A. Geist v. PSP (OOR)
CourtCommonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
Docket43 C.D. 2026
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Aiden Geist, :
Petitioner :
:
v. :
:
Pennsylvania State Police :
(Office of Open Records), : No. 43 C.D. 2026
Respondent : Submitted: October 13, 2026
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM FILED: November 16, 2026
Aiden Geist (Petitioner), pro se, petitions for review of the January 9,
2026 Final Determination of the Office of Open Records (OOR), which held that the
Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) did not possess the documents requested by
Petitioner pursuant to the Right-to-Know Law (RTKL).1 Upon review, we affirm.
I. Background
Petitioner was involved in a traffic stop in Fort Washington,
Pennsylvania with an unidentified state trooper on October 26, 2025, after which
Petitioner submitted a complaint to the PSP’s Internal Affairs Division (IAD
Complaint) about the incident. Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 13.2 On November 5,
2025, Petitioner submitted an RTKL request (Request) to the PSP, seeking “[t]he
name, rank, and badge or identification number of the trooper who initiated or
1
Act of February 14, 2008, P.L. 6, 65 P.S. §§ 67.101-67.3104.
2
Reproduced Record citations are to electronic pagination.
conducted” the traffic stop “on October 26, 2025, at approximately 8:15 PM on the
Pennsylvania Turnpike (I-276) eastbound near mile marker 340, Fort Washington,
PA.” Id. at 4. After requesting a 30-day extension to respond, the PSP denied
Petitioner’s Request, informing him that the PSP did not have any responsive records
in its possession, custody or control. Id. at 6-7 & 10.
Petitioner appealed to the OOR on December 12, 2025, challenging the
PSP’s denial and arguing that it failed to conduct a good faith search pursuant to
Section 901 of the RTKL, 65 P.S. § 67.901, because the PSP searched only its
Record Management System (RMS). R.R. at 15. The OOR invited both parties to
supplement the record. See id. at 36. On December 24, 2025, the PSP provided an
affidavit from its open records officer, William Rozier (Rozier Affidavit), who
explained, in relevant part:
7. The [PSP] reviewed the [R]equest and searched all
[PSP] databases and the Axon system where audio/video
records are stored for evidence of any PSP records that
may identify the occurrence.
8. The [PSP] checked the RMS [] which logs and
details . . . any interaction between a trooper and the
citizen which is called into the PSP Communications
Office. No [ ] [r]eport was found based upon the
information provided by [Petitioner].
9. Using the information and description provided
by [Petitioner], the PSP [ ] conducted a search for any
audio/video recording that may identify any contact with
[Petitioner] and was unable to locate any audio/video
recordings for the time and location generated by a PSP
patrol vehicle.
2
10. Additionally, [t]he [PSP] contacted PSP Troop T,
Highspire, which indicated they have no audio/video
recording associated with this incident.
11. Additionally, the PSP [ ] contacted the PSP Bureau of
Professional Responsibility pursuant to the complaint filed
by [Petitioner]. This Bureau is responsible for
investigating complaints made against PSP Personnel.
This office did so in order to ascertain any information
as to the identity of a Trooper based upon their
investigation into the complaint with negative results.
Id. at 25 (emphasis added). On January 3, 2026, Petitioner submitted a letter in
support of his appeal in which he recounted an alleged phone call with Corporal
Kenneth Konek (Corporal Konek) regarding Petitioner’s IAD complaint. Id. at 34.
Petitioner attested that Corporal Konek “referenced the October 26, 2025 traffic
stop, . . . the exact incident of [his R]equest, and quoted [his] verbatim statements
made to the involved trooper,” but declined to provide the trooper’s identity upon
Petitioner’s request. Id.
On January 9, 2026, the OOR denied Petitioner’s appeal, finding that
the PSP satisfied its burden of proof that it did not possess the records sought by the
Request. Id. at 38-39. Petitioner thereafter filed a timely appeal with this Court.
II. Issues
Before this Court,3 Petitioner argues that the PSP failed to carry its
burden of proving that responsive documents did not exist. Petitioner’s Br. at 8.
Specifically, Petitioner argues that the Rozier Affidavit cannot be treated as
3
This Court’s standard of review under the RTKL is de novo, and we may adopt the
agency’s findings or substitute them with our own. Bowling v. Off. of Open Recs., 75 A.3d 453,
473 (Pa. 2013). Our scope of review is plenary, and we may expand the record through additional
hearings or remand. Id. at 476.
3
dispositive proof that no responsive records exist because it lacks sufficient detail to
permit meaningful judicial review. Id. at 12-13. Petitioner also maintains that the
PSP failed to conduct a good faith search because the PSP’s search was not tailored
to Petitioner’s Request and the Rozier Affidavit did not provide sufficient detail
regarding which specific databases and operational records were searched, what
search terms or filters were used, and whether complaint-related records were
reviewed. Id. at 10-11. Finally, Petitioner asserts that his alleged discussion with
Corporal Konek regarding Petitioner’s IAD complaint rebuts the PSP’s assertion that
no responsive records exist, as the IAD complaint could not be processed without
identifying the involved trooper. Id. at 13.
The PSP argues that it conducted a good faith search because it
searched all databases where records of the incident would be stored and consulted
with likely custodians. PSP’s Br. at 9. The PSP maintains that other means of
potentially identifying the trooper would be speculative and therefore futile and
outside the PSP’s burden under the RTKL. Id. at 8-9. The PSP also asserts that
Petitioner fails to establish that Corporal Konek had any knowledge of the trooper’s
identity from the October 26, 2025 traffic stop, as the conversation pertained to
Petitioner’s IAD complaint which had not yet identified the trooper in question. Id.
at 10-11.
III. Discussion
The RTKL is “designed to promote access to official government
information in order to prohibit secrets, scrutinize the actions of public officials, and
make public officials accountable for their actions.” Pa. State Educ. Ass’n v.
Commonwealth, 148 A.3d 142, 155 (Pa. 2016). When an individual submits a
request for public records under the RTKL, “an agency shall make a good faith effort
to determine if . . . the agency has possession, custody or control of the record[.]”
4
65 P.S. § 67.901. While the RTKL does not define what constitutes a “good faith
effort,” this Court has stated:
As part of a good faith search, the open records officer has
a duty to advise all custodians of potentially responsive
records about the request, and to obtain all potentially
responsive records from those in possession. When
records are not in an agency’s physical possession, an
open records officer has a duty to contact agents within its
control. . . . After obtaining all potentially responsive
records, an agency has the duty to review the records and
assess their public nature under . . . the RTKL.
Uniontown Newspapers, Inc. v. Dep’t of Corr., 185 A.3d 1161, 1172 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2018) (holding that “[a]n agency’s failure to locate responsive records until
motivated by litigation evinces bad faith”). However, an agency “cannot be required
to produce a record not in its possession, even if one would expect that it should
possess the record.” Sturgis v. Dep’t of Corr., 96 A.3d 445, 448 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014)
(emphasis added); see also Hodges v. Pa. Dep’t of Health, 29 A.3d 1190, 1192 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2011) (stating that an agency is not required to create a record if the
requested record does not exist).
The burden of proving a record does not exist, or is exempt from
disclosure, is placed on the agency responding to an RTKL request by a
preponderance of the evidence. See 65 P.S. § 67.708(a)(1). A preponderance of the
evidence standard is the lowest evidentiary standard, which “is tantamount to a more
likely than not inquiry.” Delaware Cnty. v. Schaefer, 45 A.3d 1149, 1156 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2012). This Court has repeatedly held that an attestation is generally
competent evidence to satisfy an agency’s burden of proof. Hodges, 29 A.3d at 1192
(reiterating that an agency may satisfy its burden of proof that it does not possess a
requested record with either an unsworn attestation by the individual who searched
for a record or a sworn affidavit of nonexistence of the record); see also Moore v.
5
Off. of Open Recs., 992 A.2d 907, 908-09 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). In the absence of
any competent evidence of bad faith, an agency’s averments explaining the reasons
for nondisclosure of records “should be accepted as true.” Pa. Dep’t of Health v.
Mahon, 283 A.3d 929, 936 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2022) (citing Smith Butz, LLC v. Pa. Dep’t
of Env’t Prot., 142 A.3d 941, 945 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016)).
Here, the Rozier Affidavit was competent evidence to satisfy the PSP’s
burden of proof that it does not possess records responsive to Petitioner’s Request.
The Rozier Affidavit was authored by the PSP’s open records officer who
investigated the Request and the Rozier Affidavit asserted five separate bases
supporting the nonexistence of responsive documents. R.R. at 24-25; see also
Hodges, 29 A.3d at 1192; Paul v. Pa. State Police, 361 A.3d 695, 700-01 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2026) (holding that a PSP affidavit was sufficient evidence where the
author attests to personal investigation of the request and asserts bases on which the
request was denied). While Petitioner argues that the Rozier Affidavit was
conclusory and insufficiently detailed regarding the PSP’s search process, this Court
has determined that a no-records attestation requires less detail than an attestation
that invokes an RTKL exemption. Mahon, 283 A.3d at 936 (holding that, when there
is evidence that a record does not exist, “[i]t is questionable to what degree additional
detail and explanation are necessary to establish the nonexistence of a record rather
than its exemption from disclosure”). Accordingly, the Rozier Affidavit’s general
description of the different searches conducted and the negative results therefrom
are sufficient to establish the nonexistence of any responsive records.
Further, the Rozier Affidavit plainly disputed Petitioner’s argument
that the PSP failed to conduct a good faith, thorough, and tailored search based on
the details provided in his Request. Petitioner’s Br. at 11-12. Specifically, the
Rozier Affidavit repeatedly stated that the PSP reviewed the Request and “searched
all PSP databases and the Axon system where audio/video records are stored for
6
evidence of any PSP records,” checked its systems “based upon the information
provided by [Petitioner],” and attempted to “ascertain any information as to the
identity of a Trooper based upon [the PSP’s] investigation into the [IAD
C]omplaint.” R.R. at 25 (emphasis added). Thus, contrary to Petitioner’s assertions,
the PSP’s competent evidence established that it searched all of its relevant databases
applying five separate search methods based on the details provided in Petitioner’s
Request and IAD Complaint.
Finally, while Petitioner baldly asserts that his conversation with
Corporal Konek in connection with Petitioner’s IAD complaint rebuts the PSP’s
evidence of nonexistence, he fails to provide any evidence or legal analysis to
support his assertion that the processing of a complaint first requires identification
of the trooper involved.4 See Petitioner’s Br. at 13-14; see also Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a)
(requiring the argument portion of an appellate brief to support each question raised
with discussion and citation of authorities deemed pertinent). Regardless, even if
Petitioner believes records should have been created in connection with the
processing of his IAD Complaint, the PSP cannot be required to produce a record
not in its possession. Sturgis, 96 A.3d at 448 (holding that a petitioner’s argument
that a record should have been created pursuant to Section 9764(a)(8) of the
Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9764(a)(8), did not require the Department of
Corrections to disclose a record whose nonexistence was established by competent
evidence). Because the PSP presented competent evidence to establish the
4
Even so, we emphasize that an RTKL request pertains to physical records, not general
knowledge. See 65 P.S. § 67.102 (“The term [‘record’] includes a document, paper, letter, map,
book, tape, photograph, film or sound recording, information stored or maintained electronically
and a data-processed or image-processed document.”). Stated otherwise, even if the PSP might
know the trooper’s identity, the RTKL requires only that the PSP produce physical records
revealing that identity, not that it state the trooper’s name and badge number separately from any
such records.
7
nonexistence of responsive records, the issue of whether identifying documents
should exist is irrelevant to our inquiry.
IV. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing discussion, the January 9, 2026 Final
Determination of the OOR is affirmed.
8
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Aiden Geist, :
Petitioner :
:
v. :
:
Pennsylvania State Police :
(Office of Open Records), : No. 43 C.D. 2026
Respondent :
PER CURIAM
ORDER
AND NOW, this 16th day of November, 2026, the January 9, 2026 Final
Determination of the Office of Open Records is AFFIRMED.