Full Opinion

J-A19042-26 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 SALLAH ABDULLA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : SELINA INC., BUDO BUNUL, AND : No. 1049 EDA 2025 ELEBEH MOHAMED : Appeal from the Judgment Entered May 16, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at No(s): 211001723 BEFORE: OLSON, J., DUBOW, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.  MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED NOVEMBER 2, 2026 Sallah Abdulla appeals pro se from the judgment entered following a non-jury trial during which the court found in favor of the defendant-appellees, Selina Inc., Budo Bunul, and Elebeh Mohamed, 1 in the amount of $0.00. Abdulla argues reversal is required on grounds: (1) of judicial bias; (2) that the court erred in not recognizing the existence of a verbal lease between himself and Bunul; (3) that Abdulla proved he was illegally evicted by the defendant-appellees; and (4) that the coordinate jurisdiction rule is inapplicable to this case. We affirm. The trial court summarized the factual and procedural history of this ____________________________________________  Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 1“Mohamed” is alternatively spelled “Mohammed” elsewhere in the record. See, e.g., Trial Court Opinion, 1/12/26, at 1. J-A19042-26 matter, in relevant part, as follows: The core disagreement in this matter concerns the legality of Abdulla’s eviction from an Airbnb rental establishment and alleged past due rent. On October 21, 2021, Abdulla initiated a civil action in equity in the First Judicial District of Pennsylvania Civil Division by filing a pro se complaint against Bunul, Selina Inc., and Elebeh, which was docketed under October Term 2022 No. 01723. Abdulla’s complaint asserted that on October 8, 2021, the defendant- appellees had engaged in an illegal self-help eviction and unlawfully evicted Abdulla from a “rental” unit at 1528 N. Mascher St., Philadelphia, PA. Commensurate with his filing of the complaint, Abdulla filed an [“]emergency petition to reverse illegal eviction[”] seeking to restore his access and possession to the subject property. [Judge] Paula Patrick[2] . . . entered a rule and order scheduling a virtual hearing for October 28, 2021, and requiring Abdulla to effectuate personal service of the complaint and emergency motion and rule upon all defendant-appellees and to provide advance proof of service by October 25, 2021. Docket records reflected Abdulla’s unsuccessful and untimely service and proof of filing of that service. Upon reassignment, on October 26, 2021, [Judge] Joshua Roberts . . . entered a rule and order scheduling a virtual hearing for October 28, 2021[,] and requiring Abdulla to effectuate personal service of the complaint and emergency motion and rule upon all defendant-appellees and to provide advance proof of service by October 25, 2021. On November 1, 2021, and as modified on November 9, 202[1], [Judge] Roberts entered emergency injunctive orders granting Abdulla temporary restoration of access and possession of the subject property. Judge Roberts scheduled [a] further hearing upon Abdulla’s filing of a motion for contempt. ____________________________________________ 2 All judges referenced herein are judges on the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. -2- J-A19042-26 Thereafter, Steven Lynas, Esquire[,] entered [an appearance] as counsel on behalf of Selina Inc. and Elebeh in the civil action and filed preliminary objections to the complaint and a motion for reconsideration of Judge Roberts’ order dated November 1, 2021. Rachelle Waitz, Esquire[,] entered her appearance on behalf of Bunul, and filed a commensurate motion[] for reconsideration of [] Judge Roberts’ order and preliminary objections to the complaint. Additional responsive pleadings were filed by Abdulla. The respective motions for reconsideration were rescheduled for hearing on December 6, 2021. Thereafter, Judge Roberts vacated his respective orders of November 1, 2021[,] and November 9, 2021[,] and denied Abdulla’s previously requested forms of injunctive relief[, in effect expressly dissolving the then-existing preliminary injunction]. On January 4, 2022, in due course of the underlying civil action, [Judge] Jaqueline Allen sustained the preliminary objections of Selina Inc. and Elebeh to the complaint and directed Abdulla to timely file more specific pleadings. On January 18, 2022, [Judge] Charles Cunningham denied Abdulla’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. Abdulla filed an amended complaint on January 31, 202[2]. Following [a] settlement conference and case management conference, a corresponding scheduling order was entered. On February 14, 2022[, Judge] Ann Butchart sustained Bunul’s . . . preliminary objections to Abdulla’s complaint and directed Abdulla to file an amended complaint with more specific pleading[s] within twenty (20) days. On February 23, 2022, . . . Elebeh and Selina Inc. filed an answer with new matter to Abdulla’s complaint. Thereafter[,] Judge Butchart entered an order deeming Bunul’s preliminary objections to Abdulla’s complaint to be moot. Additional preliminary objections to Abdulla’s amended complaint were filed . . . [by] Bunul on March 7, 2022. Abdulla filed an answer. On April 25, 2022, [Judge] Mich[a]el Erdos entered an order overruling Bunul’s . . . preliminary objections on April 25, 2022. [Bunul then filed his] answer with new matter to Abdulla’s amended complaint on May 4, 2022. On May 13, 2022, Abdulla filed a miscellaneous motion to strike -3- J-A19042-26 the jury demand and on May 31, 2022, he filed preliminary objections. Because the motion to strike the jury demand appeared to be unopposed, [Judge] Denis Cohen granted the motion to strike and transferred the matter to non-jury trial expedited programs on June 7, 2022. On June 16, 2022, [Bunul filed an amended answer to the new matter,] which rendered Abdulla’s preliminary objections moot. Abdulla filed additional . . . preliminary objections . . . on July 5, 2022. Also, in July 2022[,] the underlying matter was listed for pre-trial conference and placed in the trial ready pool. . . . [After proceedings that are irrelevant to the present appeal, which necessitated placing the case into deferred status, the case ultimately proceeded to a non-jury trial on April 7, 2025]. Following oral argument, [the trial c]ourt[, Judge Anne Marie Coyle,] found in favor of defendant-appellees. On that same date, Abdulla filed a motion to reconsider Judge Roberts[’] December 7, 2021 order. On April 9, 2025, Abdulla filed a [“]motion to recuse[”] seeking [the trial c]ourt to vacate its April 7 findings and recuse itself from a future trial in this matter. Judge Robe[r]ts denied the motion and on April 15th, Abdulla filed a post[-]trial motion seeking [the trial c]ourt [to] vacate its April 7th order and to relist the matter before Judge Roberts. On April 16, Abdulla’s motion to disqualify [the trial c]ourt was denied. On April 24, a notice of appeal . . . was filed to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. [Thereafter, Abdulla filed] a 7-page [Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure] 1925(b) statement [cumulatively raising ten issues]. Trial Court Opinion, 1/12/26, at 1-12 (party names altered; unnecessary capitalization omitted). Preliminarily, we note that Abdulla’s brief violates our appellate rules in multiple ways. See generally Pa.R.A.P. 2111(a) (designating the necessary components of an appellate brief); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2117(b) (prohibiting the inclusion of argument within the statement of the case). Most importantly, however, although his “Questions Preserved” portion of his brief contains twelve “questions,” see Appellant’s Brief at 7-8, the argument section of his -4- J-A19042-26 brief only contains four headings. See id. at 14-20. Rule 2119(a) establishes that “[t]he argument shall be divided into as many parts as there are questions to be argued; and shall have at the head of each part--in distinctive type or in type distinctively displayed--the particular point treated therein, followed by such discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent.” Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). Although we recognize Abdulla’s status as a pro se litigant and are willing to liberally construe the materials he has filed, we also stress that, “pro se status confers no special benefit upon the appellant.” S.S. v. T.J., 212 A.3d 1026, 1032 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted). And, as a further point of emphasis, we caution that “any person choosing to represent himself in a legal proceeding must, to a reasonable extent, assume that his lack of expertise and legal training will be his undoing.” Id. (citation omitted). With all of that in mind, given the incongruency between his questions presented and the number of arguments contained in his argument section, we endeavor to interpret his claims as much as is practicable. Our disposition will be guided by Abdulla’s argument headings, which will be addressed in seriatim. As this case involves the appeal of a judgment entered following a non- jury trial, our standard of review is as follows: Our appellate role in cases arising from non-jury trial verdicts is to determine whether the findings of the trial court are supported by competent evidence and whether the trial court committed error in any application of the law. The findings of fact of the trial judge must be given the same weight and effect on appeal as the -5- J-A19042-26 verdict of a jury. We consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict winner. We will reverse the trial court only if its findings of fact are not supported by competent evidence in the record or if its findings are premised on an error of law. However, where the issue concerns a question of law, our scope of review is plenary. Bank of New York Mellon v. Bach, 159 A.3d 16, 19 (Pa. Super. 2017). First, Abdulla contends that Judge Coyle’s decision and judgment were motivated by bias, prejudice, and partiality. See Appellant’s Brief at 14. Abdulla asserts that she “declared her personal bias and prejudice towards the merits of the case in broad daylight.” Id. Although he highlights a specific portion of the trial transcript in which he alleges bias from the court, see id. quoting Non-Jury Trial, 4/7/25, at 7, review of the transcript confirms that he did not make a contemporaneous objection to the court’s statement he now challenges. Furthermore, Abdulla’s brief does not establish where and how he has preserved his averment of bias or, alternatively, when he sought recusal. See, e.g., Pa.R.A.P. 2119(e); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2117(c); Reily v. SEPTA, 489 A.2d 1291, 1300 (Pa. 1985) (“Once the trial is completed with the entry of a verdict, a party[, who failed to make a timely, specific objection at trial as to recusal,] is deemed to have waived his right to have a judge disqualified, and if he has waived that issue, he cannot be heard to complain following an unfavorable result.”). Accordingly, Abdulla’s claim is unreviewable and warrants no relief. See Thorson v. EDDW, LLC, 309 A.3d 141, 148 (Pa. Super. 2024) (stating to preserve an issue for appeal, a litigant must make a timely, specific objection at trial); see also Pa.R.Civ.P. 227.1(b)(1), Note (“[I]f no objection is made, error which could have been corrected . . . during -6- J-A19042-26 trial by timely objection may not constitute a ground for post-trial relief.”). In his second claim, Abdulla argues that there was a legitimate verbal lease establishing a landlord-tenant relationship between himself and Bunul, but that the court did not recognize its existence. Abdulla avers that he “had lived in the subject property for a year and 4 months and had been paying monthly rent to Bunul by electronic checks.” Appellant’s Brief at 15. Abdulla exclusively cites to Pennsylvania’s Landlord and Tenant Act of 1951 for a definition of tenant (and the Philadelphia’s Code’s adoption of similar language), which, therein, expressly contemplates the existence of oral lease agreements. See id. At the end of trial, the court concluded that Abdulla and Bunul were operating under an “Airbnb-type agreement” with one another, with Abdulla as an apparent licensee of the property, rather than pursuant to an oral lease, which would have, instead, manifested a landlord-tenant relationship: [Abdulla’s] interactions with Mr. Bunul were under the guise of an Airbnb; albeit not perfectly done in accordance with the rules, but both of you entered into that type of arrangement. Both of you are responsible for the fact that that arrangement did not work out well. And neither one of you come in here with clean hands so I’m not providing relief to either one of you for that reason. You knew full well, Mr. Abdulla, that the arrangement that you were entering into was a short-term type of Airbnb type of reservation. That’s all over the place. You did it with him in reference to other folks and/or yourself and other properties. And it was all well and good until you stopped paying. Then you started looking for a way out, that way out. I understand that perfectly. -7- J-A19042-26 Mr. Bunul should have sought proper authorization from the city and county of Philadelphia throughout the application that would support his continued Airbnb type of business there. But that’s what you agreed to and what Mr. Bunul agreed to. Paid into Airbnb part of the time. You also contradicted yourself on several occasions when I looked at the prior notes of testimony and your testimony today. And neither of you come in here with clean hands so you are not entitled to a penny. Non-Jury Trial, 4/7/25, at 130. “It is well settled that in the case of a disputed oral contract, what was said and done by the parties as well as what was intended by what was said and done by them are questions of fact[.]” Solomon v. Luria, 246 A.2d 435, 438 (Pa. Super. 1968). Those questions of fact are exclusively within the providence of the factfinder, which was, here, Judge Coyle. Judge Coyle found that, based on the actions of the parties, Abdulla and Bunul entered into what she construed as an atypical Airbnb guest agreement. Conversely, she concluded that a lessor-lessee relationship did not exist. Abdulla is correct insofar as there is some evidence of him having directly paid Bunul on occasion. See, e.g., Non-Jury Trial, 4/7/25, at 18. Nevertheless, he fails to demonstrate that those payments are dispositive of the court’s implicit conclusion that he was simply a temporary licensee, rather than a tenant, of the property at the moment he was removed therefrom, which was largely based on the testimony that it received and credibility -8- J-A19042-26 determinations made thereon.3 Nevertheless, Abdulla, himself, admitted that he also had been making payments on Airbnb’s platform. See id. at 85 (“In November, [Abdulla] was paying Airbnb platform because [Bunul] told [Abdulla that Bunul was] operating Airbnb and [Abdulla] didn’t have any problem. Instead of paying [Bunul] electronic checks, [Abdullla] was paying through the link, the Airbnb link.”). Although the court determined that Abdulla and Bunul coalesced around “an Airbnb relationship,” to challenge this finding, Abdulla has merely provided unintelligible innuendo about the existence of a verbal lease in response. See Appellant’s Brief at 16 (stating “According [to] the [L]andlord and [T]enant [A]ct of 1951, [a] verbal lease is good[,] and even if there is evidence that the landlord or his/her agent has accepted rent, that will suffice to establish [a] landlord and tenant relationship. Obviously[,] this not one of the cases where [a] verbal lease may be deemed not good.”). Without any clear showing that the court committed an error of law, Abdulla’s second issue is, as such, meritless. In his third issue, similar to his second, Abdulla maintains that the court erred in finding that he failed to credibly demonstrate that he was a tenant and was illegally evicted. Abdulla argues, without authority or record citation, 4 ____________________________________________ 3 Abdulla does not distinguish, or provide any authority that expounds upon, the distinct legal concepts of tenant and licensee or meaningfully refute the court’s conclusion that he fell into the latter category. 4As we have made clear, this Court will not act as counsel and “shall not develop an argument for an appellant, nor shall we scour the record to find (Footnote Continued Next Page) -9- J-A19042-26 that the subject property was not zoned for Airbnb, and accordingly, he was “not a guest or short-term renter because such zoning is legally enforceable[.]” Id. at 17; see also id. at 18 (“Therefore those payments that [Abdulla] made to . . . Bunul cannot be deemed anything but rent regardless of his unreliable contention that he did not enter into any verbal contract with me.”). Abdulla then asks a series of rhetorical questions as to whether he was either a civil or criminal trespasser and the alleged legal permutations of either scenario. See id. at 17. Even assuming Abdulla’s contention as to the property’s zoning status to be true, Abdulla provides nothing to show that the operation of an purportedly illegal Airbnb property necessarily renders the then-inhabitant of a property a tenant rather than a licensee. Without any basis to show that improper zoning status “transforms” an otherwise guest-based Airbnb relationship, the finding of which was expressly made by Judge Coyle, into one that is bound by more-stringent landlord-tenant laws, Abdulla has not evidenced any misapplication of the law. Therefore, his third claim, predicated on undeveloped assertions, necessarily fails. Cf. Lackner v. Glosser, 892 A.2d 21, 29 (Pa. Super. 2006) (“[A]rguments which are not properly developed are waived”) (citation omitted). In his final issue, Abdulla asserts that Judge Coyle erroneously relied on ____________________________________________ evidence to support an argument[.]” Milby v. Pote, 189 A.3d 1065, 1079 (Pa. Super. 2018). - 10 - J-A19042-26 what is known as the coordinate jurisdiction rule, because “there was a change in fact and law that could have enabled [Judge Coyle] to reconsider Judge Roberts[’] rulings[.]” Id. at 20. In essence, Abdulla seeks that Judge Coyle reimpose the preliminary injunction that was dissolved by Judge Roberts, years prior to Judge Coyle’s involvement in the case, because the defendant- appellees have allegedly lied at various junctures. Our Court has defined the coordinate jurisdiction rule as follows: Generally, the coordinate jurisdiction rule commands that upon transfer of a matter between trial judges of coordinate jurisdiction, a transferee trial judge may not alter resolution of a legal question previously decided by a transferor trial judge. In other words, judges of coordinate jurisdiction should not overrule each other’s decisions. In addition to promoting the goal of judicial economy, the coordinate jurisdiction rule serves (1) to protect the settled expectations of the parties; (2) to insure uniformity of decisions; (3) to maintain consistency during the course of a single case; (4) to effectuate the proper and streamlined administration of justice; and (5) to bring litigation to an end. The coordinate jurisdiction rule applies unless there has been a change in the law; a change in the facts; or a conclusion that the initial ruling was clearly erroneous, and that following it would create a manifest injustice. While a ruling issued at a different stage of the proceedings may give rise to one of the limited exceptions to the coordinate jurisdiction rule — for example, a change in the facts — it is the demonstration of the exceptional circumstance, not the distinct procedural posture, which renders the coordinate jurisdiction rule inapplicable. Brader v. Allegheny Health Network, 349 A.3d 210, 217-18 (Pa. Super. 2025) (citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted). Instantly, the court found that there was no exception applicable to the coordinate jurisdiction rule, thus believing herself to be correct in not - 11 - J-A19042-26 reversing Judge Roberts’ order dissolving his initial grant of a preliminary injunction. See Trial Court Opinion, 1/12/26, at 13. However, we have held that, regarding application of the coordinate jurisdiction rule, “[i]n contrast to a permanent injunction, a decision regarding a preliminary injunction is not binding for purposes of a final adjudication.” Buck Hill Falls Co. v. Clifford Press, 791 A.2d 392, 397 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citation omitted). Therefore, contrary to Judge Coyle’s finding, it was possible for the court to reach a different conclusion than any of the decisions previously reached in the preliminary injunction phase of the proceedings. Nevertheless, after our own review, we reiterate that it was Judge Roberts, himself, who dissolved his own preliminary injunction. We further emphasize that Judge Roberts initially granted that preliminary injunction prior to any response filed by the defendant-appellees. After hearing from the defendant-appellees, both in written form and via a hearing, Judge Roberts dissolved the preliminary injunction.5 Furthermore, important to our decision, although he contends that there have been “changes of facts” that have occurred throughout the life of this case, providing an exception to the coordinate jurisdiction rule and allowing Judge Coyle to reinstate the preliminary injunction, we note that Judge Coyle ____________________________________________ 5 Abdulla does not discuss the relevance of Judge Roberts’ decision to dissolve his own preliminary objection. - 12 - J-A19042-26 found that Abdulla, himself, was not credible. See Trial Court Opinion, 1/12/26, at 14 (“At the April 7 hearing, [] Abdulla was not credible.”). Therefore, it is unclear what “changes of facts” he is, in fact, relying upon in support of his claim. In the end, though, despite stressing the inapplicability of the coordinate jurisdiction rule and asserting that defendant-appellees lied to both Judge Roberts prior to him dissolving the preliminary injunction and before Judge Coyle at the non-jury trial, Abdulla has simply not supplied any cognizable basis for this Court to reverse Judge Coyle’s order. 6 Thus, Abdulla is due no relief. As none of the four issues raised in his brief have merit, we affirm the judgment in favor of the defendant-appellees and against Abdulla in the amount of $0.00. Judgment affirmed. Date: 11/2/2026 ____________________________________________ 6 We may affirm on any basis supported by the record. Cf. Lynn v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 70 A.3d 814, 823 (Pa. Super. 2013) (reiterating that an appellate court may affirm a trial court’s ruling on any basis supported by the record on appeal). Here, Abdulla has failed to prove that an error of law led to the court reaching an erroneous conclusion. - 13 -