Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3320-24 LUANN BARNETT, Petitioner-Appellant, v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES, PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM, Respondent-Respondent. ____________________________ Submitted October 6, 2026 – Decided November 20, 2026 Before Judges Bishop-Thompson and Jablonski. On appeal from the Board of Trustees of the Public Employees' Retirement System, Department of the Treasury, PERS No. xx1863. O'Brien Belland & Bushinsky, LLC, attorneys for appellant (Kevin D. Jarvis, Mark E. Belland and Bradley M. Parsons, on the briefs). Jennifer Davenport, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Janet Greenberg Cohen, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Payal Y. Ved, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). PER CURIAM Petitioner Luann Barnett, the former chief of the Enrollment, Adjustments, Purchase, Loan and Withdrawal Bureau in the Department of the Treasury, appeals from a May 21, 2025 final agency decision of the Board of Trustees (Board) of the Public Employees' Retirement System (PERS), which forfeited a portion of her pension service credit after it determined part of her public service was dishonorable. The Board's determination arose from Barnett's efforts to obtain service credit for prior public employment at a reduced rate through fraudulent means. On appeal, Barnett argues the Board misapplied the multi-factor analysis required under Uricoli v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 91 N.J. 62, 77-78 (1982). Having considered Barnett's arguments in light of the record and governing legal principles, we conclude the Board reasonably applied the Uricoli factors, and its determination "is supported by sufficient credible evidence on the record as a whole," R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(D), and its decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. We therefore affirm. A-3320-24 2 I. Barnett was hired by the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) as a pension benefits specialist on November 7, 1998, and enrolled in PERS. During the course of her employment, Barnett received several promotions, including supervising pension benefits specialist on July 30, 2011, and ultimately, chief on February 6, 2016. For most of her tenure, Barnett received favorable evaluations and had no prior disciplinary history. In 1999, Barnett sought to purchase two years of uncredited service for prior employment with Ocean County in the early 1980s. That request was denied. In 2016, she again sought to purchase the same service, and that request was likewise denied. On July 15, 2020, Barnett submitted a third request to purchase the same service credit. In connection with that request, Barnett directed two subordinates to calculate the purchase price. One subordinate refused. The other processed the request, later explaining she did so out of fear of disobeying a directive. The request was processed using Barnett's 1999 salary rather than her 2020 salary, resulting in a quoted purchase price of $2,795.33 instead of $15,314.87. Barnett paid for this uncredited service in a lump-sum payment. A-3320-24 3 An investigation followed. It confirmed Barnett improperly directed the processing of her own purchase request, including permitting it to proceed without a completed employment verification form. Barnett was served with a Preliminary Notice of Disciplinary Action charging her with: incompetency, inefficiency, or failure to perform duties, N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(1); conduct unbecoming a public employee, N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(6); and other sufficient cause, specifically misuse of official position, theft, violation of the public trust, violation of the State of New Jersey Uniform Ethics Code, and violation of the Plain Language Guide to New Jersey's Executive Branch Ethics Standards, N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(12). The recommended penalty was removal. Following a departmental hearing, the hearing officer issued a comprehensive written report, finding Barnett's misuse of her "position to benefit herself [was] quite egregious, especially considering her position as a manager." In his report, the hearing officer further found Barnett "was fully cognizant of the rules pertaining to purchase of service credit," The hearing officer stated: With the rigorous ethics education and training provided by the Treasury, there is little doubt [Barnett] was aware of the Uniform Ethics Code requirement to recuse in matters pertaining to herself. A-3320-24 4 The actions of [Barnett], proven to the satisfaction of the hearing officer, to facilitate a fraudulent approval at a fraudulently low cost for ineligible service credit is quite egregious. The Division of Pensions and Benefits issued a Final Notice of Disciplinary Action sustaining the charges and terminating Barnett's employment on September 15, 2020. Barnett also pled guilty to third-degree attempted theft by deception, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1(a)(3), charged in a single-count Mercer County accusation, and was sentenced to a period of non-custodial probation and fined. She also agreed to forfeit any current public office and to a lifetime disqualification from public employment. Barnett applied for a pension. After reviewing Barnett's submissions and the documentation relating to her termination pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:1-3, the Board approved the application, but excluded salary and service credit from July 11, 2011, through September 15, 2020. Barnett appealed to the Board and contended the forfeiture period should run only from July 15, 2020, the date of the misconduct, through September 15, 2020, the date of her termination. Alternatively, she argued forfeiture should be limited to the period beginning February 6, 2016, when she became A-3320-24 5 chief, through September 15, 2020. The Board transmitted the matter to the Office of Administrative Law as a contested case. At the hearing before the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), only Barnett testified. As part of that hearing, Barnett informed the ALJ she was forced to contend with substantial personal issues within her family and personally. Specifically, she suffered from memory issues at the time of her misconduct that "affected her judgment and contributed to the offense." In her initial decision, the ALJ accepted Barnett's alternative proposal and concluded that partial forfeiture should run from February 6, 2016, through September 15, 2021. The ALJ explained: No doubt the offense that occurred here was serious; it was an attempt to obtain service credits for [Barnett's] personal benefit at a cost far less than they would have been had [Barnett] been eligible, and it involved the use of her supervisory authority as [c]hief of the [b]ureau. A partial forfeiture of [Barnett's] service credits and pension benefits is required. Taking all the factors into consideration, it appears that this matter is most similar to that of Parkin,[ 1 ] whose pension was forfeited back to the date of his 1 Parkin v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps.' Ret. Sys., No. A-2466-07 (App. Div. May 14, 2009) (slip op. at 2). Although an unpublished decision is not binding on us or any court, R. 1:36-2, because the Board was a party to that appeal, it is bound by its holding, see Raymond v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 221 N.J. Super. 381, 384 n.1 (App. Div. 1987) ("While an unpublished opinion does not have stare decisis effect, it is nevertheless binding as against a party, in particular a public party whose conduct is thereby prescribed."). A-3320-24 6 appointment as [c]hief of [s]taff even though the offenses he committed took place years later. The offense here took place in July 2020, and a forfeiture effective with that date would undermine the seriousness of the misconduct. [Barnett] shall therefore forfeit pension service credits from February 6, 2016, to the date of her termination. A forfeiture effective from the date [Barnett] became [c]hief of the [b]ureau is a substantial loss of service credit and a suitable punishment for the misconduct that occurred here. Both parties filed exceptions to the ALJ's decision. On May 22, 2025, the Board issued its final decision adopting the ALJ's initial decision. This appeal followed. II. "The receipt of a public pension or retirement benefit is . . . expressly conditioned upon the rendering of honorable service by a public officer or employee." N.J.S.A. 43:1-3(a). The Board may forfeit all or part of a pension benefit where "misconduct occurring during the member's public service . . . renders the member's service or part thereof dishonorable." N.J.S.A. 43:1 - 3(b). In Uricoli, 91 N.J. at 77-78, our Supreme Court developed an eleven- point balancing test to determine the extent to which a public employee's A-3320-24 7 pension might be forfeited when the employee engages in dishonorable service. The Uricoli test was later codified in N.J.S.A. 43:1-3(c), as follows: In evaluating a member's misconduct to determine whether it constitutes a breach of the condition that public service be honorable and whether forfeiture or partial forfeiture of earned service credit or earned pension or retirement benefits is appropriate, the board of trustees shall consider and balance the following factors in view of the goals to be achieved under the pension laws: (1) the member's length of service; (2) the basis for retirement; (3) the extent to which the member's pension has vested; (4) the duties of the particular member; (5) the member's public employment history and record covered under the retirement system; (6) any other public employment or service; (7) the nature of the misconduct or crime, including the gravity or substantiality of the offense, whether it was a single or multiple offense and whether it was continuing or isolated; (8) the relationship between the misconduct and the member's public duties; A-3320-24 8 (9) the quality of moral turpitude or the degree of guilt or culpability, including the member's motives and reasons, personal gain and similar considerations; (10) the availability and adequacy of other penal sanctions; and (11) other personal circumstances relating to the member which bear upon the justness of forfeiture. Additionally, certain crimes automatically result in total forfeiture under N.J.S.A. 43:1-3.1, none of which pertain here. We evaluate the Board's applications of the Uricoli factors through a deferential lens of appellate review. An administrative agency's determination generally "will be sustained unless there is a clear showing that it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or that it lacks fair support in the record." Saccone v. Bd. of Trs. of Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 219 N.J. 369, 380 (2014) (quoting Russo v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 206 N.J. 14, 27 (2011)). Although we review de novo an agency's interpretation of law, Russo 206 N.J. at 27, "[w]e must give great deference to an agency's interpretation and implementation of its rules enforcing the statutes for which it is responsible." Piatt v. Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 443 N.J. Super. 80, 99 A-3320-24 9 (App. Div. 2015) (quoting St. Peter's Univ. Hosp. v. Lacy, 185 N.J. 1, 13 (2005)). We "must be mindful of, and deferential to, the agency's 'expertise and superior knowledge of a particular field.'" Circus Liquors, Inc. v. Governing Body of Middletown Twp., 199 N.J. 1, 10 (2009) (quoting Greenwood v. State Police Training Ctr., 127 N.J. 500, 513 (1992)). "Such deference has been specifically extended to state agencies that administer pension statutes." Piatt, 443 N.J. Super. at 99. Our deference to agency decisions also "applies to the review of disciplinary sanctions." In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 28 (2007). In light of the deference owed to these determinations, when reviewing administrative sanctions, "[T]he test . . . is 'whether such punishment is so disproportionate to the offense, in light of all the circumstances, as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness.'" Id. at 28-29 (quoting In re Polk, 90 N.J. 550, 578 (1982)). Guided by these principles, we uphold the Board's determination imposing a partial forfeiture of Barnett's pension benefits. Having considered the facts, the surrounding circumstances, and the equitable considerations presented, we are satisfied the Board reasonably applied the pertinent factors. In particular, we concur in the Board's emphasis on factors seven, eight, and nine set forth in Uricoli. A-3320-24 10 With respect to factor seven—the nature of the misconduct—the Board reasonably concluded Barnett's conduct was serious and substantial. Among other administrative violations, Barnett was charged with misuse of her official position and with conduct involving advance planning. As the ALJ observed, "the nature of the crime was serious; it was not just an attempt to purchase pension credits at a lesser cost than that which would have been paid had the service been eligible for purchase." Rather, as chief, Barnett directed a subordinate employee to process and approve the application. The record supports the conclusion Barnett used her sophisticated knowledge of the system and exploited her position to accomplish that result. As to factor eight—the relationship of the misconduct to the member's public duties—the Board found the connection to be direct. We discern no basis to disturb that finding. The misconduct was not attenuated from Barnett's official responsibilities. Rather, it arose from and was facilitated by the very position she held. We likewise defer to the Board's reliance on factor nine—the degree of moral turpitude. The ALJ concluded that "the nature of [Barnett's] misconduct involved a high degree of guilt and culpability" and that her motive was personal gain. That assessment is amply supported by the record. A-3320-24 11 The ALJ also appropriately considered mitigating circumstances under factor eleven. The ALJ found Barnett had "an exemplary record as an employee prior to the offense and lost a job she loved." The ALJ also concluded a reduction in her pension would impose a financial hardship on Barnett and her husband. In addition, the ALJ noted Barnett's memory issues affected her judgment and contributed to the offense. The ALJ further found Barnett "had a long record of exemplary public service prior to the date of the offense and has suffered severe penal sanctions for the offense." Barnett accepted responsibility for her actions, lost both the position she valued and her eligibility for future public employment, and continued to address her medical issues. Even in light of those mitigating considerations, we conclude the sanction imposed by the Board was reasonable. The penalty reflects a measured and deliberate assessment of the relevant factors, as informed by the ALJ's detailed findings. The ALJ determined that the lesser penalty Barnett requested—covering only the period from the date of the misconduct in July 2020, to September 15, 2020—would "undermine the seriousness of the conduct." Affording appropriate deference to the Board's adoption of that determination, we agree. A-3320-24 12 The sanction imposed was carefully calibrated to the nature of the misconduct and the mitigating circumstances present. Our review of the record does not persuade us that the penalty is so disproportionate as to shock the judicial conscience. Accordingly, we decline to disturb the Board's decision. To the extent we have not addressed them explicitly, Barnett's remaining argument lacks sufficient merit to warrant discussion in this opinion. R. 2:11- 3(e)(1)(E). Affirmed. A-3320-24 13