P. Hennessy and B. Girgenti v. East Rockhill Twp. ZHB
CourtCommonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
Docket693 C.D. 2025
JudgeCohn Jubelirer
StatusUnpublished
📰 News Coverage: Read the LAWS.com news report on this case
Full Opinion
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Paul Hennessy and Beverly Girgenti, :
Appellants :
:
v. : No. 693 C.D. 2025
: Submitted: October 13, 2026
East Rockhill Township Zoning :
Hearing Board, Lynn Builders, LLC, :
and East Rockhill Township :
BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge (P.)
HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY
PRESIDENT JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER FILED: November 16, 2026
Neighboring property owners Paul Hennessy and Beverly Girgenti
(Neighbors) appeal from the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County
(trial court) dated April 9, 2025 (Order), affirming the Zoning Hearing Board (ZHB)
of East Rockhill Township’s (Township) Decision (ZHB Decision), which granted
two variances to Roger and Patti Jones (Applicants). The variances offer relief from
Section 27-602(b) of the Township’s Zoning Ordinance (Ordinance),1 allowing
Lynn Builders, LLC (Lynn Builders), successor in interest to Applicants, to build a
single-family home on the property identified as Tax Map Parcel 12-011-033-005(B)
(Lot 5 or the Property). Upon careful review, we affirm.
1
EAST ROCKHILL TOWNSHIP ZONING ORDINANCE OF 1970, as amended, § 27-602(b)
(2024). The Ordinance is available at https://ecode360.com/9647638 (last visited November 13,
2026).
I. BACKGROUND
This appeal concerns the proposed development of a single-family home on
Lot 5 by Lynn Builders. (ZHB Decision,2 Findings of Fact (FOF) ¶ 9.) Lot 5 is a
heavily wooded lot approximately 0.861 acres in size and 125 feet in lot width,
located in the Rural Residential (RR) zoning district in the Township. (Id. ¶¶ 8, 18,
20.) The minimum required lot size for the RR zoning district is 1.8 acres, while the
minimum required lot width is 150 feet, making Lot 5 undersized. (Id. ¶¶ 19-20.)
Lot 5 was created in 1969, pursuant to a plan for a two-lot subdivision. (Id. ¶ 13.)
Lot 5 has never been improved with any buildings or structures. (Id. ¶¶ 13, 15.)
Immediately south of Lot 5 is Lot 2 (collectively, with Lot 5, sometimes referred to
as the Lots), which was created from this same 1969 two-lot subdivision. (Id. ¶ 14.)
A house, which has not been occupied since at least 2018 or 2019 is located on Lot 2.
(Id. ¶¶ 39, 42.)
With respect to ownership of Lots 2 and 5, Christabel R. Hudack owned Lot 5
at the time of its creation in 1969, while both Christabel R. Hudack and Robert E.
Hudack (the Hudacks) owned Lot 2. (Id. ¶¶ 13, 46-47.) The Hudacks conveyed Lot
2 to Tyler Gibson on January 12, 2006,3 while Mrs. Hudack, as sole owner, conveyed
Lot 5 to Tyler Gibson in 2006. (Id. ¶¶ 46-47; Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 247a,
295a; Trial Ct. Op. at 2-3 & n.1-2.) On January 17, 2007,4 Tyler Gibson conveyed
2
The ZHB’s Decision is found at pages 4a to 11a of the Reproduced Record.
3
As noted by the Trial Court’s Opinion, the ZHB Decision appears to have mistakenly
transposed the number of the date and the year when describing the first conveyances of Lots 2
and 5 as occurring on January 6, 2012. (FOF ¶¶ 46-47; Trial Ct. Op. at 2-3 & n.1-2.) The parties
appear to agree that these conveyances both occurred in 2006, as corrected by the Trial Court.
4
As noted by the Trial Court’s Opinion, the ZHB Decision mistakenly states the date of
this conveyance as January 7, 2017. (FOF ¶ 47; Trial Ct. Op. at 3 n.2.) The parties agree that the
date of this conveyance was January 17, 2007.
2
Lot 2 to Charles Gibson and Tyler Gibson.5 (FOF ¶ 47; Trial Ct. Op. at 3 n.2.) Tyler
Gibson conveyed Lot 5 to APS Trust on August 10, 2021, which remains the current
owner. (FOF ¶ 3; R.R. at 235a, 273a-75a.)
Applicants are under an agreement of sale to purchase Lot 5 from APS Trust,
contingent on approval of the zoning relief requested. (FOF ¶ 4; R.R. at 241a-49a.)
Applicants intend to construct a single-family detached dwelling on Lot 5, for which
they seek variances. Specifically, Applicants applied for the following three
variances from Section 27-602: (1) a variance for a minimum lot size of 0.86 acres
where 1.8 acres is required; (2) a variance for a minimum lot width of 125 feet where
150 feet is required; and (3) a minimum side yard setback of 12 feet where 30 feet
is required. (FOF ¶ 9; R.R. at 235a-38a, 264a.) Applicants alternatively applied for
a variance from Section 27-1702, to build a detached dwelling on a lot less than one
acre. (FOF ¶ 9.) The proposed dwelling would be approximately 2,348 square feet.
(Id. ¶ 23.)
The ZHB held public hearings on Applicants’ variance requests on February
20,6 April 10, and April 29, 2024. (R.R. at 31a-229a.) On the second hearing date,
Applicants presented Stephen Yates, licensed professional engineer and home
builder employed by Lynn Builders, and Applicant Roger Jones. (Id. at 65a; 79a-
80a.) Neighbors presented themselves as owners of the property adjacent to Lot 5,
as well as Luke Heverly, a neighbor who resides on the property adjacent to Lot 2.
(Id. at 156a; 162a.) In addition, the following neighboring or nearby property
5
Although Neighbors’ Brief states that Lot 2 is currently owned by Charles Gibson’s Trust
based on a September 2, 2020 deed, no such deed is in the record. Rather, the most recent evidence
of current ownership of Lot 2 is tax assessment documentation naming Tyler Gibson and Charles
Gibson as the current owners. (R.R. 293a.)
6
The parties presented no testimony on this first date, as the matter was continued so that
Applicants could appear with counsel. (FOF ¶ 1.)
3
owners (Objectors) testified concerning their objections: Robert Napor, Ronald
Smolen, Lori Fegley, Bevan Kohan, and Paul Hennessy.7 (R.R. at 174a; 180a; 204a;
211a; 213a; 221a.) Following the presentation of the above witnesses, the parties
reconvened on a third day so that Applicants could introduce an amended plan. (FOF
¶¶ 50-51.) The amended plan reduced the width of the proposed single-family
dwelling and relocated it so that it no longer protruded into a side yard setback. (Id.;
R.R. at 197a, 240a, 297a-98a.)
On May 14, 2024, the ZHB Decision granted Applicants’ requests for two
variances from Section 27-602 to: (1) allow for a minimum lot size of 0.86 acres
where 1.8 is required; and (2) allow for a minimum lot width of 125 feet where 150
is required. (ZHB Decision at 7.) The ZHB Decision also denied Applicants’
request for a variance from Section 27-602 to allow for a reduced side yard setback,
as Applicants’ amended plan alleviated the need for this relief. (Id.) Further, the
ZHB Decision imposed several conditions, including mandatory compliance with
the Township’s Stormwater Management Ordinance.8 (Id. at 7-8.) In reaching this
decision, the ZHB rejected Neighbors’ argument that the variances must be denied
because Lots 2 and 5 had merged under Section 27-1702. (ZHB Decision,
Conclusions of Law (COL) ¶ 5.) The ZHB concluded that the lots had not merged
because Lot 2 was not “vacant” within the meaning of this Section. (Id.) The ZHB
also concluded that the conditions and circumstances of Lot 5 posed a hardship for
Applicants that was not self-created, as Lot 5 was a “lawful pre-existing
7
The ZHB granted Objectors and Neighbors party status. (FOF ¶ 10.) Neighboring or
nearby property owners Maurie Heverly, Larry and Kimberly Marr, and David Cairns also had
party status but declined to testify. (Id.)
8
EAST ROCKHILL TOWNSHIP STORMWATER MANAGEMENT ORDINANCE, as amended,
§§ 26-301-26-358 (2022). The Stormwater Management Ordinance is available
https://ecode360.com/31220773#31220773 (last visited November 13, 2026).
4
nonconforming lot.” (Id. at ¶ 7.) The ZHB concluded that the revised plan presented
by Applicants supported that the requested variances afforded the minimum
necessary relief under the circumstances and that the variances would not alter the
essential character of the neighborhood. (Id. ¶¶ 8-9.) The ZHB likewise concluded
that Neighbors and Objectors offered only speculative concerns regarding potential
stormwater impacts and other harms, which did not warrant denial of the variances.
(Id. ¶¶ 10-11.)
Neighbors timely appealed the ZHB’s Decision to the trial court on June 13,
2024, and the Township and Lynn Builders intervened.9 (R.R. at 14a-19a, 311a-12a;
Original Record (O.R.) Item 5.) Following briefing, the trial court held oral
argument on March 28, 2025. (Id. at 388a-417a.) Without taking any additional
evidence, the trial court issued its Order, determining that the ZHB properly granted
the two variances because (1) Lots 2 and 5 have not merged under Section 27-1702,
where neither have been both vacant and held in joint ownership at the same time;
(2) Applicants’ hardship is not self-created; and (3) Applicants seek only the
minimum necessary relief. (Order at 5-7.) Accordingly, the trial court held that the
ZHB did not commit an error of law or abuse its discretion, and, therefore, affirmed
the ZHB Decision. (Id. at 7-8.) Neighbors filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
Order and a Motion for Post-Trial Relief, both of which were denied by the trial
court. (O.R. Items 27-28, 30.) Neighbors now appeal to this Court.10
9
Lynn Builders intervened as successor in interest to Applicants, in its capacity as equitable
owner of the Property.
10
“Where the trial court does not take additional evidence, we are limited to determining
whether the zoning hearing board committed an error of law or manifestly abused its discretion.”
Coal Gas Recovery, L.P., v. Franklin Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 944 A.2d 832, 837-38 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2008) (citation omitted). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the findings are not
supported by substantial evidence in the record.” Id. at 838 n.9 (citation omitted). “Substantial
5
II. PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS11
Neighbors contend that Section 27-1702(b) of the Ordinance resulted in the
merger of Lots 2 and 5, minimizing any area and dimensional nonconformity and
requiring that the ZHB deny the variances. (Neighbors’ Brief (Br.) at 7-12.) As a
result, Neighbors argue that the ZHB misinterpreted Section 27-1702(b) by not
concluding that Lots 2 and 5 merged. (Id.) Specifically, Neighbors argue that the
ZHB should have found that Lots 2 and 5 satisfied the requirements for merger under
the Ordinance because they were both vacant (at least as of 2016), contiguous, shared
common ownership, and Applicants never established a tangible boundary. (Id.) As
to vacancy, Neighbors assert that Lot 2 is vacant under Section 27-1702, as the house
on Lot 2 has been unoccupied and in disrepair since 2016. (Id.) Neighbors next
argue that the ZHB erred by not assigning Applicants the burden to rebut the
presumption that Lots 2 and 5 merged. (Id. at 12-14.) Further, Neighbors argue that
the ZHB erred by not concluding that any hardship to Applicants was self-created
and, therefore, did not meet the standard for granting a variance. (Id. at 14-18.)
Finally, Neighbors assert that the ZHB improperly granted variances that were more
expansive than the minimum relief necessary. (Id. at 18-20.)
Lynn Builders responds that Neighbors incorrectly assert that the lots merged
based on their misinterpretation of several phrases in Section 27-1702. (Lynn
Builders’ Br. at 3-11.) As to hardship, Lynn Builders argues mere knowledge of the
merger language in Section 27-1702 does not mean Applicants “self-created” any
hardship and that, in any event, the merger provision does not apply to Lots 2 and 5
evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Id. (citation omitted).
11
Neither the ZHB nor the Township present arguments in this appeal, as the ZHB filed a
notice of non-participation and the Township did not file a brief.
6
because the elements in the Ordinance are not met. (Id. at 11-13.) Last, Lynn
Builders argues that Neighbors’ arguments that Applicants have sought more than
the minimum relief necessary are unavailing, as Neighbors complain of the size or
square footage of the house, which is not the subject of the variances sought. (Id. at
13-15.) Rather, having withdrawn their request for a side yard setback, Applicants
seek only relief from lot area and lot width requirements, which relief is the
minimum necessary because they cannot otherwise change the size and width of Lot
5. (Id.)
III. DISCUSSION
A. Merger of Lots12
Before we reach the merits of Neighbors’ issues concerning merger, we begin
with a review of general merger principles.
i. General Merger Principles
“The term ‘merger’ as it is being used by these courts and in this context is
meant to describe the effect of a zoning ordinance on undersized lots held in common
ownership.” Township of Middletown v. Middletown Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 548
A.2d 1297, 1299 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1988). “In general, mere common ownership of
adjoining properties does not automatically result in a physical merger of the
properties for zoning purposes.” Cottone v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Polk Twp., 954
A.2d 1271, 1275 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008) (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted). “On
the other hand, adjoining properties under common ownership can merge when a
zoning ordinance provision causes one or more of the adjoining lots to become
undersized, depending on the facts and circumstances of each case.” Id. (citation
12
We have reordered Neighbors’ merger arguments for ease of review.
7
omitted). “The focus of the inquiry is upon (1) when the properties in question came
under common ownership and (2) the effective date of the applicable zoning
ordinance.” Id. at 1275.
“[A] merger of lots provision in the applicable ordinance is the starting point
in the analysis of whether merger has taken place.” Loughran v. Valley View Devs.,
Inc., 145 A.3d 815, 822 n.8 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (citation omitted). The “merger of
lots doctrine is only triggered where a local municipality has adopted a merger of
lots provision.” Id. at 821–22. “It is axiomatic that merger of lots shall not be
presumed merely because two adjoining lots come into common ownership; first and
foremost, merger of lots is a creature of local ordinance, not common law.” Id. at
822 (citing Tinicum Township v. Jones, 723 A.2d 1068, 1071 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998);
Township of Middletown, 548 A.2d at 1300).
“If a municipality has adopted a merger of lots provision, the next step is to
determine the effective date of the ordinance provision that has altered the area or
dimension of conforming lots, as the effective date generally controls which party
carries the evidentiary burden.” Id. at 822 n.8. In Cottone, this Court explained the
interplay between the effective date of an ordinance and the identity of the party that
carries the burden in merger cases:
[I]f two adjoining, but separately-owned, lots are rendered undersized
by a zoning ordinance enactment, the two properties will not be affected
by the ordinance. Each lot will continue to be a lawful, non-conforming
size for purposes of the zoning ordinance. If those two lots later come
under common ownership, the burden is upon the municipality to
prove that the new owner intended to use the two lots as one integrated
parcel. On the other hand, if the same two adjoining lots are under
common ownership when a zoning ordinance is passed that renders
each property undersized, then the two lots are presumed to have
merged. The burden is on the landowner to rebut the presumption.
8
954 A.2d at 1277 (emphasis added); see also Appeal of Gregor, 627 A.2d 308, 311
(Pa. Cmwlth. 1993) (“The burden is placed upon the party who asserts a physical
merger to establish the landowner’s intent to integrate the adjoining lots into one
large parcel.”). “The burdened party must then establish an overt, unequivocal
physical manifestation of the owner’s intent to integrate or to keep separate
commonly held adjoining lots.” Loughran, 145 A.3d at 822 n.8 (citations omitted).
ii. Burden of Proof
Neighbors argue that the ZHB misallocated Applicants’ burden of rebutting a
presumption of merger. We disagree.
We begin our analysis by examining the Ordinance for a merger provision, as
the adoption of such a provision is a necessary trigger for the merger of lots doctrine
to apply. Loughran, 145 A.3d at 822 n.8. In this case, the Township has adopted a
merger provision in Section 27-1702 of the Ordinance. Section 27-1702(a) of the
Ordinance sets forth an exception to Section 27-602(b)’s area and dimensional
requirement from which the ZHB granted variances, allowing for construction of a
detached dwelling on an undersized lot under certain conditions:
§ 27-1702. Exceptions to Minimum Lot Areas.
a. The provisions of Parts 4 through 15 shall not prevent the
construction of a detached dwelling on any lot that was lawful when
created and which, prior to the effective date of this chapter, was in
separate ownership duly recorded by plan or deed and provided that:
(1) Such lot is not less than one acre in the RR and
[Resource Protection] [(]RP[)] districts and not less than
80% of the minimum lot area in all other districts.
(2) Those lots not served by public water and sewers shall
meet all requirements of the Bucks County Department of
Health.
9
(3) The percentage of lot area covered by the detached
dwelling shall not exceed 15% of the area of the lot.
(4) The front and rear yards shall aggregate at least 60%
of the total lot depth or meet the normal requirements of
the district in which the lot is located, but in no case shall
either the front yard or the rear yard be less than 30 feet.
(5) The side yards shall aggregate at least 40% of the total
lot width or meet the normal requirements of the district in
which the lot is located, but in no case shall either side yard
be less than 12 feet.
Id. § 27-1702(a).
Section 27-1702(b) provides an exception to the exception set forth in Section
27-1702(a) above and constitutes the requisite merger provision, setting forth the
conditions where two lots would merge:
b. This exception shall not apply to any two or more vacant
contiguous lots in a single ownership as of or subsequent to the
effective date of this chapter. These lots shall be consolidated to
minimize the nonconformity.
Id. § 27-1702(b) (emphasis added).
Having established the existence of a merger provision under the Ordinance,
we must determine its effective date to resolve which party carries the evidentiary
burden. Loughran, 145 A.3d at 822 n.8. We find, as did the trial court, that the
effective date of the Ordinance (and to the extent relevant, Chapter 27) is 1987.
(Trial Ct. Op. at 13.) The parties agree that 1987 is the controlling effective date of
the Ordinance for purposes of our merger analysis. (Neighbors’ Br. at 5; Lynn
Builders’ Br. at 2.)
With the merger provision and its effective date in mind, we turn back to
Neighbors’ burden misallocation argument. Neighbors assert that the ZHB erred by
10
not finding that Lots 2 and 5 were presumed to merge and failing to place the burden
on Applicants to rebut this presumption, contrary to Neighbors’ interpretation of
Polish Hill Civic Association v. City of Pittsburgh Zoning Board of Adjustment, 285
A.3d 718 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2022). This argument misapprehends well-established case
law on merger and the facts of record in this case.
As set forth above, determination of whether a municipality or landowner
carries the evidentiary burden in merger cases depends on whether two adjoining
lots came under common ownership before or after the effective date of the zoning
ordinance. Cottone, 954 A.2d at 1277. We adopted this same burden framework in
Polish Hill, 285 A.3d at 725-26 (quoting Cottone, 954 A.2d at 1275-76). As in this
case, the objector in Polish Hill appealed a zoning board of adjustment’s grant of
requested variances. Id. at 720. This Court ultimately remanded to the trial court
with instructions to remand to the zoning board of adjustment to take further
evidence, if necessary, as the zoning board of adjustment had “failed to address
whether the lots were in common ownership prior to the adoption of the [zoning
c]ode’s minimum lot size requirement, or whether they came into common
ownership after that time.” Id. at 725 (footnote omitted).
Here, Neighbors cite Polish Hill for the proposition that the burden was on
Lynn Builders or Applicants to rebut the presumption that Lots 2 and 5 merged.
Counter to this proposition, however, Polish Hill establishes that the landowner’s
burden is only triggered where lots “are under common ownership prior to the
passage of the ordinance,” whereas the burden is on the municipality to show the
owner merged the lots where they were acquired by a “single owner” after the
passage of the ordinance. Id. at 726 (emphasis added). In this case, the ZHB made
findings, supported by substantial evidence in the record before it, concerning the
11
ownership of Lots 2 and 5 both prior to and after the passage of the Ordinance.
(FOF ¶¶ 13, 46-47; COL ¶ 5.) These findings establish that Lots 2 and 5 were not
in single ownership prior to the passage of the Ordinance, which the parties agree
was enacted in 1987. Consequently, the burden would have been on the municipality
(Township), or Neighbors, as the other party asserting a physical merger, to prove
that the new common/single owner has merged the Lots. Appeal of Gregor, 627
A.2d at 311. As will be discussed in more detail below, this burden was not met,
where Neighbors and the Township did not prove both Lots were “vacant” at any
point in time, let alone when the Lots were under single ownership or as of or
subsequent to 1987.
Neighbors do not offer support for their assertion that the Lots were in single
ownership prior to the Ordinance’s enactment, apart from a single citation to “RR2,
¶13.” (Neighbors’ Br. at 8.) To the extent “RR2” was meant to refer to the
Reproduced Record, page 2a of the Reproduced Record corresponds to this Court’s
Docket Sheet and contains no reference to ownership of the Lots. (R.R. at 2a.) If
Neighbors instead intended to refer to page 2, paragraph 13 of the ZHB Decision,
this paragraph merely states, “The Property is a vacant lot and was created in 1969
pursuant to a plan for a two (2) lot subdivision recorded at the Bucks County
Recorder of Deeds Office on June 20, 1969 at Plan Book 67 and Page 41 (See Exhibit
A-2).” (Id. at 5a (FOF ¶ 13).) That Lot 5 was created pursuant to a June 20, 1969
two-lot subdivision does not lend support for finding single ownership before the
Ordinance and ignores that the ZHB Decision later plainly finds that in 1969, Lots 2
and 5 did not have the same record owners. (FOF ¶¶ 46-47.) To any extent that
Neighbors assert that Lots 2 and 5 were each owned by the Hudacks upon
subdivision in 1969, this is contrary to the ZHB’s finding that Lot 5 was owned
12
solely by Christabel R. Hudack rather than both Hudacks on the date of
subdivision—a fact supported by a deed admitted at the hearing.13 (Id. ¶¶ 13, 46;
R.R. at 273a.) In sum, the ZHB walked through the history of ownership and
conveyances of Lots 2 and 5 both prior to and after the adoption of the Ordinance
and found separate ownership upon the creation of the Lots in 1969, and Neighbors
do not dispute that no other conveyances of the Lots occurred until 2006, after the
passage of the Ordinance. In light of the foregoing, the Lots were not in common
ownership before the adoption of the Ordinance in 1987. Accordingly, the
landowners’ evidentiary burden never triggered under Polish Hill, and Neighbors’
arguments concerning misallocation of the burden on Applicants and/or Lynn
Builders is without merit. 285 A.3d at 725-26.
Moreover, “merger of lots shall not be presumed merely because two
adjoining lots come into common ownership,” as “merger of lots is a creature of
local ordinance, not common law.” Loughran, 145 A.3d at 822 (citation omitted)
(emphasis added). In this case, even if the evidentiary burden fell on landowners
under these facts—which it did not—the conditions necessary to trigger the
Ordinance’s merger provision were not met. That is, for reasons that will be set forth
in more detail in the next section, the Lots were not both vacant during the period
the Lots were under single ownership, as required under Section 27-1702(b).
13
Insofar as Neighbors’ Statement of Questions Involved raises the issue that the trial court
erred by concluding that “single ownership could not include one or more joint owners or of a
different named trust or commercial entity,” (Neighbors’ Br. at 3), this issue was not developed in
the Brief and is, therefore, waived. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 985 A.2d 915, 924 (Pa. 2009)
(“[W]here an appellate brief fails to provide any discussion of a claim with citation to relevant
authority or fails to develop the issue in any other meaningful fashion capable of review, that claim
is waived.”). Even if sufficiently briefed, we agree with the trial court’s assessment that this issue
is waived for Neighbors’ having not developed the issue before the trial court. (Trial Ct. Op. at 15
n.7.)
13
Accordingly, no presumption of merger was triggered for Applicants or Lynn
Builders to have rebutted, even if the ZHB misallocated an evidentiary burden that
fell on landowners—which it did not.
iii. Merger under the Ordinance
Next, we consider Neighbors’ argument that the ZHB misinterpreted Section
27-1702(b) by not finding that Lots 2 and 5 merged because the Lots were vacant,
contiguous, and under single ownership as of the effective date of the Ordinance.14
We first examine whether the ZHB erred in its interpretation of “vacant” under
the Ordinance. As a threshold matter, for Lots 2 and 5 to have merged under Section
27-1702(b), they must have both been “vacant” for at least some period that the Lots
were in single ownership, as of or subsequent to 1987. While Neighbors argue that
a lot is vacant so long as it is unoccupied (even if improved by a dwelling), Lynn
Builders argues, consistent with the ZHB’s interpretation, that a lot is vacant only if
it is undeveloped. The ZHB ultimately found that the dwelling on Lot 2 has been in
existence since at least Lot 2’s creation in 1969; thus, Lot 2 cannot satisfy the
vacancy requirement for merger under Section 27-1702(b). (COL ¶ 5.) Upon
careful review, we agree.
“When interpreting a zoning ordinance, we apply the rules of statutory
construction, with the primary mission of determining legislative intent, which is
best indicated by the plain language of the statute.” City of Clairton v. Zoning
Hearing Bd. of City of Clairton, 246 A.3d 890, 909 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021) (citation
omitted). Section 1903(a) of the Statutory Construction Act of 1972 provides that
“[w]ords and phrases shall be construed . . . according to their common and approved
usage . . . .” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1903(a); City of Hope v. Sadsbury Twp. Zoning Hearing
14
The parties do not dispute that Lots 2 and 5 are contiguous.
14
Bd., 890 A.2d 1137, 1144 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006) (“When interpreting zoning
ordinances, this Court relies on the common usage of words and phrases and
construes language in a sensible manner.”). “Undefined terms are given their plain
meaning, and any doubt is resolved in favor of the landowner and the least restrictive
use of the land.” Caln Nether Co., L.P. v. Bd. of Sup’rs, Thornbury Twp., 840 A.2d
484, 491 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004). It is a well-settled principle that “ambiguities in an
ordinance must be interpreted in favor of the landowner.” Bethlehem Manor Vill.,
LLC v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of City of Bethlehem, 251 A.3d 448, 466 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2021); see also Riverfront Dev. Grp., LLC v. City of Harrisburg Zoning Hearing
Bd., 109 A.3d 358, 366 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015) (holding that a zoning hearing board
“has an obligation to construe the words of an ordinance as broadly as possible to
give the landowner the benefit of the least restrictive use when interpreting its own
[z]oning [c]ode”). It is a “well-settled principle that a zoning hearing board’s
interpretation of its own zoning ordinance is entitled to great weight and deference.”
City of Hope, 890 A.2d at 1143 (citation omitted). “Such deference is appropriate
because a zoning hearing board, as the entity charged with administering a zoning
ordinance, possesses knowledge and expertise in interpreting that ordinance.” Id.
Here, the word “vacant” is not defined in the Ordinance, nor is “vacant lot.”
In the absence of any definition of “vacant” or “vacant lot,” and in light of the
divergent interpretations proposed by the parties, we turn to the dictionary
definitions of “vacant” to determine the word’s plain meaning and how it is
interpreted in its common and approved usage. See THW Grp., LLC v. Zoning Bd.
of Adjustment, 86 A.3d 330, 336 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014) (citation omitted) (“[W]here a
court needs to define an undefined term, it may consult dictionary definitions for
guidance.”). Black’s Law Dictionary defines “vacant” in relevant part as follows:
15
1. Empty; unoccupied <a vacant office>. [] Courts have sometimes
distinguished vacant from unoccupied, holding that vacant means
completely empty while unoccupied means not routinely characterized
by the presence of human beings . . . .
2. Absolutely free, unclaimed, and unoccupied <vacant land>.
Vacant, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024) (emphasis added). In addition,
Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary defines “vacant” as “not put to use,” in the context
of “vacant land.” See “Vacant,” MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/vacant (last visited November 13, 2026) (emphasis added).
Merriam-Webster alternatively defines “vacant” as “not occupied by an incumbent,
possessor, or officer,” in the context of an office or throne, or as “being without
content or occupant,” in the context of a “vacant seat on a bus” or a “vacant room.”
Id. Turning back to the Ordinance, “lot” is defined as:
A parcel of land, used or set aside and available for use as the site of
one or more buildings and any buildings accessory thereto or for any
other purpose, in one ownership and not divided by a street, nor
including any land within the right-of-way of a public street upon which
said lot abuts, even if the ownership to such right-of-way is in the owner
of the lot. A lot, for the purpose of this chapter, may or may not
coincide with a lot record. A lot shall front on a public street.
ORDINANCE § 27-230(a) (emphasis added). Where the Ordinance specifically
defines a “lot” as referring to land, the definition defining “vacant” as “not put to
use” is most consistent with its common and approved usage.
As set forth above, the ZHB Decision contains findings that a dwelling is
currently located on Lot 2 and has existed there since Lot 2’s creation in 1969,
including upon the adoption of the Ordinance. (COL ¶ 5.) Lot 2, in other words,
has always been a parcel of land associated with some use—specifically, a detached
dwelling use permitted by right in the RR zoning district under Section 27-601(a).
16
See ORDINANCE § 27-601(a). This finding is supported by substantial evidence, as
Applicants introduced, and the ZHB admitted into the record, 2024 tax assessment
records confirming the existence of a residence on Lot 2, which was constructed in
1964. (R.R. at 294a.) In the absence of any language in the Ordinance defining
“vacant” as meaning unoccupied, and where the ZHB’s interpretation of “vacant” as
meaning undeveloped or not “put to use” is consistent with the common and
approved usage of the term in relation to land, we discern no error with the ZHB’s
conclusion that Lot 2 was always improved by a dwelling and, therefore, was never
vacant to trigger merger under Section 27-1702(b). Further, we discern no conflict
between the ZHB’s interpretation and the provisions of the Ordinance governing
interpretation of Chapter 27. See ORDINANCE § 27-103 (“In interpreting and
applying the provisions of this chapter, they shall be held to be the minimum
requirements for the promotion of the public health, safety, comfort, convenience
and general welfare.”).15
To hold otherwise would be to read the word “unoccupied” into the Ordinance
and sanction the absurd result that two contiguous lots (satisfying all other conditions
under the Ordinance) may inadvertently merge, simply because they are unoccupied
for even extremely short or temporary periods of time. For instance, an owner of
15
Even if we adopted Neighbors’ interpretation of the Ordinance and concluded that the
ZHB should have based its findings of vacancy on the dates of occupancy of the house on Lot 2,
we would find the ZHB’s error to be harmless and would affirm for the same reason the trial court
agreed with an “occupancy”-focused definition of “vacant” but rejected Neighbors’ theory of
merger. (Trial Ct. Op. at 14 & n. 6.) That is, even if we were to agree with Neighbors that vacancy
depends on “occupancy,” Lot 2 only became “vacant” in 2018 or 2019; therefore, merger would
still not trigger unless the Lots were also under single ownership at the same time as this non-
occupancy or vacancy. (Id.) As discussed at length herein, the Lots were only under single
ownership for an approximate one-year period from 2006-07, for which there is no evidence that
the Lots were vacant or unoccupied; thus, there is no support for finding merger under the
Ordinance even under Neighbors’ interpretation of “vacant.”
17
two contiguous lots who has constructed detached dwellings for purposes of renting
on both lots may face merger if there were a short window where tenant vacancies
overlapped, or an inheritor of two contiguous lots may be faced with merger if there
is any period of time the properties are both unoccupied as she transitions the lots
into her physical possession. These absurd results necessarily flow from the
interpretation advanced by Neighbors, and the ZHB did not err by rejecting this
construction. See In re Thompson, 896 A.2d 659, 669 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006) (“One of
the primary rules of statutory construction is that an ordinance must be construed, if
possible, to give effect to all of its provisions. An interpretation of an ordinance
which produces an absurd result is contrary to the rules of statutory construction.”).16
B. Self-Created Hardship
Next, we address Neighbors’ argument that Applicants improperly claimed a
hardship that was “self-created” by purchasing Lot 5 with “the intention of pursuing
non-permitted uses” while being “aware the merger doctrine will apply.”
(Neighbors’ Br. at 17.) “When seeking a dimensional variance within a permitted
use, the owner is asking only for a reasonable adjustment of the zoning regulations
in order to utilize the property in a manner consistent with the applicable
regulations.” Hertzberg v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of the City of Pittsburgh, 721
A.2d 43, 47 (Pa. 1998). In cases of dimensional variances, a relaxed standard for
establishing unnecessary hardship is applied. Id.
“An undersized lot constitutes the physical circumstances which may entitle
one to a variance provided the other variance criteria are met.” Riccio v. Newtown
16
Having concluded that the ZHB did not err in finding Section 27-1702(b) inapplicable
because Lots 2 and 5 were never vacant at the same time, we need not reach Neighbors’ allegations
concerning the timeline of single ownership of the Lots in order to uphold the ZHB’s Decision.
Notwithstanding, we examine the ZHB’s ownership findings in our assessment of Neighbors’
burden of proof arguments in the next Section.
18
Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 308 A.3d 928, 942 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2024) (citations
omitted). “Where a lot is too small to conform with the minimum lot area
requirements, and cannot be made to conform by merging lots or by re-subdividing
a larger tract, enforcement of the ordinance would sterilize the land, creating the
necessary hardship which will justify the granting of a variance.” Id. (alteration
omitted and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting West Goshen Township v.
Crater, 538 A.2d 952, 955 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1988)). This Court has repeatedly found in
circumstances where the lot size of a property is less than that required by an
ordinance, a lot is nonconforming and its undersized area creates a necessary
hardship, to the extent merger of lots is not found. Id. at 942-43; see, e.g., JMAC
Invs., LLC v. Lower Southampton Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 68
C.D. 2025, filed April 6, 2026), slip op. at 22 (citation omitted) (“The undersized lot
constitutes an unnecessary hardship because without a variance from the minimum
lot size and lot width requirements, [o]wner cannot develop the [p]roperty for a
residential use.”);17 N. Pugliese, Inc. v. Palmer Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 592 A.2d
118, 121 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1991) (“[I]t was error for the [b]oard to hold that a purchaser
of [an undersized lot] creates his own hardship when he buys with knowledge that
the lot is undersized.”).
Here, the ZHB found that “the undersized nature of the Property and the
undersized lot width” were hardships that existed and were not self-created, as Lot 5
is a pre-existing nonconforming lot. (COL ¶¶ 3, 7.) The record contains substantial
evidence, and the parties agree, that Lot 5 is undersized and a pre-existing
nonconforming lot. Because the nonconformity flows from Lot 5’s undersized area
17
This unreported decision is cited as persuasive authority pursuant to Rule 126(b) of the
Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, Pa.R.A.P 126(b), and Section 414(a) of this Court’s
Internal Operating Procedures, 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a).
19
and dimensions, and because Lot 5 does not merge with Lot 2 for the reasons set
forth above, Applicants are faced with the same or similar conditions as those
deemed to be necessary hardship in Riccio, N. Pugliese, Inc., and JMAC Invs. LLC,
and we disce