Brian J. Diehl v. Kim M. Friedlander
CourtNew Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
DocketA-0956-25
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0956-25
BRIAN J. DIEHL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
KIM M. FRIEDLANDER,
Defendant-Respondent.
________________________
Submitted November 5, 2026 – Decided November 16, 2026
Before Judges DeAlmeida and Chase.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Morris County,
Docket No. FD-14-0163-18.
Brian J. Diehl, self-represented appellant.
Respondent has not filed a brief.
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff Brian J. Diehl appeals from the portion of an August 8, 2025 non-
dissolution order requiring him to reimburse defendant, Kim M. Friedlander,
$1,100 in therapy costs. We vacate that portion of the order and remand for
further proceedings for the reasons expressed in this opinion.
I.
Plaintiff and defendant are the parents of two children. Their relationship
ended shortly after the birth of the second child.
The parties share equal parenting time. They agreed the children incur
unreimbursed medical expenses, participate in extracurricular activities, and
attend preschool as work-related childcare when they were younger.
Under a July 2018 order, the parties' proportional net incomes were set at
seventy-six percent for defendant and twenty-four percent for plaintiff. In July
2023, defendant sought reimbursement for various out-of-pocket expenses based
on those income percentages. Her request included reimbursement for therapy
sessions for one of the children, which both parties agreed the child should
attend. Defendant claimed she paid $4,650 for those sessions and sought $1,110
from plaintiff.
In November 2023, the court entered an order that, among other things,
denied defendant's request for reimbursement of the therapy expenses.
Defendant appealed. We vacated this order and remanded because the court had
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not made adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law under Rule 1:7-4(a).
Diehl v. Friedlander, No. A-1134-23 (App. Div. Nov. 25, 2024).
On remand, the court issued a new order that, amongst other issues, denied
defendant's request for reimbursement of therapy expenses. Defendant then
moved for reconsideration. On August 8, 2025, the court granted
reconsideration and ordered plaintiff to reimburse defendant for twenty -four
percent of the therapy costs, which the court calculated as $1,110.
In its attached statement of reasons, the court explained:
As to therapy costs, [p]laintiff indicated that he has
reimbursed [d]efendant for costs. However, the amount
of $1,500 [p]laintiff paid was payment for therapy in
October 2021, which is not the timeframe in which
[d]efendant is requesting a reimbursement for. Further,
the amount of $400 that [p]laintiff paid was for July
2021, again during periods that [d]efendant is not
requesting reimbursement. It appears then, that
[p]laintiff has not shown in his submissions that he has
reimbursed [d]efendant for the months of March, April,
May[,] and June 2021.
The [c]onsent [o]rder of July 17, 2018[,] indicates that
the parties would share the costs at a percentage of
[twenty-four percent] and [seventy-six percent].
Clearly, from the submissions, the parties continue to
agree to this cost split. Based on the submissions then,
there appearing no confirmation that [p]laintiff has in
fact paid his share for the months of March, April,
May[,] and June 2021, [p]laintiff owes [d]efendant
$1,110 for his share of the costs of therapy sessions.
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II.
We "accord particular deference to the Family Part because of its 'special
jurisdiction and expertise' in family matters." Harte v. Hand, 433 N.J. Super.
457, 461 (App. Div. 2013) (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 412 (1998)).
Therefore, we will "not disturb the 'factual findings and legal conclusions of the
trial judge unless [we are] convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported by
or inconsistent with the competent, relevant[,] and reasonably credible evidence
as to offend the interests of justice.'" Cesare, 154 N.J. at 412 (quoting Rova
Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)).
Conversely, "all legal issues are reviewed de novo." Ricci v. Ricci, 448 N.J.
Super. 546, 565 (App. Div. 2017) (citing Reese v. Weis, 430 N.J. Super. 552,
568 (App. Div. 2013)).
III.
We are convinced by plaintiff's contention the record does not contain
sufficient evidence to support the finding the child attended therapy after March
2021. The receipts plaintiff supplied show twenty-five total therapy visits,
ending on March 4, 2021. Each visit cost $185, for a total of $4,625. At oral
argument on the reconsideration motion, defendant's counsel stated she sought
reimbursement for therapy sessions from May 29, 2020, through March 4, 2021.
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In contrast, the court's August 2025 statement of reasons treated plaintiff's
payments as covering therapy bills for March, April, May, June, and October
2021. Yet, both parties agreed no therapy occurred during those months.
A claim for reimbursement of therapy costs must rest on competent
evidence the trial court can rely upon to draw its legal conclusions. Curtis v.
Finneran, 83 N.J. 563, 570 (1980). Plaintiff may owe defendant some portion
of these costs; however, because the record contains no invoices for April, May,
June, or October 2021, the court's conclusion cannot stand.
We therefore are constrained to vacate the order and remand for a new
hearing to determine what, if anything, defendant is owed for all of the therapy
sessions, and how much plaintiff has already paid toward these expenses. To
the extent we have not addressed a particular argument, it is because either our
disposition makes it unnecessary or the argument lacks sufficient merit to
warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Vacated and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.
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