Full Opinion

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Ana Negron, : Petitioner : : No. 1029 C.D. 2025 v. : : Submitted: September 14, 2026 Unemployment Compensation Board of : Review, : Respondent : BEFORE: HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge OPINION NOT REPORTED MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE DUMAS FILED: October 26, 2026 Ana Negron (Claimant), proceeding pro se, has petitioned this Court to review the adjudication issued by the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Board) on June 23, 2025, which affirmed a Referee’s decision that the Claimant was ineligible for unemployment compensation (UC) benefits under section 402(e) of the UC Law relating to willful misconduct.1 Upon review, we affirm. 1 Section 402(e) of the UC Law, Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P.S. § 802(e) (stating that an employee is ineligible for compensation when his separation from employment is due to willful misconduct connected with his work). I. BACKGROUND2 Claimant was employed full time as a SWEEP Officer for the City of Allentown (Employer) from October 2007 to February 2025. During the course of his employment, Claimant signed an acknowledgment that he understood and was responsible for compliance with Employer’s workplace policies, which included a sexual harassment policy and a “fleet operations” policy that prohibits employees from idling their work vehicles longer than is necessary to safely operate those vehicles. Due to several prior incidents of insubordination, Employer issued Claimant a last chance agreement on February 23, 2024. Nevertheless, on November 15 and 20, 2024, Claimant made unwanted sexual comments to his supervisor, who reported the incidents to Employer. Thereafter, on December 12, 2024, Claimant left his work vehicle idling and became upset and obstinate when instructed to turn off the vehicle. On January 25, 2025, Employer placed Claimant on paid administrative leave while investigating Claimant’s conduct. On February 18, 2025, Claimant participated in a Loudermill3 hearing, and his last day of work was February 19, 2 Unless stated otherwise, we adopt this background from the Board’s decision and order, which adopted the Referee’s findings and conclusions. See Bd.’s Decision & Order, 06/27/25; see also Referee’s Decision, 05/16/25. We note further that the transcript of the hearing in this matter identifies Claimant as “Mr. Negron.” For example, [Claimant’s Rep.] Okay. Mr. Negron, did you make any sexual comment to Ms. Alkhal on or about November 15th if you recall? [Claimant] That conversation with Ms. Alkhal never happened. Hr’g Tr., 5/15/25, at 26 3 A Loudermill hearing is a pre-termination meeting given to public employees, affording them a constitutional right to respond to charges against them. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985). 2 2025. Employer terminated Claimant for violating Employer’s policies against sexual harassment and insubordination. Claimant filed for UC benefits, which the UC Service Center denied. Claimant appealed to a Referee, who held a hearing where Claimant and three witnesses for Employer testified, including Giselle Alkhal, Claimant’s supervisor and the subject of Claimant’s offending sexual comments, and Hiba Khouri, a human resources generalist and witness to Claimant’s sexual misconduct.4 The Referee affirmed, finding that Claimant had committed willful misconduct. Claimant timely appealed to the Board, which affirmed the Referee. Claimant then timely appealed to this Court. II. ISSUES Claimant raises two issues for review, which we have reordered and rephrased as follows. First, Claimant asserts that the Board violated his right to due process by relying on hearsay and denying him a fair opportunity to challenge the evidence against him. Claimant’s Br. at 4, 8. Second, Claimant contends that he did not commit willful misconduct. Id. at 4, 7-8. III. DISCUSSION5 A. Due Process Claimant asserts that the Board violated his right to due process. Id. at 8. According to Claimant, the Board permitted “unverified hearsay” testimony from Khouri yet failed to offer Claimant a full and fair opportunity to rebut Khouri’s 4 As noted, Claimant has proceeded pro se. Nevertheless, at the hearing, Claimant had the assistance of a non-legal representative, Spencer Cohn. See Hr’g Tr. at 1-2. 5 Our review of the Board’s decision is limited to “determining whether necessary findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence, whether errors of law were committed, or whether constitutional rights were violated.” Pierce-Boyce v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 289 A.3d 130, 135 n. 4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2022). 3 allegations that Claimant had committed sexual misconduct.6 Id. (citing Walker v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 367 A.2d 366 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1976)). Thus, Claimant concludes, the Court must reverse the Board’s decision or remand for a new hearing consistent with due process. Id. In administrative proceedings, due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard. 2 Pa.C.S. § 504-05; Goldata Comput. Servs., Inc., v. Dep’t of Banking & Sec., 350 A.3d 278, 308 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2025); Groch v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 472 A.2d 286, 287–88 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1984). This includes a claimant’s right to file a brief and request oral argument. McFadden v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev. 806 A.2d 955, 958 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002). Importantly, “[a] party’s due process rights include an opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses.” 2 Pa.C.S. § 505; Henderson v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 77 A.3d 699, 715 (Pa. 2013) (“Reasonable examination and cross-examination shall be permitted.”). Here, Claimant, accompanied by a non-legal representative, was afforded the opportunity to participate in an evidentiary hearing with a Referee. See generally Hr’g Tr. During this hearing, Claimant had ample opportunity to cross- examine each of Employer’s witnesses. See, e.g., Hr’g Tr. at 19-24 (cross- examining Alkhal), 25-26 (cross-examining Khouri). Following Employer’s presentation of evidence, Claimant presented testimony supporting his version of events. See Hr’g Tr. at 25-32. Finally, following the admission of evidence and the close of testimony, Claimant offered oral argument. See Hr’g Tr. at 37. 6 Claimant asserts that the Board relied on unverified hearsay. Claimant’s Br. at 8. Immediately thereafter, Claimant suggests the last-minute testimony from Khouri “exemplifies the procedural deficiencies in the hearing.” Id. (emphasis omitted). Thus, we infer that Claimant specifically challenges the admission of Khouri’s testimony. However, our analysis is equally applicable if Claimant intended to challenge Alkhal’s testimony as well. 4 Regarding Claimant’s hearsay argument, specifically, we note the following: “Hearsay means a statement that (1) the declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing; and (2) a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.” Pa.R.E. 801(c). Absent an exception, hearsay evidence is inadmissible. Pa.R.E. 802. Generally, “agencies shall not be bound by technical rules of evidence at agency hearings, and all relevant evidence of reasonably probative value may be received.” 2 Pa.C.S. § 505. Notwithstanding, the “Walker Rule” invoked by Claimant limits the admissibility of hearsay evidence in the following manner. Hearsay evidence, properly objected to, cannot support a finding in an administrative hearing. Walker, 367 A.2d at 370. If a party does not object to its admissibility, hearsay evidence may support a finding of the Board, provided it is corroborated by any competent evidence. Id.; Pierce-Boyce, 289 A.3d at 137. However, “[t]he Walker Rule need not be considered if evidence is admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule.” Tran v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 348 A.3d 371, 382 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2025) (citation omitted). Finally, the improper admission of evidence, including hearsay evidence, can implicate due process concerns. See Speight v. Dep’t of Corr., 989 A.2d 77, 80 n. 3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) (“The Walker Rule is not truly a rule of evidence but based on the principle that fundamental due process requires that no adjudication be based solely on hearsay evidence.”); Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev. v. Ceja, 427 A.2d 631, 645-47 (Pa. 1981) (Roberts, J., concurring) (cautioning against a fact- finder’s sole reliance on hearsay, as it “would deny claimants in administrative proceedings the due process protections regarding admissibility of hearsay evidence which are afforded civil litigants who proceed to trial”). 5 Khouri’s testimony constitutes hearsay. It includes a statement allegedly made by Claimant, out of court, to prove that Claimant made an offensive comment to Alkhal. See Hr’g Tr. at 24 (“I witnessed the Claimant make a statement about wrapping Gizelle like a present and putting her under the Christmas tree.”). Nevertheless, this testimony was admissible as an opposing party’s statement. Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 803(25)(A) provides that a statement “offered against an opposing party and . . . made by the party in an individual or representative capacity” is not excluded by the rule against hearsay. Pa.R.E. 803(25)(A). Here, Khouri’s testimony was offered against Claimant, and Claimant is the one who made the statement to which Khouri testified. Thus, we need not address the Walker Rule. See Tran, 348 A.3d at 382. For these reasons, we discern no violation of Claimant’s right to due process. See id.; Henderson, 77 A.3d at 715; McFadden, 806 A.2d at 958; Goldata Comp. Servs., Inc., 350 A.3d at 308. B. Willful Misconduct Next, Claimant challenges the Board’s decision that he committed willful misconduct. See Claimant’s Br. at 7-8. In support, he offers several arguments. Claimant specifically denies the allegations of sexual misconduct. Id. at 7. Further, in his view, the Board’s contrary finding must be rejected because there was no credible, competent evidence introduced by Employer. See id. (rejecting the testimony of Khouri and Alkhal as lacking credibility and reliability). Additionally, according to Claimant, Employer failed to introduce any evidence that 6 Claimant’s alleged conduct was intentional or deliberate. See id. at 7-8. Rather, Claimant maintains that he “consistently acted in good faith . . . .” Id. at 8.7 Essentially, Claimant’s first argument challenges the Board’s role as factfinder. Claimant maintains that the Board erroneously credited the testimony of Employer’s second witness, Khouri, because she is purportedly related to Claimant’s supervisor and her testimony was “unverified and potentially biased.” Claimant’s Br. at 5. This argument renews assertions made by Claimant at the hearing, where Claimant testified that the accusations against him were levied in retaliation because he had reported Alkhal for being high at work. Hr’g Tr. at 27. Claimant also argues that Alkhal and Khouri are related to one another and this interferes substantially with their ability to provide credible testimony.8 Id. at 28-29. “In UC cases, the Board is the ultimate factfinder and is empowered to resolve all issues of witness credibility, conflicting evidence, and evidentiary weight.” Pierce-Boyce, 289 A.3d at 136. Because the Board is the ultimate factfinder, its findings and credibility determinations are conclusive on appeal so long as they are supported by substantial evidence of record. Guthrie v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 738 A.2d 518, 521 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999). Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable person may accept as adequate to support a finding. Pierce-Boyce, 289 A.3d at 136. 7 It appears that these later arguments are directed to Claimant’s alleged violation of Employer’s fleet operations policy. See Claimant’s Br. at 7 (“[Claimant’s] actions, including any alleged [f]leet [o]peration issues, were neither deliberate nor malicious.”). These arguments are misplaced. To be clear, the Board did not deny Claimant benefits for his alleged violation of Employer’s fleet operations policy, but rather for making inappropriate sexual comments and for insubordination. Bd.’s Decision & Order at 1. We will consider his legal argument to the extent it is relevant. 8 Khouri testified that she is not related to Alkhal. Hr’g Tr. at 25. 7 Both witnesses for Employer provided the same account of Claimant’s sexual misconduct on November 20, 2024. Hr’g Tr. at 14 (“[Claimant] walked in and said Boss, I want to wrap you up and put you under the tree so I can open you up later.”); 24 (same). Additionally, Alkhal also testified to an incident that occurred on November 15, 2024, when Claimant told her, “I would like to take you [to a strip club] and break you in.” Id. at 13.9 In response to this testimony, Claimant specifically denied making any offensive remarks to Alkhal. See, e.g., Hr’g Tr. at 26 (“That conversation never happened. It never took place and such things didn’t come out of my mouth.”). Considering these disparate versions, the Board rejected Claimant’s version and credited the testimony from Employer’s witnesses. See Bd.’s Decision & Order, 06/27/25; see also Referee’s Decision, 05/16/25. Claimant requests this Court reweigh the testimony in his favor. We decline to do so, as substantial evidence supports the Board’s findings. Pierce- Boyce, 289 A.3d at 135-136. Next, Claimant argues that his behavior did not constitute willful misconduct. Claimant’s Br. at 7. The term “willful misconduct” is not defined by statute, but this court has defined it as “(1) an act of wanton and willful disregard of an employer’s interests; (2) a deliberate violation of rules; (3) a disregard of the 9 We include Alkhal’s complete response for context: The Claimant asked me to have -- I’m sorry. He asked me to have a Thanksgiving luncheon for the SWEEP office because he did not feel like he was included. So I had asked him if he’d like to accompany me to the Family Dollar to buy stuff for the party, and he did. We parked in front of Family Dollar and next door to it is Platinum Plus[, a strip club]. And that’s when he asked me if I [had] ever been there, and I said no. And he said it’s really fun. I go with my wife for our birthdays, and I would like to take you there and break you in. And I said I don’t like that type of conversations. I’ve never been to a strip club. I would not go to [] one. Please don’t ever talk about that. Hr’g Tr. at 13. 8 standards of behavior which an employer can rightfully expect from an employee; [] (4) negligence showing an intentional disregard of the employer’s interest; [or] (5) [] the employee’s duties and obligations.” Waverly Heights, Ltd. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 173 A.3d 1224, 1228 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017). The burden of proving willful misconduct rests with the employer. Adams v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 56 A.3d 76, 78-79 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012). Where an employer seeks to deny benefits based on a work-rule violation, the employer must prove the existence of a work rule, the reasonableness of the rule, that the employee was aware of the rule, and the employee’s violation of the rule. Waverly Heights, 173 A.3d at 1228. If the employer meets this burden, the burden of proof shifts to the employee to prove that he had good cause for his actions. Halloran v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 188 A.3d 592, 597 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018). Here, Claimant does not challenge the existence of a workplace rule against insubordination or sexual harassment, nor does he suggest such rules or policies would be unreasonable. Rather, Claimant asserts that Employer failed to provide evidence of any “intentional or deliberate” violation. Claimant’s Br. at 7-8 (citing Navickas v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 787 A.2d 284 (Pa. 2001)).10 In Navickas, a nurse was discharged because she improperly administered antibiotic medication to a patient. Navickas, 787 A.2d at 300-01. Although the patient was unharmed, the nurse’s mistake rendered the medication 10 Claimant also relies on holdings in Taylor v. UCBR and Borough of Coaldale v. UCBR. Claimant’s Br. at ii. Both of these cases involve voluntary termination and the Claimant’s responsibility to show a necessitous and compelling reason to do so in order to receive UC benefits. See generally Taylor v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 378 A.2d 829 (Pa. 1977); see also Borough of Coaldale v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 745 A.2d 728 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000). Neither case addresses issues relevant to Claimant’s argument. 9 less effective. Id. She applied for UC benefits but was denied based on a finding of willful misconduct. Id. at 301. On appeal, this Court agreed, reasoning that nurses are held to a “higher standard of care” than most other employees. Id. at 299-300. Upon further review, however, the Supreme Court reversed our holding, because the nurse’s actions were inadvertent and negligent but did not rise to a level of deliberateness amounting to willful misconduct. Id. at 307. The Navickas Court instructed that such “mere negligence” is insufficient because “our working definition of willful misconduct speaks only of negligence of such a magnitude as to indicate an intentional disregard of the employer’s interest or the employee’s duties. Id. at 306 (cleaned up). An employee’s negligence constitutes willful misconduct “only if it is of such a degree or recurrence as to manifest culpability, wrongful intent, or evil design, or show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer’s interest or of the employee’s duties and obligations to the employer.” Id. An employee’s failure to work up to his full, proven ability, especially after multiple warnings, must be construed as willful misconduct because such conduct demonstrates an intentional disregard of the employer’s interest or the employee's obligations and duties. Scott v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 36 A.3d 643, 648 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012). Here, Claimant was not terminated for a single act of insubordination. Rather, since his employment began in 2007, Claimant was disciplined for numerous acts of insubordination, resulting in a two-day suspension, a five-day suspension, and a “last chance agreement.” Hr’g Tr. at 33; Emp’r Exh. 3. In addition to evidence of Claimant’s progressive disciplinary record and the credited testimony of Employer’s witnesses, Employer provided a copy of its employee handbook, signed by Claimant, that included Employer’s strict policies regarding sexual harassment 10 and fleet operations. Emp’r Exh. at 7. Claimant confirmed he was aware of Employer’s sexual harassment policy and that his repeated acts of insubordination could result in termination.11 Hr’g Tr. at 32-33. Following the issuance of the last chance agreement, Claimant again violated Employer’s policies and became belligerent when asked to comply, resulting in his termination. Hr’g Tr. at 20 (“[Claimant] said that I was targeting him, and that I was out to get him.”). The Board resolved the evidence in favor of Employer. Employer provided substantial evidence that it maintained policies against sexual harassment and insubordination and that Claimant should have been aware of these rules. Further, Claimant clearly violated these policies, and Claimant’s wrongful intent may be inferred from his persistent violations of Employer’s policies after multiple warnings and a proven ability to perform his job. See Scott, 36 A.3d at 648; cf. Navickas, 787 A.2d at 306. Thus, Employer met its burden to prove Claimant committed willful misconduct. Waverly Heights, 173 A.3d at 1228. Thus, the burden shifted to Claimant to show good cause for his insubordination and sexual harassment. Halloran, 188 A.3d at 597. Claimant’s sole justification for violating the policy against idling his vehicle and refusing to shut it off was that the weather was cold that day and it was necessary to keep it idling. Hr’g Tr. at 30 (“[I]t was December 12th, which is very cold out . . . it was necessary for me to have it idling.”). Alkhal testified that Claimant did not provide this explanation to her when she asked him to shut off his vehicle. Hr’g Tr. at 15-16. Rather, he became agitated and refused to follow her directive. Hr’g Tr. at 20. Based 11 At the hearing, Claimant denied signing the employee handbook. Hr’g Tr. at 34 (“That’s not my signature. . . That’s not my name.”). Claimant does not raise the issue of his awareness of Employer’s rules on appeal. See generally Claimant’s Br. 11 on Employer’s testimony regarding Claimant’s response to Employer’s directive and repeated instances of rule violations, Claimant failed to meet his burden. Halloran, 188 A.3d at 597. Accordingly, the Board properly found that Claimant committed willful misconduct. Waverly Heights, 173 A.3d at 1228; Halloran, 188 A.3d at 597. IV. CONCLUSION Khouri’s testimony was properly admitted into evidence as an opposing party’s statement; therefore, Claimant’s reliance upon the Walker Rule is misplaced. Pa.R.E. 803(25)(A); Tran, 348 A.3d at 382. Additionally, Claimant was afforded all necessary elements of an administrative hearing required by due process. Henderson, 77 A.3d at 715. Further, based on substantial evidence, Employer met its burden to prove Claimant’s actions amounted to willful misconduct. Waverly Heights, 173 A.3d at 1228. Claimant did not provide good cause to justify his history of repeated insubordination and sexual harassment. Halloran, 188 A.3d at 597. Thus, we affirm the Board’s decision. LORI A. DUMAS, Judge 12 IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Ana Negron, : Petitioner : : No. 1029 C.D. 2025 v. : : Unemployment Compensation Board of : Review, : Respondent : ORDER AND NOW, this 26th day of October, 2026, the order issued by the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review on June 23, 2025, is AFFIRMED. LORI A. DUMAS, Judge