Petraglia v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles

************************************************ The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the “officially released” date appearing in the opinion. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecti- cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the advance release version of an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ************************************************  Petraglia v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles PATRICIA PETRAGLIA v. COMMISSIONER OF MOTOR VEHICLES (AC 48540) Alvord, Moll and Keller, Js.* Syllabus The plaintiff appealed from the Superior Court’s judgment dismissing her administrative appeal from the defendant’s decision to suspend her motor vehicle operator’s license and to require the installation of an ignition interlock device in her vehicle pursuant to statute (§ 14-227b). She claimed that there was not substantial evidence on the whole record that she had, in fact, been operating her motor vehicle while under the influence of any intoxicating substance in violation of statute (§ 14-227a) because the chemi- cal tests to which she voluntarily submitted did not detect any alcohol or drugs in her system. Held: The Superior Court properly applied the significantly deferential standard of review applicable to administrative appeals involving license suspensions in determining that the plaintiff did not meet her burden of proving that the defendant’s decision was clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record. Argued March 24—officially released September 29, 2026 Procedural History Appeal from the decision of the defendant suspend- ing the plaintiff’s motor vehicle operator’s license and requiring the installation of an ignition interlock device, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New Britain and tried to the court, Taylor, J.; judgment dismissing the appeal, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Affirmed. Conrad Ost Seifert, for the appellant (plaintiff). Deanna S. Levine, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, was William Tong, attorney general, for the appellee (defendant). Opinion KELLER, J. The plaintiff, Patricia Petraglia, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing her * The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of the date of oral argument.  Petraglia v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles appeal from the administrative decision of the Com- missioner of Motor Vehicles (commissioner) suspend- ing her motor vehicle operator’s license. Pursuant to General Statutes § 14-227b,1 the plaintiff’s license was suspended for forty-five days and she was required to install and maintain an ignition interlock device in her vehicle for six months. In this appeal, we must decide whether the trial court properly applied the correct legal standard in upholding the commissioner’s decision that the plaintiff was operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug, or both, notwithstanding the undisputed fact that the chemical tests to which she voluntarily submitted did not detect any alcohol or drugs in her system. The plaintiff claims that her “rights were prejudiced because there was not ‘substantial evidence on the whole record’ ” that she was, in fact, operating her motor vehicle while under the influence of any intoxicating substance. We affirm the judgment of the court. A review of the record reveals the following. On March 4, 2024, the plaintiff was arrested and charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug or both in violation of General Statutes § 14-227a.2 Following the plaintiff’s arrest, Officer Sebastian Obando and Sergeant George Caponera, both of the New Canaan Police Department, prepared reports that included the following informa- tion. On March 4, 2024, at approximately 4:57 p.m., Obando was dispatched to the plaintiff’s residence in New Canaan to attempt to locate the driver of a vehicle that was reported to have been involved in a possible evading 1 Although § 14-227b has been amended by the legislature since the events underlying this appeal; see, e.g., Public Acts 2024, No. 24-40, § 54; those amendments have no bearing on the merits of this appeal. In the interest of simplicity, we refer to the current revision of the statute. 2 Although § 14-227a has been amended by the legislature since the events underlying this appeal; see, e.g., Public Acts 2025, No. 25-110, § 49; those amendments have no bearing on the merits of this appeal. In the interest of simplicity, we refer to the current revision of the statute.  Petraglia v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles motor vehicle accident in Darien.3 While traveling to the plaintiff’s residence, Obando was informed by the desk officer about the color, make, model, and registra- tion number of the vehicle in question and he further learned that a separate complaint of erratic driving had been made with respect to that vehicle. Specifically, the vehicle had been observed swerving off the road, almost striking a tree, and then taking a dangerous right turn, nearly causing a collision. When Obando arrived at the plaintiff’s residence, he observed that the vehicle in question was parked in the driveway and that there was a female, who later was iden- tified as the plaintiff, seated in the driver’s seat. Obando pulled his patrol vehicle into the driveway and parked behind the plaintiff’s vehicle. As Obando was exiting his patrol vehicle, the plaintiff opened her driver’s side door and Obando announced his presence as he approached her. The plaintiff explained that she had been at Quest Diagnostics in Darien. Obando observed “numerous pre- scription bottles in [the plaintiff’s] vehicle. Some of the prescription bottles were in [the plaintiff’s] center console and some were in her bag which was on her lap.” When Obando asked the plaintiff for her motor vehicle operator’s license, “she began to fumble her belongings.” She also was “being very slow with her movements,” and she dropped her bag, causing its contents, including loose pills, to fall out and scatter both inside and outside of her vehicle. When Obando asked the plaintiff if she had been involved “in any motor vehicle accident,” the plaintiff said no. Obando observed, however, that there was damage to the passenger side front bumper of the plaintiff’s vehicle. Obando did not smell any alcohol on the plaintiff’s breath, but it was “clear” to him that she “was impaired.” 3 The report came from the Darien Police Department. “The essence of the offense of evading responsibility is the failure of the driver to stop and render aid.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Wil- liams, 137 Conn. App. 250, 251, 47 A.3d 914, cert. denied, 307 Conn. 921, 54 A.3d 182 (2012).  Petraglia v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles At this point, Caponera arrived on the scene. Caponera “spoke with [the plaintiff] and advised her about the incident in Darien.” The plaintiff appeared to Caponera “to be disoriented and was not able to answer questions clearly.” She “denied drinking any alcoholic beverages, but admitted she took prescription medication earlier in the day.” Caponera and Obando decided to conduct stan- dardized field sobriety tests (sobriety tests) “to determine if [the plaintiff] was impaired and unsafe to drive.” The plaintiff exited her vehicle at Caponera’s request, and Obando “had [her] come to the rear end of her vehicle,” which she did without any reported incident or diffi- culty. Obando then asked the plaintiff whether she had any head or eye injuries and she responded no. Caponera asked the plaintiff if she was diabetic, and she responded no. Obando then administered the horizontal gaze nys- tagmus test (HGN test)4 and was “unable to observe any nystagmus however [the plaintiff] repeatedly moved her head after being told not to numerous times.” He then 4 “The [HGN] test measures the extent to which a person’s eyes jerk as they follow an object moving from one side of the person’s field of vision to the other. The test is premised on the understanding that, whereas everyone’s eyes exhibit some jerking while turning to the side, when the subject is intoxicated the onset of the jerking occurs after fewer degrees of turning, and the jerking at more extreme angles becomes more distinct.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Colon, 232 Conn. App. 122, 126 n.4, 335 A.3d 848, cert. denied, 353 Conn. 902, 341 A.3d 959 (2025). “To administer the test, the officer positions a stimulus approximately twelve to eighteen inches away from and slightly above the subject’s eyes. The stimulus, usually a pen or the officer’s finger, is then moved slowly from the midline of the nose to maximum deviation, the farthest lateral point to which the eyes can move to either side. The officer observes the subject’s eyes as [the subject tracks the stimulus. The officer] looks for six clues, three for each eye, to determine whether the subject passes or fails the test. The officer looks for (1) the inability of each eye to track movement smoothly, (2) pronounced nystagmus at maximum deviation and (3) the onset of nystagmus at an angle less than forty-five degrees in relation to the center point. A finding of four clues indicates failure of the test and is a sign of intoxication.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Balbi, 89 Conn. App. 567, 571, 874 A.2d 288, cert. denied, 275 Conn. 919, 883 A.2d 1246 (2005).  Petraglia v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles administered the walk and turn test,5 and the plaintiff “lost balance, did not walk heel to toe, stepped off line and turned incorrectly.” Finally, he administered the one leg stand test,6 during which the plaintiff “was sway- ing, hopping and continuously putting her foot down.” Obando “terminated the test due to [the plaintiff] being unable to keep her balance and for her safety.” After Obando completed the sobriety tests, Caponera decided to “retest [the plaintiff] in the HGN and [walk and turn tests] to determine if she was under the influence of her prescription medications.” In readministering the HGN test, Caponera “noticed [the plaintiff’s] pupil size to be equal, but her pupils were pin point.”7 He “observed a lack of smooth pursuit in both eyes,” “a slight bounce of each eye,” and “at maximum deviation [he] would see a slight bouncing of each eye.” At Caponera’s request, the plaintiff also performed the walk and turn test a second time “but did not touch heel to toe on any step. In fact, she took wide strides, and did not count out loud. She did not appear to have good balance as her steps appeared random and in a non-linear manner.” In addition, Caponera performed two Advanced Road- side Impaired Driving Enforcement (ARIDE) tests8—the 5 “The walk and turn test requires the subject to walk heel to toe along a straight line for nine paces, pivot, and then walk back heel to toe along the line for another nine paces. The subject is required to count each pace aloud from one to nine.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Colon, 232 Conn. App. 122, 126 n.5, 335 A.3d 848, cert. denied, 353 Conn. 902, 341 A.3d 959 (2025). 6 “The one leg stand test requires the subject to stand on one leg with the other leg extended in the air for [a set time period], while counting aloud . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Colon, 232 Conn. App. 122, 126 n.6, 335 A.3d 848, cert. denied, 353 Conn. 902, 341 A.3d 959 (2025). 7 “Pinpoint pupils occur when the pupils shrink to a small size. This can be due to various conditions and medications, such as prescription opioids, hypertension medications, and eye inflammation.” B. Weaver, Seven Causes of Pinpoint Pupils, (last modified June 3, 2024), available at https://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/321209 (last visited September 16, 2026). 8 General Statutes § 14-227a (a) (A) provides in relevant part: “ ‘[A]dvanced roadside impaired driving enforcement’ means a program  Petraglia v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles lack of convergence and the modified Romberg tests. During the lack of convergence test, the plaintiff’s “eyes failed to converge the first time at the bridge of her nose, but the second time came closer.”9 The plaintiff passed a portion of the modified Romberg test, which Caponera administered “to see if she had suffered any loss of coor- dination,” but she “failed to do the test properly” because she kept her head at the resting position.10 “Ultimately based on the totality of circumstances [Caponera] advised [the plaintiff] that she failed the tests” and summoned a female officer to the scene to “search and arrest [the plaintiff]” for illegal operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs in violation of § 14-227a.11 The plaintiff then was transported to the New Canaan Police Department for booking. A National Crime Infor- mation Center (NCIC) check was conducted, “which developed by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration with the International Association of Chiefs of Police and the Techni- cal Advisory Panel, which focuses on impaired driving enforcement education for police officers . . . .” ARIDE was intended “to bridge the gap in training between the [sobri- ety tests] and the Drug Evaluation and Classification program. ARIDE includes a set of three tests: (a) the lack of convergence eye test; (b) the finger to nose coordination test; and (c) the modified Romberg balance test. ARIDE is additional training for more experienced officers con- ducting [sobriety test] investigations to help detect drug impairment.” State v. Langshaw, Docket No. CR-XX-XXXXXXX-S, 2025 WL 2124394, *1 n.2 (Conn. Super. July 23, 2025). 9 In his report, Caponera explained that, when he administered this test, he “had [the plaintiff] stand with her feet together and hands at her side. [He] held up [a pen] and advised her to follow it with her eyes only. [He] then moved the pen clockwise in a circle, in front of her face for two rotations. [He] then brought the pen to the bridge of her nose to see if her eyes would meet in the center. [He] returned the pen to the starting position and back to center.” 10 In his report, Caponera explained that, before administering this test, he “instructed [the plaintiff] to stand with her feet together and hands at her side. [He] then advised her to close her eyes, tilt her head back and approximate [thirty] seconds before opening her eyes, returning to resting position and stating she was done. [He] demonstrated how to perform the head tilt with eyes closed.” 11 The record does not reflect whether or how the criminal charges against the plaintiff were disposed.  Petraglia v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles yielded no hits or wants.”12 At Obando’s request, the plaintiff provided one breath sample, which tested nega- tive for alcohol, and one urine sample, which was sent to the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection Division of Scientific Services for testing. The plaintiff also iterated that she had last taken prescription medication earlier in the day, specifically at noon, and further advised that she had not eaten anything since the morning hours.13 During the booking procedure, Obando listed “all the prescription bottles that were on [the plaintiff] dur- ing the time of the incident” as follows: “Ciprofloxacin 500mg, Omeprazole 20mg, Potassium 10MEQ, Hydrala- zine 25mg, Oxycodone 5mg, Acetaminophen 500mg, Phospha 250 tablet, Valacyclovir 1GM tablet, Myco- phenolic [acid] 180mg and Carvedilol 12.5mg.” He also documented that “[t]here were duplicate prescription bottles . . . and numerous tablets in her bag that were not properly stored in a prescription bottle.” The plain- tiff “completed the booking process without incident,” although there “were moments that [she] was dozing off and had to be seated.” Caponera asked the plaintiff if she needed medical attention and she stated no. Thereafter, on March 7, 2024, Obando prepared an A-44 form14 for submission to the Department of Motor Vehicles (department) pursuant to § 14-227b (c). In the “INVESTIGATION INFORMATION” section of that 12 “The NCIC database is maintained by the [Federal Bureau of Inves- tigation] and aggregates criminal justice information from a variety of sources. Some files in the database contain information about individual persons and are known as person files. Other files contain records regard- ing stolen property. Law enforcement agencies routinely check NCIC records to obtain information concerning persons in custody or under investigation.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bey, 240 Conn. App. 505, 506 n.1, ___ A.3d ___ (2026). 13 The plaintiff had been read her notice of rights at 5:43 p.m. 14 “The A-44 form is used by the police to report an arrest related to operating a motor vehicle under the influence and the results of any sobriety tests administered or the refusal to submit to such tests.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Crandlemire v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 117 Conn. App. 832, 835 n.2, 982 A.2d 212 (2009).  Petraglia v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles form, Obando checked the box that indicated that the plaintiff did not “have any physical injury or illness which would prevent . . . her from performing any part of the [sobriety tests].” With respect to the “WALK- TURN” test, Obando checked the boxes for “Loses Bal- ance,” “No Heel to Toe,” “Steps off Line,” and “Turns Incorrectly.” With respect to the “ONE LEG STAND” test, Obando checked the boxes for “Sways While Balanc- ing,” “Hopping,” and “Puts Foot Down.” With respect to the HGN test, Obando checked the box for “Other (Explain)” and noted “Unable to perform.” Finally, with respect to “PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST,” Obando checked the boxes for “STANDARDIZED FIELD SOBRI- ETY TESTS” and “OTHER (EXPLAIN)” and noted the “[c]omplainant observed erratic operating of vehicle. Vehicle was involved in evading motor vehicle accident in Darien prior to arriving at vehicle [owner’s] residence. Numerous prescription bottles in vehicle.” In the “POST ARREST INTERVIEW” section of the form, Obando checked the boxes that indicate that the plaintiff was not injured but that she was ill and noted that her illness was “[d]ue to drugs taking.” The form reflects that the plaintiff “take[s] medication” and states “[n]umerous” to describe “what type.” Further, the form indicates that the plaintiff “last [took] this medication” at 12 p.m. and was not in need of any more. The form also reflects that the plaintiff had “last eat[en]” at 9 a.m.15 All of the questions related to “drinking” are marked “N/A.” Finally, in the “CHEMICAL ALCOHOL TEST DATA” section of the form, the “breath” and “urine” tests are identified as the “TEST[S] SELECTED BY OFFICER.” 15 We note that the form also reflects that the plaintiff had not “taken any drugs” and that the follow-up question, “If so, what kind and how much?” is left unanswered. Given the plaintiff’s admission that she had taken medication at 12 p.m., we presume that this apparent inconsistency is either a scrivener’s error or that it reflects an attempt to distinguish between the prescribed medication the plaintiff admitted to taking and other drugs she denied having consumed.  Petraglia v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles The result of the chemical breath test was “0.00.” The result of the chemical urine test was “[u]nknown.” Thereafter, the plaintiff was notified in writing by the commissioner that her operator’s license was to be sus- pended for a period of forty-five days and that she would be required to install and maintain an ignition interlock device in her vehicle for six months. In that March 11, 2024 notice, the plaintiff also was advised that she had the right to request an administrative hearing to deter- mine whether her operator’s license should be suspended pursuant to § 14-227b and that if she did not do so within seven days, the suspension would automatically go into effect. See General Statutes § 14-227b (e) and (i) (1). The plaintiff requested a hearing and her case was presented, on behalf of the commissioner, by one of its attorney “presenters,” Attorney Thomas Donohue, in an administrative per se hearing held on April 17, 2024.16 By that time, the results of the plaintiff’s chemical urine test, which revealed “[n]o [d]rugs [d]etected,” had been received. At the hearing, Donohue submitted into evidence one nineteen page exhibit that included the A-44 form; see footnote 14 of this opinion; a breath test receipt, police case/incident reports, a criminal appearance bond, an advisement of rights form signed by the plaintiff, the uniform arrest report, and a toxicology report dated 16 “In most [administrative] per se hearings, the [department] Hearing Officer plays the role of prosecutor and judge.” S. Tomeo & J. Sills, 21 Connecticut Practice Series: Connecticut DUI Law (2025) § 4:5, pp. 139–40. However, “[t]he . . . [department] employs individuals referred to as ‘Presenters’ to screen all A-44 Reports received by the department. If the Presenter feels that a case or report is lacking evidence, he or she may then subpoena additional testimonial or documentary evidence. In such cases, the Presenter will . . . ‘present’ the case on behalf of the [department], much like a prosecutor would in criminal court. Presenter cases tend to be more adversarial with the hearing officer’s role more judge-like. Since this remains a fact finding hearing, the hearing officer is still permitted to ask questions of the witnesses and lawyers as well as subpoena additional evidence.” Id., § 4:6, p. 140.  Petraglia v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles March 27, 2024.17 Donohue also presented testimony from Obando, whom he had subpoenaed.18 The plaintiff, who was represented by counsel, submitted into evidence a copy of a motion to dismiss, with exhibits, that she had filed prior to the hearing. The motion to dismiss was predicated on the plaintiff’s claim that there was no physical or empirical evidence that the plaintiff “was taking any drugs that would impair her ability to oper- ate a motor vehicle . . . .” Her exhibits included copies of the A-44 form, the breath test receipt, the toxicology report and the uniform arrest report. The plaintiff also testified on her own behalf. At the beginning of the hearing, after the hearing officer had sworn in the commissioner’s witnesses; see footnote 18 of this opinion; but before the hearing began, the hearing officer considered and denied the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss. In opposing that motion, Donohue argued that “[c]ounsel said there is no physical evidence. I’m going to disagree with that. I will agree that there’s no chemical evidence. The drug test[s] for 150 drugs, but there can be other drugs.” Thereafter, during his direct examination, Obando testified that once he made contact with the plaintiff, he advised her that he had been dispatched to her home because she was suspected of evading a motor vehicle accident in Darien and, although she denied knowing anything about an accident, he observed “fresh dam- age” on her passenger front bumper, “which matched 17 The toxicology report includes a section entitled “Limitations,” which states in relevant part that “[a]nalytical methods used allow for the detection of numerous drugs/metabolites, but are limited. For questions about whether or not a specific drug or drug metabolite would have been detected in this analysis, please contact the Toxicology Unit at [the telephone number listed thereon]. “Analytes reported as ‘not detected,’ ‘negative,’ or similar verbiage may mean that such analytes were either not detected or were below the method’s reportable limit.” 18 Donohue also had subpoenaed Caponera and Lieutenant Marc DeFe- lice, but neither testified at the hearing. Although Caponera did not testify at the hearing, his written report had been submitted into evidence by the commissioner and the plaintiff.  Petraglia v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles up with” where the Darien Police Department said the damage should be. With respect to the plaintiff herself, Obando observed that “[s]he was a bit slow in her reaction in her speech with [him]” and that there were “a lot of prescription bottles all over her center console [and] in her lap . . . .” He described her movement as “very slow, a little lethargic, just not really having full capabilities of her . . . movements” and recounted that, at one point, as she was searching for her driver’s license, the bag on her lap “fell over and tons of prescription bottles fell out, [and] empty pills fell out as well.”19 Obando explained that he was attempting to gather as much information as he could in order to determine whether the plaintiff was “intoxicated, was she under the influence of drugs.” He testified that, in addition to the “[driving under the influence (DUI)] option [training] in the [police] academy,” he attended a week long DUI school in Waterford and that he had advanced ARIDE training, which “helps you detect if someone is impaired . . . under drugs instead of alcohol . . . .”20 He stated that, once Caponera arrived at the plaintiff’s residence, they decided to conduct field sobriety tests. They first asked the plaintiff “[is she] diabetic, [does she] have any head injuries? Any recent injuries . . . that wouldn’t allow [her] to perform the test such as . . . ankle, legs, hips, anything of that sort” and the plaintiff said no. They “asked her numerous questions . . . and she didn’t raise any flags to us . . . .” Therefore, they proceeded with the tests and Obando testified that the plaintiff “didn’t perform to standard.”21 Obando further testified that, 19 As stated previously in this opinion, Obando had documented in his report that “[t]here were duplicate prescription bottles in [the plaintiff’s] bag and numerous tablets in her bag that were not properly stored in a prescription bottle.” 20 Obando testified that it was Caponera who conducted the ARIDE testing, which is consistent with the police report. 21 Obando testified during cross-examination that he had no special training “as it relates to physical limitations of elderly people perform- ing these tests” and did not agree that “someone who’s elderly, older, infirm, maybe has physical limitations, would be unable to perform” some of these tests. He explained that, “if that was the case, they would  Petraglia v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles “based [on] the totality of circumstances with the Darien call, the [subsequent] traffic complaint, and just, you know, what I observed with prescription bottles and my observation of her in and of itself, we believed that there was probable cause to arrest her for DUI,” and they did so. Obando confirmed that the chemical breath test the plaintiff took resulted in “[z]ero across the board” and that she also submitted a urine sample that showed “no drugs detected.” During his cross-examination, Obando reiterated that, before administering the sobriety tests, he and Capo- nera “asked [the plaintiff] the basic questions that we ask anyone else, if they’re diabetic, if they’ve had any recent injuries that they would be unable to perform these tests,” and she gave no indication that she did. With respect to the chemical breath and urine tests, Obando acknowledged, again, that the plaintiff’s breath test resulted in “[z]ero across the board” and that the urine test revealed “no drugs detected.” Thereafter, he agreed that, on the basis of the chemical breath test results, the plaintiff was not suffering from alcohol impairment. Obando did not agree, however, that the plaintiff was not impaired by drugs. As grounds for his disagree- ment, he referenced his “observation” of the plaintiff and explained that he is trained to detect whether someone is “taking drugs” “based off of their eyes, based off of their movements.” Nonetheless, he admitted that he was not qualified to determine by sight exactly what drugs people are taking, that “people can take drugs all the time that do not impair their ability to operate a motor vehicle” and that not every person who loses control of their vehicle and gets into an accident is impaired. Even so, he iterated what he had written in his report, namely, that the plaintiff “did say that she did consume some of put an age limit as to when . . . someone of the age can . . . perform the test.” Apart from the fruitless questioning of Obando by the plaintiff’s counsel, no evidence was introduced at the hearing to indicate that, after reaching a certain age, a person would have difficulty performing any of the tests performed on the plaintiff, and the plaintiff did not raise this as an issue on appeal to the trial court.  Petraglia v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles her prescription drugs at twelve o’clock and has not eaten since.” Obando did not know what specific medication the plaintiff had taken, let alone whether that medication was intoxicating in nature and would have impaired her ability to operate her vehicle. Indeed, Obando admitted that he did not ask the plaintiff what prescription medi- cation she had taken at noon. He acknowledged that his report is silent in this regard and he confirmed that, had he asked the plaintiff what medication she had taken, this information would have been included in his report because he was “trying to prove [that] she was impaired.” The seventy-one year old plaintiff testified that she was not using any prescription drugs that would impair her ability to operate a motor vehicle and that she had a handicapped placard on the console of her vehicle when Obando first approached her.22 She testified that Obando did not ask her whether she “had physical limitations” before they administered the sobriety tests but that, once “they started to do the walking exercises, [and] they asked [her] to put one . . . foot in front of the other and walk [in] a straight line . . . [she] explained to them that [she has] a lot of pain and that [she] had sciatica and damage in [her] lower body.” She further testified that “the reason why I don’t walk properly is because I’ve had two kidney transplants and I developed a condition called . . . calcineurin-inhibitor pain syndrome, and it’s a rare condition that happens posttransplant that is very painful and it affects mostly the lower body. So . . . it feels as if you’re walking on broken bones sometimes, and that is the condition that I have; that’s the reason for the handicapped placard.” During cross-examination, the plaintiff explained that, with respect to the accident that prompted the investigation, she “thought that [she] had struck a curb and basically kind of chastised [herself] and kept going to [her] appointment.” She further explained that when the officers asked her about an accident, she thought they 22 Obando testified that a handicapped placard “was not something that I observed.”  Petraglia v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles meant a collision with “someone” and that “later when the Darien police came to New Canaan, I told them, they said you hit more than a curb, and I apologize[d] because I thought that I had just hit the curb.” When Donohue asked whether the plaintiff recalled Obando asking her, “if you had any injuries or illnesses that would hinder the performance of the test,” as reflected on the A-44 form, she testified that she did not. Finally, when asked if she was “upset that night being arrested,” the plaintiff responded “[a]bsolutely. I have never in my whole life had any type of arrest or, you know, any type of contact like this. I was frightened . . . .”23 During his closing argument, Donohue argued that “[t]he real issue” for the hearing officer to decide was whether there was substantial evidence that the plaintiff was in fact operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug or both, and that was, in fact, the only issue the plaintiff’s counsel addressed in his closing argument. On this point, Dono- hue argued that “the state admits she blows zeros. And I actually followed up to check, it’s a 150; so, it’s a lot of drugs they test for. Because I thought if it’s ten or something—but again I’m straightforward. They test for 150. They said approximately 150 the [state Forensic Science Laboratory] told me, because I didn’t know. . . . So, no drugs detected of those 150.”24 Donohue also emphasized that “two ARIDE trained officers” were involved in the investigation and that the hearing officer should consider what they observed when reviewing the evidence. The plaintiff’s counsel argued, in response, that there “has to be substantial evidence to indicate that [the plain- 23 The plaintiff’s driving history as of May 10, 2024, reflected only the April 18, 2024 per se license suspension. 24 Although the toxicology report identified “[l]imitations” with respect to the “numerous drugs/metabolites” that would be detected; see foot- note 17 of this opinion; no documentary or testimonial evidence was presented at the hearing that the plaintiff’s urine sample was tested for “approximately 150” drugs as Donohue argued. See, e.g., State v.  Petraglia v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles tiff] was impaired” and there was not. He emphasized the evidence regarding the negative chemical breath and urine tests, the plaintiff’s physical condition and “lower body syndrome,” and Obando’s admissions that (1) taking medication does not necessarily mean that it will impair one’s ability to operate a motor vehicle and (2) he did not know, or even ask, what medication the plaintiff had taken at noon that day as support for this conclusion. In a one page decision dated April 19, 2024, the hear- ing officer found that the requirements of § 14-227b were satisfied and ordered that the plaintiff’s license or operating privilege be suspended for forty-five days and that an ignition interlock device be installed and maintained for six months. In reaching this conclusion, the hearing officer made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law: “1. The [plaintiff] was placed under arrest. “2. The [plaintiff] is not the holder of a commercial driver’s license. “3. [The plaintiff] was operating the motor vehicle. “4. The police officer had probable cause to arrest the [plaintiff] for a violation specified in [§ 14-227b]. “5. [The plaintiff] was operating a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug, or both.” The hearing officer also made the following subordinate findings. “There is sufficient evidence that the [plaintiff] was operating a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug or both. “[Obando] gave sworn testimony that once he walked up to the motor vehicle, he observed that the [plaintiff] had numerous prescription bottles in plain sight, the bottles were in her purse, in her lap and on the center console. [Obando] testified that the [plaintiff’s] movements were Stepherson, 237 Conn. App. 65, 81 n.9, 350 A.3d 1174 (2026) (repre- sentations of counsel are not evidence).  Petraglia v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles very slow and that she did not know that she was in an accident. Further, [Obando] terminated the [sobriety tests] due to the [plaintiff] being unable to keep her bal- ance and for her safety. “[Caponera] stated in the police report that he con- ducted the [HGN test] and he noticed her pupil size was equal, but pinpoint. [Caponera] observed a lack of smooth pursuit, slight bounce of each eye as they would track the stimulus and at maximum deviation there was slight bounce of each eye as well.” The hearing officer made no mention of the negative chemical breath and urine test results. On April 25, 2024, the plaintiff filed a petition for reconsideration with the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles Petition Review Committee, which was sum- marily denied without comment on May 6, 2024. Pursuant to General Statutes § 4-183,25 the plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court from the decision of the commissioner, claiming that the decision should be reversed because the hearing officer’s “findings, infer- ences, conclusions, or decisions . . . [are] clearly erroneous in light of reliable, probative, and substantial evidence produced at the hearing . . . .” Specifically, the plaintiff claimed there was insufficient evidence to support the hearing officer’s finding that she was “under the influ- ence of intoxicating liquor and/or drugs at the time of operation.” She posited that, “[w]ith such reliable and substantial evidence of a 0.00 reading on the chemical breath test and ‘No Drugs Detected’ on the chemical urine test, it is impossible to establish impairment without additional substantial evidence of impairment” and that her due process rights under the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution had been violated. In a memorandum of decision, the court, Taylor, J., noted that the sole basis of the plaintiff’s appeal was the hearing officer’s finding that the plaintiff was “operating 25 General Statutes § 4-183 provides in relevant part: “(a) A person who has exhausted all administrative remedies available within the agency and who is aggrieved by a final decision may appeal to the Superior Court as provided in this section. . . .”  Petraglia v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug, or both.”26 See General Statutes § 14-227b (g) (3) (C). The court explained in its recitation of the facts, derived from the evidence in the record, that “[t]he plaintiff’s breath and urine samples were negative for alcohol or any of the drugs that are tested for in these circumstances.” (Emphasis added.) It then recounted much of the information that was included in the police report, including the officer’s observations with respect to the plaintiff’s slow movement, the “numerous pre- scription bottles in the plaintiff’s vehicle,” her admission that she had taken “her prescription medication at noon that date,” and the damage to her vehicle. The court also listed the names of the prescribed medications, just as Obando had done in his report. The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that “the fact that [she] tested negative