Full Opinion

Filed 11/17/26 Taylor v. Anderson CA1/3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE CECILY TAYLOR, Plaintiff, Cross-defendant, and Appellant, A173775 v. (Alameda County CHRISTIAN A. ANDERSON, Super. Ct. No. 23CV033664) Defendant and Respondent; GRAND MARINA, INC., Defendant, Cross-complainant, and Respondent. Plaintiff Cecily Taylor appeals from the trial court’s order granting Christian A. Anderson’s and Grand Marina, Inc.’s (collectively, defendants) separate motions for summary judgment. Taylor argues defendants failed to meet their burdens of proof and submitted an improper separate statement; she also contends that she adequately opposed their separate statements. We affirm. BACKGROUND Taylor filed the operative fourth amended complaint against Anderson and Grand Marina alleging conversion, breach of contract, trespass, and negligence. The complaint alleges she purchased a boat for business 1 purposes that she berthed at Grand Marina’s facilities. The complaint further asserts that, when Taylor failed to make certain lease payments, defendants prevented her from accessing the boat, removed personal property from the vessel without her knowledge or consent, impeded the operation of her business, and stole and damaged the boat. Grand Marina filed a cross-complaint against Taylor for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. It asserted the parties’ wharfage contract allowed either party to terminate the agreement, and Taylor engaged in multiple breaches of the agreement, including failing to pay wharfage fees, failing to provide proof of insurance, use of the vessel for overnight accommodations without permission, and loud disturbances involving police. Defendants moved for summary judgment on Taylor’s complaint. Grand Marina also moved for summary judgment as to the cross-complaint. They argued Taylor’s complaint arose out of the repossession of her vessel by a third-party mortgage holder, and defendants did not take the vessel, board the vessel, remove any items from the vessel, or otherwise assist in the repossession of the vessel. In support of their summary judgment motions, defendants filed memoranda of points and authorities, supporting declarations, separate statements of undisputed material facts, and a request for judicial notice. Taylor opposed the motions but failed to do so within the statutory time limits. In connection with defendants’ summary judgment motion as to her complaint, Taylor argued defendants failed to meet and confer in good faith, breached their contracts, and engaged in spoilation of evidence. As to the cross-complaint, Taylor asserted she had standing to sue and there were numerous fact disputes regarding the breach of contract claim. She filed a 2 supporting declaration and a separate statement. While the separate statement provided a list of alleged undisputed facts with supporting evidence, it did not dispute or otherwise address the facts set forth in defendants’ separate statements. The court continued the hearing on both motions “to permit [Taylor’s] resubmission of conforming opposition papers.” Specifically, the court noted Taylor’s separate statement was procedurally defective as it failed to respond to defendants’ separate statements. The court directed her to submit a separate statement that “unequivocally states whether the fact is disputed or undisputed,” identify the nature of the dispute, and provide supporting evidence. The court warned Taylor that her opposition must be supported by competent evidence, and a “declaration that merely recites legal conclusions does not present a triable issue of fact.” Taylor subsequently filed a new declaration and separate statement but did not provide supporting evidence for many of the facts she identified as disputed. The court granted both motions. The court preliminarily noted that Taylor’s opposition to the summary judgment motions remained defective for the following reasons: (1) she did not submit a memorandum of points and authorities with her amended filings; (2) she did not properly serve her pleadings; (3) she did not include an opposition to the motion brought by Grand Marina as cross-complainant; (4) her amended separate statement did not unequivocally state whether certain facts were disputed or not, asserted legal arguments rather than demonstrated fact disputes, the basis for the dispute was not identified, and evidence was not cited; and (5) Taylor’s amended declaration contained the same errors as her original declaration, such as containing impermissible legal argument, legal conclusions, and hearsay statements. The court concluded the undisputed facts demonstrated 3 Taylor, rather than defendants, breached the parties’ wharfage agreement. It also concluded Taylor lacked standing to allege her claims of conversion, trespass, and negligence because she did not oppose defendants’ standing arguments. The court subsequently entered judgment in favor of defendants on Taylor’s complaint and in favor of Grand Marina on its cross-complaint, and it dismissed the case. DISCUSSION On appeal, Taylor alleges the trial court made multiple errors in granting defendants’ summary judgment motions.1 Taylor has forfeited these arguments based on the significant deficiencies in her brief. While we recognize she appears in propria persona, self-represented litigants are to be treated like any other party and receive no greater consideration than litigants represented by attorneys. (ViaView, Inc. v. Retzlaff (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 198, 208.) I. Forfeiture Appellants have the burden to affirmatively demonstrate error, and we presume judgments are correct. (Claudio v. Regents of University of California (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 224, 230, 252 (Claudio).) Appellants must identify a triable issue by “supply[ing] the reviewing court with some cogent argument supported by legal analysis and citation to the record.” (WFG National Title Ins. Co. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 881, 894; Lonely Maiden Productions, LLC v. GoldenTree Asset Management, LP (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 368, 384 (Lonely Maiden) [“ ‘As a general rule, “[t]he 1 While the introduction to Taylor’s brief states she is challenging the court’s refusal to continue the summary judgment hearing, the brief does not contain any legal argument as to that issue. 4 reviewing court is not required to make an independent, unassisted study of the record in search of error or grounds to support the judgment.” ’ ”].) Specifically, California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C) requires that briefs support “any reference to a matter in the record by a citation to the volume and page number of the record where the matter appears.” “The purpose of this rule is to enable appellate justices and staff attorneys to locate relevant portions of the record expeditiously.” (Alki Partners, LP v. DB Fund Services, LLC (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 574, 589–590 (Alki Partners).) It is particularly relevant here as Taylor submitted a clerk’s transcript that is over 1,900 pages. Failing to support factual assertions with citations to the evidence forfeits the argument. (Lonely Maiden, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 384 [“ ‘If no citation “is furnished on a particular point, the court may treat it as waived.” ’ ”]; City of Lincoln v. Barringer (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1211, 1239 [arguments not supported by adequate citations to record need not be considered on appeal].) This rule applies to appellate challenges to orders granting summary judgment. (Alki Partners, supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at p. 590.) While we review rulings on motions for summary judgment de novo, such review “ ‘does not obligate us to cull the record for the benefit of the appellant in order to attempt to uncover the requisite triable issues.’ ” (Ibid.) With these procedural rules in mind, we conclude as explained below that Taylor’s arguments are so procedurally defective as to constitute a waiver of her appellate claims. II. Summary Judgment Taylor raises three arguments on appeal. First, she contends “a number of issues of material fact” would have been presented at trial, and states that her declaration “raised various points of disagreement.” However, 5 Taylor fails to provide a single citation to the record evidencing disputed facts. This lack of citation is fatal to her appeal. (Claudio, supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 230; Lonely Maiden, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 384.) Moreover, Taylor does not explain what those alleged disputes encompass, why they were not presented to the trial court, or how the trial court erred in concluding there were no material facts in dispute. Taylor has failed to carry her burden on appeal. Next, Taylor argues defendant Grand Marina’s separate statement(s) did not comply with Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (b).2 Again, she does not provide a record citation to support her argument. In any event, and for Taylor’s benefit, we note that our independent review of the record demonstrates that Grand Marina appears to have filed a proper separate statement. It provides a list of alleged “undisputed material facts” along with correlated “supporting evidence” for those facts. For example, the first fact in its separate statement related to its cross-complaint states Taylor executed a contract and addendum, and it cites the contract, a declaration, and Taylor’s answer to the cross-complaint as the supporting evidence. Likewise, the first fact in the separate statement related to Taylor’s complaint says Grand Marina operates a marina and cites a declaration as the supporting evidence. While Taylor cites various authorities stating that a court is entitled to strike noncompliant separate statements, she fails to explain with any specificity how these separate statements are noncompliant. And to the extent her contention is that the separate statements are not “concise” but “grossly excessive” because they address all causes of action, we 2 It is unclear whether Taylor is referring to the separate statement Grand Marina filed in connection with its cross-complaint, or the separate statement it filed as a defendant to Taylor’s action. Regardless, both appear compliant for the reasons discussed. 6 disagree. We find the scope and extent of defendants’ separate statements to be appropriate. Nor does Taylor provide record citations to which portions she claims are noncompliant. Thus, Taylor again fails to demonstrate error. (Claudio, supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 230; Lonely Maiden, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 384.) Finally, Taylor argues the trial court erroneously stated the two separate statements were unopposed. She asserts she filed her own separate statement, an opposition to the defendants’ separate statement, and a declaration opposing summary judgment. The court’s order granting summary judgment identified numerous deficiencies in Taylor’s opposition: namely, she did not file a memorandum of points and authorities, she failed to properly serve defendants, she did not submit any opposition to Grand Marina’s summary judgment papers as to its cross-complaint, and her separate statement did not state whether certain facts were disputed or undisputed, asserted legal arguments rather than demonstrated fact disputes, and failed to identify the basis for any dispute or cite evidence. Taylor does not explain why any of these findings by the trial court were erroneous. Nor does she cite any portions of the record to demonstrate error. Accordingly, for the same reasons discussed above, her argument fails. (Claudio, supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 230; Lonely Maiden, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 384.) DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. Defendants may recover their costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1), (2).) 7 PETROU, J. WE CONCUR: TUCHER, P. J. FUJISAKI, J. A173775 / Taylor v. Anderson 8