Kings Mountain Land Dev. Partners, LLC v. Catawba Indian Nation
CourtCourt of Appeals of North Carolina
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
Docket25-1163
JudgeJudge Tobias Hampson
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA25-1163
Filed 18 November 2026
Cleveland County, No. 24CVS001660-220
KINGS MOUNTAIN LAND DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS, LLC,
Plaintiff/Counterclaim-Defendant,
v.
CATAWBA INDIAN NATION, Defendant/Counterclaim-Plaintiff.
Appeal by Plaintiff/Counterclaim-Defendant from Order entered 9 July 2025
by Judge W. Todd Pomeroy in Cleveland County Superior Court. Heard in the Court
of Appeals 2 June 2026.
Robinson, Bradshaw & Hinson, P.A., by Robert W. Fuller, Erik R. Zimmerman,
and Kevin R. Crandall; Teddy, Meekins & Talbert, P.L.L.C., by Will Meekins;
and Wyatt & Blake, LLP by James F. Wyatt, III, and Robert A. Blake, Jr., for
Plaintiff/Counterclaim-Defendant Appellant.
Smith, Anderson, Blount, Dorsett, Mitchell & Jernigan, L.L.P., by Michael W.
Mitchell, Jang H. Jo, and C. Michael Anderson; Carroll Law Offices, P.A., by
Dioné Carroll, for Defendant/Counterclaim-Plaintiff Appellee.
HAMPSON, Judge.
Factual and Procedural Background
Kings Mountain Land Development Partners, LLC (Plaintiff) appeals from an
Order granting Catawba Indian Nation’s (Defendant) Partial Motion to Dismiss and
for Judgment on the Pleadings. The Record before us—including the factual
KINGS MOUNTAIN LAND DEV. PARTNERS, LLC V. CATAWBA INDIAN NATION
Opinion of the Court
allegations made in Plaintiff’s Complaint, which we treat as true solely for the
purposes of this appeal—tends to reflect the following:
Plaintiff owned approximately 67 acres of land in Cleveland County, North
Carolina. In 2018, Defendant bought a 17-acre parcel from Plaintiff (the Trust Land).
The United States government took title to this parcel in trust for Defendant’s
benefit. The rest of the land remained in Plaintiff’s possession.
In 2020, Defendant obtained federal approval to build a casino on the Trust
Land. In July 2021, Defendant opened a temporary casino on the Trust Land.
Plaintiff and Defendant had planned to build a new casino together, but the National
Indian Gaming Commission did not approve those plans. Instead, Plaintiff and
Defendant entered into a “Payment Agreement” to compensate Plaintiff for use of the
surrounding land and Plaintiff’s efforts to help establish Defendant’s casino.
After the Payment Agreement’s terms were finalized, Defendant refused to
honor the agreement and pay Plaintiff unless Plaintiff agreed to sell to the Tribe a
9.4 acre tract of land immediately north of the Trust Land. Plaintiff conveyed this
tract to Defendant for use as a surface parking lot for the temporary casino. The
parties entered into an “Agreement of Restrictive Covenants” whereby Defendant
agreed to refrain from building a “parking structure and/or parking garage[ ]” on this
tract of land for twenty-five years. Plaintiff planned to construct a multi-level
parking garage on a piece of adjacent property.
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In connection to the sale of this additional tract of land, the parties entered
into a “Temporary Construction Easement Agreement” and a separate “Easement
Agreement.” The Temporary Construction Easement Agreement gave Defendant
limited access to parts of Plaintiff’s land for certain construction activities. The
Easement Agreement also granted Defendant an easement for access to Plaintiff’s
land for certain construction activities, including access to install utilities and a
stormwater system—with prior notice and subject to Plaintiff’s approval.
The Agreement of Restrictive Covenants, Temporary Construction Easement
Agreement, and Easement Agreement1 each contain a provision entitled “Limited
Waiver of Sovereign Immunity” (the Waivers). This clause provides, in relevant part,
Defendant will grant Plaintiff a limited waiver of its sovereign immunity from suit
with regard “to any claim or action that is directly or indirectly related to [the]
Agreement or any transactions contemplated hereunder”:
[Defendant], on behalf of itself, each of its affiliates, and any of
their respective successors and assigns (each, a “Tribal Party”),
hereby expressly and irrevocably grants to [Plaintiff] a limited
waiver of its sovereign immunity from suit or other legal process
with regard to any claim or action that is directly or indirectly
related to this Agreement or any transactions contemplated
hereunder, whether any such claim or action arises under law or
in equity, whether arising as a matter of contract or a tort,
whether seeking monetary damages, injunctive or declaratory
relief or other remedies, and whether arising during or after the
expiration or termination of this Agreement (each, a “Claim”), and
waives all defenses based thereon with respect thereto; provided
1These three Agreements are referred to collectively throughout this opinion as “the
Agreements.”
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that such limited waiver of sovereign immunity: (a) is limited in
duration to the statute of limitations provided under the laws of
the State of North Carolina . . . (b) is granted solely to [Plaintiff];
and (c) shall in no event permit recourse against [certain assets].2
In July 2024, after an inspection of the construction site, Plaintiff sent
Defendant a cease-and-desist letter, asking Defendant to stop certain activities.
Specifically, Plaintiff asserted Defendant had used Plaintiff’s land without regard for
property lines and easement boundaries; stored construction materials, equipment,
trash, and debris on Plaintiff’s land; created unauthorized roads on Plaintiff’s land,
parked on that land, and generally used the land at will; ran multiple dump trucks
taking rock and earth from Plaintiff’s land and used it for construction on Defendant’s
land; graded and moved earth throughout Plaintiff’s land; and impermissibly built a
generator station and fuel dump on Plaintiff’s land. In other words, Plaintiff accused
Defendant of trespassing and violating the terms of each of the three Agreements.
On 3 October 2024, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Defendant alleging
claims for Continuing Trespass, Recurring Trespass, Conversion, Breach of
Stormwater Easement, Breach of Temporary Construction Easement, Unfair and
Deceptive Trade Practices, and for Injunctive Relief.
2 There are slight variations in the Waivers in each Agreement. However, none of the
variations are material to the present appeal or affect our analysis—the language setting forth the
scope of the Waivers is identical across the three Agreements. The portion of the Waiver reproduced
here is taken from the Temporary Construction Easement Agreement.
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On 31 December 2024, Defendant filed an Answer asserting, among other
things, the trial court lacked jurisdiction over “one or more claims” in the Complaint
because Defendant possessed sovereign immunity. Defendant also asserted a
Counterclaim for Unjust Enrichment.
On 28 March 2025, Defendant filed a Partial Motion to Dismiss and for
Judgment on the Pleadings. Specifically, Defendant moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s
Complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) of the North
Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure and moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant
to Rule 12(c) as to each of Plaintiff’s claims except for the two claims pertaining to
the Easements. Defendant argued these claims were barred by its sovereign
immunity “except to the extent the claims relate directly or indirectly to the
easements . . . and fall within [Defendant’s] narrow, limited waiver of sovereign
immunity contained therein.”
A hearing on Defendant’s Motion was held on 11 June 2025. Defendant argued
Plaintiff’s claims were barred by its sovereign immunity. Plaintiff argued its claims
fell within the Waivers contained in each of the Agreements.
On 9 July 2025, the trial court entered an Order dismissing each of Plaintiff’s
claims, in whole or in part, except for its claims pertaining to the easements. In the
Order, the trial court defined “relate,” as used in the Waivers, as: “to show or establish
logical or causal connection between.” The trial court concluded a claim does not have
a logical or causal connection to an Agreement or to the transactions contemplated
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under that Agreement unless the claim is “based on the express rights or restrictions
in the Agreement.” The trial court defined any claim falling within these parameters
as an “Actionable Allegation”—that is, “allegations that could provide a basis for a
claim for which [Defendant] has clearly and unequivocally waived its sovereign
immunity under the Waiver[s.]”
The trial court determined only eighteen allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint
presented facts that could be considered Actionable Allegations. Following this
reasoning, the trial court wholly dismissed Plaintiff’s claim for Conversion with
prejudice and each of the other claims “except to the extent [a claim] relies on the
Actionable Allegations.”
Plaintiff timely filed Notice of Appeal on 11 July 2025.
Appellate Jurisdiction
“An interlocutory order is one made during the pendency of an action, which
does not dispose of the case, but leaves it for further action by the trial court in order
to settle and determine the entire controversy.” Veazey v. City of Durham, 231 N.C.
357, 362, 57 S.E.2d 377, 381 (1950). Generally, there is no right to appeal from an
interlocutory order. Id. (citations omitted). However, a party may appeal an
interlocutory order “where delaying the appeal will irreparably impair a substantial
right of the party.” Hudson-Cole Dev. Corp. v. Beemer, 132 N.C. App. 341, 344, 511
S.E.2d 309, 311 (1999) (citation omitted).
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The Order at bar is interlocutory because it dismisses Plaintiff’s Complaint
only in part. See Veazey, 231 N.C. at 361-62, 57 S.E.2d at 381 (citations omitted).
Plaintiff presents three grounds under which it argues we have jurisdiction over its
appeal: because (1) it is a ruling on sovereign immunity, (2) it is an adverse ruling on
personal jurisdiction, and (3) it creates a risk of inconsistent verdicts.
In Moore v. Evans, this Court stated, “when the moving party claims sovereign,
absolute or qualified immunity, the denial of a motion for summary judgment is
immediately appealable.” 124 N.C. App. 35, 39, 476 S.E.2d 415, 420 (1996) (citations
omitted). This Court subsequently held the same is true in appeals arising out of the
grant of summary judgment. See Greene v. Barrick, 198 N.C. App. 647, 650, 680
S.E.2d 727, 729-30 (2009) (“Even though this case involves the grant, rather than the
denial of sovereign immunity, we believe the same type of issues are called into
question by the appeal, and therefore, plaintiff’s appeal is properly before this Court.”
(citing Moore, 124 N.C. App. at 39, 476 S.E.2d at 420)). More recently, this Court, in
an opinion authored by Judge (now Justice) Dietz, stated: “[O]ur Court has held that
the grant of a motion to dismiss based on sovereign or governmental immunity is
immediately appealable.” Ballard v. Shelley, 257 N.C. App. 561, 564, 811 S.E.2d 603,
605 (2018) (emphasis in original) (first citing Greene, 198 N.C. App. at 649-50, 680
S.E.2d at 720-30, and then citing Odom v. Lane, 161 N.C. App. 534, 535, 588 S.E.2d
548, 549 (2003)).
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The dissenting opinion is concerned it is “non-sensical” for Plaintiff to assert
a claim of substantial right based upon sovereign immunity to obtain immediate
appellate review when the immunity belongs to Defendant. Nevertheless, that is the
right the plaintiffs asserted in Ballard. In that case, which involved a dispute
between individual plaintiffs and Cabarrus County over an issue with a fence built
on the individual plaintiffs’ property, the trial court dismissed the individual
plaintiffs’ claims on the basis Cabarrus County possessed governmental immunity.
257 N.C. App. at 562-63, 811 S.E.2d at 604-05. This Court allowed the individual
plaintiffs’ appeal despite its interlocutory nature because it affected a substantial
right based on the County’s immunity. Id. at 564, 811 S.E.2d at 605-06.
Moreover, we can find no authority indicating we should treat the present
appeal differently because it is concerned with tribal sovereign immunity instead of
local governmental immunity. See id. at 564, 811 S.E.2d at 605 (stating
governmental immunity is “a form of” sovereign immunity). To the contrary, the
Ballard Court stated a grant of a motion to dismiss “based on sovereign or
governmental immunity is immediately appealable.” Id. at 564, 811 S.E.2d at 605
(emphasis added) (citations omitted). Thus, we are bound to hold Plaintiff’s
interlocutory appeal is permissible.3 See id. at 564, 811 S.E.2d at 606 (“Because one
panel of this Court cannot overrule another, we are bound to hold that the [plaintiffs’]
3 Because we conclude we have appellate jurisdiction on this ground, we do not address
Plaintiff’s other arguments regarding our jurisdiction over the appeal.
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interlocutory appeal on this issue is permissible.”); In re Civil Penalty, 324 N.C. 373,
384, 379 S.E.2d 30, 36 (1989) (“Where a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided the
same issue, albeit in a different case, a subsequent panel of the same court is bound
by that precedent, unless it has been overturned by a higher court.” (citations
omitted)).
Issue
The dispositive issue on appeal is whether the Order is sufficient to permit
appellate review of the trial court’s determination Plaintiff’s claims for Conversion,
Trespass, Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices, and Injunctive Relief do not fall, in
whole or in part, within the Waivers.
Analysis
“This Court reviews a grant of a motion for judgment on the pleadings de novo.”
Hughes v. Bd. of Trs. Tchrs.’ and State Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 296 N.C. App. 478, 486, 909
S.E.2d 697, 703 (2024) (citing Carpenter v. Carpenter, 189 N.C. App. 755, 757, 659
S.E.2d 762, 764 (2008)). “ ‘Judgment on the pleadings, pursuant to Rule 12(c), is
appropriate when all the material allegations of fact are admitted in the pleadings
and only questions of law remain.’ ” Id. at 485, 909 S.E.2d at 703 (quoting Groves v.
Cmty. Hous. Corp. of Haywood Cnty., 144 N.C. App. 79, 87, 548 S.E.2d 535, 540
(2001)). “ ‘All well pleaded factual allegations in the nonmoving party’s pleadings are
taken as true and all contravening assertions in the movant’s pleadings are taken as
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false.’ ” Id. (quoting Ragsdale v. Kennedy, 286 N.C. 130, 137, 209 S.E.2d 494, 499
(1974)).
Moreover, we review “a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion to
dismiss based upon the doctrine of sovereign immunity using a de novo standard of
review.” State ex rel. Stein v. Kinston Charter Acad., 379 N.C. 560, 571, 866 S.E.2d
647, 655-56 (2021) (citing White v. Trew, 366 N.C. 360, 362-63, 736 S.E.2d 166 (2013)).
“[T]ribal immunity is a matter of federal law and is not subject to diminution
by the States.” Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 756, 118 S. Ct.
1700, 1703, 140 L. Ed. 2d 981 (1998) (citations omitted). “As a matter of federal law,
an Indian tribe is subject to suit only where Congress has authorized the suit or the
tribe has waived its immunity.” Id. at 754, 118 S. Ct. at 1702 (citations omitted).
“Suits against Indian tribes are . . . barred by sovereign immunity absent a
clear waiver by the tribe or congressional abrogation.” Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen
Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 509, 111 S. Ct. 905, 909, 112
L. Ed. 2d 1112 (1991) (citing Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58, 98 S.
Ct. 1670, 1677, 56 L. Ed. 2d 106 (1978)); see also Welch Contracting, Inc. v. N.C. Dep’t
of Transp., 175 N.C. App. 45, 54, 622 S.E.2d 691, 696 (2005) (“An Indian tribe . . . is
subject to suit only where Congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has expressly
and unequivocally waived its tribal sovereign immunity.” (citations omitted)). In the
present case, the Agreements contain a “limited” waiver of Defendant’s sovereign
immunity. The Waivers specify Defendant agrees to waive its sovereign immunity
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with regard “to any claim or action that is directly or indirectly related to [the]
Agreement or any transactions contemplated hereunder[.]” Neither party argues the
Waivers are not enforceable. Rather, Plaintiff contends the trial court erred in
interpreting the scope of the Waivers.
“ ‘North Carolina law requires a court to interpret a contract by examining its
language for indications of the parties’ intent at the moment of execution.’ ”4 Advisor
Law, LLC v. Holland, _ N.C. App. _, _, 927 S.E.2d 39, 43 (2026) (quoting Fairview
Devs., Inc. v. Miller, 187 N.C. App. 168, 171, 652 S.E.2d 365, 367 (2007)). “ ‘If the
plain language of a contract is clear, the intention of the parties is inferred from the
words of the contract.’ ” Id. (quoting Walton v. City of Raleigh, 342 N.C. 879, 881, 467
S.E.2d 410, 411 (1996)). “ ‘This intention is to be gathered from the entire instrument,
4 Defendant, citing Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1439 (D.C. Cir. 1988), argues
“[f]ederal law requires a court to strictly construe the waiver in favor of the tribe.” In that case, the
Court stated: “ ‘Statutes are to be construed liberally in favor of the Indians, with ambiguous
provisions interpreted to their benefit.’ ” 851 F.2d at 1444-45 (brackets omitted) (quoting Montana v.
Blackfeet Tr. of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 766, 105 S. Ct. 2399, 2403, 85 L. Ed. 2d 753 (1985)). However,
in the present case, we are concerned with issues of contract interpretation—not statutory
construction—and we are not interpreting ambiguous provisions.
Moreover, in Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, the Supreme Court of the United States
explained: “the standard principles of statutory construction do not have their usual force in cases
involving Indian law. . . . [T]he canons of construction applicable in Indian law are rooted in the unique
trust relationship between the United States and the Indians.” 471 U.S. at 766, 105 S. Ct. at 2403.
But in the present case, we are faced with a series of Agreements Defendant entered into with Plaintiff,
a private actor—not the State or federal government. Cf. Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 675, 32 S. Ct.
565, 569, 56 L. Ed. 2d 941 (1912) (“[T]ax exemptions are strictly construed . . . [b]ut in the government’s
dealings with the Indians the rule is exactly the contrary. The construction, instead of being strict, is
liberal[.]” (emphasis added)).
Defendant has not produced any authority showing different principles of review apply to this
Court’s review of an express contractual waiver of liability entered into with a private actor. Nor has
our research returned any such case. Accordingly, our review in this case is conducted in accordance
with State law principles of contract interpretation.
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viewing it from its four corners.’ ” Id. (quoting Jones v. Palace Realty Co., 226 N.C.
303, 305, 37 S.E.2d 906, 907 (1946)). “ ‘When interpreting a contract, the Court
should presume that the words of the agreement were deliberately selected and be
given their plain meaning.’ ” Id. (quoting Value Health Sols., Inc. v. Pharm. Rsch.
Assocs., 385 N.C. 250, 267, 891 S.E.2d 100, 114 (2023)). “If ‘only one reasonable
interpretation exists, the courts must enforce the contract as written; they may not,
under the guise of construing an ambiguous term, rewrite the contract . . . .’ ” Id.
(alteration in original) (quoting Woods v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 295 N.C. 500, 506,
246 S.E.2d 773, 777 (1978)).
Here, as the trial court found, the Waivers provide, in relevant part:
[Defendant], on behalf of itself, each of its affiliates, and any of
their respective successors and assigns (each, a “Tribal Party”),
hereby expressly and irrevocably grants to [Plaintiff] a limited
waiver of its sovereign immunity from suit or other legal process
with regard to any claim or action that is directly or indirectly
related to this Agreement or any transactions contemplated
hereunder, whether any such claim or action arises under law or
in equity, whether arising as a matter of contract or a tort,
whether seeking monetary damages, injunctive or declaratory
relief or other remedies, and whether arising during or after the
expiration or termination of this Agreement (each, a “Claim”), and
waives all defenses based thereon with respect thereto; . . . .
Based on the Waivers, the trial court concluded:
7. The Waiver in an Agreement applies to claims that are “directly
or indirectly related to” that Agreement or to “transactions
contemplated [t]hereunder.” The plain and ordinary meaning of
the term “relate” is “to show or establish logical or causal
connection between.” Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary,
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available at https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/relate
(last visited June 2, 2025).
8. A claim does not have a logical or causal connection to an
Agreement or the transactions contemplated thereunder unless it
is based on the express rights or restrictions in the Agreement.
9. The allegations in Paragraphs 7, 9, 22(b), 22(c), 24, 27, 29(d),
29(f), 31-35, 38, 39, 40(e), 40(f), and 42(d) of the Complaint,
insofar as they are based on the express rights or restrictions in
the Easements, are the only allegations that could provide a basis
for a claim for which [Defendant] has clearly and unequivocally
waived its sovereign immunity under the Waiver (hereinafter,
collectively, the “Actionable Allegations”).
There is no support for the trial court’s Conclusion “[a] claim does not have a
logical or causal connection to an Agreement or the transactions contemplated
thereunder unless it is based on the express rights or restrictions in the Agreement.”
Specifically, nothing in the plain language of the Waivers says anything about a claim
needing to be “based on the express rights or restrictions in the Agreement.” Rather,
the Waivers simply provide a claim falls within the provision if it is “directly or
indirectly related to this Agreement or any transactions contemplated hereunder[.]”
See Hodgin v. Brighton, 196 N.C. App. 126, 128, 674 S.E.2d 444, 446 (2009) (“Where
the language of a contract is plain and unambiguous, the construction of the
agreement is a matter of law; and the court may not . . . insert words into it, but must
construe the contract as written, in the light of the undisputed evidence as to the
custom, usage, and meaning of its terms.” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)).
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Using the trial court’s definition of “relate[d],” a claim falls within the Waivers
if it “directly or indirectly has a logical or casual connection to an Agreement.”
However, although the trial court acknowledged the “Waiver in an Agreement applies
to claims that are ‘directly or indirectly related to’ that Agreement[,]” it did not
specifically address this language and did not consider what it means for a claim to
be “directly” or “indirectly” related to an Agreement. Nor did the trial court explain
how, or if, a claim related to a “transaction contemplated hereunder” differs from a
claim which is related to an Agreement itself.
Moreover, the Order dismisses Plaintiff’s claims for Continuing Trespass,
Recurring Trespass, Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices, and Injunctive Relief only
“to the extent” any of these claims “rel[y] on the Actionable Allegations.”5 It is
possible that one or all of these claims could partially or wholly rely on the Actionable
Allegations. As such, the trial court’s Order does not actually decide the central
question at issue: what claims, if any, fall within the Waivers.
“[W]hen reviewing a matter de novo, the reviewing court considers the matter
anew and freely substitutes its own judgment for that of the lower courts.” Savage v.
N.C. Dep’t of Transp., 388 N.C. 196, 200, 919 S.E.2d 144, 147 (2025) (citation and
quotation marks omitted). Here, because the Order does not contain Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law addressing the meaning of “directly or indirectly” or what
5 The only claim the Order fully dismisses is Plaintiff’s claim for Conversion.
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constitutes a “transaction contemplated hereunder,” “[a]t this point the Court is not
in a position to determine whether plaintiff[’s] last salvo hit its mark or not.” Krantz
v. Owens, 168 N.C. App. 384, 391, 607 S.E.2d 337, 342 (2005); see also Parker v.
Glosson, 182 N.C. App. 229, 231, 641 S.E.2d 735, 737 (2007) (“ ‘The word de novo
means fresh or anew; for a second time[.]’ ” (emphasis added) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting In re Reassignment of Hayes, 261 N.C. 616, 622, 135 S.E.2d
645, 649 (1964)).
Importantly, the parties on appeal present arguments about the trial court’s
interpretation of the term “indirectly” and “transactions contemplated hereunder.”
But the fact of the matter is the trial court did not address these issues. These
questions are more properly left to the trial court, not this Court, to decide in the first
instance. We should not conduct a de novo review of questions the trial court has
simply not yet addressed. See Finley Forest Condominium Ass’n v. Perry, 163 N.C.
App. 735, 738, 594 S.E.2d 227, 230 (2004) (“This Court is unable to review the issue .
. . since there is nothing before this Court indicating the trial court’s ruling on the
question.” (citing N.C. R. App. P. 10(b)(1) (2003))); Crews v. Paysour, 261 N.C. App.
557, 565, 821 S.E.2d 469, 474 (2018) (remand was appropriate for trial court to
address counterclaim party raised but trial court “did not address . . . at all”);
McKnight v. Cagle, 76 N.C. App. 59, 66, 331 S.E.2d 707, 712 (1985) (remanding “for
resolution of plaintiff’s claim” where the trial court’s findings of fact did not address
issues central to the claim); see also N.C. R. App. P. 10(a)(1) (“In order to preserve an
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issue for appellate review, a party must . . . obtain a ruling upon the party’s request,
objection, or motion.”).
Thus, we vacate the Order and remand this matter to the trial court for it to
interpret the complete language of the Waivers and expressly determine which, if
any, of Plaintiff’s claims are barred by Defendant’s sovereign immunity. In doing so,
the trial court should consider what it means for a claim to be “directly or indirectly
related to” the Agreements and/or whether such claims are related to “any
transactions contemplated [t]hereunder.”
Conclusion
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we vacate the Order on Defendant’s
Partial Motion to Dismiss and for Judgment on the Pleadings and remand this matter
to the trial court for further proceedings. The trial court may, in its discretion, elect
to allow further argument on remand at the Judgment on the Pleadings stage or allow
additional discovery and proceedings for the matter to advance to Summary
Judgment.
VACATED AND REMANDED.
Chief Judge DILLON concurs.
Judge TYSON concurs in part and dissents in part by separate opinion.
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TYSON, Judge, concurring in part, dissenting in part.
I fully concur with the majority opinion’s conclusion: “The Order at bar is
interlocutory because it dismisses Plaintiff’s Complaint only in part. See Veazey, 231
N.C. at 361-62, 57 S.E.2d at 381.”
The trial court properly defined the express restriction of “related to” as used
in the “limited” waivers as: “to show or establish logical or causal connection between”
and concluded a claim does not have a logical or causal connection to an Agreement
or to the transactions contemplated under that Agreement unless “based on the
express rights or restrictions in the Agreement.”
The trial court properly dismissed Plaintiff’s tort and statutory claims, except
for its claims “related to” the easements and entered an Order on 9 July 2025. The
trial court’s order is presumed to be correct, and Plaintiff bears the burden to show
both error and prejudice on appeal. The appeal is clearly interlocutory, and Plaintiff
has not demonstrated a substantial right or risk of inconsistent verdicts to warrant
immediate review. I respectfully dissent.
I. Sovereign Immunity of the Tribe
Federally recognized Indian tribes are sovereign nations and governments.
Their existence predates the Constitution of the United States. The tribes retain
inherent powers of nationhood and self-governance, which have not been
extinguished or abrogated. See United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557, 42 L. Ed.
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2d 706, 716-17 (1975) (“Indian tribes are unique aggregations possessing attributes
of sovereignty over both their members and their territory . . . they are a separate
people possessing the power of regulating their internal and social relations . . . .”
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
One power retained by the tribe is immunity from suit. Sovereign immunity is
not merely an affirmative defense to claims, it is a “complete immunity from being
sued in court.” Magana v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 183 N.C. App. 146,
147, 645 S.E.2d 91, 92 (2007). “Suits against Indian tribes are . . . barred by sovereign
immunity absent a clear waiver by the tribe or congressional abrogation.” Okla. Tax
Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 509, 112 L.
Ed. 2d 1112, 1119 (1991). The Supreme Court of the United States re-affirmed the
baseline rule in Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 572 U.S. 782, 791, 188 L.
Ed. 2d 1071, 1084 (2014). A tribe is subject to suit only when Congress has authorized
it or the tribe has clearly waived immunity. Id. The Court held an Indian tribe’s
sovereign immunity can only be revoked by Congress. Id. at 803-04, 188 L. Ed. 2d at
1092-93.
The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (“IGRA”) provides if certain requirements
are met, including a compact between the state and the tribe, an Indian tribe can
lawfully operate a casino on Indian lands. 25 U.S.C. § 2701 (2024) et seq. Lands
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bought with funds from a congressionally established trust are sovereign Indian
lands. See 25 U.S.C. § 5108 et seq. (2024).
The Supreme Court’s decision in Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Manufacturing
Technologies extended an Indian tribe’s sovereign immunity to lawsuits arising out
of the tribe’s commercial activity. 523 U.S. 751, 760, 140 L. Ed. 2d 981, 988 (1998).
The issue before the Court in Kiowa Tribe of Okla. was whether Indian tribes can be
sued in state courts for breaches of contract involving off-reservation commercial
conduct. Id. at 754, 140 L. Ed. 2d at 984-85.
Under the IGRA, Class III gaming is conducted under an effective tribal-state
compact. 25 U.S.C. § 2710 (2024). Contracts with tribal entities sometimes include
waiver provisions. A well-drafted contract specifies whether the tribe has waived
immunity for contract disputes, which court has jurisdiction, and what remedies are
available. If the contract does not address these questions, a claimant, as here, may
find itself without a forum, even if the purported breach is clear. See id. Any waiver
of sovereign immunity is strictly construed and a potential claimant against the tribe
must identify a valid waiver or abrogation before suing. See Guthrie v. State Ports
Authority, 307 N.C. 522, 537-38, 299 S.E.2d 618, 627 (1983) (citations omitted).
Waivers must be clear and specific, and courts will not infer a waiver from a
tribe’s general conduct or participation in commercial activity. In C & L Enterprises,
Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe of Oklahoma, the Supreme Court of the United
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States found a waiver where the tribe had agreed to binding arbitration and
enforcement of the award in court. 532 U.S. 411, 423, 149 L. Ed. 2d 623, 634 (2001).
Tribes may expressly and partially waive immunity in specific and narrow
circumstances and for specific purposes. Sovereign immunity remains in place for
any claims not specifically waived. Before a tribe can be sued, a claimant must
identify an express waiver of immunity, which covers its claim. If no or a limited
waiver exists, the purported lawsuit, as here, is properly dismissed, not because of
lack of a claim on the merits, but because the court lacks jurisdiction to hear it. Id.
II. Interlocutory Appeal
Plaintiff filed this action against Defendant for trespass, conversion, unfair
and deceptive trade practices, injunctive relief, and breach of the easement
agreements. Defendant filed a partial motion to dismiss and for judgment on the
pleadings under Rules 12(b)(2) and 12(c). N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rules 12(b)(2) and
12(c) (2025). Defendant sought dismissal of all of Plaintiff’s claims, except the breach
of easement claims, based upon its asserted right of sovereign immunity. The trial
court dismissed the conversion claim in full. It dismissed the claims for trespass,
unfair and deceptive trade practices, and injunctive relief, except to the extent those
claims are “based on the express rights or restrictions” in the agreements. Defendant
filed a counterclaim for unjust enrichment, which also remains pending before the
trial court.
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We all agree: “The Order at bar is interlocutory because it dismisses Plaintiff’s
Complaint only in part.” Veazey v. Durham, 231 N.C. 354, 362, 57 S.E.2d 377, 382
(1950) (citation omitted). Interlocutory orders are generally not immediately
appealable in order to prevent fragmentary and premature appeals, which
unnecessarily delay the administration of justice. Id.
Nevertheless, “[a]n interlocutory appeal is ordinarily permissible . . . if (1) the
trial court certified the order under Rule 54(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, or (2)
the order affects a substantial right that would be lost without immediate review.”
Boyd v. Robeson Cty., 169 N.C. App. 460, 464, 621 S.E.2d 1, 4, disc. review denied,
359 N.C. 629, 615 S.E.2d 866 (2005). The order before us is not certified by the trial
court as immediately appealable under Rule 54(b). N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 54(b)
(2025).
Plaintiff argues the order dismissing its claims is immediately appealable
because (1) it is a ruling on sovereign immunity, (2) it is an adverse ruling on personal
jurisdiction, and (3) it creates a risk of inconsistent verdicts. The majority’s opinion
relies on Ballard v. Shelley, 257 N.C. App. 561, 564, 811 S.E.2d 603, 605-06 (2018)
and holds the order is immediately appealable because it is based upon sovereign
immunity to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims. This is a case of an independent and sovereign
nation’s immunity, not of local governmental immunity. See id. I disagree with the
majority’s assertion Ballard mandates immediate review of this admitted and clearly
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interlocutory appeal.
The burden rests upon the appellant to “demo