Full Opinion

Filed Washington State Court of Appeals Division Two October 27, 2026 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION II In the Matter of the Marriage of: No. 61890-7-II KARENA LYNN MCKENZIE, Respondent, and UNPUBLISHED OPINION SCOTT MCKENZIE, Appellant. GLASGOW, J.—Karena McKenzie and Scott McKenzie dissolved their marriage in 2021. They had one child, ZM, who was five years old at the time. The trial court approved a parenting plan that provided for equal residential parenting time and joint decision making. In 2025, Karena’s work schedule changed and ZM’s time in before- and after-school care increased. Scott believed spending more time in care of others was detrimental to ZM and petitioned to modify the parenting plan. Scott’s proposed modification sought to make him the primary residential parent and to reduce Karena’s residential time with the child to every other weekend. The trial court did not find adequate cause to support a full hearing on the proposed modification and dismissed Scott’s petition. We affirm. No. 61890-7-II FACTS I. BACKGROUND Karena and Scott1 have one child, ZM, together. The trial court approved a parenting plan in May 2021 and found no reason to impose limitations on either parent. The parenting plan required Karena and Scott to split residential time equally by implementing a “week-on/week-off schedule,” with an opportunity for a visit with ZM on Tuesdays during each parent’s “off” week. Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 3. The parenting plan also established joint decision making regarding major education and healthcare decisions. The plan also designated mediation as the appropriate mechanism for resolving disagreements about shared decisions regarding ZM. In 2025, Karena’s work schedule changed to four, nine-hour shifts per week. This required ZM, then 10 years old, to spend additional time in before- and after-school care on the four days Karena worked. Around the same time, both Karena and Scott observed that ZM was “‘feeling stressed’” and “having a hard time.” CP at 20-21. A school counselor met with ZM and relayed that ZM explained she was “primarily concerned about a lingering sports injury that was preventing her from playing softball.” CP at 21. Scott disagreed about the source of ZM’s stress and believed it derived from ZM’s extended time at before- and after-school care. Scott, who retired early from his job in 2025, offered to provide this care for ZM during Karena’s residential time. Karena declined Scott’s offer. II. PETITION TO MODIFY PARENTING PLAN In June 2025, Scott petitioned the court to modify the parenting plan, asking to reduce Karena’s residential time and decision making authority, while also reducing Scott’s child support 1 Because the parties share the same last name, we refer to them by their first names. 2 No. 61890-7-II obligation. Scott’s proposed parenting plan would establish Scott as the primary residential parent and limit Karena’s residential time to “Every other Friday at 6:00 PM through the following Monday at 6:00 PM.” CP at 31. Scott argued that major modification to the parenting plan was warranted because ZM’s “current living situation is harmful to [her] physical, mental, or emotional health.” CP at 13. Specifically, Scott told the trial court that ZM was “showing signs of emotional stress” and “having a hard time” due to ZM’s prolonged before- and after-school care during Karena’s residential weeks. CP at 20. Scott claimed that his early retirement allowed him to provide “better quality care” for the child and that it is “evident” that the child was much happier spending time with Scott than attending before- and after-school care. CP at 21. Karena opposed the petition for modification and moved for an adequate cause decision, requesting that the trial court find no adequate cause to support a full hearing on the petition to modify the parenting plan. III. TRIAL COURT ORDER DENYING MODIFICATION After reviewing the documentary evidence, the trial court found no adequate cause to support a full hearing on the merits and dismissed Scott’s petition to modify the parenting plan. In making its decision, the trial court highlighted that the “circumstances for changing a parenting plan are very limited” and require the petitioner to make a “very, very high threshold showing” that living in the other parent’s home is detrimental to the child’s health, safety, and welfare. 1 Verbatim Rep. of Proc. (VRP) at 16. The trial court further explained that disputes over childcare are not necessarily evidence that the child’s living situation is detrimental to their health. 3 No. 61890-7-II The trial court also acknowledged that while ZM had both a sports injury and challenges with her before- and after-school care, the childcare arrangements had since been changed.2 The trial court emphasized that reducing Karena from equal residential time with ZM to having ZM every other weekend was “a huge leap to make” on these facts. 1 VRP at 17. It also explained that under the parenting plan, mediation is the appropriate mechanism for resolving these types of disputes, “but changing the parenting plan is a last resort, and only under very unusual circumstances will the Court do it.” 1 VRP at 18. Accordingly, the trial court found there was no adequate cause to have a full hearing and dismissed Scott’s petition to modify the parenting plan. Scott appeals. ANALYSIS I. REQUIREMENTS FOR MAJOR MODIFICATION OF A PARENTING PLAN A. Legal Principles A trial court generally shall not modify a parenting plan unless it finds that “a substantial change has occurred in the circumstances of the child or the nonmoving party” and that “modification is in the best interest of the child.” RCW 26.09.260(1). Additionally, there is a strong presumption against modifying residential schedules in parenting plans because such changes can be highly disruptive to children. In re Marriage of MacLaren, 8 Wn. App. 2d 751, 771, 440 P.3d 1055 (2019). The trial court may modify a parenting plan only in enumerated circumstances, 2 The trial court referenced this information, which was discussed at the motion to deny adequate cause hearing on September 26, 2025. However, we note that this information was also included in Karena’s strict reply, which she attached as appendices to her Brief of Respondent filed in this court. But Karena failed to designate the documents she included as appendices as clerk’s papers for our record under RAP 9.6(a), which permits a respondent to supplement the designation of clerk’s papers when necessary. Thus, we decline to consider the appendices to Karena’s Brief of Respondent because they are not part of our record. 4 No. 61890-7-II including if the “present environment is detrimental to the child’s physical, mental, or emotional health and the harm likely to be caused by a change of environment is outweighed by the advantage of a change to the child.” RCW 26.09.260(2)(c). In the interest of finality, parties must meet a high bar to modify a parenting plan. In re Parentage of Jannot, 149 Wn.2d 123, 128, 65 P.3d 664 (2003). The moving party must first make a threshold showing of adequate cause for modification before a full hearing on the merits of the petition is granted. In re Marriage of Zigler, 154 Wn. App. 803, 809, 226 P.3d 202 (2010). At this threshold stage, adequate cause requires facts and evidence, “not self-serving or conclusory statements.” MacLaren, 8 Wn. App. 2d at 774. The evidence must support “‘a finding on each fact that the movant must prove in order to modify.’” Id. at 773 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re Custody of E.A.T.W., 168 Wn.2d 335, 347, 227 P.3d 1284 (2010)). If the trial court finds the petitioner has failed to establish adequate cause, it must dismiss the petition without holding a full hearing on the merits. In re Custody of Halls, 126 Wn. App. 599, 607-08, 109 P.3d 15 (2005) (citing RCW 26.09.270). “A trial court’s . . . adequate cause determination should be overturned only where the trial court has abused its discretion.” Jannot, 149 Wn.2d at128. This occurs when a court’s decision is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds. In re Marriage of McDole, 122 Wn.2d 604, 610, 859 P.2d 1239 (1993). Trial judges are better suited than appellate judges to determine whether submitted affidavits show adequate cause to warrant a hearing on a petition to modify a parenting plan because trial judges serving in family court are best suited to assign the proper weight to the multiple, fact-intensive considerations that are relevant to modification. Jannot, 149 Wn.2d at 126-27. 5 No. 61890-7-II B. Adequate Cause Determination Here, Scott contends that the trial court erred by ignoring his evidence of alleged substantial changes in Karena’s circumstances that were detrimental to ZM’s physical, mental, or emotional health. We disagree. Scott argued that Karena’s change in work schedule, ZM’s increased time in before- and after-school care, and Scott’s own availability to care for ZM were substantial changes requiring modification to the parenting plan. Scott’s evidence that ZM was experiencing negative mental and emotional consequences because of these changes included, (1) Scott’s claim that ZM said before- and after-school care was causing her stress and (2) Scott’s opinion that ZM was happier spending time with Scott before and after school. Scott did not submit any additional evidence that splitting residential time equally with Karena was detrimental to ZM’s physical, mental, or emotional health. Scott’s affidavit acknowledged that a school counselor who spoke with ZM and determined that ZM was “primarily concerned about a lingering sports injury that was preventing her from playing softball.” CP at 39. Under this context, it was uncertain whether ZM’s emotional distress was even related to her residential time with Karena and before- and after-school care at all. The trial court was in the best position to evaluate the weight and credibility of such evidence; accordingly, we defer to the trial court’s judgment. See Jannot, 149 Wn.2d at 126-27. On this evidence, it was not unreasonable for the trial court to find that the alleged stress or unhappiness was not detrimental to [ZM’s] physical, mental, or emotional health. RCW 26.09.260(2)(c). Scott’s allegations, without more, do not meet the burden required to advance to a full hearing. 6 No. 61890-7-II Furthermore, it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to dismiss Scott’s petition despite his recent increase in available time to watch ZM. Under RCW 26.09.260(1), the court must not modify a parenting plan unless it finds that a substantial change has occurred in the circumstances of the child or the nonmoving party. Scott’s increase in availability is a change in his own circumstances, not “the circumstances of the child or the nonmoving party.” RCW 26.09.260(1). Thus, Scott’s change in circumstances is not a significant change the court could rely on under the statute. Furthermore, evidence of Scott’s increase in availability is not responsive to the facts he had to prove, chiefly that ZM’s environment when with Karena was detrimental to ZM’s physical, mental, or emotional health. The trial court’s determination that Scott’s evidence was insufficient to show adequate cause for a full hearing on the merits is supported by this record. CONCLUSION The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding no adequate cause for full hearing and dismissing Scott’s petition to modify the parenting plan. We affirm. 7 No. 61890-7-II A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered. GLASGOW, J. We concur: VELJACIC, C.J. PRICE, J. 8