Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-4008-24 LANCE TRUSTY, Appellant, v. BOARD OF REVIEW, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT, and GMRI, INC., Respondents. _____________________________ Submitted September 30, 2026 – Decided October 22, 2026 Before Judges Mayer and Vinci. On appeal from the Board of Review, Division of Unemployment Insurance, Department of Labor and Workforce Development, Docket No. 369494. Lance Trusty, self-represented appellant. Jennifer Davenport, Attorney General, attorney for respondent Board of Review (Christopher Weber, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Courtney S. Babb, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). PER CURIAM Lance Trusty appeals from an August 7, 2024 final agency decision by respondent Board of Review (Board), Department of Labor and Workforce Development affirming a decision by the Appeal Tribunal that he is disqualified for unemployment benefits. We affirm. Trusty was employed as a part-time server by GMRI, Inc., t/a Bahama Breeze (Bahama Breeze), from July 14, 2022, through March 17, 2024. In March 2024, Trusty failed to report to work on several occasions. On March 7, he advised Bahama Breeze by text message that he missed work because he "ha[d] a lot on [his] plate with . . . other jobs." After Trusty failed to report to work on subsequent dates, Bahama Breeze gave him the option to resign voluntarily by "signing a letter of resignation" rather than face disciplinary action. On March 17, Trusty signed a letter stating he was "voluntarily resigning from the company" and his "last day of work [would] be March 17[], 2024." On March 31, 2024, Trusty filed a claim for unemployment benefits. On April 19, 2024, a Deputy with the Division of Unemployment Insurance (Deputy) determined Trusty was eligible for benefits because he "left [his] job voluntarily to accept other employment" and the "reason for leaving [was] not disqualifying since [his] new employment commenced within seven days of A-4008-24 2 [his] resignation and has weekly hours and/or pay not less than [his] prior employment." On April 21, 2024, Bahama Breeze filed an appeal from the Deputy's determination. On July 9, 2024, the Appeal Tribunal notified the parties that a telephonic hearing was scheduled for August 1, 2024. A representative of Bahama Breeze testified at the hearing. Trusty did not participate in the hearing. On August 7, 2024, the Appeal Tribunal reversed the Deputy's determination. Based on the testimony at the hearing, the Appeal Tribunal found Trusty "stopped showing up for work" and "advised [Bahama Breeze] via text message that he had a lot going on with his other jobs which [was] why he was missing days." The Appeal Tribunal determined Trusty's "reason for leaving work was personal and not attributable to the work" and he was "disqualified for benefits under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) as of March 17, 2024" because he "left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work." On August 21, 2024, Trusty appealed from the Appeal Tribunal's decision to the Board. On May 19, 2025, the Board sent Trusty a letter "not[ing] that [he] did not participate in the Appeal Tribunal hearing on August 1, 2024. " It requested he "[p]lease respond as to whether or not [he] received" notice of the hearing and, if so, provide "an explanation as to why [he] failed to register and A-4008-24 3 participate in the hearing." The Board also asked "if [he] would participate in another hearing in the event one [wa]s rescheduled." The Board advised Trusty if it did not "receive [a] response within seven . . . days, [it would] review [his] case on the information available." Trusty did not respond. On July 17, 2025, the Board issued its final decision affirming the Appeal Tribunal's decision. It found "there [was] no valid ground for a further hearing" because Trusty "was given the opportunity to participate in the Appeal Tribunal hearing and to respond to the Board . . . with the reason [he] did not participate" and did not show "good cause for failing to register [for the hearing] or request an adjournment." The Board affirmed the Appeal Tribunal's decision "[o]n the basis of the record below." This appeal followed. On appeal, Trusty argues the Board "erred in upholding disqualification" because he "was not provided a meaningful opportunity to be heard . . . consistent with due process." He contends the Board's May 19, 2025 letter "did not include the necessary information identifying where or how the requested response was to be submitted." Specifically, "the notice failed to include an address, electronic submission method, or other instructions sufficient to allow [him] to timely transmit a response." A-4008-24 4 We are not persuaded by Trusty's claim that he was denied due process. Procedural due process guarantees a party notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Rivera v. Bd. of Rev., 127 N.J. 578, 583 (1992). "[T]he nature of the notice required . . . depends on the actual context in which notice is being given." Id. at 588. Trusty's claim that the Board's May 19, 2025 letter did not include an address or other instructions for him to respond to the Board's letter lacks merit. The letter, which Trusty does not deny he received, prominently included the Board's Trenton post office box address in bold print at the top of the page. Trusty fails to offer any reason why he did not respond to the Board's letter by sending his response to the address provided. On appeal, Trusty did not raise any additional arguments regarding the merits of the Board's decision. Generally, we decline to consider arguments that are not properly raised. However, for completeness, we briefly address the Board's decision. A reviewing court will not reverse an agency decision unless it is "arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable or . . . not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole." In re Ambroise, 258 N.J. 180, 197 (2024) (omission in original) (quoting In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 A-4008-24 5 (2011)). We afford "[w]ide discretion . . . to administrative decisions because of an agency's specialized knowledge." In re Request to Modify Prison Sentences, 242 N.J. 357, 390 (2020). In determining whether an agency's decision is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, we examine: (1) whether the agency's decision conforms with relevant law; (2) whether the decision is supported by substantial credible evidence in the record; and (3) whether in applying the law to the facts, the "agency clearly erred in reaching [its] conclusion." Stallworth, 208 N.J. at 194 (quoting In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 482-83 (2007)). Having carefully reviewed the record and the Board's decision, we are satisfied the Board's factual findings are amply supported by credible evidence in the record and the Board properly applied those facts to the law. A representative of Bahama Breeze testified at the Appeal Tribunal hearing that Trusty left work voluntarily and that testimony was supported by Trusty's own text messages and the letter of resignation. Additionally, Trusty does not deny receiving the Appeal Tribunal's notice scheduling the telephonic hearing or the Board's May 19, 2025 letter, nor does he offer any explanation for his failure to participate in the Appeal Tribunal hearing. There is no basis for us to disturb A-4008-24 6 the Board's decision because it is supported by sufficient credible evidence on the record as a whole. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(D). Affirmed. A-4008-24 7