Thorogood v. MSPB
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Date FiledOctober 8, 2026
Docket26-1588
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
Case: 26-1588 Document: 34 Page: 1 Filed: 10/08/2026
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
MICHAEL THOROGOOD,
Petitioner
v.
MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD,
Respondent
______________________
2026-1588
______________________
Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection
Board in No. DC-0752-24-0353-I-1.
______________________
Decided: October 8, 2026
______________________
MICHAEL THOROGOOD, Norfolk, VA, pro se.
ELIZABETH W. FLETCHER, Office of the General Coun-
sel, United States Merit Systems Protection Board, Wash-
ington, DC, for respondent. Also represented by
KATHERINE MICHELLE SMITH.
______________________
Before LOURIE, REYNA, and WALLACH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Case: 26-1588 Document: 34 Page: 2 Filed: 10/08/2026
2 THOROGOOD v. MSPB
Mr. Thorogood seeks review of a Merit Systems
Protection Board (“the Board”) final decision denying his
petition for review and affirming an initial decision
dismissing his administrative appeal as moot. Because we
agree with the Board’s determination that the
administrative appeal is moot, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
Mr. Thorogood was employed by the Department of the
Navy (“the Agency”) as a Logistics Management Specialist,
GS-0346-09, at Norfolk Naval Shipyard. Mr. Thorogood’s
position required him to obtain and maintain a Secret
security clearance. Appx107–11. 1
On July 17, 2023, the Agency notified Mr. Thorogood
that his “eligibility to access classified information” had
been revoked “based on [certain] security concerns.”
Appx68. The Personnel Security Appeals Board (“the
PSAB”) issued a final decision upholding Mr. Thorogood’s
security clearance revocation on January 12, 2024.
Appx77. On January 25, 2024, the Agency issued
Mr. Thorogood a Notice of Proposed Removal for failure to
meet a condition of employment. Appx70. On January 28,
2024, the Agency indefinitely suspended Mr. Thorogood
“due to the loss of eligibility for access to classified
information and assignment to sensitive duties.” 2
SAppx44 fn.1; Thorogood Br. at 5 (“On October 26, 2023,
1 “Appx” refers to the appendix filed by
Mr. Thorogood, whereas “SAppx” refers to the appendix
attached to the MSPB’s brief.
2 Mr. Thorogood appealed the indefinite suspension
to the Board in case number DC-0752-24-0319-I-1. On
June 3, 2026, this Court affirmed the Board’s final
decision, which upheld Mr. Thorogood’s indefinite
suspension. See Thorogood v. Dep’t of the Navy, No. 2026-
1219, 2026 WL 1580155, at *1 (Fed. Cir. June 3, 2026).
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THOROGOOD v. MSPB 3
the agency issued a decision letter placing Petitioner into a
non-pay status effective January 28, 2024.”).
On January 29, 2024, Mr. Thorogood sent the Agency
an email disagreeing with the PSAB’s decision. See
Appx79. However, the Agency “mistakenly believed”
Mr. Thorogood’s email was a reply to the Notice of
Proposed Removal, Appx86, and issued a final decision
removing him from his position, effective February 16,
2024, Appx74. On February 17, 2024, Mr. Thorogood
emailed the Agency stating that he did not receive the
Notice of Proposed Removal until February 16, 2024, and
that he intended to reply to it. Appx91. On February 26,
2024, Mr. Thorogood filed an administrative appeal with
the Board challenging the February 16, 2024 removal.
Appx81–84.
On February 27, 2024, the Agency notified
Mr. Thorogood that “the Agency is in the process of
rescinding the Decision Letter dated February 9, 2024, and
the SF-50 that was issued February 16th.” Appx86.
Mr. Thorogood was also notified that he would “be given
the chance to reply to the Notice of Proposed Removal.”
Appx86. That same day, the Agency cancelled the
February 16, 2024 removal and reinstated Mr. Thorogood
to his position, retroactive to February 16, 2024. See
SAppx49.
On July 9, 2024, after two status conferences and an
Order to Show Cause, the Administrative Judge (“the AJ”)
issued an initial decision dismissing Mr. Thorogood’s
appeal as moot. The AJ found that the Agency had
returned Mr. Thorogood to the status quo ante, i.e., he was
reinstated into his indefinite suspension status and given
an opportunity to respond to the Notice of Proposed
Removal. SAppx13. The AJ also found that
Mr. Thorogood’s benefits were restored without a break in
coverage and his Official Personnel File was “purged” of
any reference to the February 16, 2024 removal decision.
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4 THOROGOOD v. MSPB
SAppx13. On March 26, 2026, the Board denied
Mr. Thorogood’s petition for review and affirmed the AJ’s
initial decision, which became the Board’s final decision
under 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b). SAppx1–2. Mr. Thorogood
timely appealed to this Court. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9).
DISCUSSION
“Our scope of review in an appeal from a decision of the
Board is limited.” Cheney v. Dep’t of Just., 479 F.3d 1343,
1348 (Fed. Cir. 2007). “We will uphold a decision of the
[Board] unless it is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law or
unsupported by substantial evidence.” Jenkins v. Merit
Sys. Prot. Bd., 911 F.3d 1370, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2019)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “We
review the Board’s jurisdictional determinations de novo
and its underlying factual findings for substantial
evidence.” Jones v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 98 F.4th 1376,
1380 (Fed. Cir. 2024). “Substantial evidence is such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). “The petitioner bears the
burden of establishing error in the Board’s decision.”
Harris v. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 142 F.3d 1463, 1467
(Fed. Cir. 1998).
“If an appealable action is canceled or rescinded by an
agency, any appeal from that action becomes moot, thereby
depriving the [Board] of jurisdiction.” Jenkins, 911 F.3d
at 1373 (internal quotation marks omitted). “For an appeal
to be deemed moot, the agency’s rescission must be
complete, i.e., the appellant must be returned to the status
quo ante and not left in a worse position as a result of the
cancellation than he would have been in if the matter had
been adjudicated and he had prevailed.” Price v. U.S.
Postal Serv., 118 M.S.P.R. 222, 226 (2012).
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THOROGOOD v. MSPB 5
Mr. Thorogood raises three principal challenges on
appeal, which we address in turn.
First, Mr. Thorogood contends the Board erred in
dismissing his appeal as moot because the Agency’s
rescission of the February 16, 2024 removal was not
“voluntary, complete, [and] unconditional.” 3 See
Thorogood Br. at 39–42. Mr. Thorogood argues the
Agency’s rescission was not complete because “[m]ootness
must be established at the time the rescission is issued and
by the Show Cause deadline,” and the Agency’s rescission
failed to meet this because his “FEHB, dental, and vision
coverage remained terminated, his children were denied
medical care, and his payroll and personnel records had not
been corrected” by the “Show Cause deadline.” See id.
at 41. We disagree.
3 Although Mr. Thorogood argues that a rescission
must be “voluntary” and “unconditional,” he provides no
legal support for this assertion. See Thorogood Br. at 39,
42. The MSPB raises this same issue and asserts that this
additional “language is possibly a generative AI
hallucination.” MSPB Br. at 10. The MSPB also notes that
“Mr. Thorogood’s brief contains many hallmarks of
generative AI use, including inconsistent page margins,
heavy use of bolded font, frequent em dashes, and multiple
bulleted lists,” and “[i]t also contains a nonexistent case
caption, ‘Camble v. Department of Defense,’ with a reporter
citation that points to a different case.” Id. at 10 fn.4. Of
note, Mr. Thorogood does not deny the use of AI; instead,
he asserts that the MSPB’s AI allegation is speculative.
See Thorogood Reply Br. at 20–21. The Court interprets
Mr. Thorogood’s assertion as an admission of AI usage.
Regardless of how Mr. Thorogood’s brief was drafted, the
Court cautions against unsupported legal arguments.
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6 THOROGOOD v. MSPB
“[M]ootness can arise at any stage of litigation.”
Calderon v. Moore, 518 U.S. 149, 150 (1996). Thus,
Mr. Thorogood’s argument that mootness must be
established at a particular point in time fails as a matter
of law. Furthermore, substantial evidence supports the
Board’s finding that the Agency’s rescission was complete,
i.e., Mr. Thorogood had been returned to the status quo
ante. The Agency provided evidence that on February 27,
2024, the February 16, 2024 removal had been cancelled.
See SAppx49. The Agency also provided evidence showing
that all documents related to the February 16, 2024
removal had been eliminated from Mr. Thorogood’s Official
Personnel File and that his health benefits had been
restored without a break in coverage. See SAppx33–34.
Moreover, Mr. Thorogood conceded before the AJ that his
health benefits had been restored. See Appx64 (“During
the conference, the appellant indicated that his eligibility
for, or enrollment in, FEHB benefits had been reinstated.”).
Accordingly, we conclude that substantial evidence in the
record supports the Board’s finding regarding status quo
ante relief; and therefore, the Board did not err in
dismissing Mr. Thorogood’s administrative appeal as moot.
See Price, 118 M.S.P.R. at 226.
Second, Mr. Thorogood maintains that the Board erred
by improperly shifting the burden of proof on mootness to
himself. See Thorogood Br. at 42–43, 48–50.
Mr. Thorogood argues the AJ committed “clear legal error”
by requiring “Petitioner to prove the rescission was
incomplete” because “after Petitioner submitted
unrebutted evidence that the rescission was incomplete
after the agency’s Show Cause Deadline” the AJ “provided
the agency additional time and guidance to supplement the
record.” Id. at 42. Again, we disagree.
“The party arguing that a case has become moot bears
the burden of coming forward with the subsequent events
that have produced that alleged result.” Mitchco Int’l, Inc.
v. United States, 26 F.4th 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2022)
Case: 26-1588 Document: 34 Page: 7 Filed: 10/08/2026
THOROGOOD v. MSPB 7
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, the
burden remained with the Agency to prove the rescission
of the February 16, 2024 removal had rendered
Mr. Thorogood’s appeal moot. The Agency initially brought
forth evidence and argument that it had returned
Mr. Thorogood to the status quo ante. See SAppx40–49.
Mr. Thorogood then “filed a series of responses” arguing
that the Agency’s rescission was not complete. SAppx11;
see generally Appx121–175. Following Mr. Thorogood’s
responses, the AJ held a status conference to discuss
“concern[s] that the appellant had not been returned to the
status quo ante.” Appx64. The Agency was then given an
additional opportunity to submit evidence that
Mr. Thorogood had been returned to the status quo ante.
SAppx11–12. Throughout the entire administrative
proceeding, the AJ properly held the Agency to its burden.
Thus, we find no merit in Mr. Thorogood’s argument.
Mr. Thorogood also asserts “[t]he Show Cause Order
itself demonstrates that the AJ improperly shifted the
burden to Petitioner by directing him to prove that the
rescission was complete by a deadline.” Thorogood Br.
at 43 (emphasis omitted). Again, we disagree. The AJ
ordered Mr. Thorogood “to show cause as to why the
present appeal from the agency’s February 16, 2024
decision to remove him is not moot.” Appx59 (emphasis
added). Because Mr. Thorogood has the burden of
establishing the Board’s jurisdiction, requiring him to
respond with evidence that his appeal is not moot does not
run afoul of that principle. See 5 C.F.R.
§ 1201.56(b)(2)(i)(A) (providing that appellant bears the
burden of proof by preponderant evidence regarding
jurisdiction issues).
Third, Mr. Thorogood contends that the Board’s final
order violated the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”)
because it “consisted of a single paragraph that contained
no analysis, addressed none of Petitioner’s arguments, and
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8 THOROGOOD v. MSPB
did not evaluate the AJ’s errors or the agency’s statutory
violations.” Thorogood Br. at 57. We disagree.
As a preliminary matter, Mr. Thorogood’s MSPB
adjudication is governed by the Civil Service Reform Act
(“CSRA”), not the APA. Mr. Thorogood is challenging the
Agency’s decision to remove him, and “[a] challenge to
removal is precisely the type of personnel action regularly
adjudicated by the MSPB and the Federal Circuit within
the CSRA scheme.” See Elgin v. Dep’t of Treasury, 567 U.S.
1, 22 (2012). Mr. Thorogood cannot “circumvent the [Civil
Service Reform] Act’s requirements and limitations by
resorting to the catchall APA to challenge agency
employment actions.” See Ricci v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd.,
953 F.3d 753, 760 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
Regardless, “[t]he author of an opinion has broad
discretion to determine what the opinion should contain
and in what detail.” Lowder v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,
504 F.3d 1378, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Furthermore, “[i]t is
well-established that a litigant’s right to have all issues
fully considered and ruled on by the appellate court does
not equate to a right to a full written opinion on every issue
raised.” Bernklau v. Principi, 291 F.3d 795, 801 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
While succinct, the Board’s final order identified the
“dispositive issue” in the appeal as “whether the appeal is
moot,” summarized Mr. Thorogood’s arguments, noted that
it had “fully consider[ed]” the pleadings, and then
concluded that Mr. Thorogood had failed to establish any
basis for granting the petition for review. See SAppx1–2.
Accordingly, we see no error in the Board’s final order.
Mr. Thorogood raises several other arguments that are
either irrelevant to his appeal, unsupported by fact or law,
or both. See, e.g., Thorogood Br. at 59 (asserting that the
Agency erred by suspending him instead of reassigning
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THOROGOOD v. MSPB 9
him). Because we find no merit in these additional
arguments, we decline to address them.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasonings, we affirm.
AFFIRMED
COSTS
No costs.