Brandon Lee Schiefel v. Evan Barton
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket26-1217
JudgeKaren Nelson Moore; Amul R. Thapar; Whitney D. Hermandorfer
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 26a0473n.06
No. 26-1217
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED
Nov 20, 2026
KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk
)
BRANDON LEE SCHIEFEL,
)
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE
) UNITED STATES DISTRICT
v. ) COURT FOR THE WESTERN
) DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
EVAN BARTON, )
Defendant-Appellee. )
OPINION
)
)
Before: MOORE, THAPAR, and HERMANDORFER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM. Brandon Lee Schiefel, a state inmate, took his Eighth Amendment
failure-to-protect claim against correctional officer Evan Barton to trial. During trial, Schiefel
sought to elicit testimony from two witnesses corroborating the fact that Schiefel had told Barton
that placing another inmate, Robert Taylor, in Schiefel’s cell would create an excessive risk of
harm. The district court excluded this proffered testimony as inadmissible hearsay. This was an
abuse of discretion because the testimony was proffered to prove knowledge rather than the truth
of the matter asserted, and therefore did not constitute hearsay. Nevertheless, a district court’s
erroneous decision to exclude evidence is not grounds for granting a new trial unless the court’s
error affected the litigant’s substantial rights. Accordingly, we VACATE the judgment of the
district court and REMAND for that court to consider in the first instance whether its error
prejudiced Schiefel.
No. 26-1217, Schiefel v. Barton
I. BACKGROUND
Schiefel filed a pro se complaint against Barton in December 2022. R. 1 (Compl.) (Page
ID #1–7). The district court later granted summary judgment to Barton on Schiefel’s Eighth
Amendment excessive-force claim and state-law claims, but denied summary judgment on
Schiefel’s Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim, which proceeded to trial. R. 35 (R&R)
(Page ID #270–81); R. 36 (Summ. J. Ord.) (Page ID #282).
Many of the facts at trial were not contested. In December 2020, Schiefel was housed in
Carson City Correctional Facility’s 500 unit. R. 84 (Tr. Vol. 1 at 163) (Page ID #591). While
there, Schiefel got into a fight with Taylor and a third prisoner. Id. at 177–78 (Page ID #605–06).
Schiefel pleaded guilty to violating prison rules in a misconduct proceeding and was sanctioned.
Id. at 152, 178–80 (Page ID #580, 606–08). After that incident, Schiefel reported to prison staff
that Taylor was threatening him. Id. at 152 (Page ID #580). Schiefel committed another infraction
and was placed into protective custody in the prison’s 1200 unit. Id. at 153 (Page ID #581). After
leaving protective custody, Schiefel was transferred to Cell 18 in the 1200 unit. Id. at 154, 164
(Page ID #582, 592).
On March 24, 2021, Schiefel’s cell door opened and he saw Taylor walking toward Cell
18. Id. at 154–55 (Page ID #582–83). Once Taylor realized that Schiefel was in Cell 18, Taylor
objected to the cell assignment. Id. at 129, 155 (Page ID #557, 583). Barton ordered Taylor to
enter the cell anyway, and Taylor complied. Id. at 130, 158 (Page ID #558, 586). Almost
immediately after Barton left, someone in the cell began pushing a button that set off an emergency
light. Id. at 108 (Page ID #536). Barton and another officer, John Dill, returned to the cell. Id. at
108–09 (Page ID #536–37). Barton was told that the cell assignment would not work and was
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asked to call a sergeant. Id. at 109, 170–71 (Page ID #537, 598–99). Barton left again, spoke to
a sergeant, and began delivering inmate mail, but then “heard abnormal sounds coming from Cell
18,” saw that Taylor and Schiefel were fighting, and, after commanding them to stop, deployed
his taser, hitting Schiefel in the back of his head. Id. at 109–10, 159 (Page ID #537–38, 587).
According to Barton, Schiefel was “on top of” Taylor when Barton reopened the door to Cell 18.
Id. at 109 (Page ID #537). Schiefel, on the other hand, claimed that Taylor “sucker punched [him]
in the back of the head” and “wrestled [him] to the ground,” “punching [Schiefel] in [his] head
and face for several minutes until Barton opened the door.” Id. at 159 (Page ID #587).
At the core of the parties’ dispute was what Barton knew when he locked Schiefel and
Taylor in Cell 18 together and whether he responded reasonably based on that knowledge. Barton
testified that he was not told that the two had a prior altercation and that he would not have placed
them together if he had known about the December fight. Id. at 129, 144 (Page ID #557, 572).
Dill, who visited the cell with Barton after the emergency call, also testified that neither Schiefel
nor Taylor alluded to their past altercation. Id. at 202–03 (Page ID #630–31). Schiefel, on the
other hand, said that he “told Barton that [he and Taylor] had been in a fight before” when Taylor
arrived at the cell. Id. at 155 (Page ID #583). Schiefel testified that he reiterated the concern again
when Barton and Dill responded to the emergency button, and that “Taylor was saying the same
things.” Id. at 158–59 (Page ID #586–87).
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Schiefel attempted to elicit testimony from two other witnesses, both fellow inmates who
testified via a remote video link, that would corroborate his account.1 His first witness was Quincy
Williams. Schiefel’s counsel began by establishing that Williams was in the 1200 unit at Carson
City on March 24, 2021, and recalled witnessing the fight between Schiefel and Taylor. Id. at 81–
83 (Page ID #509–11). When Schiefel’s counsel asked Williams if he overheard “anyone say
anything about why they didn’t want to be in that room,” Barton’s attorney objected, citing the
rule against hearsay. Id. at 87 (Page ID #515). Schiefel’s lawyer argued that he was seeking to
elicit testimony not for the truth of the matter asserted in what Williams overheard, but for its effect
on Barton. Id. at 87–88 (Page ID #515–16). Nevertheless, the district court sustained the
objection. Id.
Schiefel’s next witness was Myron Glenn, another inmate who was in the 1200 unit with
Schiefel in March 2021. Id. at 93–96 (Page ID #521–24). Glenn explained that he was “maybe
five or six cells down” from Cell 18 and could hear what happened. Id. at 98 (Page ID #526).
When Schiefel’s counsel asked Glenn what he heard Schiefel or Taylor say leading up to the
encounter, Barton’s attorney objected again, citing hearsay and speculation. Id. at 98–99 (Page ID
#526–27). The district court sustained the objection and rejected Schiefel’s counsel’s argument
that the testimony would show “the effect on the listener.” Id.; see also id. at 101 (Page ID #529)
(argument that the statements were “not hearsay because we’re not introducing for underlying the
truth [sic]” but for “the fact that a statement was made and people heard it”). When Glenn began
1
Both witnesses submitted affidavits in support of Schiefel’s opposition to Barton’s motion for summary
judgment in which they said Schiefel had told Barton about the December fight. R. 29-4 (Glenn Decl. at 2) (Page ID
#225); R. 29-5 (Williams Decl. at 2) (Page ID #228).
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to go down a similar route shortly thereafter, the district court sustained another objection and told
Schiefel’s counsel that he should just “ask Barton those questions.” Id. at 100 (Page ID #528).
Both Schiefel’s and Barton’s closing arguments emphasized the importance of whether
Barton knew about the December fight. Schiefel’s counsel told the jury not to believe the
defendant’s account that “nobody said anything” about the prior incident. R. 85 (Tr. Vol. 2 at 238)
(Page ID #666). And Barton’s counsel, for his part, acknowledged that “much of this case really
hinges on what it is that Barton . . . knew on March 24th of 2021” and argued that “Schiefel ha[d]
given [the jury] no evidence that shows that Officer Barton was aware of any threats to Mr. Schiefel
before he opened the door and found Mr. Schiefel and Mr. Taylor fighting.” Id. at 244–45 (Page
ID #672–73). The jury deliberated for about six hours and returned with a defense verdict. Id. at
278–81 (Page ID #706–09). The district court entered judgment in Barton’s favor, and Schiefel
timely appealed. See R. 80 (Judgment) (Page ID #420); R. 82 (Notice of Appeal) (Page ID #425).
II. ANALYSIS
A. Evidentiary Error
Schiefel’s appeal challenges only the district court’s hearsay rulings. We review the
district court’s exclusion of the proffered testimony for abuse of discretion. Yoder & Frey
Auctioneers, Inc. v. EquipmentFacts, LLC, 774 F.3d 1065, 1071 (6th Cir. 2014). In doing so, we
“review de novo ‘the lower court’s conclusions of law, e.g., the decision that certain evidence
constitutes hearsay, and review for clear error the court’s factual determinations that underpin its
legal conclusions.’” Id. (citation modified) (quoting United States v. McDaniel, 398 F.3d 540, 544
(6th Cir. 2005)); see also United States v. Levy, 904 F.2d 1026, 1029 (6th Cir. 1990) (“[A] district
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No. 26-1217, Schiefel v. Barton
court's conclusions of law, such as whether proffered evidence constitutes hearsay within the
meaning of the Federal Rules of Evidence, are reviewed de novo.”).
The district court’s hearsay rulings constituted an abuse of discretion. It is black letter law
that hearsay is a declarant’s out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
Fed. R. Evid. 801(a)–(c); 2 McCormick on Evidence § 246 (9th ed. 2025). The rule against hearsay
is grounded in the principle that admission of such statements implicates “core credibility
concerns” by preventing in-court testing of the declarant’s “truthfulness, memory, or perception.”
United States v. Rodriguez-Lopez, 565 F.3d 312, 315 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Williamson v. United
States, 512 U.S. 594, 598 (1994)); see also Robert P. Mosteller, 2 McCormick on Evidence § 245.
But those core concerns do not apply, and a statement is not hearsay, when the statement is
introduced for a purpose other than its truth. “Accordingly, when a proponent offers a statement
to prove that the declarant or a listener had knowledge of the proposition asserted in the statement,
rather than to prove the truth of that proposition, he has not offered hearsay.” United States v.
Sherman, 168 F.4th 417, 429 (6th Cir. 2026). The introduction of such testimony is particularly
important when “state of mind is an element.” United States v. Boyd, 640 F.3d 657, 664 (6th Cir.
2011) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 71 F.3d 539, 543 (6th Cir. 1995)). If a party must
demonstrate an individual’s knowledge and “the proffered testimony [is] probative to . . .
knowledge, the evidence is not hearsay.” Id. (citation modified).
Williams’s and Glenn’s proffered testimony regarding what Schiefel or Taylor said to
Barton was not hearsay.2 The fact that the December fight happened was uncontested, and
2
The district court appears to have premised its exclusion of the testimony on the idea that there is no “general
exception to hearsay of the effect on the listener.” R. 84 (Tr. Vol. 1 at 99) (Page ID #527). Although this is literally
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No. 26-1217, Schiefel v. Barton
everyone agreed that “much of this case really hinges on what it is that Barton . . . knew on March
24th of 2021.” R. 85 (Tr. Vol. 2 at 244) (Page ID #672). And, as Schiefel’s counsel explained to
the district court in contesting Barton’s objection, the point of the testimony was exactly that: to
show what Barton knew. R. 84 (Tr. Vol. 1 at 88) (Page ID #516) (“[I]f there was statements as to
why they couldn’t be in the same cell it’s not the truth of the matter asserted, it’s Defendant
Barton’s knowledge.”); id. at 99 (Page ID #527) (“Effect on the listener, Your Honor.”). Because
the “statement that [Schiefel] made a statement to [Barton]” was proffered “to establish the state
of mind thereby induced in [Barton], such as receiving notice or having knowledge,” it was “not
subject to attack as hearsay.” 2 McCormick on Evidence § 249 (footnotes omitted); see also
Biegas v. Quickway Carriers, Inc., 573 F.3d 365, 379 (6th Cir. 2009) (concluding that a statement
was not hearsay when “offered to prove . . . that Biegas had been put on notice that he was in
imminent danger and should have been aware of the risk he faced”); Boyd, 640 F.3d at 664.
Because the district court relied on an incorrect view of the law which led it to characterize the
proffered testimony as hearsay, its rulings were an abuse of discretion. Levy, 904 F.2d at 1029.3
B. Harmless Error
Even when a district court abuses its discretion in excluding evidence, a new trial will not
be ordered unless the error affected a party’s “substantial rights.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 61 (“[T]he court
correct, it misses the point. Schiefel did not need to show that the testimony fell into an exception to the Rule against
hearsay, see Fed. R. Evid. 803, because it was not hearsay as defined in Rule 801 in the first place.
3
Barton largely abandons his hearsay objection on appeal but insists that we may nonetheless uphold the
exclusion of the evidence for lack of foundation. D. 9 (Appellee Br. at 13). This too is incorrect. Schiefel laid a
foundation by establishing that Williams and Glenn were inmates in the same unit as Schiefel on March 24, 2021, and
that they could overhear the events in question. See R. 84 (Tr. Vol. 1 at 81–83, 94–98) (Page ID #509–11, 522–26);
Fed. R. Evid. 602 (“A witness may testify to a matter only if evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that
the witness has personal knowledge of the matter. Evidence to prove personal knowledge may consist of the witness’s
own testimony.”).
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must disregard all errors and defects that do not affect any party’s substantial rights.”); see also 28
U.S.C. § 2111 (“On the hearing of any appeal . . . the court shall give judgment after an
examination of the record without regard to errors or defects which do not affect the substantial
rights of the parties.”); Fed. R. Evid. 103(a) (“A party may claim error in a ruling to admit or
exclude evidence only if the error affects a substantial right of the party.”).
In civil cases, the burden of showing that one’s substantial rights were affected generally
lies with “the party that ‘seeks to have [the] judgment set aside because of [the] erroneous ruling.’”
Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409 (2009) (quoting Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 116
(1943)); see A.K. ex rel. Kocher v. Durham Sch. Servs., L.P., 969 F.3d 625, 630–31 (6th Cir. 2020)
(noting that in civil cases, appellants “must demonstrate that any errors affected their substantial
rights”). This burden is not “particularly onerous,” but requires the party seeking a new trial to (1)
“point to rulings by the trial judge that [they believe] are erroneous,” (2) “explain why the
erroneous ruling caused harm,” and (3) “marshal[] the facts and evidence” necessary to support
their claim “[i]f . . . the party seeking an affirmance makes a strong argument” that any error was
harmless. Shinseki, 556 U.S. at 410.
To prevail on his failure-to-protect claim, Schiefel had to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that Barton “kn[ew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk” to Schiefel’s safety. Zakora
v. Chrisman, 44 F.4th 452, 472 (6th Cir. 2022) (quoting Rhodes v. Michigan, 10 F.4th 665, 674–
75 (6th Cir. 2021)); see also R. 85 (Tr. Vol. 2 at 262) (Page ID #690) (instructing jury that Schiefel
must prove “the defendant was actually aware that the plaintiff was at risk of being serious[ly]
harmed”). Because of the district court’s hearsay rulings, Schiefel’s sole evidence on this point
was his own testimony that he told Barton about the prior fight, which the jury weighed against
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Barton’s and Dill’s assertions that the fight went unmentioned. The district court thus left Schiefel
without key corroborating evidence on a point that even Barton acknowledged lies at the center of
this case. See R. 85 (Tr. Vol. 2 at 244) (Page ID #672).
Nevertheless, there are “a number of grounds on which the exclusion of evidence in a jury
case may be found to be harmless error,” including where the evidence would have been “of little
or no value in determining the issues in the case,” where the “evidence is of a fact already
established by other evidence and thus may be regarded as cumulative,” and where any “error in
exclusion” was “made harmless by the instructions of the court” or “the jury’s answer to a special
verdict question.” 11 WRIGHT & MILLER’S FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2885 (3d ed.
1997). Because the district court is in the best position to assess the impact the excluded testimony
may have had on the jury’s verdict, we remand this case to the district court to consider whether
excluding the proffered witness testimony prejudiced Schiefel in the first instance. See Neder v.
United States, 527 U.S. 1, 25 (1999) (“Consistent with our normal practice where the court below
has not passed on the harmlessness of any error, we remand this case to the [court below] for it to
consider in the first instance whether the . . . error was harmless.” (internal citation omitted)); see
also Dimora v. United States, 973 F.3d 496, 506 (6th Cir. 2020).
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we VACATE the judgment of the district court and REMAND
for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
9