Luann Barnett v. Board of Trustees, Etc.
CourtNew Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
DocketA-3320-24
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3320-24
LUANN BARNETT,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
BOARD OF TRUSTEES,
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES'
RETIREMENT SYSTEM,
Respondent-Respondent.
____________________________
Submitted October 6, 2026 – Decided November 20, 2026
Before Judges Bishop-Thompson and Jablonski.
On appeal from the Board of Trustees of the Public
Employees' Retirement System, Department of the
Treasury, PERS No. xx1863.
O'Brien Belland & Bushinsky, LLC, attorneys for
appellant (Kevin D. Jarvis, Mark E. Belland and
Bradley M. Parsons, on the briefs).
Jennifer Davenport, Attorney General, attorney for
respondent (Janet Greenberg Cohen, Assistant
Attorney General, of counsel; Payal Y. Ved, Deputy
Attorney General, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Petitioner Luann Barnett, the former chief of the Enrollment,
Adjustments, Purchase, Loan and Withdrawal Bureau in the Department of the
Treasury, appeals from a May 21, 2025 final agency decision of the Board of
Trustees (Board) of the Public Employees' Retirement System (PERS), which
forfeited a portion of her pension service credit after it determined part of her
public service was dishonorable. The Board's determination arose from
Barnett's efforts to obtain service credit for prior public employment at a
reduced rate through fraudulent means.
On appeal, Barnett argues the Board misapplied the multi-factor analysis
required under Uricoli v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 91 N.J. 62,
77-78 (1982). Having considered Barnett's arguments in light of the record
and governing legal principles, we conclude the Board reasonably applied the
Uricoli factors, and its determination "is supported by sufficient credible
evidence on the record as a whole," R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(D), and its decision was
not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. We therefore affirm.
A-3320-24
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I.
Barnett was hired by the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) as a
pension benefits specialist on November 7, 1998, and enrolled in PERS.
During the course of her employment, Barnett received several promotions,
including supervising pension benefits specialist on July 30, 2011, and
ultimately, chief on February 6, 2016. For most of her tenure, Barnett received
favorable evaluations and had no prior disciplinary history.
In 1999, Barnett sought to purchase two years of uncredited service for
prior employment with Ocean County in the early 1980s. That request was
denied. In 2016, she again sought to purchase the same service, and that
request was likewise denied.
On July 15, 2020, Barnett submitted a third request to purchase the same
service credit. In connection with that request, Barnett directed two
subordinates to calculate the purchase price. One subordinate refused. The
other processed the request, later explaining she did so out of fear of
disobeying a directive. The request was processed using Barnett's 1999 salary
rather than her 2020 salary, resulting in a quoted purchase price of $2,795.33
instead of $15,314.87. Barnett paid for this uncredited service in a lump-sum
payment.
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An investigation followed. It confirmed Barnett improperly directed the
processing of her own purchase request, including permitting it to proceed
without a completed employment verification form.
Barnett was served with a Preliminary Notice of Disciplinary Action
charging her with: incompetency, inefficiency, or failure to perform duties,
N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(1); conduct unbecoming a public employee, N.J.A.C.
4A:2-2.3(a)(6); and other sufficient cause, specifically misuse of official
position, theft, violation of the public trust, violation of the State of New
Jersey Uniform Ethics Code, and violation of the Plain Language Guide to
New Jersey's Executive Branch Ethics Standards, N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(12).
The recommended penalty was removal.
Following a departmental hearing, the hearing officer issued a
comprehensive written report, finding Barnett's misuse of her "position to
benefit herself [was] quite egregious, especially considering her position as a
manager." In his report, the hearing officer further found Barnett "was fully
cognizant of the rules pertaining to purchase of service credit," The hearing
officer stated:
With the rigorous ethics education and training
provided by the Treasury, there is little doubt
[Barnett] was aware of the Uniform Ethics Code
requirement to recuse in matters pertaining to herself.
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The actions of [Barnett], proven to the satisfaction of
the hearing officer, to facilitate a fraudulent approval
at a fraudulently low cost for ineligible service credit
is quite egregious.
The Division of Pensions and Benefits issued a Final Notice of
Disciplinary Action sustaining the charges and terminating Barnett's
employment on September 15, 2020.
Barnett also pled guilty to third-degree attempted theft by deception,
N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1(a)(3), charged in a single-count Mercer County accusation,
and was sentenced to a period of non-custodial probation and fined. She also
agreed to forfeit any current public office and to a lifetime disqualification
from public employment.
Barnett applied for a pension. After reviewing Barnett's submissions
and the documentation relating to her termination pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:1-3,
the Board approved the application, but excluded salary and service credit
from July 11, 2011, through September 15, 2020.
Barnett appealed to the Board and contended the forfeiture period should
run only from July 15, 2020, the date of the misconduct, through September
15, 2020, the date of her termination. Alternatively, she argued forfeiture
should be limited to the period beginning February 6, 2016, when she became
A-3320-24
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chief, through September 15, 2020. The Board transmitted the matter to the
Office of Administrative Law as a contested case.
At the hearing before the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), only Barnett
testified. As part of that hearing, Barnett informed the ALJ she was forced to
contend with substantial personal issues within her family and personally.
Specifically, she suffered from memory issues at the time of her misconduct
that "affected her judgment and contributed to the offense." In her initial
decision, the ALJ accepted Barnett's alternative proposal and concluded that
partial forfeiture should run from February 6, 2016, through September 15,
2021. The ALJ explained:
No doubt the offense that occurred here was
serious; it was an attempt to obtain service credits for
[Barnett's] personal benefit at a cost far less than they
would have been had [Barnett] been eligible, and it
involved the use of her supervisory authority as [c]hief
of the [b]ureau. A partial forfeiture of [Barnett's]
service credits and pension benefits is required.
Taking all the factors into consideration, it appears
that this matter is most similar to that of Parkin,[ 1 ]
whose pension was forfeited back to the date of his
1
Parkin v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps.' Ret. Sys., No. A-2466-07 (App. Div. May
14, 2009) (slip op. at 2). Although an unpublished decision is not binding on
us or any court, R. 1:36-2, because the Board was a party to that appeal, it is
bound by its holding, see Raymond v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 221 N.J. Super.
381, 384 n.1 (App. Div. 1987) ("While an unpublished opinion does not have
stare decisis effect, it is nevertheless binding as against a party, in particular a
public party whose conduct is thereby prescribed.").
A-3320-24
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appointment as [c]hief of [s]taff even though the
offenses he committed took place years later. The
offense here took place in July 2020, and a forfeiture
effective with that date would undermine the
seriousness of the misconduct. [Barnett] shall
therefore forfeit pension service credits from February
6, 2016, to the date of her termination. A forfeiture
effective from the date [Barnett] became [c]hief of the
[b]ureau is a substantial loss of service credit and a
suitable punishment for the misconduct that occurred
here.
Both parties filed exceptions to the ALJ's decision. On May 22, 2025,
the Board issued its final decision adopting the ALJ's initial decision. This
appeal followed.
II.
"The receipt of a public pension or retirement benefit is . . . expressly
conditioned upon the rendering of honorable service by a public officer or
employee." N.J.S.A. 43:1-3(a). The Board may forfeit all or part of a pension
benefit where "misconduct occurring during the member's public service . . .
renders the member's service or part thereof dishonorable." N.J.S.A. 43:1 -
3(b).
In Uricoli, 91 N.J. at 77-78, our Supreme Court developed an eleven-
point balancing test to determine the extent to which a public employee's
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pension might be forfeited when the employee engages in dishonorable
service. The Uricoli test was later codified in N.J.S.A. 43:1-3(c), as follows:
In evaluating a member's misconduct to determine
whether it constitutes a breach of the condition that
public service be honorable and whether forfeiture or
partial forfeiture of earned service credit or earned
pension or retirement benefits is appropriate, the board
of trustees shall consider and balance the following
factors in view of the goals to be achieved under the
pension laws:
(1) the member's length of service;
(2) the basis for retirement;
(3) the extent to which the member's
pension has vested;
(4) the duties of the particular member;
(5) the member's public employment history
and record covered under the retirement
system;
(6) any other public employment or service;
(7) the nature of the misconduct or crime,
including the gravity or substantiality of the
offense, whether it was a single or multiple
offense and whether it was continuing or
isolated;
(8) the relationship between the misconduct and
the member's public duties;
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(9) the quality of moral turpitude or the degree
of guilt or culpability, including the member's
motives and reasons, personal gain and similar
considerations;
(10) the availability and adequacy of other penal
sanctions; and
(11) other personal circumstances relating to the
member which bear upon the justness of
forfeiture.
Additionally, certain crimes automatically result in total forfeiture under
N.J.S.A. 43:1-3.1, none of which pertain here.
We evaluate the Board's applications of the Uricoli factors through a
deferential lens of appellate review. An administrative agency's determination
generally "will be sustained unless there is a clear showing that it is arbitrary,
capricious, or unreasonable, or that it lacks fair support in the record."
Saccone v. Bd. of Trs. of Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 219 N.J. 369, 380
(2014) (quoting Russo v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 206 N.J.
14, 27 (2011)).
Although we review de novo an agency's interpretation of law, Russo
206 N.J. at 27, "[w]e must give great deference to an agency's interpretation
and implementation of its rules enforcing the statutes for which it is
responsible." Piatt v. Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 443 N.J. Super. 80, 99
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(App. Div. 2015) (quoting St. Peter's Univ. Hosp. v. Lacy, 185 N.J. 1, 13
(2005)). We "must be mindful of, and deferential to, the agency's 'expertise
and superior knowledge of a particular field.'" Circus Liquors, Inc. v.
Governing Body of Middletown Twp., 199 N.J. 1, 10 (2009) (quoting
Greenwood v. State Police Training Ctr., 127 N.J. 500, 513 (1992)). "Such
deference has been specifically extended to state agencies that administer
pension statutes." Piatt, 443 N.J. Super. at 99.
Our deference to agency decisions also "applies to the review of
disciplinary sanctions." In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 28 (2007). In light of
the deference owed to these determinations, when reviewing administrative
sanctions, "[T]he test . . . is 'whether such punishment is so disproportionate to
the offense, in light of all the circumstances, as to be shocking to one's sense
of fairness.'" Id. at 28-29 (quoting In re Polk, 90 N.J. 550, 578 (1982)).
Guided by these principles, we uphold the Board's determination
imposing a partial forfeiture of Barnett's pension benefits. Having considered
the facts, the surrounding circumstances, and the equitable considerations
presented, we are satisfied the Board reasonably applied the pertinent factors.
In particular, we concur in the Board's emphasis on factors seven, eight, and
nine set forth in Uricoli.
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With respect to factor seven—the nature of the misconduct—the Board
reasonably concluded Barnett's conduct was serious and substantial. Among
other administrative violations, Barnett was charged with misuse of her official
position and with conduct involving advance planning. As the ALJ observed,
"the nature of the crime was serious; it was not just an attempt to purchase
pension credits at a lesser cost than that which would have been paid had the
service been eligible for purchase." Rather, as chief, Barnett directed a
subordinate employee to process and approve the application. The record
supports the conclusion Barnett used her sophisticated knowledge of the
system and exploited her position to accomplish that result.
As to factor eight—the relationship of the misconduct to the member's
public duties—the Board found the connection to be direct. We discern no
basis to disturb that finding. The misconduct was not attenuated from
Barnett's official responsibilities. Rather, it arose from and was facilitated by
the very position she held.
We likewise defer to the Board's reliance on factor nine—the degree of
moral turpitude. The ALJ concluded that "the nature of [Barnett's] misconduct
involved a high degree of guilt and culpability" and that her motive was
personal gain. That assessment is amply supported by the record.
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The ALJ also appropriately considered mitigating circumstances under
factor eleven. The ALJ found Barnett had "an exemplary record as an
employee prior to the offense and lost a job she loved." The ALJ also
concluded a reduction in her pension would impose a financial hardship on
Barnett and her husband. In addition, the ALJ noted Barnett's memory issues
affected her judgment and contributed to the offense. The ALJ further found
Barnett "had a long record of exemplary public service prior to the date of the
offense and has suffered severe penal sanctions for the offense." Barnett
accepted responsibility for her actions, lost both the position she valued and
her eligibility for future public employment, and continued to address her
medical issues.
Even in light of those mitigating considerations, we conclude the
sanction imposed by the Board was reasonable. The penalty reflects a
measured and deliberate assessment of the relevant factors, as informed by the
ALJ's detailed findings. The ALJ determined that the lesser penalty Barnett
requested—covering only the period from the date of the misconduct in July
2020, to September 15, 2020—would "undermine the seriousness of the
conduct." Affording appropriate deference to the Board's adoption of that
determination, we agree.
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The sanction imposed was carefully calibrated to the nature of the
misconduct and the mitigating circumstances present. Our review of the
record does not persuade us that the penalty is so disproportionate as to shock
the judicial conscience. Accordingly, we decline to disturb the Board's
decision.
To the extent we have not addressed them explicitly, Barnett's remaining
argument lacks sufficient merit to warrant discussion in this opinion. R. 2:11-
3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
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