Full Opinion

IN THE ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION TWO JACOB E. WIDEMAN, Petitioner/Appellant, v. ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND ARIZONA BOARD OF EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY, Respondents/Appellees. No. 2 CA-CV 2023-0292 Filed July 30, 2026 Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County Nos. LC2018000461001DT and LC2023000053001DT The Honorable Mark H. Brain, Judge AFFIRMED COUNSEL Law Office of Hernandez Hamilton Lamoureux PC, Tucson By Carol L. Lamoureux and Joshua F. Hamilton Counsel for Petitioner/Appellant Struck Love Acedo PLC, Chandler By Daniel P. Struck, Jacob B. Lee, and Nicholas Acedo Counsel for Respondent/Appellee Arizona Department of Corrections, Rehabilitation & Reentry Kristin K. Mayes, Arizona Attorney General By Kelly Gillilan-Gibson, Assistant Attorney General, Phoenix Counsel for Respondent/Appellee Arizona Board of Executive Clemency WIDEMAN v. ARIZ. DEP’T OF CORR. Opinion of the Court OPINION Chief Judge Staring authored the opinion of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Brearcliffe concurred and Judge Eckerstrom dissented. S T A R I N G, Chief Judge: ¶1 Jacob Wideman appeals from the superior court’s denial of his second special action complaint seeking relief from his arrest by the Arizona Department of Corrections, Rehabilitation, and Reentry (“the Department”) and the revocation of his home arrest by the Arizona Board of Executive Clemency (“the Board”). For the following reasons, we affirm. Factual and Procedural Background ¶2 In August 1986, Wideman murdered E.K. by stabbing him twice in the chest with a knife while he slept.1 The two, both sixteen at the time, were participating in an organized youth tour of the western United States and were roommates at a Flagstaff hotel. Wideman had woken up that night with an “impulse” to take E.K.’s life; he had experienced similar violent impulses since he was “six or seven years old.” After murdering E.K., Wideman fled the scene, taking traveler’s checks and the group’s car. He traveled across the country and eventually turned himself in.2 After pleading guilty to first-degree murder, Wideman was sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole after twenty-five years. ¶3 Wideman first became eligible for parole consideration in 2011. The Board denied his first six requests. In September 2016, the Board held a parole hearing.3 It heard from Wideman, his supporters, and those 1The facts of the underlying murder are taken from Wideman’s testimony at his parole hearing. 2In October 1986, while staying at a Boston mental health facility, Wideman was accused of attempting to strangle another teen residing at the facility. The charges were dismissed when the detective investigating the incident determined that it was a matter of roughhousing gone too far. 3At this hearing, the Board noted that Wideman had been put on mental health watch while imprisoned ten times, many of which 2 WIDEMAN v. ARIZ. DEP’T OF CORR. Opinion of the Court opposing his release, including E.K.’s father. At that time, Wideman promised that he would continue counseling with Dr. Jon McCaine, a psychologist who had worked with him while he was in prison. Wideman’s family paid for McCaine’s services while Wideman was imprisoned, and they indicated they would continue to help with those expenses if he was released. In his release plan, Wideman wrote: “Dr. McCaine and I have already had three counseling sessions, . . . and we are developing an excellent working relationship. I look forward to continuing to work with him throughout the transition process and afterward.” He also attached a letter from McCaine concerning their meetings, and, in it, McCaine offered his conclusions after their most recent session in August 2016. Specifically, McCaine wrote: This visit suggested continuity is beginning to develop where one meeting draws on the prior meeting. This type of thematic continuity is an essential cornerstone for ongoing therapeutic interactions in the service of personal growth and development. Mr. Wideman reiterated his intention to continue these sessions with future meetings contingent on the outcome of his next parole board hearing. ¶4 Wideman was released to home arrest in November 2016. Upon release, Wideman asked his parole officer about arranging counseling appointments with Dr. McCaine. The decision on whether Wideman would see McCaine “was placed on hold” because, “as a matter of course,” the Department first refers inmates to Correctional Healthcare Companies (CHC) for counseling, and “it was recommended . . . that [Wideman] not have two separate counselors . . . at the same time.” Wideman completed a CHC screening and attended a second session during which he was approved for employment. Wideman thereafter attended weekly individual sessions for three months and then transitioned to weekly group sessions for nearly four months afterward. On June 11, 2017, Wideman “successfully completed all exercises and met treatment goals associated with this program and was discharged successfully.” ¶5 On May 4, 2017, Wideman appeared before the Board for a status hearing. At that hearing, Wideman’s counsel stated that Dr. McCaine corresponded with the receipt of bad news, such as the denial of a parole request. 3 WIDEMAN v. ARIZ. DEP’T OF CORR. Opinion of the Court was still “ready to start working with [Wideman]” and that Wideman had “the payment taken care of.” The Board voted to continue Wideman on home arrest “with same conditions.” On June 22, Wideman’s parole officer, Patrick Pogue, called Wideman and instructed him to contact McCaine “within the next week to schedule an appointment for therapy.” On June 27, Pogue contacted Wideman’s wife to inquire whether she had any questions or concerns. Pogue asked her if Wideman had “reached out to Dr. McCain[e] yet. [She] reported that [Wideman] may not be able to afford the services with Dr. McCain[e]” and was “planning on discussing other options with” Pogue. ¶6 On June 28, Pogue visited Wideman and asked if he had made contact with Dr. McCaine. Wideman said he “was going to check to see how much it would cost as he believed Dr. McCaine charges approx[imately] $200-$400 per hour,” which “he would likely not be able to afford.” Despite assuring the Board less than two months earlier that payment for McCaine’s services had been “taken care of,” Wideman now asked if the Department would help subsidize the cost. Pogue “did not believe that would be an option” but said he would “staff the issue.” ¶7 On June 29, after waiting the full week Pogue had given him to initiate contact, Wideman emailed Dr. McCaine. The email did not ask about McCaine’s fees but expressed an interest in “resum[ing] a counseling relationship” and asked about McCaine’s schedule. On July 5, McCaine responded, inquiring whether Wideman had insurance coverage and requesting that Wideman give him a call to schedule a formal intake. Wideman subsequently spoke with his supervisor at work about attending sessions with McCaine during regular business hours, but his supervisor expressed doubt that the business could “afford to have [him] miss that much work, especially if [he] wanted to . . . continue on a promotion track.”4 At that time, Wideman was working as a customer service representative at 24/7 In Touch in Mesa, Arizona, requiring a more than two hour commute each direction using public transportation, earning $12 an hour. ¶8 On July 6, Pogue asked Wideman if he had learned how much Dr. McCaine charged. Wideman indicated he had contacted McCaine and, according to the chronology notes, said he would contact him again that 4Relatedly, CHC counselor Carole Coughlin, after meeting Wideman for the first time, expressed concern that he would “use work as an excuse to not attend individual [counseling] sessions.” 4 WIDEMAN v. ARIZ. DEP’T OF CORR. Opinion of the Court day or the next. (However, Wideman later disputed having promised to do so at the revocation hearing and accordingly testified he did not call McCaine on July 6 or 7.) Wideman again expressed doubt to Pogue that he could afford McCaine’s services, but he said he would “start receiving insurance benefits” through his employer “in the next few weeks and that might help pay for some of the cost.” Wideman also asked about “continu[ing] classes with CHC as a financial alternate,” noting that, “due to employment hours,” weekend classes, which CHC offers, were “best.” Pogue again said CHC “would be looked into.” ¶9 On July 12, community corrections officer James Berg visited Wideman. Wideman reported that he had called Dr. McCaine, learned his fees were $300 per session, and was “waiting to hear back” if insurance could reduce those fees. (However, there is no other evidence of this call in the record, and McCaine later testified that he charged only $150 per session.) Wideman reiterated to Berg that he would receive insurance through his work after ninety days of employment, which he had almost attained, but again stated, “I don’t really think I am going to be able to afford Dr. McCaine and will probably have to go back to CHC.” ¶10 On July 17, Pogue asked Wideman if he was going to attend counseling with Dr. McCaine. Wideman said he would “rather attend more CHC classes” as McCaine’s “fees were more than he could afford.” He also reported he did not believe McCaine could see him on weekends, although McCaine had previously visited Wideman on a Saturday. Pogue asked if Wideman was “going to set up an intake assessment with Dr. McCaine or not.” Wideman replied he would call on July 18 to do so. ¶11 On July 18, Wideman called Dr. McCaine’s office twice using the direct line to McCaine’s office, “which nobody answers except” McCaine. When no live person answered, he left a voicemail. Immediately afterward, Wideman called Pogue to report that he had called McCaine and that he would “wait to hear back from Dr. McCaine and continue to try to set up the appointment.” Pogue allegedly responded, “Perfect,” but there is no indication he was aware Wideman had called McCaine’s direct line, as Wideman “reported he contacted Dr. McCaine’s office.” The next day, during a visit at Wideman’s home, Pogue asked if he had heard back from McCaine’s office, to which Wideman reportedly responded that “he had not,” reiterating that “he did not have the financial means to pay for” McCaine’s services, but this time explaining that he had used the money saved for counseling to pay for unspecified “other things.” 5 WIDEMAN v. ARIZ. DEP’T OF CORR. Opinion of the Court ¶12 Holly Dorman, Pogue’s supervisor, issued a warrant for Wideman’s arrest on July 24. The warrant indicated Wideman had violated Condition of Supervision Number Two, “as demonstrated by his failure to follow the directives of his assigned parole officer by failing to schedule an intake assessment with Dr. Jon McCaine, a licensed psychologist, on or about 07/18/2017, as verbally directed on 07/17/2017 by” Pogue. On July 25, pursuant to the warrant, the Department arrested Wideman and returned him to custody. ¶13 In August 2017, the Board conducted a revocation hearing in two phases. During Phase I, the Board heard testimony from Wideman contesting that he had violated his release conditions. Over Wideman’s objection, the Board also heard recorded testimony from Dorman. She testified that she had issued the warrant because, although Wideman insisted he would resume a counseling relationship with Dr. McCaine after his release, Wideman failed for about three weeks to schedule an appointment. This led Dorman to believe he was “trying to avoid” treatment. The Board concluded Phase I by finding Wideman had violated his conditions of supervision. The Board then conducted Phase II, after which it unanimously revoked Wideman’s home arrest. ¶14 In November 2018, Wideman filed a petition for special action challenging the actions of the Department and the Board (collectively, “the state”). Wideman argued, among other things, that the Department had lacked reasonable cause to issue the warrant and that the warrant did not articulate facts indicating Wideman was about to lapse into criminal ways or conduct. Wideman also asserted that the Board had failed to hold a preliminary hearing on the warrant; that the Board had admitted undisclosed, unsworn videotaped testimony of Dorman, which prevented cross-examination; that the Board’s findings were not established by a preponderance of the evidence; and that the Board had failed to issue a written statement. ¶15 In July 2019, the superior court accepted jurisdiction and granted relief on grounds that the state had failed to conduct a mandatory preliminary hearing and had deprived Wideman of due process by introducing videotaped testimony of Dorman that was not subject to cross-examination. The court vacated the revocation decision and remanded to the Board for further proceedings. ¶16 In September 2019, the Board held a preliminary hearing to determine if probable cause existed to issue the warrant. After considering the testimony, the notes written by the parole officers, the email 6 WIDEMAN v. ARIZ. DEP’T OF CORR. Opinion of the Court correspondence and phone records, and “the totality of the circumstances,” the hearing officer determined there was probable cause that Wideman had violated a condition of his release by failing to follow his parole officer’s directive to make an appointment with Dr. McCaine and “may have lapsed into criminal ways.” ¶17 In January 2020, the Board held the second revocation hearing. The Board indicated it would consider only evidence submitted at the first revocation hearing, excluding the videotaped testimony of Dorman. Based on the information in the warrant and the testimony presented at the hearing, the Board found that Wideman had “violated the terms and conditions of his supervision” and “that he may have lapsed or was about to lapse into criminal ways.” The Board then voted to revoke Wideman’s home arrest again. ¶18 In December 2022, Wideman filed a second special action. As to the Department, Wideman re-raised his argument that the warrant was defective. As to the Board, Wideman argued the hearing officer at the preliminary hearing had prevented Wideman from cross-examining Dorman and had made no finding that Wideman lapsed into criminal ways. Wideman also asserted the Board had violated his right to due process at the second revocation hearing by interrupting his cross-examination of Pogue, had violated Arizona law and its own policy by failing to find, based on specific facts, that he lapsed or was probably about to lapse into criminal ways, and had failed to provide a written statement identifying the evidence it relied upon in revoking his release. Wideman further maintained that the Board’s revocation was void because three of the Board’s members were from the same professional discipline in violation of A.R.S. § 31-401(B). ¶19 In October 2023, the superior court accepted jurisdiction of Wideman’s second special-action petition but denied relief. This appeal followed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 12-2101(A)(1). See Ariz. R. P. Spec. Act. 4(c); 10(c). Discussion ¶20 Wideman argues the superior court erred by failing to conclude that (1) the Board had violated his right to due process by its conduct during the preliminary and the second revocation hearings, (2) the Board acted arbitrarily and capriciously in finding grounds to revoke his home arrest, and (3) the Board’s membership impermissibly contained 7 WIDEMAN v. ARIZ. DEP’T OF CORR. Opinion of the Court people of the same profession.5 He also argues the warrant the Department issued was defective because (1) it failed to articulate specific facts supporting the lapse prong of A.R.S. § 31-415, and (2) Dorman, as community corrections manager, lacked the authority to issue the warrant because she did not fall within any of the offices empowered to do so under § 31-415. ¶21 We review the superior court’s denial of relief in this special action for an abuse of discretion. Hormel v. Maricopa County, 224 Ariz. 454, ¶ 16 (App. 2010). A court abuses its discretion when its decision is unsupported by the record or it commits an error of law. Shinn v. Ariz. Bd. of Exec. Clemency, 254 Ariz. 255, ¶ 13 (2022). Section 31-402(A), A.R.S., grants the board the “exclusive power to pass on and recommend . . . paroles.” This grant of authority precludes this court from substituting its view of the facts for that of the Board and from reweighing the merits of parole board decisions.6 Cooper v. Ariz. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 149 Ariz. 182, 184 (1986); Stewart v. Ariz. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 156 Ariz. 538, 540 (App. 1988). Review by special action of the parole board’s decisions is thus narrowly confined to determining whether a parolee has been denied due process during revocation proceedings or whether the board has exceeded its legal authority. Broadhead v. Ariz. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 151 Ariz. 37, 40 (App. 1986), disapproved on other grounds by Kelley v. Ariz. Dep’t of Corr., 154 Ariz. 476, 479-80 (1987). ¶22 As a preliminary matter, we decline to address Wideman’s warrant challenges. He raised these challenges in the first special action, in 5Wideman also contends that to “correct the due process violations” we should consider “vacating [the Department’s] invalid warrant and [the Board’s] revocation decision and order that Wideman be released back on home arrest.” Because we have found that no due process violation occurred, it is unnecessary to address this claim. However, we reiterate that the proper remedy for a due process violation in connection with parole revocation proceedings is ordering a new hearing, not ordering release. See Long v. Ariz. Bd. of Pardons and Parole, 180 Ariz. 490, 495 (App. 1994). We are aware of no authority that, on the record before us, would support this court ordering Wideman’s release. 6Distilled to its essence, our colleague’s dissent reflects an expansive view of this court’s role in reviewing board decisions. Although couched in terms of due process, much of it amounts to reweighing the evidence. See Stewart v. Ariz. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 156 Ariz. 538, 540 (App. 1988). 8 WIDEMAN v. ARIZ. DEP’T OF CORR. Opinion of the Court which the superior court remanded for the Board to conduct a preliminary hearing but expressly denied Wideman’s requested relief of vacating the warrant. Wideman did not appeal that ruling. Wideman nevertheless contends that his failure to appeal did not result in waiver of the warrant claim, reasoning that the superior court in the first special action “declined to resolve” the claim directly by ordering a preliminary hearing at which challenges to the sufficiency of the warrant could be heard. Wideman misinterprets that ruling. Although the court noted that the warrant lacked information pertaining to lapse, it did so in the context of analyzing whether the lack of a preliminary hearing prejudiced Wideman by depriving him of notice of the evidence against him. The court expressly denied the warrant claim, and Wideman did not seek review of that ruling. Therefore, this claim is not properly before us.7 See Ariz. R. P. Spec. Act. 10(c) (Arizona Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure apply to special actions); Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 9(a) (providing thirty days to file appeal from entry of judgment). I. Due Process During Revocation Proceedings ¶23 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects a parolee’s interest in his continued liberty such that revocation requires “some orderly process, however informal.”8 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481-84 & 482 (1972); see also U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Broadhead, 151 Ariz. at 40. Still, revocation of parole is not part of a criminal prosecution, and thus a parolee does not enjoy the “full panoply” of due process rights afforded a criminal defendant.9 Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480, 7The warrant met the requirements imposed by the Arizona Administrative Code. See A.A.C. R5-4-302(A) (requiring warrant to “allege[] an inmate violated a condition of the inmate’s release” and “list[] documents and items to be offered as evidence and witnesses who will be called to testify”). Notably, § 31-415 is largely silent as to the warrant’s required contents, mandating only that it specify the date of “expiration of the maximum sentence or term of community supervision,” which the warrant at issue here did. 8A home arrestee, though an inmate, is entitled to “due process rights of return.” A.R.S. § 41-1604.13(F). 9For example, “the process should be flexible enough to consider evidence . . . that would not be admissible in an adversary criminal trial.” Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489. 9 WIDEMAN v. ARIZ. DEP’T OF CORR. Opinion of the Court 482. The informal process must include two hearings: a preliminary hearing and a revocation hearing. Id. at 485-89; Broadhead, 151 Ariz. at 40. A. The preliminary hearing ¶24 The purpose of the preliminary hearing is to determine whether probable cause or reasonable grounds exist to believe that the arrested parolee has violated the terms of parole. Broadhead, 151 Ariz. at 40; Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 485. The parolee must be provided an opportunity to appear at the hearing and to present relevant witnesses or documentary evidence. Broadhead, 151 Ariz. at 40. Upon request, those who have given adverse information about the parolee must be made available for questioning in the parolee’s presence. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 487. Hearing officers employed by the board’s executive director preside over preliminary hearings. See § 31-402(G). A hearing officer must exercise control over the hearing to prevent “delaying tactics and other abuses.” Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 490. The hearing officer must also summarize what occurred at the hearing, including the parolee’s responses and the substance of the evidence relied on, but formal findings of fact and conclusions of law are not required. Id. at 487. If the hearing officer finds “reasonable grounds to believe a violation occurred,” the parolee may be re-incarcerated pending the final decision of the board on revocation. Broadhead, 151 Ariz. at 40. ¶25 At Wideman’s preliminary hearing, the hearing officer allowed his counsel to cross-examine Dorman, the officer who had managed Wideman’s case on parole and issued the warrant. Dorman answered questions regarding CHC counseling, the July 17 instruction, and the warrant. However, the hearing officer limited questions unrelated to the alleged violation, explaining that whether Wideman “followed the directives of his” parole officer was his primary concern during the hearing. After the hearing, the hearing officer provided a written summary, noting in the findings section that he found “probable cause that Mr. Wideman violated a condition of his release” based on “the testimony from all parties involved, submitted attachments related to phone records, Chrono notes, emails, and the totality of the circumstances.” ¶26 Wideman argues that the hearing officer deprived him of due process by determining that probable cause existed in the absence of any evidence that Wideman had lapsed or probably would lapse into criminal ways or company. He further contends that the hearing officer deprived him of his due process right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses by limiting questions unrelated to the alleged violation. 10 WIDEMAN v. ARIZ. DEP’T OF CORR. Opinion of the Court ¶27 The preliminary hearing satisfied the due process requirements set forth in Morrissey. See 408 U.S. at 485, 487. Contrary to Wideman’s assertion, due process only required the hearing officer to determine whether there was probable cause to believe a violation had occurred—not whether Wideman had lapsed or was about to lapse. See Broadhead, 151 Ariz. at 40 (“If reasonable grounds to believe a violation occurred are found after a proper hearing, the parolee may be re-incarcerated pending the next stage, the revocation hearing.”). The hearing officer met this standard by identifying the evidence supporting his conclusion that Wideman had “violated a condition of release” when he failed to follow the “directive . . . to make an appointment with Dr. McCaine.” Thus, the alleged absence of lapse evidence did not result in a deprivation of Wideman’s due process rights.10 ¶28 Moreover, Wideman was afforded the opportunity to cross-examine Dorman and to challenge the evidence supporting a finding that he violated a condition of his release. The hearing officer merely restricted questioning that fell outside the scope of the alleged violation, which was consistent with the limited purpose of a preliminary hearing and the hearing officer’s duty to control the proceeding. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 485, 490. Accordingly, the superior court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Wideman had failed to demonstrate a basis for relief as to his claim that the preliminary hearing officer deprived him of due process. B. The second revocation hearing ¶29 As noted, Wideman also asserts the Board violated his right to due process at the second revocation hearing by interrupting his cross-examination of Pogue, by finding lapse in Phase I without evidentiary support, by failing to consider whether a sanction short of reimprisonment would be sufficient to address the violation, and by failing to make sufficient written findings identifying the evidence relied upon in revoking his release. 10Further, what constitutes lapse evidence in the case of Wideman? He is not a pedophile who might be observed watching a playground. Neither is he a bank robber who might be observed surveilling a bank. Wideman brutally murdered E.K. in private in order to satisfy his recurring impulses to kill. The Board could reasonably find evidence of lapse in his repeated failures to pursue continuing counseling with Dr. McCaine. 11 WIDEMAN v. ARIZ. DEP’T OF CORR. Opinion of the Court ¶30 The purpose of the revocation hearing is to reach “a final evaluation of any contested relevant facts and consideration of whether the facts as determined warrant revocation.” Broadhead, 151 Ariz. at 41-42 (quoting Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 488). If the Board finds the parolee delinquent after a hearing, it may revoke parole and recommit the parolee to prison. A.R.S. § 31-417. “Delinquent” in this context refers to the “two prong standard of A.R.S. § 31-415,” Broadhead, 151 Ariz. at 43-44, which requires proof “that a paroled prisoner . . . has violated his parole . . . and has lapsed or is probably about to lapse into criminal ways,” § 31-415. The minimum requirements of due process at this stage include: (a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a “neutral and detached” hearing body . . . ; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489. ¶31 Board policy explains that revocation hearings are conducted in two phases. Ariz. Bd. of Exec. Clemency, Board Policy # 111 (Revocation Hearings), 111.2.2 (2019). During Phase I, the board should consider the allegation in the warrant and related information. Id. at 111.2.3. “If the Board determines that the offender violated the terms and conditions of supervision, was delinquent and has lapsed or is probably about to lapse into criminal ways or company, then the Board will move to Phase II.” Id. at 111.2.4(b). In Phase II, after considering testimony and materials provided by the inmate and other interested parties, the board may revoke parole or continue the offender on parole with or without additional conditions. Id. at 111.2.5; see also A.A.C. R5-4-302(D). ¶32 Phase I of the second revocation hearing began with a reading of the allegation in the arrest warrant, which Wideman stated was false. Pogue then read the accompanying violation report, and Wideman was given an opportunity to respond. However, when the topic of Wideman’s testimony veered away from the warrant, the Board interjected, explaining 12 WIDEMAN v. ARIZ. DEP’T OF CORR. Opinion of the Court that such subjects would be covered in Phase II. The Board then moved to find that Wideman had violated the terms of his parole and that he lapsed or was about to lapse into criminal ways. Wideman’s counsel objected, asserting that Wideman was entitled to cross-examine Pogue before that finding could be made. The Board stated that Wideman would have an opportunity to cross-examine Pogue during Phase II and that the purpose of Phase I was to determine whether a condition had been violated. The Board added that, in Phase II, Wideman would have “ample time to . . . convince [the Board] that there isn’t a reason to revoke the parole.” ¶33 Still, the Board vacated the motion and allowed a limited cross-examination of Pogue. When Wideman’s counsel asked Pogue about the other programs CHC offers, the Board again interjected, explaining that in Phase I the Board was not considering “what other counseling options might have been available.” However, the Board noted that the availability of alternative counseling “might be something that would be consider[ed] in deciding whether or not [Wideman] should be returned to supervision or have his parole revoked.” After Wideman’s counsel indicated that she had no more questions for Pogue related to the allegation in the warrant, the Board commenced its own questioning of Pogue. Pogue explained that it was Wideman who had selected Dr. McCaine, that he had directed Wideman to schedule an appointment “probably six times,” and that he considered counseling to be a “key component of [Wideman’s] release”—a fact highlighted by Wideman in his own release plan. The Board then allowed Wideman to respond and asked him several follow-up questions, during which Wideman confirmed that, as of June 28, he “knew that it was an expectation that [he] schedule an appointment with Dr. McCaine,” but pushed back on “the idea that there was . . . a standing order” to do so given that he was waiting for an update on CHC from Pogue. The Board then adopted a motion finding that Wideman had “violated the terms and conditions of his supervision” and “may have lapsed or was about to lapse into criminal ways” and proceeded to Phase II. ¶34 Phase II began with Wideman’s testimony. When asked whether his assertions, in his release plan, regarding his relationship with Dr. McCaine had an “influence” on the Board when it granted him parole, Wideman responded, “Yes, absolutely.” However, he maintained that he could not obtain counseling with McCaine after completing CHC programming due to a change in “life circumstances.” He also denied making a statement at his first release hearing that he still experienced “violent mental images” accompanied by a “rush of emotion,” explaining 13 WIDEMAN v. ARIZ. DEP’T OF CORR. Opinion of the Court that he would experience similar, intense “emotional energy” about “three times a year,” but that he was able to deal with that energy. ¶35 Dorman testified next. She explained that Wideman’s work-related justifications for not attending therapy with Dr. McCaine, with whom Wideman insisted he had an established relationship, coupled with CHC counselor Carole Coughlin’s concern that Wideman would use work as an excuse to not attend counseling, led her to believe that Wideman was about to lapse into criminal ways. She further testified that it is her job to use her education, training, and experience to “identify when people are . . . stepping into risk factors that lead to . . . reoffending” and that she is not required to wait for a parolee to cause harm before issuing a warrant. The hearing proceeded with Wideman’s cross-examination of Dorman, during which she answered questions regarding Wideman’s initial request to see McCaine, Wideman’s compliance with other directives, her decision to withhold information pertaining to the availability of CHC programming due to public safety concerns, the availability of alternative counseling, her conversations about Wideman with the Department’s director, and Wideman’s counseling with Coughlin. The Board interrupted the cross-examination only twice11 to express concern that the respective question exceeded the scope of Dorman’s personal knowledge, and both times Wideman’s counsel was permitted to clarify the reasoning behind the questions before proceeding. The Board also permitted Wideman to cross-examine Pogue, who, without interruption, answered questions regarding Wideman’s compliance with other directives and positive evaluations from Wideman’s employers and other associates. ¶36 After hearing from the interested members of the public, including Wideman’s mother and sister, the Board moved on to the parties’ closing statements. During her closing statement, Wideman’s counsel claimed that the Department had intentionally misled Wideman as to the availability of CHC programs to create a violation where there was none. She additionally reminded the Board that it could “reinstate the inmate’s release with or without additional conditions” and emphasized Wideman’s compliant record while on parole. During Wideman’s closing statement, he accused the Department of deliberate deception, based on Dorman’s testimony, and emphasized his record while on parole. 11There was one other interruption seemingly because a spectator tried to take a photograph. 14 WIDEMAN v. ARIZ. DEP’T OF CORR. Opinion of the Court ¶37 The Board then made oral findings on the record, during which it acknowledged Wideman’s largely compliant behavior but explained the need to balance that against the heinous nature of the killing and the other facts of the case. It found that Wideman’s failure to schedule an appointment with Dr. McCaine raised a significant concern that Wideman would “commit another crime” given the emphasis placed on the relationship between the two in Wideman’s original release plan. It also found Dorman’s testimony “very credible” given her “significant experience and training,” while expressing doubts about Wideman’s justifications for not scheduling an appointment. Specifically, it noted cost was not raised as an issue when Wideman assumed the obligation of attending counseling with McCaine, and it deemed Wideman’s alleged belief that CHC remained a viable option unreasonable given Pogue’s repeated requests to schedule an appointment with McCaine. Emphasizing that continued counseling was a “critical condition of his . . . release,” the Board found that Wideman should have taken a more “proactive . . . approach” to scheduling an appointment. It subsequently voted to revoke Wideman’s parole, finding he was delinquent, had violated the conditions of his release, and had lapsed or was probably about to lapse into criminal ways. ¶38 As noted, with respect to Phase I, Wideman argues that the Board violated its own policies and deprived him of his due process right to “confront adverse witnesses against him” by “cutting off” his attempts to cross-examine Pogue about “subjects relevant to the lapse inquiry.” He further contends that the Board’s finding of lapse during Phase I was “lacking in evidentiary support” and “violated due process” because it was made before any lapse evidence was presented. ¶39 These arguments, however, discount Phase II of the hearing, during which these alleged deficiencies were adequately addressed. While the Board initially curtailed Wideman’s cross-examination of Pogue on the ground that the sole purpose of Phase I was to discuss the “directive and the violation,” contradicting its own policy,12 see Ariz. Bd. of Exec. Clemency, Board Policy # 111 (Revocation Hearings), 111.2.4(b), the Board allowed Wideman to cross-examine Pogue without interruption during Phase II. Further, the Board permitted a lengthy cross-examination of 12Although an administrative agency must follow its own rules and regulations, Clay v. Ariz. Interscholastic Ass’n, 161 Ariz. 474, 476 (1989), the Board complied with the relevant regulation here, see R5-4-302(D). 15 WIDEMAN v. ARIZ. DEP’T OF CORR. Opinion of the Court Dorman, and its two interruptions during that examination were reasonable in light of the Board’s duty to control the proceeding. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 490. Thus, we cannot say that the Board deprived Wideman of his right to confront adverse witnesses against him. ¶40 Although the Board found Wideman “may have lapsed” in Phase I before the evidentiary record was fully developed, it also found that Wideman “had lapsed” in Phase II. The second finding was made after the Board had heard Dorman’s extensive lapse testimony and was based, in part, on that testimony. We cannot say the Phase I finding of lapse violated due process when the subsequent Phase II finding was adequately supported by the evidence. Wideman counters that the presentation of lapse evidence and subsequent finding of lapse in Phase II was meaningless in light of the Board’s Phase I finding. But given the Board’s statements that they were only consider