Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-4035-24 FRANKLIN CASTANOS and SOLANGE PLASENCIA, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. EMAD GHALY, Defendant-Appellant, and EIG REAL ESTATE MANAGEMENT, LLC, Defendant. ____________________________ Submitted September 28, 2026 – Decided October 20, 2026 Before Judges Perez Friscia and Torregrossa-O'Connor. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Hudson County, Docket No. L-1434-20. Emad Ghaly, self-represented appellant. Respondents have not filed a brief. PER CURIAM Defendant Emad Ghaly, self-represented, appeals from the January 17, 2025 trial court final judgment entered in favor of plaintiffs Franklin Castanos and Solange Plasencia pursuant to Rule 4:43-2(b).1 Following our review of the record, Ghaly's arguments, and the applicable law, we vacate the final judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. I. We begin by noting that in challenging the final judgment, Ghaly asserts in his notice of appeal that default was also improperly entered by the court in October 2023. However, Ghaly has not appealed from the court's order entering default pursuant to Rule 2:4-1(a), nor has he provided in his appendix that order, the transcript, or the related order denying his motion to vacate default. 2 Additionally, Ghaly has not provided all of the documents relevant to his appeal from the final judgment, including plaintiffs' motion exhibits in support of the 1 Codefendant EIG Real Estate Management ("EIG") is not participating in this appeal. The court had entered default judgment against EIG having found it "is a limited liability corporation and require[d] counsel as per R[ule] 1:21-1(c)." 2 "The record on appeal shall consist of all papers on file in the court . . . below." R. 2:5-4(a); see also R. 2:6-1(a)(1)(I) (explaining the appellant's appendix shall include "such other parts of the record, . . . as are essential to the proper consideration of the issues"). A-4035-24 2 final judgment amount for the sum certain. "We are not 'obliged to attempt the review of an issue when the relevant portions of the record are not included. '" State v. D.F.W., 468 N.J. Super. 422, 447 (App. Div. 2021) (quoting Cmty. Hosp. Grp., Inc. v. Blume Goldfaden Berkowitz Donnelly Fried & Forte, P.C. , 381 N.J. Super. 119, 127 (App. Div. 2005)). Nevertheless, recognizing Ghaly is self-represented,3 we have endeavored to fairly discern the procedural history and his arguments. Plaintiffs entered a residential lease for a single-family home in Bayonne.4 EIG owned the property, and Ghaly was a member of EIG. In renting the home, plaintiffs paid the first month's rent and a security deposit. After issues with the home's condition arose, plaintiffs vacated the premises. Plaintiffs thereafter filed an action in the Law Division. In October 2023, the parties had a trial date and Ghaly failed to appear. The court ordered Ghaly's answer stricken and entered default based on his non-appearance. Ghaly later 3 Generally, a self-represented litigant is not entitled to greater rights than a litigant represented by counsel. Ridge at Back Brook, LLC v. Klenert, 437 N.J. Super. 90, 99 (App. Div. 2014). Self-represented litigants are held to the same standards for compliance with our Court Rules. See Rubin v. Rubin, 188 N.J. Super. 155, 159 (App. Div. 1982). 4 Ghaly has not provided a copy of the lease on appeal. It is therefore unclear if both defendants signed the lease. A-4035-24 3 moved to vacate the default, which the court denied in November 2023. Ghaly moved for reconsideration, which the court also denied. As plaintiffs failed to timely move for default judgment for a sum certain or for a proof hearing pursuant to Rule 4:23-2(b), plaintiffs' action was dismissed for lack of prosecution. Thereafter, plaintiffs moved to reinstate their case, which the court granted in October 2024. The parties appeared for a proof hearing on November 18, 2024. Shortly before the hearing, Ghaly had moved to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e). At the hearing, the court noted plaintiffs had initiated the action in April 2020, and the matter was pending for over four years. It highlighted there had also been "motion practice, dismissals, [a] default[ entered,]" and "attempts to vacate default." Regarding the default entered against Ghaly, the court noted "that the answering pleading of . . . [Ghaly] [wa]s stricken and default [wa]s entered" for his failure to appear for trial. The court explained that EIG remained in default as an attorney and had not filed an appearance on behalf of the LLC. See R. 1:21-1(c). Further, the court noted that after default was entered in October 2023, Ghaly moved to vacate the default, which the court denied without prejudice A-4035-24 4 based on deficiencies. Ghaly argued the matter was previously consolidated with a Special Civil Part action he had initiated and he had filed a counterclaim in this Law Division action. The court explained that the default entered against Ghaly applied to his affirmative claims as well. Plaintiffs' attorney explained that Ghaly failed to appear for trial, there was never a request to adjourn the trial, and plaintiffs had prepared to proceed to trial. Regarding Ghaly's assertion that he sought an adjournment, plaintiffs' attorney represented there was no request received. After reviewing eCourts 5 and discussing the procedural history with staff, the court found there was "no record of any request of an adjournment for the [October 4, 2023] trial date." When the court began the proof hearing, Ghaly requested an adjournment to retain an attorney. The court granted his request and plaintiffs ' attorney inquired if the matter could proceed by "a motion for judgment on the papers [for a sum certain] rather than" a "proof[] hearing," explaining his client now resided in Pennsylvania. The court advised that the parties' motions would be heard on December 20, 2024. Afterwards, Ghaly apparently filed a motion to vacate the default entered against him. 5 eCourts is a web-based application that allows attorneys to electronically file documents with the courts and provides attorneys and the public with access to case information. See https://www.njcourts.gov/attorneys/ecourts.html. A-4035-24 5 On January 17, 2025, the parties appeared before the court for a virtual motion hearing. The court explained it had provided Ghaly a second adjournment after the listed December 2024 date because he alleged a medical issue and represented he was hiring an attorney. Ghaly advised the court he had an accident and was "[un]able to get" representation. Further, Ghaly alleged that default was entered only against EIG and not him "personal[ly.]" The court denied his motion to vacate default, finding there was neither proof Ghaly had asked for an adjournment of the October 2023 trial date nor evidence "show[ing] a viable excuse" for his nonappearance. The court thereafter permitted plaintiffs to proceed on their motion for a final judgment for a sum certain against defendants. During argument, plaintiffs' attorney represented that the lease "was signed between the parties." He argued plaintiffs sustained financial losses from having to vacate the home due to uninhabitable conditions and that they were "seeking double damage on the security deposit and treble damage under the " New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act ("CFA"), N.J.S.A. 56:8-1 to -228. Plaintiffs' attorney asserted plaintiffs were owed the $4,050 security deposit, first month's rent of $2,700, and $1,000 in attorney's fees. "[A] group of handwritten receipts," totaling $1,430, were referenced by plaintiffs' attorney, who argued A-4035-24 6 they reflected plaintiffs' "cash payments" spent "in order to clean the property and make it in move-in condition." Additionally, plaintiffs claimed damages for furniture purchased on a "layaway type of plan," in the amounts of $2,681.89, $2,222.30, $2,828.66, $2,456.20, and $2,434.63, but they did not provide legible receipts. The court heard no testimony regarding any amounts claimed. Plaintiffs' attorney asserted plaintiffs had total damages in the amount of $17,753.68, which did not include the amount of $8,100 for doubling the security deposit of $4,050, but consisted of the first month's rent of $2,700, attorney's fees of $1,000 for the frivolous eviction Ghaly filed, the furniture costs of $12,623.68, and the cleaning costs of $1,430. However, plaintiffs' attorney acknowledged plaintiffs' "certification" "d[id] not tabulate" the amounts. Additionally, because plaintiffs had not submitted the furniture receipts, the court ordered plaintiffs' attorney to "email" the receipts not provided.6 Regarding plaintiffs' damages pursuant to the CFA, plaintiffs' attorney argued Ghaly was responsible for the amounts because he was "a licensed real estate" salesperson in New Jersey and a "highly seasoned landlord" who 6 It is unclear from the record if plaintiffs' attorney later forwarded the receipts for furniture on eCourts and if the court and Ghaly received them. A-4035-24 7 personally made fraudulent claims and misrepresentations to plaintiffs, which were recounted in Castanos' certification. Plaintiffs maintained Ghaly misrepresented the condition of the home and that they could sublet "the basement" to assist in paying the rent. Plaintiffs "subsequently learned . . . from the City of Bayonne['s] . . . [z]oning [o]ffice[r]" that subletting was not permitted. They asserted that when the lease began, residents were living in the home. Upon moving in, plaintiffs found the place infested with cockroaches, repairs were not completed, and no parking was available. Based on their ascertainable losses of $17,753.68, plaintiffs argued for treble damages of $53,261.04. Plaintiffs' attorney also posited the court should add $8,100 for double the amount of the security deposit, resulting in a total final judgment amount of $61,361.04. Plaintiffs additionally requested to submit a certification of services for an amount of attorney's fees incurred. The court advised Ghaly that he was in default regarding "[t]he question of liability" but could provide "specific objections to [plaintiffs' claimed] amounts." Ghaly admitted signing the lease "agreement with . . . [plaintiffs]" but argued plaintiffs suffered no losses as an "inspect[ion of] the property" occurred "with . . . [plaintiffs] three times." He explained plaintiffs were also provided a garage and a vacant driveway with the rental home. When Ghaly A-4035-24 8 began to address the basement, the court stopped him as his arguments were addressing liability issues. The court then found Ghaly was "not prepared to . . . oppose the calculation of the amount of damages" and "mut[ed]" him for "not cooperating." The court issued an order accompanied by an oral statement that "the matter [was] ending" there and the amount of the final judgment entered was $61,361.04. The court further ordered plaintiffs would receive "reasonable attorney's fees . . . in an amount to be determined upon the submission of a certification of services." Defendants thereafter retained an attorney, who filed an appearance, and moved for reconsideration and to vacate the final judgment. Defendants' attorney acknowledged this matter had a tortured history and that default was entered against Ghaly because he never contacted the court for a trial adjournment or had done so too late. Regarding the final judgment, defendants' attorney argued the court should vacate the "$61,000 judgment" awarded in the interest of justice because there was only an "$8,000 deficiency" alleged. He further contended that the judgment entered against defendants "just . . . [did not] make any sense" and "should [not] have been entered directly against . . . Ghaly" as the "pleading itself d[id not] talk about piercing the corporate veil." A-4035-24 9 As to the requested damages, defendants' attorney stated that the complaint provided for compensatory damages of $19,000, but there was "never really any elucidation of those damages." Plaintiffs' attorney countered that individual liability against Ghaly was supported under the CFA, it was too late to vacate the judgment, and defendants' conduct "was clearly sanctionable." After oral argument, the court found the parties had been provided the "opportunity to present proofs and evidence, and . . . [Ghaly] had the opportunity to object to any proofs." It also questioned Ghaly's demeanor at the prior appearance. While Ghaly has not provided us with a copy of the court's order, the record indicates the court denied defendants' motion. On appeal, Ghaly contends the court's final judgment should be vacated because: plaintiffs improperly named him individually when the property was rented to plaintiffs by EIG; and default resulted from an unavoidable court conflict and not Ghaly's willful non-appearance. II. Where a defendant has defaulted, a final judgment may be entered either by the clerk of the court upon the plaintiff's demonstration of a sum certain or by the court after a motion is filed. R. 4:43-2(a) and (b). The court, "on its own motion or at the request of a party on notice to the defaulting defendant . . . , A-4035-24 10 may conduct such proof hearings . . . as it deems appropriate." R. 4:43-2(b). When a trial court holds a Rule 4:43-2(b) proof hearing, we defer to the trial court's factual findings. See Romero v. Gold Star Distrib., LLC, 468 N.J. Super. 274, 302 (App. Div. 2021). We review a trial court's legal determinations de novo. See EnviroFinance Grp. LLC v. Env't Barrier Co., 440 N.J. Super. 325, 343-44 (App. Div. 2015). In the context of a proof hearing, "trial courts have been directed to view a plaintiff's proofs 'indulgently' . . . and the general practice of our courts has been to require only a prima facie case." Heimbach v. Mueller, 229 N.J. Super. 17, 20 (App. Div. 1988); Kolczycki v. City of East Orange, 317 N.J. Super. 505, 514 (App. Div. 1999). "A successful plaintiff in any default judgment can be required to furnish some proof on the merits of the issues to show entitlement to the relief demanded." Slowinski v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 264 N.J. Super. 172, 183 (App. Div. 1993). Generally, a plaintiff is required "to furnish proof on the issue of damages as well as liability." Johnson v. Johnson, 92 N.J. Super. 457, 464 (App. Div. 1966). However, "a judge might properly not require a plaintiff to prove liability in a case where the defaulting defendant exclusively controls key evidence." Morales v. Santiago, 217 N.J. Super. 496, 505 (App. Div. 1987). A-4035-24 11 A plaintiff is entitled to "all of the damages" that can be "prove[n] by competent, relevant evidence." Heimbach, 229 N.J. Super. at 28. We review "on appeal . . . whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support the trial court's factual findings and legal conclusions of law." Romero, 468 N.J. Super. at 302. Furthermore, the court's "[f]actual findings must establish the entitlement to relief." EnviroFinance Grp., 440 N.J. Super. at 343. III. Ghaly argues the court erred in entering the final judgment against him as plaintiffs leased the Bayonne property from EIG, which is a limited liability company. He asserts that a "limited liability company is a separate legal entity," "members are generally not personally liable for [its] obligations," and the record does not "reflect findings justifying [his] personal liability." Further, Ghaly contends the final judgment should be vacated because the court should not have entered default against him in October 2023 as he had a "scheduling conflict that prevented [his] appearance" at trial.7 7 We decline to address Ghaly's arguments that the court improperly entered default against him in 2023. As we previously noted, he did not appeal the court's order entering default nor has he provided us with the order and transcript. A-4035-24 12 At the proof hearing, plaintiffs attempted to establish a sum certain without testifying. Plaintiffs' attorney represented the amounts plaintiffs incurred and referenced motion exhibits. Problematically, plaintiffs ' attorney conceded during the hearing that plaintiffs' proofs did not have the total amounts "tabulate[d]" and certain receipts were not submitted. After a review of the hearing transcript, we cannot fairly discern what evidence the court relied upon to determine the final judgment amount because no factual findings were made. Specifically, plaintiffs' attorney argued on plaintiffs' CFA claim that the court should award damages in the amount of $17,753.68, based on multiple alleged losses, and the amount should be trebled. Plaintiffs' attorney then represented the security deposit should also be doubled. Again, plaintiffs did not testify as to the amounts, and support for some of the amounts was notably not submitted prior to the hearing. Precluding our meaningful review, the court's only final judgment finding was that it was "entering judgment in th[e] matter in the amount of $61,361.04." We have held "that 'an articulation of reasons is essential to the fair resolution of a case.'" Raspantini v. Arocho, 364 N.J. Super. 528, 532 (App. Div. 2003) (quoting Schwarz v. Schwarz, 328 N.J. Super. 275, 282 (App. Div. 2000)). Further, "appellate review is impeded when a trial court fails to 'state A-4035-24 13 its factual findings and conclusions of law on the record as required by Rule 1:7- 4(a).'" Parke Bank v. Voorhees Diner Corp., 480 N.J. Super. 254, 266 (App. Div. 2024) (quoting Lakhani v. Patel, 479 N.J. Super. 291, 297-98 (App. Div. 2024)). A "trial [court] is required to 'state clearly its factual findings and correlate them with the relevant legal conclusions.'" Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015) (quoting Curtis v. Finneran, 83 N.J. 563, 570 (1980)). For these reasons, we are constrained to vacate the court's final judgment amount entered and to remand this matter for additional findings as to Ghaly's liability and the amount of damages awarded to plaintiffs. The court shall address the amount of final judgment and what proofs were timely provided by plaintiffs, permitting further argument. It is well established that when "the record is unclear as to . . . the trial court['s]" findings in entering final judgment as to liability and damages, a remand is appropriate. Romero, 468 N.J. Super. at 304. Finally, we are mindful that because default was entered against Ghaly, the court had the discretion to determine the sufficiency of plaintiffs' prima facie showing of liability. Nevertheless, the court was required to provide its conclusions on Ghaly's liability. In sum, on remand, the court is directed to provide sufficient findings as to plaintiffs' requested damages, citing the A-4035-24 14 evidence relied on in reaching the final judgment amount, and its conclusions of law. Vacated and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction. A-4035-24 15