Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0478-25 ALEJANDRO ZAERA-POLO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE TRUSTEES OF PRINCETON UNIVERSITY, CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, individually and as President of Princeton University, SANJEEV KULKARNI, individually and as Former Dean of the Faculty of Princeton University, TONI TURANO, individually and as Deputy Dean of the Faculty of Princeton University, MONICA PONCE DE LEON, individually and as Dean of the School of Architecture of Princeton University, ELIZABETH DILLER, individually and as Thesis Coordinator of the School of Architecture of Princeton University, RICHARD REGISTER, JEAN E. SCHWARZBAUER, LYNN W. ENQUIST, SUSAN T. FISKE, HARVEY S. ROSEN, IRENE V. SMALL, CAROLINA MANGONE, MARGOT CANADAY, HARVEY LEDERMANN, SARAH S. POOR, JEFF DOLVEN, ANIRUDHA MAJUMDAR, as members of the Committee on Conference and Faculty Appeal of Princeton University, V. MITCH MCEWEN, individually and as Assistant Professor of the School of Architecture, ANN COLLART, individually, and PARSA KHALILI, individually, Defendants-Respondents. _________________________________ Argued October 27, 2026 – Decided November 6, 2026 Before Judges Natali, Bishop-Thompson, and Jablonski. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Mercer County, Docket No. L-1472-22. Alejandro Zaera-Polo, appellant, argued the cause on appellant's behalf. Stephen J. Kastenberg argued the cause for respondents (Ballard Spahr LLP, attorneys; Stephen J. Kastenberg and Elizabeth K. McManus, on the brief). PER CURIAM Plaintiff Alejandro Zaera-Polo appeals from a September 23, 2025 order granting defendants' motion for summary judgment and denying his motion to reinstate certain dismissed counts of his complaint. Because the trial court failed A-0478-25 2 to comply with the findings and conclusions requirement of Rule 1:7-4(a), we vacate the order and remand for further proceedings. I. Plaintiff joined Princeton University's School of Architecture (School) faculty in 2009 and served as dean from 2012 to 2014. In 2014, he stepped down as dean at the request of University President Christopher Eisgruber after he was found responsible for research misconduct and plagiarism, but remained on the faculty until his termination in 2021. Plaintiff's employment was governed by Princeton's Rights, Rules, and Responsibilities and the Rules and Procedures of the Faculty of Princeton University, which authorize dismissal for substantial and manifest neglect of duty, violation of university rules applicable to faculty, and conduct substantially impairing a faculty member's performance. The governing rules also provide a multi-step dismissal process, including notice, opportunities to be heard, review by the Committee on Conference and Faculty Appeal (CCFA), and consideration by a committee of the Board of Trustees. After Monica Ponce de Leon became dean of the School in 2016, plaintiff repeatedly objected to her leadership. The principal dispute concerned the School's requirement plaintiff advise master's students on their theses. In 2018, plaintiff informed the thesis committee he would not participate in the advising A-0478-25 3 process under the conditions then in place. Dean Ponce de Leon informed him advising students was part of his faculty responsibilities. Although plaintiff initially relented, he later refused to continue advising an assigned student, and the matter was referred to Dean of the Faculty Sanjeev Kulkarni. Plaintiff told Dean Kulkarni the thesis protocols infringed upon his academic freedom. In December 2018, Dean Kulkarni rejected that position and warned plaintiff that refusing to perform thesis-advising duties could constitute substantial and manifest neglect of duty and could result in discipline, including dismissal. Plaintiff sought reconsideration and separately attempted to challenge the thesis procedures, but Dean Kulkarni adhered to his determination and the CCFA denied relief in February 2019. The dispute continued. According to the motion record, plaintiff later contacted students directly about advisor selection after Dean Ponce de Leon declined to disclose confidential advisor preferences, and he urged students not to choose him as an advisor even while acknowledging he was required to serve in that role. When one student selected him, plaintiff warned the student would not benefit from his advice. Dean Ponce de Leon reported the student felt attacked and feared retaliation. In December 2019, Dean Kulkarni directed Deputy Dean Toni Turano and outside counsel Anne Collart to investigate plaintiff's conduct. Plaintiff asked A-0478-25 4 Turano to recuse herself based on her prior involvement in disputes involving plaintiff, but she declined. After interviewing witnesses and reviewing documents, the investigators issued a report in July 2020 concluding, among other things, plaintiff had effectively refused to advise master's thesis students, had disregarded prior warnings, harmed students and increased colleagues' workloads, and engaged in communications that violated Princeton's Respect for Others policy. Plaintiff submitted a written response challenging the investigation, and Dean Kulkarni ordered a supplemental investigation. A second report issued in October 2020, did not materially alter the investigators' conclusions. Dean Kulkarni then advised plaintiff that suspension or dismissal was under consideration and met with him again in November 2020. Shortly before that meeting, however, plaintiff sent an additional communication to students urging them not to select him as an advisor. Plaintiff was placed on paid administrative leave. In January 2021, Dean Kulkarni recommended plaintiff's dismissal to President Eisgruber, identifying as grounds plaintiff's mistreatment of graduate students, refusal to advise graduate students, and continuing defiant and disruptive conduct. He concluded plaintiff's conduct constituted substantial and manifest neglect of duty, violation of Princeton's rules and procedures A-0478-25 5 applicable to faculty, and conduct substantially impairing his performance of faculty responsibilities. On February 25, 2021, President Eisgruber recommended dismissal to the Board of Trustees. Plaintiff appealed to the CCFA, arguing the recommendation was premature because his cross-complaints against Dean Ponce de Leon had not been fully investigated and that Dean Kulkarni had a conflict. The CCFA reviewed plaintiff's submissions, interviewed Dean Kulkarni, met with plaintiff, and unanimously found no evidence of unfair procedures, inappropriate criteria, nor a penalty imposed without reasonable consideration of the facts. The matter then proceeded to a committee of Princeton's Board of Trustees. On July 15, 2021, the Executive Committee, acting on behalf of the Trustees, voted to terminate plaintiff's employment effective four days later. Plaintiff sued defendants in August 2022, alleging wrongful termination, breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, hostile work environment and discrimination, and defamation. In May 2023, the trial court dismissed the wrongful-termination and defamation claims with prejudice, dismissed the hostile work environment and discrimination claim without prejudice, and dismissed all individual defendants except the Trustees of Princeton University. A-0478-25 6 In February 2025, Princeton moved for summary judgment on the remaining counts. Plaintiff opposed the motion and cross-moved to reinstate the previously dismissed claims. Following oral argument in September 2025, the court granted Princeton's motion, denied plaintiff's cross-motion, and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The court, however, neither placed its reasons on the record nor issued a written statement of reasons. On appeal, plaintiff contends the court granted summary judgment too early, before discovery was materially complete. Plaintiff also argues the court failed to enforce defendants' discovery obligations and ignored genuine issues of material fact about whether defendants had a contractual duty to provide thesis advising. Finally, plaintiff argues the court failed to make adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law, thereby frustrating meaningful appellate review. II. Our review of a summary judgment order is de novo, applying the same standard as the trial court. Samolyk v. Berthe, 251 N.J. 73, 78 (2022). Our standard of review of this matter, however, compels us to vacate the trial court's order granting defendants' summary judgment motion and denying plaintiff's motion to reinstate because we have not been provided with the benefit of the A-0478-25 7 motion judge's findings of fact and conclusions of law as is required under Rule 1:7-4. Our ability to resolve an appeal is dependent on the motion court's compliance with Rule 1:7-4, which states, in pertinent part, "the court shall, by an opinion or memorandum decision, either written or oral, find the facts and state its conclusions of law . . . on every motion decided by a written order that is appealable as of right." To allow us to address the issues on appeal substantively, a motion judge's legal conclusions must be tethered to the underlying facts. See Heinl v. Heinl, 287 N.J. Super. 337, 347 (App. Div. 1996); Curtis v. Finneran, 83 N.J. 563, 570 (1980) ("Naked conclusions do not satisfy the purpose of [Rule] 1:7-4."). Without a statement of reasons clearly outlining the motion judge's findings of fact and conclusions of law, "we are left to conjecture as to what the judge may have had in mind" and cannot address the merits of the parties' dispute. Salch v. Salch, 240 N.J. Super. 441, 443 (App. Div. 1990). Rule 1:7-4 is incorporated into the summary judgment standard. R. 4:46-2(c). We conclude Rule 1:7-4 was not satisfied here because the judge did not set forth any specific findings of fact and conclusions of law substantiating the entry of the order under scrutiny. On remand, the motion judge shall comply with this Rule by issuing either a written or oral statement of reasons "stat[ing] A-0478-25 8 clearly [their] factual findings and correlat[ing] them with relevant legal conclusions." Avelino-Catabran v. Catabran, 445 N.J. Super. 574, 594-95 (App. Div. 2016) (quoting Monte v. Monte, 212 N.J. Super. 557, 565 (App. Div. 1986)). We take no position regarding the outcome of this matter on remand. Vacated and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction. A-0478-25 9