Full Opinion

Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 533 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION IV No. CV-25-474 LESTER KEITH HAMAKER Opinion Delivered November 4, 2026 APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE GARLAND COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT V. [NO. 26DR-22-90] DONNA HAMAKER HONORABLE JOE GRAHAM, JUDGE APPELLEE AFFIRMED ROBERT J. GLADWIN, Judge Appellant Lester Hamaker appeals from the Garland County Circuit Court’s order extending an order of protection, finding him in contempt, and awarding the appellee Donna Hamaker attorney’s fees. On appeal, Lester argues that (1) the circuit court erred in extending the order of protection because there was no evidence of abuse under the Domestic Abuse Act (the “Act”), (2) the circuit court erred by finding him in contempt because the provisions of the protective order were unclear, and (3) the attorney’s-fees award should be reversed because fees are not allowed under the Act. We affirm. I. Background Facts Lester and Donna were married, and they separated in February 2022. Thereafter, they divorced. Donna filed a petition for an order of protection against Lester on February 17, 2022. In her affidavit, Donna described several instances of violence involving Lester, including, but not limited to, spanking Donna with a belt; slapping her face; hitting her face with a phone; hiding her car keys; forcing her down on the floor and causing bruising on her upper arm; and verbal abuse. The circuit court entered an ex parte order of protection. On April 12, 2022, the circuit court held a hearing with both parties in attendance and represented by counsel. Lester’s attorney announced to the court that the parties had come to an agreement and read the agreement into the record. The parties agreed that the order of protection would be in place for three years, and it specifically excluded Lester from several locations. Lester acknowledged before the circuit court that he agreed he was prohibited from being at those locations and understood the consequences of violating the protective order. Accordingly, the court entered an final order of protection on April 26, 2022. Thereafter, Lester objected to the final order and argued that it included terms that were not within his understanding of the agreement. Lester moved to reopen the case and requested a criminal referral or, alternatively, a health referral and evaluation for Donna. In his motion, Lester alleged that Donna was untruthful in her affidavit; that there was no “meeting of the minds” regarding all the addresses included in the order; and that the agreement was made under duress. The circuit court denied Lester’s motions by written order on February 14, 2023. The court held that valid negotiations took place between the parties before entry of the final order of protection, and furthermore, Lester failed to show any fraud on Donna’s part. Lester appealed the circuit court’s denial of his motions, and this court affirmed. See Hamaker v. Hamaker, 2025 Ark. App. 156, 708 S.W.3d 839. This court held, in part, that 2 Lester consented to the terms of the final order of protection; thus, the time to adjudicate the merits of Donna’s petition had passed. Id. On February 14, 2025, Donna moved to extend the order of protection. She alleged that Lester had repeatedly violated the protection order, that she feared for her safety, and that her safety would be in jeopardy if the final order of protection was not extended. Furthermore, Donna requested that the circuit court find Lester in contempt, sanction him accordingly, and award her attorney’s fees. The circuit court held a hearing on the motion on April 9, 2025. After the hearing, the circuit court announced that Lester was in willful contempt for violating the order of protection and extended the order for seven years. The circuit court entered its written order reflecting these findings on April 23 and awarded Donna attorney’s fees in the amount of $3,602.50. A sentencing hearing for Lester’s contempt was held on May 14. The circuit court acknowledged that Lester spent nine days in jail for violating the order of protection in another county; therefore, the court imposed a nine-day jail sentence for contempt and gave him credit for time served. Lester filed a timely notice of appeal; this appeal followed. II. Standard of Review Our standard of review in domestic-relations cases is well settled. This court reviews domestic-relations cases de novo but will not reverse the circuit court’s findings unless they are clearly erroneous Doss v. Doss, 2018 Ark. App. 487, 561 S.W.3d 348. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire 3 evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Id. Due deference is given to the circuit court’s superior position to determine the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Id. III. Points on Appeal Lester argues on appeal that (1) the initial order of protection lacked proof of domestic abuse; therefore, the court erred by extending the order because there was an absence of proof under the language of the Act; (2) the circuit court erred by excluding a portion of Donna’s deposition wherein he alleges she admitted to no physical abuse; (3) the circuit court erred by holding him in contempt because the provisions of the order were not sufficiently clear to put him on notice that his actions were contemptuous; and (4) the circuit court erred by awarding attorney’s fees because fees are not allowed under the Act. IV. Discussion A. Extension of Order of Protection First, Lester maintains that the order extending the protective order should be reversed because there was no proof of domestic abuse or that a threat of domestic abuse still exists. His argument is twofold. First, he maintains that the initial order of protection did not involve an adjudication; thus, the proceedings were insufficient as a matter of law to show that domestic abuse occurred in the original proceeding. Second, Lester maintains that there was no proof presented at the hearing on the order to extend that would satisfy the requirements of abuse under the Act. 4 Regarding Lester’s arguments pertaining to the order of protection that was entered on April 26, 2022—the agreed order of protection—we decline to further address those arguments because they were already addressed in his first appeal to this court. As stated in the prior appeal, Lester consented to the terms of the final order of protection; thus, the time to adjudicate the merits of Donna’s petition has passed. See Hamaker, 2025 Ark. App. 156, at 6–7, 708 S.W.3d at 843. Next, Lester maintains that the circuit court committed error by extending the order of protection because Donna’s allegations that Lester tried to communicate with her by mail, leaving voicemails on her phone, and sending a gift to her mother do not satisfy actions under the Act that meet the statutory definition of abuse. Accordingly, Lester argues that the court extended the order without sufficient proof. We disagree. Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-15-205 (Repl. 2020) provides that an order of protection can be renewed, at the discretion of the court, upon proof and a finding by the court that the threat of domestic abuse still exists. We first note that Lester’s characterization of his alleged violations of the order in his brief are significantly minimized from what the record demonstrates. At the hearing, Donna testified to numerous incidents in which Lester violated the protective order since its entry in 2022. She has filed several police reports, and Lester has been charged and imprisoned for violations. Donna also testified that she feared for her safety when the order expired because she believed that Lester was “pretty mad at [her].” The only requirement for a court to extend an order of protection is that the original threat “still exists.” Hocut v. Hocut, 2022 Ark. App. 452, at 7–8, 655 S.W.3d 527, 532. 5 Furthermore, as this court held in Hocut, the relevant statutes do not state that new evidence bars the inclusion of previous acts of violence, particularly where the perpetrator is estopped by prior findings from denying those encounters. 2022 Ark. App. 452, at 8–9, 655 S.W.3d at 533. Donna’s original 2022 petition for the protective order was replete with allegations of domestic abuse. Specifically, Donna alleged that Lester spanked her with a belt; slapped her face; threw a phone and hit her face; hid her car keys; forced her down to the floor and caused bruising on her upper arm; and engaged in instances of verbal abuse. The issuance of the 2022 final protective order by the circuit court became factual evidence that domestic abuse existed, and Lester agreed to the terms of the order. The protective order directed Lester not to be around Donna and prohibited him from initiating “any contact with [Donna], including, but not limited to, physical presence, telephonic, electronic, oral, written, visual, or video.” However, despite issuance of the order, Lester initiated contact with Donna numerous times throughout the three-year period the original order was in place. At the hearing, the circuit court explained that Lester seemed intent on violating the protective order “no matter what the court said.” Donna testified that on one occasion, Lester traveled approximately 170 miles to her residence and parked down the street and watched as an individual—to whom Lester paid twenty dollars—delivered a package to Donna. Donna immediately called the police. On another occasion, Donna testified that Lester showed up at the marital home—after being notified that Donna would be at the residence to clean and start preparations to sell it—and 6 walked around the home yelling Donna’s name while carrying what appeared to be two large containers of Freon. Donna testified that she hid underneath the stairs and called 911. She remained hidden until the police arrived, and Lester was charged with violating the protective order. The next time Donna was scheduled to be at the marital home, Lester admitted that he “observed the home from a distance.” Donna testified that she never returned to the marital home after Lester violated the protective order in June 2024 because she was afraid to do so. In its April 23, 2025 written order, the circuit court extended the order of protection for seven years “for [Donna’s] protection and safety.” The court found that Lester consistently violated the agreed protective order and has continued to harass and contact Donna despite the court’s directives and reminders not to do so. Given the record before us, we cannot agree that there was insufficient proof that a threat still existed. We simply are not left with a definite and firm conviction that the circuit court made a mistake by extending the protective order for Donna’s safety and protection. To the extent that Lester is asking this court to reweigh the evidence in his favor, this court does not act as a super fact-finder or second-guess the circuit court’s credibility finding. Jolliff v. Wilson, 2021 Ark. App. 430, 636 S.W.3d 390. Accordingly, we do not find that the circuit court abused its discretion in extending the order of protection for seven years, which is allowed by statute. B. Deposition Testimony Lester sought to introduce one page of Donna’s deposition—taken before the divorce decree and final order of protection were entered—wherein he alleges that Donna confirmed 7 she did not suffer physical abuse during the marriage. The circuit court held that the excerpt from the deposition was not admissible because it was irrelevant to the current issue of whether the order of protection should be extended. On appeal, Lester contends the ruling of the court was an abuse of discretion. We disagree. Appellate courts review the admission of evidence by the circuit court using an abuse- of-discretion standard. Ventry v. State, 2021 Ark. 96, 622 S.W.3d 630. The decision to admit or exclude evidence is within the sound discretion of the circuit court, and this court will not reverse a court’s decision regarding the admission of evidence absent a manifest abuse of discretion. Id. Abuse of discretion is a high threshold that does not simply require error in the circuit court’s decision but also requires that the circuit court act improvidently, thoughtlessly, or without due consideration. Id. On appeal, Lester contends that the circuit court abused its discretion by excluding the deposition testimony because it evidenced an admission by Donna that was critical in determining whether there was domestic abuse under the Act and whether the earlier agreed order should be extended. As stated above, the issue of whether there was any abuse on which to base the final order of protection has already been addressed on appeal. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the circuit court’s finding that evidence regarding whether the final order of protection was warranted is irrelevant to whether the order should be extended. Furthermore, Lester argues that the introduction of the deposition testimony was relevant to the issue of whether there was abuse demonstrated to extend the order and, 8 therefore, was admissible to impeach Donna’s testimony. However, Donna admitted there had been no physical altercations since entry of the protective order; thus, the circuit court correctly held there was no testimony on the record for Lester to impeach with the deposition testimony. Accordingly, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony. C. Contempt Next, Lester argues that the circuit court abused its discretion by holding him in contempt because the order of protection was not clear regarding what actions were prohibited. Alternatively, Lester contends that even if his actions constituted contempt, his violations were de minimis, and his sentence was excessive. To establish civil contempt, there must be willful disobedience of a valid court order. The order must be definite in its terms and clear about what duties it imposes. Riddick v. Harris, 2016 Ark. App. 426, 501 S.W.3d 859. We will not reverse a finding of civil contempt unless it is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Id. A finding of contempt is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence if, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id. Issues of credibility in a contempt proceeding are for the fact- finder. Id. At the April 12, 2022 hearing, after the circuit court read the parties’ agreement into the record, Lester was asked by the court if he agreed to all the excluded locations, and his counsel answered affirmatively. The court then explained to Lester the consequences if he 9 violated the order by contacting Donna or being at any of the four excluded locations, and Lester verbally acknowledged that he understood the terms. Furthermore, the provisions of the final order of protection were quite clear: 5. That pursuant to the Final Order of Protection, Defendant is prohibited from initiating any contact with Plaintiff, including, but not limited to, physical presence, telephonic, electronic, oral, written, visual, or video. Defendant is also prohibited from using a third party to contact Plaintiff, except by legal counsel or as authorized by law or court order. 6. That Defendant is restrained from committing any criminal act against Plaintiff, including, but not limited to acts of violence or domestic abuse, harassment, harassing communications, stalking or terroristic threatening, in violation of Ark. Code Ann. §§ 9-15-103, 5-71-208, 5-71-209, 5-71-229, and 5-13-301. The order specifically provided the address of each of the four locations from which Lester was excluded. As detailed above, Donna’s testimony was replete with Lester’s attempt to communicate with her via telephone, email, and in person after entry of the protective order. She testified that she filed approximately eight police reports due to Lester’s violations of the court’s order. Donna also testified that she had received numerous pieces of mail from Lester—all sent to one of the addresses identified in the protective order. At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court stated that Lester had shown “nothing but contempt” for the court’s orders. The court characterized Lester as someone who has continued to harass and contact Donna no matter what the court orders. We find no abuse of discretion in the court’s finding of contempt. The record demonstrates several incidents of Lester’s violating the clear provisions of the protective order. We also find that 10 his argument regarding an excessive sentence lacks merit. The circuit court sentenced him to time served for the nine days he spent in jail for violating the protective order in a different county. Given Lester’s repeated violations, his time-served sentence is not excessive. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s finding of contempt and subsequent sentence. D. Attorney’s Fees Finally, Lester contends that the circuit court’s award of attorney’s fees was erroneous and should be reversed. Specifically, Lester maintains that attorney’s fees are not allowed under the Act, and because Donna failed to differentiate in her fee petition which fees were under the Act and which were contempt fees, the fee award must be reversed. We disagree. As a general rule, attorney’s fees are not allowed in the absence of a statute permitting their allowance. Artman v. Hoy, 370 Ark. 131, 257 S.W.3d 864 (2007). However, our appellate courts have recognized that it is within the inherent power of a circuit court to allow attorney’s fees in certain matters not specifically covered by statute, including contempt proceedings. Gavin v. Gavin, 319 Ark. 270, 890 S.W.2d 592 (1995), overruled on other grounds by Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Sauer, 358 Ark. 89, 186 S.W.3d 229 (2004); Feazell v. Feazell, 225 Ark. 611, 284 S.W.2d 117 (1955). The decision to award fees and the amount thereof are matters within the discretion of the circuit court. Baber v. Baber, 2011 Ark. 40, 378 S.W.3d 699. Contrary to Lester’s argument on appeal, section 9-15-205(a)(5) of the Act specifically provides for an award of attorney’s fees to the prevailing party as an available form of relief. Thus, because the protective order was extended, and we do not find that the circuit court 11 abused its discretion in doing so, Donna was clearly the prevailing party, and the circuit court had statutory authority to make an award of attorney’s fees. Moreover, as Lester acknowledges, the circuit court also has the inherent power to award attorney’s fees in contempt proceedings. Scudder v. Ramsey, 2013 Ark. 115, 426 S.W.3d 427. We, therefore, affirm the circuit court’s award of attorney’s fees to Donna because the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in awarding them. V. Conclusion For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the circuit court’s order extending the final order of protection, finding Lester in contempt and issuing sanctions, and awarding attorney’s fees to Donna. Affirmed. VIRDEN and TUCKER, JJ., agree. Robert S. Tschiemer, for appellant. Montgomery Wyatt Hardy, PLC, by: Betty J. Hardy, for appellee. 12