Taylor v. Anderson CA1/3
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 17, 2026
DocketA173775
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
Filed 11/17/26 Taylor v. Anderson CA1/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
CECILY TAYLOR,
Plaintiff, Cross-defendant, and
Appellant, A173775
v. (Alameda County
CHRISTIAN A. ANDERSON, Super. Ct. No. 23CV033664)
Defendant and Respondent;
GRAND MARINA, INC.,
Defendant, Cross-complainant,
and Respondent.
Plaintiff Cecily Taylor appeals from the trial court’s order granting
Christian A. Anderson’s and Grand Marina, Inc.’s (collectively, defendants)
separate motions for summary judgment. Taylor argues defendants failed to
meet their burdens of proof and submitted an improper separate statement;
she also contends that she adequately opposed their separate statements.
We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Taylor filed the operative fourth amended complaint against Anderson
and Grand Marina alleging conversion, breach of contract, trespass, and
negligence. The complaint alleges she purchased a boat for business
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purposes that she berthed at Grand Marina’s facilities. The complaint
further asserts that, when Taylor failed to make certain lease payments,
defendants prevented her from accessing the boat, removed personal property
from the vessel without her knowledge or consent, impeded the operation of
her business, and stole and damaged the boat.
Grand Marina filed a cross-complaint against Taylor for breach of
contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. It
asserted the parties’ wharfage contract allowed either party to terminate the
agreement, and Taylor engaged in multiple breaches of the agreement,
including failing to pay wharfage fees, failing to provide proof of insurance,
use of the vessel for overnight accommodations without permission, and loud
disturbances involving police.
Defendants moved for summary judgment on Taylor’s complaint.
Grand Marina also moved for summary judgment as to the cross-complaint.
They argued Taylor’s complaint arose out of the repossession of her vessel by
a third-party mortgage holder, and defendants did not take the vessel, board
the vessel, remove any items from the vessel, or otherwise assist in the
repossession of the vessel. In support of their summary judgment motions,
defendants filed memoranda of points and authorities, supporting
declarations, separate statements of undisputed material facts, and a request
for judicial notice.
Taylor opposed the motions but failed to do so within the statutory time
limits. In connection with defendants’ summary judgment motion as to her
complaint, Taylor argued defendants failed to meet and confer in good faith,
breached their contracts, and engaged in spoilation of evidence. As to the
cross-complaint, Taylor asserted she had standing to sue and there were
numerous fact disputes regarding the breach of contract claim. She filed a
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supporting declaration and a separate statement. While the separate
statement provided a list of alleged undisputed facts with supporting
evidence, it did not dispute or otherwise address the facts set forth in
defendants’ separate statements.
The court continued the hearing on both motions “to permit [Taylor’s]
resubmission of conforming opposition papers.” Specifically, the court noted
Taylor’s separate statement was procedurally defective as it failed to respond
to defendants’ separate statements. The court directed her to submit a
separate statement that “unequivocally states whether the fact is disputed or
undisputed,” identify the nature of the dispute, and provide supporting
evidence. The court warned Taylor that her opposition must be supported by
competent evidence, and a “declaration that merely recites legal conclusions
does not present a triable issue of fact.” Taylor subsequently filed a new
declaration and separate statement but did not provide supporting evidence
for many of the facts she identified as disputed.
The court granted both motions. The court preliminarily noted that
Taylor’s opposition to the summary judgment motions remained defective for
the following reasons: (1) she did not submit a memorandum of points and
authorities with her amended filings; (2) she did not properly serve her
pleadings; (3) she did not include an opposition to the motion brought by
Grand Marina as cross-complainant; (4) her amended separate statement did
not unequivocally state whether certain facts were disputed or not, asserted
legal arguments rather than demonstrated fact disputes, the basis for the
dispute was not identified, and evidence was not cited; and (5) Taylor’s
amended declaration contained the same errors as her original declaration,
such as containing impermissible legal argument, legal conclusions, and
hearsay statements. The court concluded the undisputed facts demonstrated
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Taylor, rather than defendants, breached the parties’ wharfage agreement.
It also concluded Taylor lacked standing to allege her claims of conversion,
trespass, and negligence because she did not oppose defendants’ standing
arguments.
The court subsequently entered judgment in favor of defendants on
Taylor’s complaint and in favor of Grand Marina on its cross-complaint, and
it dismissed the case.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Taylor alleges the trial court made multiple errors in
granting defendants’ summary judgment motions.1 Taylor has forfeited these
arguments based on the significant deficiencies in her brief. While we
recognize she appears in propria persona, self-represented litigants are to be
treated like any other party and receive no greater consideration than
litigants represented by attorneys. (ViaView, Inc. v. Retzlaff (2016) 1
Cal.App.5th 198, 208.)
I. Forfeiture
Appellants have the burden to affirmatively demonstrate error, and we
presume judgments are correct. (Claudio v. Regents of University of
California (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 224, 230, 252 (Claudio).) Appellants must
identify a triable issue by “supply[ing] the reviewing court with some cogent
argument supported by legal analysis and citation to the record.” (WFG
National Title Ins. Co. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 881,
894; Lonely Maiden Productions, LLC v. GoldenTree Asset Management, LP
(2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 368, 384 (Lonely Maiden) [“ ‘As a general rule, “[t]he
1 While the introduction to Taylor’s brief states she is challenging the
court’s refusal to continue the summary judgment hearing, the brief does not
contain any legal argument as to that issue.
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reviewing court is not required to make an independent, unassisted study of
the record in search of error or grounds to support the judgment.” ’ ”].)
Specifically, California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C) requires that
briefs support “any reference to a matter in the record by a citation to the
volume and page number of the record where the matter appears.” “The
purpose of this rule is to enable appellate justices and staff attorneys to
locate relevant portions of the record expeditiously.” (Alki Partners, LP v. DB
Fund Services, LLC (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 574, 589–590 (Alki Partners).) It is
particularly relevant here as Taylor submitted a clerk’s transcript that is
over 1,900 pages.
Failing to support factual assertions with citations to the evidence
forfeits the argument. (Lonely Maiden, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 384 [“ ‘If
no citation “is furnished on a particular point, the court may treat it as
waived.” ’ ”]; City of Lincoln v. Barringer (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1211, 1239
[arguments not supported by adequate citations to record need not be
considered on appeal].) This rule applies to appellate challenges to orders
granting summary judgment. (Alki Partners, supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at p. 590.)
While we review rulings on motions for summary judgment de novo, such
review “ ‘does not obligate us to cull the record for the benefit of the appellant
in order to attempt to uncover the requisite triable issues.’ ” (Ibid.)
With these procedural rules in mind, we conclude as explained below
that Taylor’s arguments are so procedurally defective as to constitute a
waiver of her appellate claims.
II. Summary Judgment
Taylor raises three arguments on appeal. First, she contends “a
number of issues of material fact” would have been presented at trial, and
states that her declaration “raised various points of disagreement.” However,
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Taylor fails to provide a single citation to the record evidencing disputed
facts. This lack of citation is fatal to her appeal. (Claudio, supra, 134
Cal.App.4th at p. 230; Lonely Maiden, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 384.)
Moreover, Taylor does not explain what those alleged disputes encompass,
why they were not presented to the trial court, or how the trial court erred in
concluding there were no material facts in dispute. Taylor has failed to carry
her burden on appeal.
Next, Taylor argues defendant Grand Marina’s separate statement(s)
did not comply with Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (b).2
Again, she does not provide a record citation to support her argument. In any
event, and for Taylor’s benefit, we note that our independent review of the
record demonstrates that Grand Marina appears to have filed a proper
separate statement. It provides a list of alleged “undisputed material facts”
along with correlated “supporting evidence” for those facts. For example, the
first fact in its separate statement related to its cross-complaint states Taylor
executed a contract and addendum, and it cites the contract, a declaration,
and Taylor’s answer to the cross-complaint as the supporting evidence.
Likewise, the first fact in the separate statement related to Taylor’s
complaint says Grand Marina operates a marina and cites a declaration as
the supporting evidence. While Taylor cites various authorities stating that a
court is entitled to strike noncompliant separate statements, she fails to
explain with any specificity how these separate statements are noncompliant.
And to the extent her contention is that the separate statements are not
“concise” but “grossly excessive” because they address all causes of action, we
2 It is unclear whether Taylor is referring to the separate statement
Grand Marina filed in connection with its cross-complaint, or the separate
statement it filed as a defendant to Taylor’s action. Regardless, both appear
compliant for the reasons discussed.
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disagree. We find the scope and extent of defendants’ separate statements to
be appropriate. Nor does Taylor provide record citations to which portions
she claims are noncompliant. Thus, Taylor again fails to demonstrate error.
(Claudio, supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 230; Lonely Maiden, supra, 201
Cal.App.4th at p. 384.)
Finally, Taylor argues the trial court erroneously stated the two
separate statements were unopposed. She asserts she filed her own separate
statement, an opposition to the defendants’ separate statement, and a
declaration opposing summary judgment.
The court’s order granting summary judgment identified numerous
deficiencies in Taylor’s opposition: namely, she did not file a memorandum of
points and authorities, she failed to properly serve defendants, she did not
submit any opposition to Grand Marina’s summary judgment papers as to its
cross-complaint, and her separate statement did not state whether certain
facts were disputed or undisputed, asserted legal arguments rather than
demonstrated fact disputes, and failed to identify the basis for any dispute or
cite evidence. Taylor does not explain why any of these findings by the trial
court were erroneous. Nor does she cite any portions of the record to
demonstrate error. Accordingly, for the same reasons discussed above, her
argument fails. (Claudio, supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 230; Lonely Maiden,
supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 384.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Defendants may recover their costs on
appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1), (2).)
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PETROU, J.
WE CONCUR:
TUCHER, P. J.
FUJISAKI, J.
A173775 / Taylor v. Anderson
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