Full Opinion

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed October 1, 2026 In The Fifteenth Court of Appeals NO. 15-25-00154-CV EIREVBENAGIE OBAZEE, Appellant V. TEXAS HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Appellee On Appeal from the 98th District Court Travis County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. D-1-GN-22-002077 MEMORANDUM OPINION The administrative law judge’s (ALJ) order affirmed the Health and Human Services Commission’s (HHSC) decision that Eirevbenagie Obazee committed reportable neglect in his duties at a State Supported Living Center. The trial court affirmed the ALJ’s order. The question before us is whether the ALJ’s order was supported by substantial evidence. Because it was, we affirm the district court’s judgment. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Obazee worked at the State Supported Living Center (SSLC) in Denton as a direct support professional. On February 23, 2020, Obazee agreed to provide one- to-one care for a resident, J.W. J.W. was diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder, schizoaffective-disorder-bipolar-type, schizophrenia, mild intellectual disability disorder, and substance abuse. J.W. was known to engage in self-injurious behavior. Due to the self-injurious behavior and other behaviors, J.W. had a Positive Behavior Support Plan in place that required a one-to-one level of supervision, including no privacy in the bathroom or his bedroom. Obazee was aware of J.W.’s history of self-injurious behavior. At the hearing before the ALJ, Obazee disputed that he received training on J.W.’s Positive Behavior Support Plan; however, he acknowledged he received training on levels of supervision and knew that J.W. required one-to-one supervision. At 2:45 p.m. on February 23, 2020, Obazee signed a Level of Supervision (LOS) card assuming the responsibility of providing one-to-one supervision for J.W.; the signed LOS sheet instructed that staff should not allow J.W. privacy in the bathroom or in his bedroom. Obazee testified that he understood that one-to-one supervision required that J.W. not have privacy in the bathroom. At approximately 6:45 p.m., Obazee asked another staff member, Wendell Wood, to take over supervision of J.W. However, Obazee did not present J.W.’s LOS sheet for Wood to sign, and Wood was not trained in providing one-to-one supervision for J.W. At 6:53 p.m., Wood left J.W. alone in his bedroom for approximately two minutes when he went to an adjacent room to ask Obazee to resume supervision because both Wood and J.W. needed to use the restroom. Wood proceeded to go to the restroom. At 6:55 p.m., J.W. exited his bedroom with a backpack and water bottle and went to a different bathroom than 2 Wood without staff supervision. At 6:56 p.m., J.W. left his backpack and water bottle in the bathroom, returned to his room, retrieved a few items, and then returned to the restroom still unsupervised. At 6:57 p.m., J.W. went into the restroom and closed the door still unsupervised. At 7:01 p.m., Obazee first approached the bathroom door and stood outside. The door was closed, and Obazee did not open the door or go into the bathroom. Video surveillance showed that the bathroom door was completely shut at this time. J.W. exited the bathroom at 7:09 p.m. with his backpack and water bottle and headed back to his room. Obazee followed J.W. At approximately 9:19 p.m., Obazee noticed J.W. was breathing heavily and called for the nurse. After a pulse and heartbeat could not be found, the paramedics were called. J.W. was pronounced dead at the hospital. The autopsy report concluded that J.W. died from a lethal overdose of diphenhydramine, also known as Benadryl. After J.W.’s death, an empty bottle of Benadryl was found in the backpack he had taken into the bathroom. The autopsy found the manner of death to be suicide. HHSC investigated after the tragic incident. The HHSC determined that Obazee’s conduct was neglect that rose to the level of reportable conduct that necessitated placement on the Employee Misconduct Registry (EMR). See Tex. Hum. Res. Code § 48.403; Tex. Health & Safety Code § 253.007. “Placement in the [EMR] is effectively career-ending.” Mosley v. Tex. Health & Hum. Servs. Comm’n, 593 S.W.3d 250, 255 (Tex. 2019). Obazee requested a contested-case hearing before an ALJ to challenge the HHSC’s findings of reportable conduct. See Tex. Hum. Res. Code § 48.404(b). After a hearing was held, the ALJ rendered a Final Decision and Order (the ALJ’s Order) affirming the HHSC’s finding. See id. § 48.405(b). Appellant filed a 3 motion for rehearing, and the agency overruled the motion. Obazee then filed suit for judicial review in Travis County district court. See id. § 48.406(b). After the court affirmed the ALJ’s Order, Obazee filed this appeal. STANDARD OF REVIEW The standard of review of the ALJ’s decision in the trial court and on appeal is substantial evidence. Tex. Health & Hum. Servs. Comm’n v. Canto, No. 15-24- 00080-CV, 2025 WL 2471263, at *2 (Tex. App.—15th Dist. Aug. 28, 2025, no pet.); see also Tex. Gov’t Code § 2001.174. In applying the substantial evidence standard, a court “may not substitute [its] judgment for the judgment of the state agency on the weight of the evidence.” Dyer v. Tex. Comm’n on Env’t Quality, 646 S.W.3d 498, 514 (Tex. 2022). In assessing whether the agency’s decision is “reasonably supported by substantial evidence,” Tex. Gov’t Code § 2001.174(2)(E), the issue is not whether the agency’s decision is correct, but only whether the record demonstrates some reasonable basis for the decision. Tex. Comm’n on Env’t Quality v. Maverick Cnty., 642 S.W.3d 537, 544 (Tex. 2022) (“The true test is not whether the agency reached the correct conclusion, but whether some reasonable basis exists in the record for the action taken by the agency.”) (quoting Tex. Health Facilities Comm’n v. Charter Med.-Dallas, Inc., 665 S.W.2d 446, 452 (Tex. 1984)). Neither we nor the trial court may substitute our judgment for the judgment of the state agency on the weight of the evidence. Dyer, 646 S.W.3d at 514. Instead, “[w]e must uphold the agency’s ultimate decision if the evidence ‘is such that reasonable minds could have reached the conclusion that the agency must have reached in order to justify its action.’” Id. (quoting Charter Med.-Dallas, Inc., 665 S.W.2d at 453). Under the substantial evidence standard, a reviewing court shall reverse or remand a case for further proceedings if the appellant’s “substantial rights” have 4 been prejudiced “because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions” are: (A) in violation of a constitutional or statutory provision; (B) in excess of the agency’s statutory authority; (C) made through unlawful procedure; (D) affected by other error of law; (E) not reasonably supported by substantial evidence considering the reliable and probative evidence in the record as a whole; or (F) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion. Tex. Gov’t Code § 2001.174(2). The agency’s findings, inferences, conclusions, and decisions are “presumed to be supported by substantial evidence, and the burden is on the contestant to demonstrate otherwise.” Maverick Cnty., 642 S.W.3d at 547 (quoting Charter Med.-Dallas, Inc., 665 S.W.2d at 453). Whether the contestant has met this burden is a question of law, see Dyer, 646 S.W.3d at 505, and on review, we focus on the agency’s decision without deference to the trial court’s judgment, see Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Alford, 209 S.W.3d 101, 103 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam) (noting that an appellate court applies substantial evidence review without deference to district court). ANALYSIS I. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding of reportable neglect. In a single issue presented on appeal, Obazee raises two arguments. Obazee first challenges the ALJ’s Order for not being supported by substantial evidence. The Human Resources Code explains “‘reportable conduct’ includes [in relevant part] . . . abuse or neglect that causes or may cause death or harm to an individual receiving agency services.” Tex. Hum. Res. Code § 48.401(5). “[N]eglect is 5 defined as a negligent act or omission which caused or may have caused physical or emotional injury or death to an individual receiving services[.]” 26 Tex. Admin. Code § 711.19(a) (Health & Hum. Servs. Comm’n, How is neglect defined?). The HHSC rule provides a non-exhaustive list of examples of neglect, several of which are especially helpful here, such as “the failure to . . . establish or carry out an appropriate individual program plan or treatment plan for a specific individual receiving services, if such failure results in . . . death to an individual receiving services or which placed an individual receiving services at risk of physical or emotional injury or death[.]” Id. § 711.19(b)(1). Or failing to “provide a safe environment for a specific individual receiving services, including the failure to maintain adequate numbers of appropriately trained staff, if such failure results in physical or emotional injury or death to an individual receiving services or which placed an individual receiving services at risk of physical or emotional injury or death.” Id. § 711.19(b)(3). Here, the ALJ concluded that HHSC met its burden of proof on the question of neglect based on evidence that Obazee was aware that J.W. required one-to-one supervision but failed to exercise the appropriate level of supervision while J.W. was in his care. The record is replete with evidence to support the ALJ’s finding: Obazee had been trained on levels of supervision; Obazee signed J.W.’s LOS sheet that indicated J.W. was not allowed privacy in the bathroom or bedroom; Obazee allowed J.W. to be in the bathroom unsupervised for over ten minutes; and he was aware of J.W.’s history of suicidal behavior. The ALJ also considered other evidence, such as testimony from Obazee; J.W.’s mother; the Chief Toxicologist of Tarrant County Medical Examiner’s Office; and others. The ALJ also reviewed numerous exhibits, including videotape of the incident. A reasonable person could have found that Obazee’s failure to ensure J.W. was under one-to-one supervision 6 resulted in his death. See Dyer, 646 S.W.3d at 514 (explaining that the correct substantial evidence test is if the evidence “is such that reasonable minds could have reached the conclusion that the agency must have reached in order to justify its action.”); see also 26 Tex. Admin. Code § 711.19(b)(1), (b)(3). There is substantial evidence on which the ALJ could have reasonably based the order, regardless of the evidence Obazee presented in his defense. It was up to the ALJ to determine the credibility of the witnesses and evidence before it, and we are not to second-guess such credibility determinations or to weigh competing evidence presented to the ALJ. Dyer, 646 S.W.3d at 514. Our decision is merely whether there is sufficient evidence to support the ALJ’s decision and, here, there is. Thus, we conclude substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s Order. II. The decision was not arbitrary or capricious. Obazee secondly argues that the agency’s decision was arbitrary and capricious for ignoring the evidence. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 2001.174(2)(F). If an agency decision is supported by substantial evidence, it will only be reversed as “arbitrary and capricious” in narrow circumstances. Tex. Comm’n on Env’t Quality v. Friends of Dry Comal Creek, 669 S.W.3d 506, 517 (Tex. App.—Austin 2023, pet. denied) (citing Charter Med.-Dallas, Inc., 665 S.W.2d at 454). An arbitrary decision: “fails to consider a mandatory factor, considers an irrelevant factor, considers appropriate factors but reaches a completely unreasonable result, or fails to follow its own regulations.” Save Our Springs All., Inc. v. Tex. Comm’n on Env’t Quality, 713 S.W.3d 308, 320 (Tex. 2025). As discussed above, the HHSC findings and the ALJ decision were supported by substantial evidence. Obazee has not raised any of the narrow 7 circumstances in which such a decision would be arbitrary and capricious. Therefore, we overrule this issue on appeal. CONCLUSION Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s Order, and Obazee has not shown that the decision was arbitrary and capricious. We accordingly affirm the judgment of the trial court.1 /s/ Scott K. Field Scott K. Field Justice Panel consists of Chief Justice Brister and Justices Field and Farris. 1 In his sole issue presented on appeal, Obazee cites all subparts of section 2001.174(2) (A)–(F) of the Texas Government Code. However, Obazee only addresses two grounds in his argument: (1) the order is not supported by substantial evidence; and (2) the order is arbitrary and capricious. To the extent Obazee attempts to raise other grounds, we need not address the other grounds due to inadequate briefing. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i). 8