Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3962-24 DANIEL LUIS GOMES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LINDEN CITY MUNICIPALITY, Defendant-Respondent. ____________________________ Submitted September 22, 2026 – Decided October 29, 2026 Before Judges Gooden Brown and Vanek. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Union County, Docket No. SC-000103-25. Daniel Luis Gomes, self-represented appellant. Jardim Meisner Salmon Sprague & Susser, PC, attorneys for respondent (Ahmed A. Metwally, of counsel and the brief). PER CURIAM Plaintiff Daniel Luis Gomes appeals from a June 30, 2025 order dismissing his complaint with prejudice following a bench trial. 1 After plaintiff parked a tractor trailer he drove in connection with his work on a public street overnight and it was towed, plaintiff filed a complaint for damages against the City of Linden2 in the Law Division, Special Civil Part, Small Claims Division. We affirm. I. We recount the facts material to our decision from the record of the June 30, 2025 bench trial. On September 18, 2023, plaintiff separated the eighteen - wheel-cab from a trailer that he utilized in connection with his work, parked the trailer on the street and drove the cab to his Linden home. After Patrol Officer Michael Mutz had been dispatched to investigate a trailer parked overnight on a street, he ordered plaintiff's trailer towed for violating Linden, N.J., Code § 7-16.1. When plaintiff went to retrieve the trailer the next morning, it was gone. Suspecting it may have been stolen, plaintiff called the Linden Police Department and was informed the trailer had been 1 The bench trial also addressed plaintiff's Special Civil Part complaint filed under UNN-DC-3546-25 (the DC action). Plaintiff's appeal of the order dismissing his DC action is pending under Gomes v. Linden, A-3965-24. This opinion addresses only the small claims complaint. 2 Plaintiff sued "Linden City Municipality." We reference the defendant as the City of Linden or the City throughout this opinion. A-3962-24 2 towed. Plaintiff traveled to the towing company's impound lot to have his trailer released. Through reviewing the police report, plaintiff discovered his trailer had been towed because "it was assumed to be abandoned." On February 14, 2025, plaintiff filed a complaint in the Law Division, Special Civil Part, Small Claims Division, demanding $5,042 in the form of "gold or silver coinage," as well as a formal letter of apology from Lieutenant Ivan Ordonez, signed and approved by Officer Mutz. Plaintiff sought reimbursement for a "king pin" lock valued at $36.71 which was allegedly attached to the trailer and destroyed during the tow. Plaintiff further sought reimbursement for the $659.94 he paid to obtain the return of the trailer. Plaintiff also alleged "hardship and emotional distress" damages totaling $4,345.35. Plaintiff testified at the June 30, 2025 trial that, about a year after his trailer was towed, he noticed an unhitched trailer similar to his parked on a City street and presented photographs he claimed supported his assertion. He claimed the other trailer bore a "notice given from the Linden Police Department informing whoever may have owned the trailer that they have a certain amount of time to remove the trailer before it would get towed." Plaintiff testified that A-3962-24 3 he returned two days later and noticed "the trailer had still not yet been towed, even though it was given a fair notice." Plaintiff testified he was "not given any kind of notice . . . nor [does he] see a reason for a trailer to be towed in the first place." For that reason, he is "challenging the jurisdiction of the Linden Municipality in that they do not own the roadways, they simply regulate it to make it regular, to make safe." Plaintiff asserted hardship and emotional damages in addition to the $659.94 paid to the tow yard and presented a $36.71 receipt for the broken "king pin" lock. On cross-examination, plaintiff stated he was not challenging the Linden code provision prohibiting trailers from being parked on the public streets between 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m., but instead asserted he was not under "the jurisdiction of the municipality" and the City's ordinances do not apply to him. Plaintiff testified that he is a "sovereign," "someone who is under the laws of nature, common law, law of the land and soil. [He] is a free man, living, and as far as [his] private property goes, the laws enable [him] to use [his] property as [he] deem[s] fit." The defense called Officer Mutz, who testified that when he observed the trailer parked on a public street in violation of Linden, N.J., Code § 7 -16.1, he contacted Gabe's Towing to have the trailer removed. Officer Mutz testified A-3962-24 4 that he had mistakenly inputted the incorrect code section when writing the summons related to plaintiff's trailer and inadvertently referenced the code section for an unhitched and abandoned trailer, rather than for a trailer parked without its towing vehicle. Officer Mutz testified that regardless of the code provision cited in the report, the trailer had to be towed under either ordinance. Officer Mutz clarified when a vehicle is deemed abandoned, the owner is given forty-eight-hours notice before towing, but in the case of an unhitched trailer, no prior notice is required. At the conclusion of trial, the judge rendered a comprehensive oral decision that same day. The judge found plaintiff admitted he separated the trailer from the cab and parked it on the street overnight in violation of a City ordinance prohibiting parking trailers without transportation on the roadway. The judge found the facts were undisputed and recognized that plaintiff's position that "the laws of the state and the city ordinances don't apply to him." The judge recounted that plaintiff declares himself "a free man upon the land, and according to him, he's therefore unrestricted with regard to any type of governmental oversight of his activities with regard to motor vehicles or the public roadways." The judge found plaintiff's position to be "wholly and A-3962-24 5 completely without merit." The judge found plaintiff's position affected his credibility on a "fundamental and basic level." Conversely, the judge found the police officers, including Officer Mutz, testified credibly as follows: They testified in a logical and straightforward fashion. They answered the questions without evasion. Their body language and mannerisms gave me every indication that they were being truthful and not evasive. They each could have answered the questions differently to advance their employer's interest, and they didn't do so. Based on the trial record, the judge found that "the operative elements that gave the police the authority to do what they did are not really in dispute" and, instead, found the issue "in dispute is the legal status of [plaintiff] existing among us. And his position is without merit and cannot support a cause of action against the defendant in either case." As a result, the judge dismissed both complaints with prejudice. Plaintiff argues on appeal that the trial court wrongly dismissed his small claims action because the City had no lawful basis to tow his trailer and applied the law unfairly to him. He further contends the police report was false as it described his trailer as abandoned, when it had been parked for less than twelve hours. Plaintiff requests a retrial with "a different judge and jury." A-3962-24 6 The City asserts the dismissal should be affirmed, as plaintiff admits the trailer was left overnight on a public street in violation of the ordinance. The City also asserts it has the authority to regulate its own roads and parking, and that plaintiff's claim that the law does not apply to him does not defeat its ability to tow noncompliant vehicles. II. Our review of a trial court's determinations, premised on the testimony of witnesses and written evidence at a bench trial, is deferential. Nelson v. Elizabeth Bd. of Educ., 466 N.J. Super. 325, 336 (App. Div. 2021) (quoting D'Agostino v. Maldonado, 216 N.J. 168, 182 (2013)). We do "not disturb the factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge unless convinced that those findings and conclusions were so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the consistent, relevant, and reasonably credible evidence so as to offend the interests of justice." Whiteman v. Twp. Council of Berkeley Twp., 261 N.J. 106, 122 (2025) (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Northfield Med. Ctr., P.C., 228 N.J. 596, 619 (2017)). We defer to the "trial court that heard the witnesses, sifted the competing evidence, and made reasoned conclusions.'" H.S.P. v. J.K., 223 N.J. 196, 215 (2015) (quoting Gripenburg v. Twp. of Ocean, 220 N.J. 239, 254 (2015)). A-3962-24 7 III. We discern no error in the judge's dismissal of plaintiff's small claims complaint at the conclusion of trial. Under Linden, N.J., Code § 7-16.1(a), "[n]o person shall park a truck tractor cab, trailer, pole trailer, recreational vehicle, camper or boat from 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. in or upon any street in the City of Linden." Linden, N.J. , Code § 7-16.1(b) also provides, "[n]o person shall park a trailer, pole trailer, camper or boat on any street, or part of any street, under any circumstances if it is unattached or not connected to a towing vehicle." The penalty for violation of those respective code provisions appears in § 7-3 as follows: Any vehicle parked in violation of this chapter shall be deemed a nuisance and a menace to the safe and proper regulation of traffic, and any Police Officer may provide for the removal of that vehicle. The owner shall bear the reasonable costs of removal and storage which may result from such removal before regaining possession of the vehicle. [Linden, N.J., Code § 7-3.] Because plaintiff admits he parked his truck tractor within the prohibited times and that he parked his trailer on a public street without its cab in violation of Linden, N.J., Code §§ 7-16.1(a) and (b), the tow was authorized. A-3962-24 8 Accordingly, there is no basis to award plaintiff damages as the result of the tow. Plaintiff does not assert "that he was legally parked at the time of the towing," but rather that "the laws do not apply to him." We are unpersuaded. The judge properly rejected plaintiff's argument that he is not required to follow local and state laws because he is "not a resident, nor a nonresident of the State of New Jersey, in their traditional meanings, but rather a domiciled inhabitant, who happens to be a lawful State Citizen." It is undisputed plaintiff is a citizen of the City of Linden and the State of New Jersey, and therefore, is subject to their laws. Plaintiff holds a New Jersey driver's license and filed the small claims complaint and subsequent appeal in the New Jersey state courts. As a result, the judge did not err in finding New Jersey laws and ordinances apply to plaintiff. We are also unconvinced the judge erred in rejecting plaintiff's claim that he is entitled to damages based on the failure to warn him before towing the trailer because he observed a similarly unhitched trailer a year later that was not towed but instead was issued a warning. The judge rejected plaintiff's testimony on this issue based on his finding that plaintiff lacked credibility as to the facts A-3962-24 9 related to his defense. We decline to disturb the judge's credibility determinations predicated on the trial record. We are equally unpersuaded that Officer Mutz's report mistakenly designating plaintiff's trailer as abandoned is a basis for relief. The judge found Officer Mutz to be credible, and, as a result, accepted his candid testimony that he made a mistake in writing the report and the trailer would have been towed in any event. For these reasons, we discern no reason to disturb the trial judge's findings, which are supported by the substantial, credible evidence in the record. IV. Plaintiff's final argument can be construed as an attack on the constitutionality of the City's ordinances. We decline to address plaintiff's constitutional arguments as not properly raised to the trial court. "Generally, an appellate court will not consider issues, even constitutional ones, which were not raised below." State v. Galicia, 210 N.J. 364, 383 (2012). We note only that it is well-settled that government agencies have the authority to regulate motor vehicles and public highways. See Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610, 622 (1915) ("In the absence of national legislation covering the subject, a state A-3962-24 10 may rightfully prescribe uniform regulations necessary for public safety and order in respect to the operation upon its highways of all motor vehicles."). To the extent we have not addressed any arguments raised by plaintiff, they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11- 3(e)(1)(E). Affirmed. A-3962-24 11