Full Opinion

NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________ No. 26-1877 ___________ WILLIAM F. KAETZ, Appellant v. EDUCATIONAL CREDIT MANAGEMENT CORPORATION; EXPERIAN; TRANSUNION; EQUIFAX ____________________________________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D.C. Civil Action No. 2:16-cv-09225) District Judge: Honorable Evelyn Padin ____________________________________ Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) October 27, 2026 Before: PORTER, MONTGOMERY-REEVES, and BOVE, Circuit Judges (Opinion filed November 6, 2026) _________ OPINION* _________ PER CURIAM * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. William Kaetz is a frequent litigant who is subject to at least four filing injunctions/preclusion orders issued by a District Court and a similar filing restriction imposed by the United States Supreme Court. See, e.g., Kaetz v. United States, No. 23- 2322, 2024 WL 4403872, at *3-4 & n.7 (3d Cir. Oct. 4, 2024) (per curiam). We previously affirmed one of the District Court’s preclusion orders. See id. Kaetz now appeals another preclusion order along with related orders that the court entered in a different case. We will affirm those orders as well. I. In this case, Kaetz filed suit against a student loan administrator and three credit reporting agencies raising claims relating to his student loan debt. He argued, inter alia, that his debt had been discharged in bankruptcy and that a statute that operated to provide otherwise, 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8), was unconstitutional. He also argued that the United States Department of Education was unconstitutional too and that this purported circumstance invalidated his debt. The District Court rejected these arguments and Kaetz’s others, dismissed his Second Amended Complaint with prejudice, and denied his motion for reconsideration. We affirmed. See Kaetz v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., No. 20-2592, 2022 WL 996422, at *2-3 (3d Cir. Apr. 4, 2022) (per curiam). We later denied Kaetz’s petition for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc, and the Supreme Court denied his petition for a writ of certiorari, 143 S. Ct. 277 (2022), and his petition for rehearing, 143 S. Ct. 416 (2022). Kaetz then filed with the District Court a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d)(3) to set aside the dismissal of his complaint on the ground that the defendants’ opposition to 2 his arguments constituted “fraud.” The District Court denied Kaetz’s motion and his subsequent motion for reconsideration, and we again affirmed. See Kaetz v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., No. 23-2897, 2024 WL 3042382, at *2 (3d Cir. June 18, 2024) (per curiam).1 We also again denied Kaetz’s petition for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc, and the Supreme Court again denied his certiorari petition, see 145 S. Ct. 986 (2024), and his petition for rehearing, see 145 S. Ct. 1322 (2025). While Kaetz was seeking Supreme Court review, we issued the opinion noted above affirming a preclusion order that the District Court entered in another of his cases. See Kaetz, 2024 WL 4403872, at *3. In that order, the court responded to Kaetz’s vexatious practice of suing federal judges by prohibiting him from filing any new action without leave of court. We affirmed because Kaetz’s “pattern of vexatious litigation transcend[ed] [the] particular dispute” in which the court entered it. Id. (quotation marks omitted). In explaining how, we referenced this case and Kaetz’s other “frivolous and repetitive” challenges to his student loan debt. Id. at *3-4. Nevertheless, and just over two months after the Supreme Court denied rehearing in Kaetz’s last appeal in this case, he returned to the District Court with still another Rule 60 motion, this time styled as one under Rules 60(b)(2), (3) and (6).2 Kaetz repeated 1 Kaetz also filed a second Rule 60 motion with the District Court just three days after the court denied reconsideration of the denial of his first Rule 60 motion. The court denied Kaetz’s second Rule 60 motion too, but he did not appeal that ruling. 2 Despite this express styling in the District Court, Kaetz now refers to this motion as a “renewed” motion under Rule 60(d)(3). Our disposition does not turn on the precise characterization of Kaetz’s motion, but his current characterization merely underscores the repetitive nature of his challenge. 3 many of the same arguments as before, including that § 523(a)(8) and the Department of Education are unconstitutional.3 Defendants opposed the motion and filed a cross-motion to enjoin Kaetz from further filings in this matter. The court denied Kaetz’s motion and, although Kaetz already had responded to defendants’ motion for a filing injunction, the court gave him another chance to show cause why the injunction should not issue. After Kaetz responded, the court then entered a preclusion order enjoining him from further filings in this matter without leave of court. The court also denied by text order a motion that Kaetz filed requesting the District Judge’s recusal, and it later entered another text order directing its Clerk not to docket a reconsideration-related document that Kaetz sought to file. Kaetz appeals, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. II. Kaetz challenges four orders on appeal. We review each for abuse of discretion and discern none. First, Kaetz challenges the denial of his Rule 60(b) motion.4 He argues that the District Court did not address his constitutional challenge to the Department of Education 3 Kaetz also argued in supplemental filings that the “dismantling” of the Department invalidates his debt. Kaetz relied on the same circumstance in seeking Rule 60(b) relief from the denial of a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 addressed to his conviction of publicizing a federal judge’s home address. See In re Kaetz, No. 26-1085, 2026 WL 674214, at *1 (3d Cir. Mar. 10, 2026) (per curiam), cert. denied, No. 25-1414, 2026 WL 2976349 (U.S. Oct. 5, 2026). The District Court denied that motion, and we noted in denying Kaetz’s subsequent mandamus petition that his argument was “frivolous and does not state any arguable basis for relief.” Id. at *2. The same is true here. 4 Kaetz did not designate the order denying his Rule 60(b) motion in his notice of appeal, but we liberally construe his notice to include it under the circumstances. See Wiest v. Lynch, 710 F.3d 121, 127-28 (3d Cir. 2013). 4 in dismissing his Second Amended Complaint. But the court did. See Kaetz v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., No. 2:16-cv-09225, 2019 WL 4745289, at *3 (D.N.J. Sept. 30, 2019) (explaining that “Plaintiff’s Tenth Amendment arguments concerning the existence of the Department of Education and Defendant ECMC fail because the U.S. Constitution gives the Federal Government the power to create departments to oversee matters that affect the general welfare of U.S. citizens” and citing Article II). Thus, Kaetz’s real quarrel appears to remain with how the court addressed his challenge. In any event, the time to seek relief on this basis has long passed now that we have affirmed the dismissal of his complaint and denied rehearing and now that the Supreme Court has denied his certiorari petition and denied rehearing as well. See Seese v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 679 F.2d 336, 337 (3d Cir. 1982) (per curiam). The District Court otherwise acted well within its discretion in denying Kaetz’s Rule 60 motion for the reasons it explained. Second, Kaetz challenges the court’s preclusion order. His only argument on that point in his opening brief is that the order was unwarranted because he was entitled to Rule 60 relief, but the court properly concluded otherwise as explained above. The court also explained why the preclusion order was necessary, gave Kaetz ample opportunity to respond, and appropriately tailored the order to the circumstances that warranted it. See Brow v. Farrelly, 994 F.2d 1027, 1032 (3d Cir. 1993).5 5 As noted, this is now the second time that we are affirming a preclusion order against Kaetz. When we first did so, we warned him that continued frivolous and repetitive filings could result in filing restrictions and other sanctions in this Court too. See Kaetz, 2024 WL 4403872, at *4 n.7. We repeat that warning and advise Kaetz to heed it. 5 Third, Kaetz states that he is challenging the court’s application of the preclusion order in ordering its Clerk not to docket reconsideration-related materials that Kaetz sought to file. But Kaetz included no argument addressed to that order in his opening brief, and he has not otherwise raised anything suggesting that the court abused its discretion in applying its preclusion order in this manner. Fourth and finally, Kaetz argues that the District Judge should have recused herself for an appearance of bias or partiality. The only argument that he raises on that point on appeal is that the District Judge’s recusal is required because he named her as a defendant in a separate lawsuit docketed at D.N.J. Civ. No. 1:25-cv-15711. But as we have advised Kaetz at least twice before, that circumstance does not require recusal by itself. See In re Kaetz, 2026 WL 674214, at *1 n.1 (citing Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 304 (3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam)); United States v, Kaetz, No. 24-1605, 2024 WL 3717090, at *2 (3d Cir. Aug. 8, 2024) (per curiam) (same), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 117 (2025). Kaetz has not raised anything else that does. III. For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgments of the District Court. Kaetz’s motion for judicial notice is denied except to the extent that we have considered the arguments raised therein in reaching our disposition. 6