Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1266-24 CUMBERLAND MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, FRANKLIN MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, FARMERS MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF SALEM COUNTY, and PHILADELPHIA CONTRIBUTIONSHIP INSURANCE COMPANIES, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. ENVIRONMENTAL REMEDIATION AND FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC. ("ERFS"), Defendant, and MARK VIGNERI, Defendant-Respondent. CUMBERLAND MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY on its own behalf and on behalf of its insured THE ESTATE OF SYLVIA PRUZAN, THE PHILADELPHIA CONTRIBUTIONSHIP INSURANCE COMPANIES on its own behalf and on behalf of its insured THE ESTATE OF SYLVIA PRUZAN, and THE ESTATE OF SYLVIA PRUZAN, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. ENVIRONMENTAL REMEDIATION AND FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC. ("ERFS"), Defendant, and MARK VIGNERI, Defendant-Respondent. MARK VIGNERI, Third-Party Plaintiff- Respondent, v. DAVID DECLEMENT, ESQ., and STEVEN KALEBIC, ESQ., A-1266-24 2 Third-Party Defendants, and JOEL WERBEL, ESQ., and GEORGE GROCHALA, ESQ., Third-Party Defendants- Respondents. DAVID E. SHAVER, ESQ., and BROEGE, NEUMANN, FISCHER & SHAVER, LLC, Intervenors-Appellants. _____________________________ Argued September 22, 2026 – Decided October 26, 2026 Before Judges Vanek and Bergman. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Somerset County, Docket No. L-0605-23. Larry S. Loigman argued the cause for appellants. Joel N. Werbel argued the cause for respondents Cumberland Mutual Fire Insurance Company, Franklin Mutual Insurance Company, Farmers Mutual Fire Insurance Company of Salem County, and Joel N. Werbel, Esq. (Methfessel & Werbel, attorneys; Joel N. Werbel and Adam M. Schwartz, on the brief). George J. Grochala argued the cause for respondent The Philadelphia Contributionship Insurance Companies. PER CURIAM A-1266-24 3 Intervenors David E. Shaver, Esq., and Broege, Neumann, Fischer & Shaver, LLC, appeal from orders entered on April 25, 2023, March 22, 2024, August 30, 2024, December 2, 2024, and December 5, 2024, which respectively, granted respondents' motion for sanctions pursuant to Rule 1:4-8 against intervenors, imposed a protective order, quantified the counsel fees and costs previously awarded under Rule 1:4-8, addressed reconsideration of those fee awards, and entered judgment thereon. The sanctions arose from counterclaims and third-party claims filed against the plaintiff insurance carriers and their counsel on behalf of defendant Mark Vigneri. Because the trial court failed to render adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Rule 1:7-4(a) addressing the requirements of Rule 1:4-8, we are constrained to vacate the challenged orders and judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. I. We recite the facts and procedural history in a detailed manner because of their complex nature. Two related civil actions were filed in the Law Division in 2020 against Environmental Remediation and Financial Services (ERFS), a company engaged in performing environmental remediation services, and its principal, Vigneri, arising from allegations that ERFS accepted substantial A-1266-24 4 prepaid sums to perform residential remediation work and failed to complete, and in some instances, failed to even begin that work. The first complaint, filed September 22, 2020, concerned only one property and asserted claims sounding in contract, consumer fraud, unjust enrichment, and fraud. The second complaint, filed October 21, 2020, expanded the allegations to approximately forty residential properties and sought, among other relief, the appointment of a special master. On November 4, 2020, the court entered a consent order consolidating the matters and directing the parties to agree upon a special master. On May 3, 2022, ERFS filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition.1 On July 6, 2022, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint asserting additional claims against Vigneri personally, including insurance fraud, consumer fraud, and common-law fraud. On October 24, 2022, Vigneri, through his attorney, Shaver, filed an answer that included counterclaims against the plaintiff insurance carriers and a third-party complaint against plaintiffs' counsel, Joel Werbel, Esq., and George Grochala, Esq., as well as against David DeClement, Esq., and Steven Kalebic, Esq. The counterclaims and third-party complaint alleged several claims, including claims for tortious or intentional interference with prospective 1 The bankruptcy action does not affect the issues in this appeal. A-1266-24 5 economic advantage, defamation, civil conspiracy, and malicious abuse of process. Beginning in late October 2022 and continuing through December 16, 2022, respondents served multiple Rule 1:4-8 "safe harbor" letters on intervenors demanding withdrawal of the counterclaims and third-party claims. On November 1, 2022, after the filing of the counterclaims and a third -party complaint, a status conference was held concerning Shaver's demand that Werbel and Grochala withdraw or be disqualified; the later motion to disqualify was denied by formal order. On December 14, 2022, Philadelphia Contributionship Insurance Companies (PCIC) moved to dismiss the counterclaims and third-party claims, which all defendants joined. The first of three separate judges presiding over the matter heard argument in February 2023. In a lengthy oral decision, he concluded Vigneri's claims were deficient on multiple grounds, including lack of standing, application of the absolute litigation privilege, prematurity of the malicious prosecution claim, pleading deficiencies as to defamation, failure to establish the elements of tortious interference, and the absence of an actionable underlying wrong to sustain a civil conspiracy claim. A-1266-24 6 Although the first judge stated some of the claims "should be" dismissed with prejudice if the absolute litigation privilege applied, he ultimately dismissed the counterclaims and third-party complaint without prejudice. The same day, he denied Vigneri's motion to disqualify Werbel and Grochala. On March 9, 2023, PCIC moved for sanctions under Rule 1:4-8 against Vigneri and Intervenors, and similar sanctions motions were filed on behalf of Werbel and the other plaintiff insurance companies. At this point, a second judge had taken over case management after the first judge's retirement. On April 10, 2023, the second judge placed an initial statement of reasons on the record concerning the sanctions motions and stated, if the record remained the same, the sanctions motion "should be granted" at the conclusion of the litigation. Oral argument followed on April 14, 2023. At that hearing, the second judge found that up "until [the first judge's] ruling[,] the work expended is clearly, in my view, compensable under Rule 1:4-8." In addition, on April 10, 2023, Shaver had filed a substitution of attorney, with Vigneri proceeding pro se. On April 28, 2023, however, Shaver wrote to the second judge stating he believed he had an ethical obligation to continue taking steps "to protect" Vigneri's interests. A-1266-24 7 On April 19, 2023, the second judge supplemented his previous findings and granted movants' sanctions motions, but found the request for specific sums and costs of the sanctions would be stayed pending: 1) a stipulation dismissing the claims with prejudice; 2) a motion by plaintiffs, at the conclusion of discovery, for dismissal with prejudice, at which point additional fees and costs could be sought from April 20, 2023 forward; or 3) reinstatement if discovery later revealed facts sufficient to support the claims and Vigneri ultimately prevailed on those claims. The judge entered orders on April 25, 2023, granting the sanctions motions subject to those conditions. At the next proceeding, a May 13, 2023 case management conference, Shaver appeared with Vigneri and represented that neither he nor Vigneri intended to revive the dismissed claims. The judge stated if that were so, the claims should be dismissed with prejudice, to which Shaver responded: "Well see I was afraid to do that because I thought the 'with prejudice' would kick in the sanctions." On May 15, 2023, the second judge entered an order severing the counterclaims and third-party claims from the underlying insurer actions. The affirmative claims against Werbel, Grochala, and the plaintiff carriers proceeded in due course, with the severed claims both receiving separate docket numbers. A-1266-24 8 On August 9, 2023, the second judge entered judgment in favor of plaintiffs and against Vigneri on the consumer fraud and common-law fraud counts in the amount of $5,556,727.10, finding, among other things, that his conduct was "tantamount to a Pyramid/Ponzi scheme." On October 30, 2023, respondents moved to dismiss the severed counterclaims and third-party complaint with prejudice. A third judge granted that motion on December 19, 2023. Respondents then moved to fix the amount of sanctions contemplated by the second judge's April 25, 2023 order. In support, they submitted certifications and separately itemized billing records to the court for in camera review, accompanied by cover letters advising the parties that the billing backup had been provided to the judge's chambers. They also proposed a protective order permitting disclosure of the billing materials for use solely in the fee litigation. Attorney Loigman, now appearing for Shaver, declined to consent to the protective order without respondent providing an "explanation." Thereafter, Shaver moved to transfer venue and cross-moved to dismiss the sanctions applications, arguing the in camera submission of billing materials was improper ex parte conduct. On February 16, 2024, the second judge denied the change of venue motion, and expressly found the respondents' billing A-1266-24 9 submissions were not improper ex parte submissions because they were supporting materials for a fee application, had been disclosed by cover letter, and had been offered to Shaver and Vigneri under a proposed protective order . The third judge later entered a protective order sua sponte on March 22, 2024, governing disclosure and use of the billing materials. He thereafter heard further argument on the fee motions. On August 30, 2024, the judge entered two orders fixing sanctions. The first order awarded PCIC $36,808.02 jointly and severally against Vigneri, Shaver, and Shaver's law firm, Broege, Neumann Fischer & Shaver. The second order awarded $20,000 to Werbel and $31,854.40 to Cumberland Mutual Fire Insurance Company, Franklin Mutual Insurance Company and Farmers Mutual Fire Insurance Company of Salem County, again jointly and severally against Vigneri, Shaver, and the law firm. In his written statement of reasons, the third judge stated he had reviewed the certifications and supporting materials and found the fees "reasonable." He also rejected Shaver's position that he could not be responsible for fees incurred after withdrawing, reasoning that Shaver filed the frivolous claims, refused to dismiss the claims with prejudice, and that additional fees were caused in part by his continued conduct, including the billing dispute and venue motion. A-1266-24 10 Shaver moved for reconsideration, which the judge denied. The court thereafter entered judgments on December 5, 2024, in the same amounts fixed in the August 30, 2024 orders. On appeal, intervenors contend the sanctions and fee awards entered by the trial court were error because: 1) the court did not make appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by Rule 1:7-4(a) that analyzed the factors of Rule 1:4-8; 2) Shaver could not be held liable for fees incurred after April 10, 2023, when he substituted out as counsel; and 3) the billing records and certifications provided to the court were improperly provided by way of an in camera submission requiring a denial of the sanctions motions. II. We review an award of counsel fees under Rule 1:4-8 for abuse of discretion. Masone v. Levine, 382 N.J. Super. 181, 193 (App. Div. 2005); Shore Orthopedic Group, LLC v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the U.S., 397 N.J. Super. 614, 623 (App. Div. 2008). Notwithstanding, that deferential standard does not relieve the trial court of its obligation to make findings of fact and conclusions of law sufficient to permit appellate review pursuant to Rule 1:7- 4(a). This rule requires that "[t]he court shall, by an opinion or memorandum decision, either written or oral, find the facts and state its conclusions of law A-1266-24 11 thereon." R. 1:7-4(a). When those findings are absent or insufficient, remand is required. Bove v. AkPharma Inc., 460 N.J. Super. 123, 155 (App. Div. 2019); F.S. v. L.D., 362 N.J. Super. 161, 170 (App. Div. 2003); Estate of Doerfler v. Fed. Ins. Co., 454 N.J. Super. 298, 302 (App. Div. 2018). A. We first address intervenors' contention that the trial court's determination to award sanctions in the April 25, 2023 order was error because it failed to render appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law. The record demonstrates the second judge determined to impose sanctions through the incorporation of the first judge's findings on the motion to dismiss Vigneri's claims, while the third judge later quantified the award. The April 25, 2023 order granted the sanctions motions but stayed the entry of "specific sums and costs" pending later events. In the April 14, 2023 proceeding the second judge stated he had reviewed the first judge's transcript multiple times and based on "[the first judge's] ruling[,] the work expended is clearly, in my view, compensable under Rule 1:4-8." In the April 19, 2023 supplement, he established a framework under which sanctions would be quantified later depending on whether the claims were dismissed with prejudice or revived . A-1266-24 12 Because we conclude intervenors' argument holds merit, we are constrained to vacate the sanctions order. After our thorough review of the record, we conclude the court's findings did not sufficiently identify the precise factual and legal basis for sanctions under Rule 1:4-8. The second judge did not expressly find whether the counterclaims and third-party complaint were filed for an improper purpose, whether they lacked a reasonable legal or factual basis, or whether both grounds were present. See R. 1:4-8. He did not identify the particular papers or representations of intervenors that violated the Rule, whether the safe-harbor requirements were satisfied as to each relevant paper and each relevant respondent, or whether the conduct of Shaver, Vigneri, and Shaver's law firm should be treated identically or separately. Instead, the ruling largely referenced the first judge's decision dismissing Vigneri's claims against respondents and expressed the work expended by respondents to defend against those claims was "compensable" under Rule 1:4-8. We note the first judge dismissed Vigneri's claims pursuant to Rule 4:6- 2(e) without prejudice. Although he characterized the litigation privilege argument as the "strongest" and indicated some claims "should be" dismissed with prejudice if the privilege applied, he nonetheless left open the possibility of later amendment or reinstatement of the claims if different facts emerged. A-1266-24 13 The sanctions ruling of the second judge principally based upon the reasoning of the first judge concerning the dismissal motion required the court to explain, with specificity, why the pleadings nonetheless satisfied Rule 1:4-8 at the time they were filed and served, despite the "without-prejudice" dismissal. We further note there are distinct differences in the legal standards governing motions under Rule 4:6-2(e) and Rule 1:4-8, wherein the granting of a motion under the former rule does not, in and of itself, require the grant of a motion under the latter rule. The above omission by the court is critical because respondents' sanctions theories were numerous and distinct. Respondents asserted intervenors' pleadings were sanctionable because: 1) they were barred by the absolute litigation privilege; 2) they were filed to disqualify opposing counsel; 3) certain claims lacked essential elements as a matter of law because of standing defects, and 4) the factual allegations concerning interference with prospective purchasers lacked support. The court was required to state which theory or theories it accepted and why. See Bove, 460 N.J. Super. at 155. Notwithstanding the confusing procedural and factual assertions in a highly contentious, multiple claim matter, we are constrained to vacate the sanctions orders and remand to the trial court to render specific findings. A-1266-24 14 B. We now turn to appellant's contention that the court erred in assessing sanctions against Shaver and his law firm because he had withdrawn as counsel. The third judge issued written statements of reasons quantifying the sanctions against intervenors on August 30, 2024. Those statements addressed the reasonableness of the fees requested and intervenors' argument that Shaver should not be liable for fees incurred after substituting out as counsel . We need not reach these issues because we conclude the third judge's decisions largely treated respondents' sanctions entitlement as having already been established by the second judge and that his role was to quantify the award. Because we have determined the underlying entitlement ruling lacked specific findings required by Rule 1:7-4(a), which may affect the actions of intervenors found to be subject to sanctions, the later quantification of sanctions against Shaver and his firm cannot stand. In addition, although the third judge stated he had reviewed the certifications and supporting materials and found the fees reasonable, the court did not sufficiently explain what fees were incurred "as a direct result" of the Rule 1:4-8 violation(s), especially after April 10, 2023, when Shaver formally substituted out as counsel. See Masone, 382 N.J. Super. at 192. That question A-1266-24 15 is especially important here because the fee awards included substantial sums incurred after the substitution of attorney, after the severance of the claims, and after those claims were dismissed with prejudice. The third judge concluded Shaver remained responsible because he filed and signed the pleadings asserting the frivolous claims, refused to dismiss the claims with prejudice, and contributed to later motion practice concerning venue and the adequacy of the billing materials submitted with respondents' motion. That reasoning may ultimately be sustained, but the court must explain more specifically what fees were attributable to the original Rule 1:4-8 violation(s), what fees were attributable to Shaver's post-withdrawal conduct, if any, and whether the Rule permits recovery of these amounts. C. We now turn to intervenors' contention that the billing records and certifications provided to the court were improperly provided by way of an in camera submission and should not have been considered. Based on our previous determinations, we need not reach the propriety of the in camera billing- submission protocol in this case, as asserted by intervenors, requiring a dismissal of the fee applications. We recognize the second judge had rejected intervenors' contention the in camera submission of billing records, followed by A-1266-24 16 a proposed protective-order, constituted improper ex parte conduct and the third judge later adopted that determination. Nonetheless, because we are remanding the matter regarding the Rule 1:4-8 sanctions issues, we also remand this issue to the trial court for further determination. We note that the record does not reflect the respondents filed a formal motion seeking a protective order before requesting in camera treatment of the billing submissions. Therefore, on remand, we leave to the trial court's discretion whether a formal application for a protective order is required. The trial court may address any renewed submissions and confidentiality procedures as it deems appropriate on remand. We therefore vacate the April 25, 2023 order, the March 22, 2024 protective order, the August 30, 2024 fee orders and the December 5, 2024 judgments and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. On remand, we direct the trial court to address and enter specific findings concerning: 1) the specific submissions found to violate Rule 1:4-8; 2) whether the sanctions were based on improper purpose, lack of legal or factual basis, or both; 3) the factual and legal basis supporting those conclusions as to each sanctioned person or entity; 4) respondents' compliance with the Rule 1:4-8 safe- harbor requirements as to each person or entity sought to be sanctioned; 5) the significance, if any, of the first judge's dismissal without prejudice to the A-1266-24 17 sanctions analysis; 6) what fees were reasonably incurred as a direct result of the violation pursuant to the factors set forth in Rule 4:42-9; and 7) the basis for imposing post-April 10, 2023 fees on Shaver and his firm. We express no view on whether sanctions ultimately should or should not be awarded. We leave to the trial court's reasoned discretion whether to permit additional submissions or hold further arguments or proceedings as it deems necessary. To the extent we have not addressed any of parties' remaining arguments, we conclude those arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). Vacated and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction. A-1266-24 18