Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3965-24 DANIEL LUIS GOMES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LINDEN CITY MUNICIPALITY, Defendant-Respondent. __________________________ Submitted September 22, 2026 – Decided October 22, 2026 Before Judges Gooden Brown and Vanek. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Union County, Docket No. DC-003546-25. Daniel Luis Gomes, self-represented appellant. Jardim Meisner Salmon Sprague & Susser, PC, attorneys for respondent (Ahmed A. Metwally, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM Plaintiff Daniel Luis Gomes appeals from a June 30, 2025 Law Division order dismissing his complaint with prejudice following a bench trial. 1 Plaintiff's personal vehicle was towed for having a fictitious plate and being unregistered while parked on a public street. Plaintiff filed suit for damages against defendant City of Linden, and the trial judge found in favor of the City.2 Our careful review of the record and the applicable legal principles convinces us that the contentions raised on appeal lack merit and do not warrant extended discussion, R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E), except as noted herein. On February 21, 2025, plaintiff filed a civil complaint against the City in the Special Civil Part demanding "$20,000.00 plus costs, totaling $20,082.00, in the form of Gold or Silver coinage." In the complaint, plaintiff alleged the City "caused personal injuries in [the] form of monetary damages, emotional distress, unlawful and unwarranted seizure of property, [d]eprivation of [r]ights under [c]olor of [l]aw, and attempting to convert a [r]ight into a privilege by charging a fee and imposing a fine on a constitutionally protected activity. " 1 The bench trial also addressed a separate complaint plaintiff filed against the City of Linden under SC-000103-25. Plaintiff's appeal of the order dismissing that complaint was separately adjudicated under Gomes v. Linden City Municipality, A-3962-24. 2 Plaintiff sued "Linden City municipality." We reference the defendant as the City of Linden or the City throughout this opinion. A-3965-24 2 The proofs adduced at the ensuing June 30, 2025 bench trial showed that plaintiff's personal vehicle—a Honda CR-V—was parked on a public street on May 23, 2024. The license plate attached to the vehicle was not a Motor Vehicle Commission (MVC)-issued license plate. Instead, the plate read the word "Private," spelled out as "P-R-1-V-4-T-3" with writing under it stating, "DOT EXEMPT … FOR NON-COMMERCIAL USE ONLY." Officer Kacper Sitko, a Linden City Police Department patrol officer, testified he ran plaintiff's license plate through central dispatch across all fifty states, but the results were negative, meaning the vehicle's registration could not be found. He also testified that, to his knowledge, plaintiff's license plate was not one that was issued by the MVC. In fact, Sitko testified he attempted to "see if it was an official DMV plate" but he could only find it for "$30 on Amazon." As a result, Sitko ordered the vehicle towed and issued a citation under N.J.S.A. 39:3-4, requiring every resident and non-resident to register their automobiles and prohibiting the parking of vehicles on public streets without proper registration.3 Plaintiff testified: 3 Although Sitko testified he issued two citations, N.J.S.A. 39:3-3 and 39:3-4, he ordered the vehicle towed based on the latter violation. A-3965-24 3 I am a sovereign. I'm someone who is under the laws of nature, common law, law of the land and soil. I am a free man, living, and as far as my private property goes, the laws enable me to use my property as I deem fit without violating . . . anyone else's rights.[4] Regarding his license plate, plaintiff said: My car specifically has a plate, an identifying tag, that I have put on it myself, is specifically unregistered for the purposes of not diminishing my jurisdiction as a free man. It has come to my attention that registering anything with the State leaves the owner of that property subject to the rules, laws, regulations, codes of the State, in which I specifically avoided that by not registering. Plaintiff stressed under "[n]atural law," he was "under no obligation to register [his] private property." He then submitted to the judge a receipt showing he paid $562.53 to Gabe's Towing Company to retrieve his Honda. Following the trial, the judge rendered a comprehensive oral decision the same day. The judge found the facts were undisputed. The judge recounted plaintiff "admits . . . the vehicle was not registered," "did not have any type of government-issued license plate," and "was parked on a public roadway." The judge acknowledged "plaintiff takes the position that he is entitled to prevail 4 A sovereign citizen is one who takes the position that he or she is not subject to state or federal statutes and proceedings. State v. Tillery, 238 N.J. 293, 311 n.5 (2019) (citing United States v. Weast, 811 F.3d 743, 746 n.5 (5th Cir. 2016)). A-3965-24 4 because the laws of the state and the city ordinances don't apply to him." The judge explained plaintiff "declares himself a free man upon the land, and according to him, he's therefore unrestricted with regard to any type of governmental oversight of his activities with regard to motor vehicles or the public roadways." The judge noted despite plaintiff's claim that he was not subject to the laws of the city or the State, "[h]e is a licensed commercial truck driver." Assessing credibility, the judge found plaintiff's position negatively affected his credibility on a "fundamental and basic level." Conversely, according to the judge, Officer Sitko testified credibly in that he testified in a "logical and straightforward fashion," "answered the questions without evasion," and exhibited non-evasive "body language and mannerisms." Further, although he "could've answered the questions differently to advance [his] employer's interest," he did not do so. Based on the evidence presented, the judge found plaintiff's position to be "wholly and completely without merit." The judge determined "the operative elements that gave the police the authority to do what they did are not really in dispute " and, instead, found the issue "in dispute is the legal status of [plaintiff] existing among us." The judge concluded plaintiff's "position is without merit and cannot support a cause A-3965-24 5 [of] action against the defendant in either case." As a result, the judge dismissed the complaint with prejudice. On appeal, plaintiff argues the judge erred in dismissing his complaint because the police had no authority "to search and seize private property without a warrant" and he had "no notice or hearing" prior to the towing of his vehicle. Plaintiff asserts the judge made erroneous assumptions about plaintiff's "political and lawful status" and disregarded relevant case law supporting his claims. We reject plaintiff's contentions in their entirety. Our review of a "trial court's determinations, premised on the testimony of witnesses and written evidence at a bench trial," is deferential. Nelson v. Elizabeth Bd. of Educ., 466 N.J. Super. 325, 336 (App. Div. 2021) (quoting D'Agostino v. Maldonado, 216 N.J. 168, 182 (2013)). We do "not disturb the factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge unless convinced that those findings and conclusions were so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant, and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice." Whiteman v. Twp. Council of Berkeley Twp., 261 N.J. 106, 122 (2025) (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Northfield Med. Ctr., P.C., 228 N.J. 596, 619 (2017)). A-3965-24 6 We defer to the "trial court that heard the witnesses, sifted the competing evidence, and made reasoned conclusions." H.S.P. v. J.K., 223 N.J. 196, 215 (2015) (quoting Griepenburg v. Twp. of Ocean, 220 N.J. 239, 254 (2015)). However, "[t]o the extent that the trial court's decision constitutes a legal determination, we review it de novo." D'Agostino, 216 N.J. at 182 (citing Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)). We discern no error in the judge's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint at the conclusion of trial. N.J.S.A. 39:3-4 provides "every resident of this State and every nonresident whose automobile . . . shall be driven in this State shall, before using the vehicle on the public highways, register the same, and an automobile . . . shall not be driven unless so registered." A violation under the statute authorizes a police officer "to remove any unregistered vehicle from the public highway to a storage space or garage, and the expense involved in the removal and storing . . . shall be borne by the owner." Ibid. Relatedly, "[n]o person shall drive a motor vehicle the owner of which . . . displays a fictitious number, or a number other than that designated for the motor vehicle in its registration certificate." N.J.S.A. 39:3-33. A-3965-24 7 Sitko's investigation was prompted by the fictitious plate displayed on the vehicle. As Sitko testified, the license plate on plaintiff's car was not one issued by the MVC. In State v. Donis, our Supreme Court stated: [T]he Legislature has required the display of a license plate on both the front and rear of all cars registered in New Jersey. N.J.S.A. 39:3-33. The very purpose of that law is to identify the owner of a car should the need arise from his or her license plate. To fulfill that purpose, police officers randomly using [mobile data terminals] should have the right to determine from a motorist's license plate the status of the vehicle and the driving status of the registered owner, i.e., whether the car is registered, stolen, and whether the registered owner is licensed. [157 N.J. 44, 55 (1998).] Because plaintiff admits his car was unregistered and parked on a public street, Sitko was authorized to order the vehicle towed upon confirming the vehicle's registration status. Moreover, no New Jersey court has held that towing a vehicle without advance notice constitutes a violation of procedural due process. See Abernathy v. City of Pittsburgh, 795 Fed. Appx. 85, 87 (3d Cir. 2020) ("[B]ecause of the apparent necessity of quick action and the impracticality of providing a predeprivation process before towing [plaintiff's] vehicle, a predeprivation hearing was not required." (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); see also City of Los Angeles v. David, 538 U.S. 715, A-3965-24 8 719 (2003) (noting that a predeprivation hearing was impractical and not required prior to city's towing of vehicle). The U.S. Supreme Court has stated, "[t]he universal practice is to register ownership of automobiles and to license their drivers. Any appropriate means adopted by the states to insure competence and care on the part of its licensees and to protect others using the highway is consonant with due process." Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 660-61 (1971) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Here, because the towing was legally authorized, the judge's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint was supported by the evidence and the law. Equally unavailing is plaintiff's argument his vehicle is exempted from registration requirements because his vehicle fits within one of the statutory exceptions to the registration requirement. Specifically, plaintiff contends his vehicle is not used for "hire, pleasure or business" and therefore is exempted under N.J.S.A. 39:3-1, which exempts "[a]utomobile fire engines and such self- propelling vehicles as are used neither for the conveyance of persons for hire, pleasure or business, nor for the transportation of freights, such as steam road rollers and traction engines." Because plaintiff used his vehicle for pleasure, his vehicle was not exempt from the registration requirement under N.J.S.A. 39:3- 4. A-3965-24 9 The judge also correctly rejected plaintiff's claim that he was not required to follow local and state laws because he is "not a resident, nor a nonresident of the State of New Jersey, in their traditional meanings, but rather a domiciled inhabitant, who happens to be a lawful State Citizen." It is undisputed plaintiff is a citizen of the State of New Jersey and is therefore subject to its laws. Plaintiff holds a New Jersey driver's license and filed the complaint and subsequent appeal in the New Jersey state courts. As a result, the judge did not err in finding New Jersey laws apply to him. Likewise, we reject out of hand plaintiff's assertion his right to travel was violated. It is well-settled that government agencies have the authority to regulate motor vehicles and public highways and the right to travel does not prohibit states from enacting such regulations. See Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610, 622 (1915) ("In the absence of national legislation covering the subject, a state may rightfully prescribe uniform regulations necessary for public safety and order in respect to the operation upon its highways of all motor vehicles."). Affirmed. A-3965-24 10