of their case by resolving it on grounds the parties do not raise. Id. at 379. In order to “ensure procedural fairness” in other contexts, therefore, we have explained that a court should “provid[e] each party with the opportunity to brief an issue viewed by the court as significant and potentially decisive” before ruling on that matter. Randolph v. United States, 882 A.2d 210, 226-27 (D.C. 2005); see also Tobin v. John Grotta Co., 886 A.2d 87, 91 (D.C. 2005) (explaining that the appellant “was entitled to prior notice and an opportunity to oppose” before the trial court could “exceed the requested relief and grant summary judgment” on all claims, rather than just the one that was the subject of the motion); In re X.B., 637 A.2d 1144, 1148 (D.C. 1994) (“The purpose of any notice requirement is to provide forewarning of an event” so that the “person who must respond [has] an adequate opportunity to prepare and present his or her defense.” (citation modified)); Tazoe v. Airbus S.A.S., 631 F.3d 1321, 1336 (11th Cir. 2011) (“To employ fair procedure,  13 a district court must generally provide the plaintiff with notice of its intent to dismiss or an opportunity to respond.” (citation modified)). This prevents unfair surprise and helps to ensure that courts adhere to their proper role in our adversary system. See Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. at 378-79 (reversing where the court of appeals decided the case on a basis it raised sua sponte and then asked amicus to develop further in briefing); Margolin v. Nat. Ass’n of Immigr. Judges, 146 S. Ct. 1285, 1288 (2026) (reversing because the court of appeals “violated the party-presentation principle” by addressing an argument that the parties did not brief “without giving either side a chance to address its theory”); Clark v. Sweeney, 607 U.S. 7, 9-10 (2025) (reversing because the court of appeals “transgressed the party-presentation principle by granting relief on a claim that Sweeney never asserted and that the State never had the chance to address”). Our holding that it is reversible error for the trial court to dismiss sua sponte under Rule 12(b)(6) without providing the plaintiff with notice and an opportunity to respond follows naturally from our explication of these principles of procedural fairness and party presentation. We also find support for this notice-and-opportunity requirement in decisions by the federal courts of appeal. While the Supreme Court has declined to take a position on the propriety of sua sponte dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), see Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 329 n.8 (1989), several  14 courts have discussed the basis for a notice and opportunity-to-respond requirement with respect to sua sponte dismissals under Federal Rule 12(b)(6). In Jefferson Fourteenth Associates v. Wometco de Puerto Rico, Inc., for example, the Eleventh Circuit first concluded that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not authorize sua sponte dismissals for failure to state a claim and then explained that “courts exercise their inherent power to dismiss a suit that lacks merit only when the party who brought the case has been given notice and an opportunity to respond.” 695 F.2d 524, 526 (11th Cir. 1983). In Ricketts v. Midwest Nat’l Bank, the Seventh Circuit established a similar general rule: “if the court concludes that the complaint should be dismissed sua sponte for failure to state a claim, the parties must be given both notice of the court’s intention and an opportunity to respond.” 874 F.2d 1177, 1185 (7th Cir. 1989). The court justified these procedural safeguards on three grounds: (1) sua sponte dismissals “may often conflict with the traditional adversarial precepts of our system of justice” and undermine the perception of judicial neutrality; (2) sua sponte dismissals may unfairly “prejudice plaintiffs by depriving them of an opportunity to amend their complaint or to argue against dismissal”; and (3) such dismissals “often lead to judicial inefficiency” because premature dismissals are more likely to result in the “wasteful shuttling” of  15 complaints back and forth between the trial and appellate levels. Id. at 1184-85 (citation modified). We agree with each point. The Second, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits have applied similar procedural safeguards, for similar reasons. See Thomas v. Scully, 943 F.2d 259, 260 (2d Cir. 1991) (“Though the district court has the power to dismiss a complaint sua sponte for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted, it may not properly do so without giving the plaintiff an opportunity to be heard.”); Miller v. Sam Houston State Univ., 986 F.3d 880, 889-90 (5th Cir. 2021) (concluding that the district court did not employ a fair procedure when dismissing some of the plaintiff’s claims sua sponte where it was “debatable” whether the plaintiff received proper notice and where “the district court failed to give Miller an adequate opportunity to respond to the court’s intention to dismiss her claims”); Tingler v. Marshall, 716 F.2d 1109, 1112 (6th Cir. 1983) (exercising the court’s “supervisory authority” to hold that a district court may dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim sua sponte only if five requirements are met, one of which is providing the plaintiff with notice and an opportunity to respond). 4 Thus, the federal courts’ understanding of procedural 4 We acknowledge federal cases that have affirmed the sua sponte dismissal of a complaint under the federal Rule 12(b)(6) where the district court did not provide notice and an opportunity to respond but where it was “patently obvious”  16 fairness, party presentation, judicial restraint, and judicial economy also supports our conclusion that it is reversible error for the Superior Court to dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) sua sponte where it does not provide the plaintiff with notice of its intent and an opportunity to respond. B. The Superior Court Failed to Provide Mr. Gallo With Notice and an Opportunity to Respond. The trial court failed to provide Mr. Gallo with notice of its intent to sua sponte dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) and likewise failed to provide him with an opportunity to respond. No action of the court or the parties could have informed Mr. Gallo that that the plaintiff could not prevail. See, e.g., Baker v. Director, U.S. Parole Comm’n, 916 F.2d 725, 726 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (following the approach of the Ninth Circuit but noting that “certain other circuits enforce a strict notice requirement with regard to sua sponte dismissals pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and mandate reversal for noncompliance with procedural steps dictated by the court”); cf. Brereton v. Bountiful City Corp., 434 F.3d 1213, 1219 (10th Cir. 2006) (“Where a complaint fails to state a claim, and no amendment could cure the defect, a dismissal sua sponte may be appropriate.”). We decline to adopt such an approach. While we appreciate the “pragmatic” concerns expressed in Baker and elsewhere, 916 F.2d at 726, for the reasons explained above, we do not agree that bedrock principles of party presentation and procedural fairness should yield to judicial economy in this instance. Moreover, as Ricketts pointed out, it is not at all clear that a rule allowing sua sponte dismissals for failure to state a claim without the provision of notice and opportunity to respond is a more efficient use of judicial resources than our clear rule. See 874 F.2d at 1185.  17 his complaint was at risk of dismissal (or why), and, as a result, Mr. Gallo was deprived of a chance to address that risk. Mr. Gallo’s own motion for a preliminary injunction did not put him on notice that dismissal was possible because the preliminary injunction framework and the 12(b)(6) framework concern requests for different types of court action, rely on different sources of information, and employ different legal analyses. “[A] trial court must consider four criteria” when determining whether to grant a motion for a preliminary injunction: (1) whether there is a “substantial likelihood [the plaintiff] will prevail on the merits”; (2) whether the plaintiff “is in danger of suffering irreparable harm during the pendency of the action”; (3) whether “more harm will result to [the plaintiff] from the denial of the injunction than will result to the defendant from its grant”; and, “in appropriate cases”; (4) whether “the public interest will not be disserved by the issuance of the requested order.” Feaster v. Vance, 832 A.2d 1277, 1287-88 (D.C. 2003) (quoting District of Columbia v. Grp. Ins. Admin., 633 A.2d 2, 21 (D.C. 1993)). In this “multi-factor test[,] . . . a stronger showing on some factors can compensate for a weaker showing on others.” Competitive Enter. Inst. v. Mann, 150 A.3d 1213, 1234 (D.C. 2016). By contrast, the 12(b)(6) analysis focuses on the complaint and the documents incorporated by reference into it, and a court considering a 12(b)(6) motion answers  18 the purely legal question whether the complaint fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted. See Scott v. FedChoice Fed. Credit Union, 274 A.3d 318, 322-23 (D.C. 2022). Further, a successful 12(b)(6) motion can end a plaintiff’s case, see, e.g., Rayner v. Yale Steam Laundry Condo. Assoc., 289 A.3d 387, 396 (D.C. 2023), while the stakes for a preliminary injunction motion are whether the court will grant interim relief to alter or maintain the status quo, see Fountain v. Kelly, 630 A.2d 684, 688 (D.C. 1993). Because our adversarial system puts the onus on the parties to tell a court what they want and why, see Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. at 375, a plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction does not usually raise the risk that any of the plaintiff’s claims might be dismissed under the different 12(b)(6) standard. Compare Logan v. LaSalle Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 80 A.3d 1014, 1019 (D.C. 2013) (“[A] complaint should not be dismissed because a court does not believe that a plaintiff will prevail on [his] claim. Indeed it may appear on the face of the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not the test.” (alterations in original)), with Ortberg v. Goldman Sachs Grp., 64 A.3d 158, 162 (D.C. 2013) (“To grant an injunction, the trial court must find, among other things, that the moving party has clearly demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on the merits.” (citation modified)); see also Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. at 375 (noting that “departures from the party presentation principle have usually occurred to protect a pro se litigant’s rights” (emphasis added) (citation modified)).  19 Nothing in the briefing on Mr. Gallo’s specific motion suggests otherwise. Mr. Gallo sought a preliminary injunction with respect to only “relief items #1-3” in his complaint, which involved his requests that the defendants modify certain court filings and submit to a stipulation in the separate D.C. Circuit case. He did not ask for any preliminary relief with respect to the four other “relief items,” which requested declaratory relief (and an order that the appellees file a motion to vacate the D.C. Circuit judgment), damages for alleged fraud, and prejudgment interest. Accordingly, most of the District’s “likelihood of success on the merits” portion of its opposition brief focused on the inappropriateness of the injunctive relief that Mr. Gallo asked for in his motion. To the extent the District’s brief addressed the sufficiency of the allegations in Mr. Gallo’s complaint, it did so in a single paragraph that read as follows: Plaintiff is not likely to succeed on the merits. To start, his Complaint does not reveal any cause of action. . . . The Complaint states that Plaintiff “has no remedy at law” for his alleged concerns and seeks equitable relief. . . . But equitable relief is relief, not a cause of action, and “a court cannot grant a remedy without a cause of action.” . . . Plaintiff’s Motion should thus be denied. Thus, even if a defendant’s brief opposing a motion for a preliminary injunction can be an appropriate avenue for requesting a 12(b)(6) dismissal, the District’s brief here did not ask for the dismissal of a claim, and it certainly did not  20 ask for the dismissal of all claims with respect to all parties. Cf. New Penn Fin., LLC v. Daniels, 319 A.3d 997, 1002-03 (D.C. 2024) (holding that the trial court erred (although harmlessly) where it sua sponte granted summary judgment “on grounds not raised by a party” without giving notice to the appellant of the court’s intent to do so as to all claims against all parties, where a prior motion to dismiss was filed by only one of three parties). Moreover, when the trial court dismissed Mr. Gallo’s complaint—a month after he initiated his lawsuit—the only proceedings that had occurred were the filing of the complaint, the service of process, and the briefing cycle related to the motion for a preliminary injunction. In other words, no filing in this case could have informed Mr. Gallo that the trial court planned even to consider the sufficiency of his complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), much less dismiss it for failure to state a claim. Because no defendant in this case filed a motion to dismiss and the trial court failed to provide Mr. Gallo any notice of its intent to consider dismissing his complaint for failure to state a claim, Mr. Gallo was not on notice that dismissal of his complaint was a possibility, and he had no opportunity to present arguments that his complaint was sufficiently pled. See Randolph, 882 A.2d at 226. Therefore, the trial court’s unannounced choice to venture far afield from the parties’ briefing on Mr. Gallo’s pro se motion for a preliminary injunction was reversible error. See  21 Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. at 375; Carroll v. Fort James Corp., 470 F.3d 1171, 1177 (5th Cir. 2006); Jefferson Fourteenth Assocs., 695 F.2d at 526-27. We recognize that we review Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals de novo and that we “may affirm a decision for reasons other than those given by the trial court” in the Rule 12(b)(6) context. Exec. Sandwich Shoppe, Inc. v. Carr Realty Corp., 749 A.2d 724, 735 n.14 (D.C. 2000); see also Super. Ct. Civ. R. 61 (providing that trial court errors are generally presumed harmless “unless justice requires otherwise”). But here we decline to consider whether to affirm based on our own evaluation of the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). As we have urged on prior occasions, the trial court should generally “set forth its reasoning in a manner that allows this court to review it.” Fleet v. Fleet, 158 A.3d 486, 492 (D.C. 2017). And while Superior Court Rule of Civil Procedure 52 does not require the Superior Court to “state findings or conclusions when ruling on a motion under Rule 12,” we doubt that the Rules themselves justified the trial court’s failure to explain its reasoning here because the court acted sua sponte and thus did not “rul[e]” on a “motion under Rule 12.” Super. Ct. Civ. R. 52(a)(3). Instead, because no party moved for a 12(b)(6) dismissal and the trial court did not explain its actions, we face a record devoid of any reasoning for the result at the trial level. Cf. Vincent v. Anderson, 621 A.2d 367, 372-73 (D.C. 1993) (examining the appellee’s motion to dismiss to determine the bases for  22 dismissal where “[t]he trial court dismissed appellant’s complaint without specifying its reason for doing so”); Beard v. South Main Bank, 615 A.2d 203, 205 (D.C. 1992) (noting that “[o]ur review in this case is severely hindered by the trial court’s failure to state on the record the reasons for its decision” denying a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens). To affirm based on our own review of the sufficiency of the complaint under these circumstances would erode the fundamental principle that, as an appellate body, “we are a court of review, not of first view.” Tax Analysts v. District of Columbia, 298 A.3d 334, 342 n.25 (D.C. 2023) (citation modified). We decline to step into the trial court’s shoes in this instance. III. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings. So ordered.