Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION ONE ISAAC M. NSEJJERE, No. 89432-3-I Appellant, v. CARYN M. ANDERTON, UNPUBLISHED OPINION Respondent, DOES 1-25 inclusive, Defendants. BOWMAN, A.C.J. — Isaac Nsejjere appeals from the trial court’s order striking his CR 60(b) motion for failure to comply with vexatious litigant restrictions. We affirm the trial court’s order and award attorney fees and costs to Anderton under RAP 18.9(a). FACTS Nsejjere and Caryn Anderton had a brief romantic relationship. Nsejjere, who was in his 50s, also had a romantic relationship with 16-year old A.S.R., and they had two children together. Anderton ended the relationship with Nsejjere. According to Nsejjere, Anderton then told A.S.R. that his sexual contact with A.S.R. should be considered rape and told a mortgage loan officer that Nsejjere was a pedophile. Nsejjere sued Anderton for defamation. On July 2, 2024, the trial court dismissed the lawsuit with prejudice. Anderton asked the court to impose No. 89432-3-I/2 vexatious litigant restrictions against Nsejjere. She also asked the court to issue CR 11 sanctions based on Nsejjere’s history of filing dozens of pro se civil complaints since 2019 and engaging in bad faith discovery and litigation tactics throughout the current lawsuit. The trial court agreed. It barred Nsejjere from filing litigation against Anderton and her family, employers, associates, or friends without written approval of the Snohomish County Superior Court presiding judge. The court also ordered Nsejjere to pay $15,000 in sanctions. Division Two of our court affirmed.1 On December 8, 2025, Nsejjere moved under CR 60(b)(3) to set aside the order dismissing his defamation lawsuit against Anderton and “reopen” the case. Nsejjere attached a declaration from A.S.R., explaining that she met Nsejjere “for the first time when [she] was 20 years old,” that they “have a loving relationship,” and that they are raising two sons together. A.S.R. attached a copy of her permanent resident card and passport. Nsejjere argued that the “new evidence” showed that Anderton’s statements calling him a pedophile were not true. Nsejjere also moved under CR 15(a) to amend his defamation complaint to add Anderton’s lawyers as defendants, a request that they be disbarred, a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, a request for $13 million in damages, and a request that Anderton and her lawyers be prosecuted. The case was assigned to Judge George Appel, who heard oral argument on January 9, 2026. On January 15, Judge Appel issued an order denying Nsejjere’s motion to reopen his case. He noted that Nsejjere did not seek 1 Nsejjere v. Anderton, No. 60351-9-II, slip op. at 1-2 (Wash. Ct. App. July 8, 2025) (unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/60351-9.25.pdf. 2 No. 89432-3-I/3 permission from the Snohomish County Superior Court presiding judge before filing his motion and described the motion as “a bad faith attempt to reargue claims that have already been dismissed with prejudice and to assert new claims.” Judge Appel sanctioned Nsejjere $15,000 for engaging in bad faith litigation practices. After appearing before Judge Appel, Nsejjere asked permission from the Snohomish County Superior Court presiding judge to bring his CR 60(b) motion. The presiding judge refused to grant permission because Judge Appel had already ruled on the issue. The presiding judge also sanctioned Nsejjere $15,000 for continued bad faith litigation practices. On February 11, 2026, Nsejjere moved to clarify Judge Appel’s January 15 order. Nsejjere asked Judge Appel to issue an order explaining that the court struck Nsejjere’s CR 60(b) motion on procedural grounds only, that the court did not consider Nsejjere’s “new evidence,” and that Judge Appel did not rule on the CR 60(b) motion itself. Judge Appel declined to hear Nsejjere’ s motion for clarification because it was untimely.2 Still, Judge Appel amended his January 15 order nunc pro tunc. Judge Appel clarified that he struck Nsejjere’ s CR 60(b) motion because it did not comply with the vexatious litigant restrictions. But he also explained that had he not stricken the motion, he would have denied it as “utterly devoid of merit.” 2 Nsejjere complains that the motion was untimely only because Anderton’s attorneys engaged in “gamesmanship.” But Nsejjere fails to support his argument with citations to the record or legal analysis, so we decline to address that issue. See RAP 10.3(a)(6). 3 No. 89432-3-I/4 On March 18, 2026, a different judge entered a judgement against Nsejjere for $30,000, reflecting the total sanctions issued by Judge Appel and the presiding judge. Nsejjere appeals. ANALYSIS Nsejjere argues Judge Appel erred by striking his CR 60(b) motion. Anderton disagrees and asks for attorney fees and costs on appeal. We address each issue in turn. 1. CR 60(b) Motion Nsejjere argues Judge Appel erred by striking his CR 60(b) motion under the vexatious litigant order. We disagree. We review a trial court’s exercise of discretion for abuse of that discretion. State ex. rel. Carroll v. Junker, 79 Wn.2d 12, 26, 482 P.2d 775 (1971). A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision is manifestly unreasonable, based on untenable grounds, or is based on untenable reasons. In re Marriage of Persinger, 188 Wn. App. 606, 609, 355 P.3d 291 (2015). Every court of justice in Washington has the inherent power to control the conduct of litigants who impede the orderly conduct of proceedings. Yurtis v. Phipps, 143 Wn. App. 680, 693, 181 P.3d 849 (2008). In that regard, trial courts have the authority to enjoin a party from engaging in litigation if that party shows a “ ‘specific and detailed . . . pattern of abusive and frivolous litigation.’ ” Id. (quoting Whatcom County v. Kane, 31 Wn. App. 250, 253, 640 P.2d 1075 (1981)). Here, based on Nsejjere’s pattern of abusive and frivolous litigation, the trial court issued a vexatious litigant order restricting him from filing litigation 4 No. 89432-3-I/5 against Anderton and her family, employers, associates, or friends without written approval of the Snohomish County Superior Court presiding judge. And Division Two of our court upheld the order on appeal. Nonetheless, Nsejjere filed a motion to vacate the order dismissing his lawsuit against Anderton and “reopen” the case, asserting new causes of action, without first obtaining written approval of the Snohomish County Superior Court presiding judge. As a result, Judge Appel did not abuse his discretion by concluding that Nsejjere failed to follow the proper procedure to file his motion. Neither did the trial court err by concluding that Nsejjere’ s motion lacked merit. Under CR 60(b)(3), a party may seek relief from a final judgment if they discover new evidence that “by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under rule 59(b).” The moving party must show that the newly discovered evidence “(1) will probably change the result of the trial; (2) was discovered after trial; (3) could not have been discovered before trial; (4) is material; and (5) is not merely cumulative or impeaching.” Graves v. Dep’t of Game, 76 Wn. App. 705, 718-719, 887 P.2d 424 (1994). Nsejjere did not explain how a declaration from A.S.R. amounts to newly discovered evidence or why he could not have obtained it earlier. 2. Attorney Fees and Costs Anderton requests an award of attorney fees and costs under RAP 18.9(a) and 18.1. Under RAP 18.9(a), we may order a party who files a frivolous appeal “to pay terms or compensatory damages to any other party who has been harmed by the delay or the failure to comply or to pay sanctions to the court.” 5 No. 89432-3-I/6 Appropriate sanctions may include an award of attorney fees and costs to the opposing party. Yurtis, 143 Wn. App. at 696. “A frivolous action is one that cannot be supported by any rational argument on the law or facts.” Rhinehart v. Seattle Times, 59 Wn. App. 332, 340, 798 P.2d 1155 (1990). Because Nsejjere cannot support his assignments of error on appeal with any rational argument, we deem his appeal frivolous and award Anderton her attorney fees and costs under RAP 18.9(a) subject to compliance with RAP 18.1.3 We affirm the trial court’s order striking Nsejjere’s CR 60(b) motion and award Anderton attorney fees and costs on appeal. WE CONCUR: 3 Anderton asks us to issue a vexatious litigant order to restrict Nsejjere’s ability to appeal in the future. We decline to do so at this time. 6