Full Opinion

United States Court of Appeals FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT Argued September 23, 2026 Decided November 20, 2026 No. 25-5257 NICHOLAS VOEGELI, APPELLANT v. HUNG CAO, ACTING SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, APPELLEE Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (No. 1:24-cv-01236) Paul Brzyski argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were Brian D. Schenk and Daniel N. Lerman. Johnny H. Walker, III, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief was Jeanine Ferris Pirro, U.S. Attorney. Before: MILLETT and WALKER, Circuit Judges, and EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge. Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WALKER. Senior Circuit Judge EDWARDS concurs in the judgment. 2 WALKER, Circuit Judge: Not long after the dust had settled over the Battle of Yorktown, General George Washington debuted the Badge of Military Merit. Ever “desirous to cherish a virtuous ambition in his soldiers,” Washington bestowed the honor on those who performed “singularly meritorious action” during their service in the Continental Army. General Orders of George Washington issued at Newburgh on the Hudson, 1782–1783 (Aug. 7, 1782), at 34–35 (Edward C. Boynton ed. 1973). But by requiring “incontestible proof” before “this favor” could “be conferred on any man,” Washington required evidence that was sometimes unavailable to heroic and otherwise deserving soldiers. Id. Today, the President may award the Navy and Marine Corps Medal to “any person who, while serving in any capacity with the Navy or the Marine Corps, distinguishes himself by heroism not involving actual conflict with an enemy.” 10 U.S.C. § 8296(a)(1). And under Navy policy, all nominations for the decoration “must include statements from at least two eyewitnesses.” Secretary of the Navy, Navy and Marine Corps Awards Manual, 2-76 (2019). Nicholas Voegeli brings this lawsuit to challenge the Navy’s denial of his nomination for the Navy and Marine Corps Medal. While we recognize his heroism, and while we believe the Navy could have explained its decision better than it did, we hold that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to the Navy under the deferential standard of review required by the Administrative Procedure Act. I The City of Madison, Wisconsin, sits on an isthmus between Lake Mendota and Lake Monona. On the southern 3 shore of Lake Mendota sits the City’s flagship institution: the University of Wisconsin–Madison. See C. W. Butterfield, History of the University of Wisconsin 44 (1879). In 1992, Nicholas Voegeli was serving as a Lieutenant in the Navy Reserve. At the same time, he was a graduate business student and sailing instructor at the University. That summer, Voegeli saved a man’s life. Voegeli was teaching sailing to students from a pier on Lake Mendota. A student’s boat had capsized. He was thrown overboard, and was beginning to drown. Springing into action, Voegeli dove into the water and swam two hundred feet toward the student. Despite turbulent waves, Voegeli managed to keep him afloat long enough for a motorboat to arrive. Voegeli’s reserve unit nominated him for the Coast Guard Gold Lifesaving Medal, the Coast Guard’s highest award for saving or attempting to save someone from drowning, shipwreck, or water peril at extreme personal risk. See 14 U.S.C. § 2744(a)(1); 33 C.F.R. § 13.01-5. The nomination packet included sworn statements from the student whose life Voegeli saved and the motorboat operator. After the Coast Guard considered the nomination, Voegeli received a Coast Guard Public Service Commendation, a less prestigious but still prominent award. At that time, Voegeli was under the belief that the window to be nominated for a Navy decoration — specifically, the Navy and Marine Corps Medal — had closed. But decades later, in 2018, Voegeli read a news article about a Vietnam War veteran who had years after the fact received a military decoration with the help of his congressional representative. So Voegeli reached out to Wisconsin Senator Ron Johnson, who agreed to ask the Navy to evaluate Voegeli’s eligibility for the Navy and Marine Corps Medal. 4 Voegeli attempted to find the two eyewitnesses to his heroic act. Among other things, he searched University of Wisconsin–Madison records and submitted FOIA requests to the Coast Guard. But to no avail. Instead, he produced the single-paragraph citation accompanying his Public Service Commendation, which in turn incorporates a summary of action from Captain Lipinski, the executive officer of his unit in 1992. He also presented Lipinski’s present-day affidavit attesting that the initial nomination packet included “sworn statements of two witnesses.” JA 94–95. The Office of the Chief of Naval Operations denied the nomination. It explained that under Navy policy, Voegeli’s submissions could not serve “as a substitute for the two required eyewitness statements.” JA 104. Voegeli then appealed to the Navy’s Board for Correction of Naval Records. The Board for Correction of Naval Records referred the matter to the Board of Decorations and Medals. That advisory body recommended that Voegeli’s nomination be denied. In the advisory body’s view, Voegeli “has not provided any eyewitness testimony except his own,” and his “own account of his own actions cannot form the factual basis of any decoration for heroism.” JA 49. Nor do “Lipinski’s statements about alleged previous eyewitness testimony” qualify as “an acceptable substitute for the required eyewitness statements.” Id. The Board for Correction of Naval Records ultimately denied Voegeli’s application. In a terse opinion, the Board concluded that Voegeli “did not meet the baseline eligibility criteria” and “Lipinski’s testimony was not a functional equivalent of, or adequate substitute for, the two required eyewitness statements.” JA 24. 5 Voegeli sued to challenge the Board’s decision as arbitrary and capricious. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Secretary of the Navy. The court held that the Board’s refusal to waive the requirement of two eyewitnesses was not arbitrary and capricious because it was reasonable for the Board to conclude that Lipinski’s testimony could not stand in for the eyewitness statements themselves. We affirm. II We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Robinson v. Pezzat, 818 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2016). Under the Administrative Procedure Act, reviewing courts shall “hold unlawful and set aside agency action” if it is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). Our review under that standard is “narrow” — the court may not “substitute its judgment for that of the agency.” Muwekma Ohlone Tribe v. Salazar, 708 F.3d 209, 220 (D.C. Cir. 2013). And for military records correction decisions, that narrow review is even narrower, involving “an unusually deferential application of the arbitrary or capricious standard.” McKinney v. Wormuth, 5 F.4th 42, 45 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (cleaned up). III A In 1942, the Navy and Marine Corps Medal was specifically created to recognize “heroism not involving actual conflict with an enemy.” Pub. L. No. 77-702, § 5, 56 Stat. 743, 744 (1942) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 8296). The 6 medal has been awarded to those who have “voluntarily placed” their own lives “in peril,” usually while saving (or attempting to save) someone else’s life. Secretary of the Navy, Navy and Marine Corps Awards Manual, 2-22, 2-43 (2019). The award’s most famous recipient was honored only a couple years after its creation — for his “extremely heroic conduct as Commanding Officer of Motor Torpedo Boat 109 following the collision and sinking of that vessel in the Pacific War Area.” The sailor “unhesitatingly braved the difficulties and hazards of darkness to direct rescue operations,” and swam “many hours to secure aid and food after he had succeeded in getting his crew ashore.” His name was John F. Kennedy. See Navy and Marine Corps Medal, Citation for Navy and Marine Corps Medal, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum, perma.cc/Z44Y-W7LL, perma.cc/QES3-S8RZ. All nominations for the Navy and Marine Corps Medal “must include statements from at least two eyewitnesses.” Navy and Marine Corps Awards Manual at 2-76. “Each statement must be written in the first person, in the witness’s own words, and must only include what the witness personally observed.” Id. at 8-11. “[H]earsay, or any other information later learned . . . from some other source,” is not allowed. Id. at 2-77. On top of that, both statements “must describe the awardee’s actions in sufficient detail to support how the heroic act(s) rendered the awardee conspicuous and well above the standard expected.” Id. at 8-11. In today’s case, the nomination packet submitted on Voegeli’s behalf does not contain any statements from any eyewitnesses. It is true that Voegeli provided his own testimony, and we credit his account of the rescue. But Navy policy provides that statements “by the individual being nominated cannot form the factual basis” for an award. Id. at 2-76. 7 Voegeli also submitted Lipinski’s summary of action (as incorporated into the single-paragraph citation attached to the Public Service Commendation), as well as Lipinski’s affidavit testimony that the initial nomination packet to the Coast Guard included two eyewitness statements. But Lipinski did not personally witness what happened. His understanding of the underlying events came from the two eyewitness statements attached to Voegeli’s nomination packet for the Coast Guard Gold Lifesaving Medal. Though those materials provide reason to believe that Voegeli deserves our great admiration, it was reasonable for the Board to conclude that they do not satisfy the evidentiary requirements for the award.1 As its name suggests, Lipinski’s summary of action (as incorporated into the Coast Guard citation) is merely a summary — not a detailed description of the underlying events. And Lipinski’s affidavit merely attests to the existence of the eyewitness statements at some point more than two decades ago; it does not spell out or corroborate the contents of those statements. So the Board did not err in concluding that neither the summary nor Lipinski’s affidavit provided a sufficient basis for the Board to find the detailed facts required by the award’s demanding criteria. B None of Voegeli’s counterarguments are persuasive. First, Voegeli relies on this court’s decision in Haselwander v. McHugh, 774 F.3d 990 (D.C. Cir. 2014). There, a Vietnam War veteran sought to correct his military 1 The Secretary does not dispute that the two-eyewitness-statements requirement may be waived if the candidate offers “functional equivalent” evidence. Appellee Br. 27–28 (quoting JA 24). We proceed on that basis. 8 record to reflect that he was wounded in action. Id. at 991–92. He came forward with abundant evidence about his service- related injuries, including personal “references who could corroborate his story, along with photographs taken at the time when he was wounded showing him with bandages on his face and shoulder and wearing a dispensary-issued scrub top.” Id. at 991. The Army Board for Correction of Military Records rejected that effort, finding that there was “no available medical record to corroborate the photographs.” Id. at 992 (cleaned up). We were unimpressed with that circular logic: “It simply makes no sense” to deny the application on the grounds that “he has no medical records” when the entire point of the application is to rectify the Board’s failure to create those records in the first place. Id. at 1000 (cleaned up). Voegeli’s case is different than Haselwander. Haselwander provided detailed, documentary evidence. Voegeli, through no fault of his own, was unable to find such evidence. It was likely available in 1992, but it appears that it is not available today. See JA 24 (noting absence of “any documentary evidence”). Second, Voegeli points out that even though he “is unable to provide military personnel or medical records,” the Board has a statutory obligation to “make reasonable efforts to obtain the records” and then “inform the claimant of the results of the board’s efforts.” 10 U.S.C. § 1552(a)(3)(C). But Voegeli has conceded that the two eyewitness statements no longer exist — either because the “Coast Guard failed to retain” the nomination packet materials or because they have since “been destroyed.”2 Appellant Br. 43; JA 11, 94. 2 Because the question was not raised by the parties, we need not decide whether the duty to search records extends beyond the Naval Department. 9 Third and finally, Voegeli contends that the Board’s decision was arbitrary and capricious because it failed to explain whether (and to what extent) it relied on the advisory opinion. But the Board stated that it “concurred with” the advisory opinion to the extent that Voegeli’s “account of [his] own actions cannot form the factual basis of any decoration of heroism.” JA 24. And regardless, it is the Board’s decision — not the advisory opinion — that is the subject of this appeal. See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (authorizing review of “final agency action”). Whatever might be said about the advisory opinion’s reasoning or regrettable tone, the Board’s independent analysis is intelligible enough to pave the way for meaningful judicial review. And for the reasons we have already discussed, it reasonably concluded that Lipinski’s second-hand reports cannot “fill the evidentiary gap” left behind by the missing eyewitness statements. JA 24. To be sure, the Board’s opinion is not the epitome of clarity. It did not offer a citation for the supposed “functional equivalent” exception, nor lay out all the shortcomings of Voegeli’s proffered evidence. Nevertheless, agency orders “need not be a model of analytic precision,” and we will “uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned.” In re NTE Connecticut, LLC, 26 F.4th 980, 988 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (cleaned up); Finberg v. United States Department of Agriculture, 6 F.4th 1332, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (cleaned up). * * * With skill and courage, Nicholas Voegeli saved another man’s life. But for reasons largely outside his control, Voegeli’s nomination for the Navy and Marine Corps Medal did not include the type of evidence required for his heroism to be recognized with that award. His proffered evidence was 10 neither the functional equivalent of nor an adequate substitute for the missing eyewitness statements. So the Board’s denial decision was not arbitrary and capricious. We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Secretary of the Navy. So ordered.