Todd v. Rocket Mortgage CA4/2

Filed 11/9/26 Todd v. Rocket Mortgage CA4/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO FELISA TODD, Plaintiff and Appellant, E085261 v. (Super.Ct.No. CIVSB2218736) ROCKET MORTGAGE, LLC, OPINION Defendant and Respondent. APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Thomas S. Garza, Judge. Affirmed. Felisa Todd, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant. Messner Reeves and Heather E. Stern for Defendant and Respondent. INTRODUCTION Plaintiff and appellant Felicia Todd sued her sister and brother-in-law for fraud and elder abuse, alleging among other things, that they fraudulently induced her to take out a mortgage loan on her home. Her complaint asserted a single cause of action for 1 quiet title against the beneficiary of the deed of trust securing the mortgage loan, defendant and respondent Rocket Mortgage, LLC (Rocket). Rocket demurred to Todd’s operative third amended complaint, and the trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. We affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Todd, who was represented by counsel in the trial court but represents herself on appeal, initiated this lawsuit in October 2022. The operative complaint, Todd’s third amended complaint (the TAC), asserted elder abuse and fraud-related causes of action against her sister, Aida Pahl, Aida’s husband (Todd’s brother-in-law), and Aida’s son (Todd’s nephew) (collectively, the Pahls). According to the TAC’s allegations, Todd’s husband (Mr. Todd) left her a significant inheritance when he passed in May 2016. During their marriage, Mr. Todd handled all of the finances. In July 2016, Todd purchased a property located at 58134 Spring Drive in Yucca Valley (the Property) “free and clear of any liens or encumbrances … using the funds she received through life insurance proceeds following her husband’s death.” Todd used the Property as her primary residence and allowed the Pahls to live there with her. In May 2017, Todd sold the home that she had lived in with Mr. Todd, which was located in Antioch. At “some point” following Mr. Todd’s death (the TAC does not provide an approximate date), the Pahls “took [Todd] to see an attorney regarding the assets.” Todd agreed to the meeting because she trusted the Pahls to act in her best interest. At the meeting, Todd signed “ ‘a paper,’ ” but she “did not know what type of document it was.” 2  Over the next few years, the Pahls stole funds from Todd’s bank and retirement accounts. The TAC alleged that Todd did not learn of the Pahls’ fraudulent conduct until “around May of 2020”; however, other allegations in the TAC suggest that she knew or should have known of the conduct earlier. For example, the TAC alleged that the March 2017 statement for Todd’s individual retirement account showed that over $360,000 had been withdrawn from the account, and that the December 2018 statement showed an account balance of zero. Elsewhere in the TAC, Todd alleged that in April 2019 she traveled to the Philippines and thereafter stayed with her brother in Long Beach “because she was upset and shocked by the actions of the Pahls and did not want to live at the Property with them.” As relevant here, the TAC asserted a single claim against Rocket for quiet title. Todd alleged that in July 2018, the Pahls fraudulently induced her to take a mortgage loan out on the Property for approximately $194,000. Rocket was the beneficiary under the deed of trust securing the mortgage loan. Todd admitted that she signed the deed of trust, but alleged that, had she known what the document was, she would not have done so. Todd also admitted that, by April 2020, “no further regular payments were made from [her] accounts toward the loan.” In May 2022, Rocket initiated foreclosure proceedings against the property. The TAC alleged that although Todd sent Rocket a police report containing her allegations against the Pahls, Rocket did not take “any steps to assist [her] in regards to the identity theft.” Todd’s quiet title cause of action against Rocket sought to void the deed of trust and stop the foreclosure sale of the Property. 3  Because the appellate record contains only the TAC, the first amended complaint, Todd’s requests for entry of default against the Pahls, and the judgment of dismissal, we glean the rest of our procedural summary from the register of actions. According to the register of actions, after the trial court sustained Rocket’s demurrer to the second amended complaint with leave to amend, Rocket filed a demurrer to the TAC, which Todd opposed. On August 26, 2024, the trial court held a hearing on Rocket’s demurrer, at which a court reporter was present. Thereafter, the trial court both issued a ruling, and entered an order, sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend. On September 30, 2024, the trial court entered a judgment of dismissal in favor of Rocket. On December 19, 2024, the trial court entered an amended judgment in favor of Rocket, adding costs of $1,255.09 to the judgment of dismissal. The register of actions reflects that Rocket filed a memorandum of costs in October 2024 and that Todd did not move to tax the costs. Todd filed a notice of appeal from the notice of entry of judgment. DISCUSSION In her opening brief, Todd argues that “[t]he trial court granted summary judgment and excluded key evidence that [her] prior counsel failed to present” and that, as a result, she “seeks reversal, admission of her excluded evidence, and a remand for a proper adjudication of her fraud claims.” As an initial matter, the trial court did not grant a motion for summary judgment, but rather it sustained Rocket’s demurrer to Todd’s quiet title claim as alleged in the TAC without leave to amend. A demurrer tests whether a pleading states a cause of action as a 4 matter of law. (Mendoza v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 802, 809.) Although our review is de novo, we presume that an appealed order or judgment is correct, and the appellant bears the burden of establishing reversible error. (Demara v. The Raymond Corp. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 545, 552; Mendoza, at p. 809.) To carry that burden, “an appellant must supply the reviewing court with some cogent argument supported by legal analysis and citation to the record” (City of Santa Maria v. Adam (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 266, 286-287), as well as “an adequate record to assess error” (Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1295; see generally Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.120, 8.204(a)(1)(B) & (C)). We may treat an issue as forfeited when the appellant fails to support their argument with the necessary citations to the record, legal argument, or citation to authority. (In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 814, 830; Duarte v. Chino Community Hospital (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 849, 856.) These rules apply to represented and self-represented appellants equally. (Ballard v. Uribe (1986) 41 Cal.3d 564, 574; Huang v. Hanks (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 179, 183 & fn. 1.) Todd’s appeal lacks merit because she fails to carry her burden on appeal. Todd failed to provide the documents necessary for us to review the trial court’s decision to sustain Rocket’s demurrer without leave to amend. The appellate record does not contain any of the briefing on the demurrer, the transcript of the hearing on the demurrer, or the trial court’s ruling or order sustaining the demurrer. Without those documents, we do not know the arguments Rocket made to the trial court or the court’s reasons for concluding that Todd failed to state a cause of action for quiet title. Because we presume a judgment is correct and it is Todd’s obligation to demonstrate error, this failure alone requires us to 5 affirm. (E.g. Hernandez v. California Hospital Medical Center (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 498, 502 [“Failure to provide an adequate record on an issue requires that the issue be resolved against plaintiff.”].) In addition, however, Todd also failed to support the factual assertions in her brief with citations to the record. We struck her opening brief twice for, among other defects, the failure to support the facts contained in her briefs with citations to the volume and page number in the record where they could be found. Although her new opening brief contains a handful of citations to the clerk’s transcript, those citations appear to be irrelevant to the appealed judgment. The factual assertions that are relevant to her claims of error on appeal are not supported by record cites. “ ‘The appellate court is not required to search the record on its own seeking error.’ [Citation.] Thus, ‘[i]f a party fails to support an argument with the necessary citations to the record, … the argument [will be] deemed to have been waived.’ ” (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246.) Todd also failed to support her claims of error with cognizable legal arguments, which is a ground for treating them as forfeited. (E.g., Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784-785 [“When an appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as waived.”].) But, even if Todd had provided an adequate record for review and supported her factual and legal assertions with proper citations, we would nevertheless conclude that her claims lacked merit. Todd argues that the trial court erred by excluding evidence demonstrating that she was fraudulently induced by the Pahls to sign the deed of trust. 6 But the purpose of a demurrer is to test the legal sufficiency of a claim at the pleading stage; it is not to test whether the claim has sufficient factual support. Thus, when ruling on a demurrer, the trial court does not consider evidence but rather treats the plaintiff’s allegations as true and determines whether those allegations state a cause of action. (E.g., California Commerce Casino, Inc. v. Schwarzenegger (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1406, 1419 [A demurrer “ ‘ “ ‘admit[s] all material facts properly pleaded,’ ” ’ ” and the only evidence the court may consider is “ ‘ “ ‘matters which may be judicially noticed.’ ” ’ ”].) Thus, the trial court could not have erred by refusing to consider evidence of the Pahls’ fraudulent conduct at the demurrer stage.1 Moreover, as Rocket points out on appeal, evidence of the Pahls’ fraudulent conduct would have been irrelevant to Todd’s quiet title claim in any event because fraudulent inducement by a third party is not a ground to void a mortgage loan as to a bona fide encumbrancer for value, like Rocket. (See, e.g., Fallon v. Triangle Management Servs., Inc. (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 1103, 1106 [“A deed obtained by fraud, though voidable, is generally not void” as to “bona fide encumbrancers for value without notice.”].) 1 Because any evidence Todd may have of fraudulent inducement by the Pahls is irrelevant to Rocket’s demurrer, we deny Todd’s “Motion to Take Additional Evidence,” which she filed in this court while this appeal was pending. In opposing Todd’s motion, Rocket argues that the motion is frivolous and submits that it has incurred attorneys’ fees of at least $1,475 to oppose the motion. Rocket asks us to (1) impose monetary sanctions on Todd “in the form of Respondent’s fees on appeal,” (2) “impose monetary sanctions to be paid to the Court,” and/or (3) declare Todd to be a vexatious litigant. Although we agree the motion lacks merit, we decline to exercise our discretion in the manner requested because Todd is self-represented on appeal and this motion is the only one of its kind that she has filed. 7  As for Todd’s claim that her attorney provided ineffective assistance by failing to present evidence of fraudulent inducement to the trial court, that claim fails because, as just explained, such evidence is immaterial to the legal sufficiency of the quiet title claim and because the right to effective assistance of counsel “applies in criminal, but not civil, cases.” (Mendoza v. Superior Court (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 988, 1002.) DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. Respondent shall recover its costs on appeal. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS FIELDS J. We concur: MILLER Acting P. J. MENETREZ J. 8