Powers v. Powers CA2/6

Filed 10/22/26 Powers v. Powers CA2/6 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION SIX WILLIAM POWERS III, et al., 2d Civ. No. B346050 (Super. Ct. No. 23CVP-0159) Plaintiffs and Respondents, (San Luis Obispo County) v. WILLIAM POWERS, JR., Defendant and Appellant. William Powers, Jr. (appellant) appeals the judgment entered in favor of respondents, his adult son, William Powers III, and the son’s domestic partner, Lindsey Keyes, after a non- jury trial in this action relating to the ownership of real property in rural San Luis Obispo County.1 The trial court found that the parties formed a joint venture to buy the property and to operate it as a marijuana farm. It imposed a constructive trust on the All parties appeared in pro per in the trial court. 1 Appellant continues to represent himself on this appeal. Respondents have not participated in the appeal. property, declaring that, although appellant is the sole title holder, he owns a 50% share of it for himself and holds the remaining 50% in trust for respondents. Appellant is enjoined from taking any unilateral action to sell, encumber or dispose of the property. The judgment also awards respondent Powers $12,100 in damages against appellant for financial abuse of a dependent adult. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.30.) Finally, the trial court entered judgment in favor of respondents on appellant’s complaint for unlawful detainer. Appellant contends the trial court erred in finding that a joint venture existed because that theory was not alleged in respondents’ complaint. He further contends the joint venture finding and the trust findings are not supported by substantial evidence. Appellant contends he was denied a fair trial because the court tried his unlawful detainer complaint before respondents’ complaint. He further contends the trial court erred when it took judicial notice of statements he made in prior pleadings and that it “exceeded its adjudicative role by supplying missing legal and evidentiary elements and by structurally mismanaging the case.” We affirm. Facts Appellant’s opening brief includes only a cursory statement of facts, focusing on his claimed status as the “exclusive owner” of the property and the matter’s procedural history. The brief omits any reference to other material evidence in the record. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204, subd. (a)(2)(C); Perry v. Kia Motors America, Inc. (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 1088, 1096 (Perry) [appellant’s duty to provide complete summary of significant facts includes duty to fairly set forth all such facts, not just those beneficial to appellant].) We base our statement of 2 facts on the trial court’s statement of decision and our review of the record. In 2014, the parties made an oral agreement to acquire real property in San Luis Obispo County. The agreement contemplated that respondents would live on the property and operate it as the “Powers Family Farm,” a commercial cannabis farm. Appellant would help to select the property and secure financing for it. Respondent Powers received a disability benefits settlement in 2014 and transferred $12,100 to appellant for use in purchasing the property. Eventually, the parties selected a property on Grant Road in Santa Margarita. Appellant qualified for 100% financing and the transaction closed in July 2014. He is the only person named as a grantee in the grant deed and the only buyer identified on the final closing statement for the transaction. After closing, respondents moved to the property and began operating it as a marijuana farm. They made improvements to the property and contributed to its operating expenses. The record does not establish what happened to respondent’s $12,100. There is no evidence that appellant used any portion of it to complete the purchase of the property, to pay down the mortgage, or to pay any other expense associated with it. In 2018, San Luis Obispo County ordered that commercial cannabis growing cease at the property. Appellant and respondents unsuccessfully challenged the order together. Final judgment was entered against them in July 2019. By late 2022, the parties were trying to sell the property. Escrow opened in November 2022, but the sale fell through after the buyer’s inspection revealed a problem with the 3 septic system and leech field. The relationship between appellant and respondents fractured during this period. In 2023, appellant came to the property and announced that he was “taking over” because respondents stopped paying rent. Respondents asserted they never had an obligation to pay rent because they were co-owners of the property. They stopped farming and made preparations to move. Procedural History Appellant filed an unlawful detainer complaint against respondents. They filed their complaint against appellant alleging causes of action for anticipatory breach of contract, abuse of a dependent adult, fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, money had and received, accounting, declaratory relief and damages for good faith improvement of the property. Both matters were set for non-jury trial on the same day. The trial court decided to try the unlawful detainer action first and then proceed to the civil matter, noting that testimony given in connection with the unlawful detainer action would also be relevant to the civil action. After hearing the parties’ evidence on both matters and considering their written closing arguments, the court found in favor of respondents on the unlawful detainer complaint. While appellant is the only person named as the owner of the property on the grant deed, the trial court found no evidence that he ever entered into a lease or rental agreement with respondents. In addition, it found there was no transactional record, e.g., no cancelled checks or receipts, that respondents ever paid rent to appellant. The trial court also took judicial notice of lawsuits the parties had filed against their neighbors. In verified pleadings in 4 two of these lawsuits, appellant stated that he bought the property for respondents to live on and farm because they are both disabled. He described respondents as “founding, managing and hands on 18 hour a day farmers,” and as “financial and business partners, in the farming and medical cannabis product production business at the Powers Family Farm.” In these verified pleadings, appellant did not refer to respondents as tenants or to himself as a landlord. The trial court also noted that appellant purchased the property using a type of loan that is only available for an “owner occupied” property, yet he never resided there. Respondents were the only full-time residents of the property. On respondents’ complaint, the trial court concluded that appellant breached an oral joint venture agreement and that he financially abused a dependent disabled adult, respondent Powers.2 It found in favor of appellant on the remaining claims. With respect to the breach of contract claim, the trial court found that the parties made an oral agreement to form a joint venture to purchase the property and operate it as a commercial cannabis farm. While appellant was the only person named on the title to the property, the trial court found that respondents were the ones who moved there. They made improvements to the property and contributed to its operating expenses. This arrangement lasted until respondents were ordered to cease growing cannabis. Respondents alleged that appellant breached their contract by attempting to take more than his share of the 2Respondent Powers has stated that he is disabled by past brain surgery, the removal of his pituitary gland and a resulting seizure disorder. 5 proceeds from the sale of the property. The trial court found that appellant owned 50% of the property and held the remaining 50% in a constructive trust for respondents. He breached the contract by asserting that he was the sole owner of the property, that respondents owed him rent and that they were not entitled to any share of the proceeds should the property be sold. The trial court based these findings on what it referred to as the parties’ course of dealing. Evidence of their course of dealing included evidence that, while appellant took title in his name alone, he contributed no separate funds to the purchase of the property. For more than four years, respondents lived on the farm, cultivated cannabis there, made improvements to it and routinely transferred funds to appellant to cover operating expenses. Mortgage payments were made, and operating expenses were paid, with funds generated by respondents’ operation of the farm. For his part, appellant shared with respondents a portion of the settlement paid in one of the lawsuits they filed against a neighbor. In addition, appellant rarely visited the farm, never lived there, did not challenge respondents’ possession and use of the property and did not refer to himself as their landlord. The trial court found respondent Powers was a disabled, dependent adult. Appellant committed financial abuse of a disabled adult, in violation of Welfare & Institutions Code section 15610.30, when he took money from respondent Powers for the acquisition of the property but put that money to some other, undocumented, use. It found in favor of appellant on the remaining claims. 6  Contentions Appellant contends the trial court erred in finding the existence of an oral joint venture agreement because respondents did not plead that theory and there is no substantial evidence to support it. He challenges the imposition of a constructive trust on the same basis. Appellant contends that he was denied a fair trial when the trial court decided to try the unlawful detainer action first, rather than respondents’ civil action. He further contends the trial court improperly used judicially noticed statements as substantive evidence and that it erred by “supplying missing legal and evidentiary elements and by structurally mismanaging the case.” (Bold and capitalization omitted.) We affirm. Discussion We begin with some of the most fundamental principles of appellate review: “ ‘[A] trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment. . . .’ ” (Mora v. C.E. Enterprises, Inc. (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 72, 87, quoting Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608-609.) Because the judgment is presumed to be correct, “ ‘all intendments and presumptions are indulged in its favor, and ambiguities are resolved in favor of affirmance. [Citations.]’ Where appellants challenge the sufficiency of evidence, [we defer to the trial court]. [O]ur review is limited to whether there is substantial evidence contradicted or uncontradicted that will support the challenged factual finding.” (Las Posas Valley Water Rights Coalition v. Ventura County Waterworks Dist. No. 1 (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 1170, 1188.) 7  Appellant has a duty to provide this court with a “summary of the significant facts limited to matters in the record.” (Cal. Rule of Court, rule 8.204, subd. (a)(2)(C).) “The significant facts are not simply the facts favoring the appellant. Rather, ‘An appellant must fairly set forth all the significant facts, not just those beneficial to the appellant.’ [Citation.]” (Perry, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 1096.) These principles apply regardless of whether a respondent’s brief has been filed. Appellant still bears the burden to show error. We examine the record and may reverse only where prejudicial error is found. (In re Marriage of F.M. and M.M. (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 106, 109, fn. 1; Smith v. Smith (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1074, 1078.) The trial court has inherent power to “control its process and orders so as to make them conform to law and justice.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 128, subd. (a)(8).) This includes broad discretion to regulate or alter the order of proof at trial. (Id., §§ 607, 631.7; Rayii v. Gatica (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1402, 1413.) An abuse of discretion occurs only if the trial court’s decision “exceeds the bounds of reason and results in a miscarriage of justice . . . . We presume that the court properly applied the law and acted within its discretion unless the appellant affirmatively shows otherwise.” (Mejia v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 151, 158 (Mejia).) Joint Venture. Appellant contends the trial court erred when it found he breached an oral joint venture agreement because respondents’ second amended complaint does not allege a joint venture, and because the finding that one existed is not supported by substantial evidence. As we have noted, appellant’s opening brief does not include a summary of all the significant facts in the record, including those supporting the judgment. For 8 example, appellant does not summarize the testimony of respondent Powers or the other two witnesses. Because appellant did not comply with the mandatory rules of appellate procedure, his contention relating to the sufficiency of the evidence has been waived. (Perry, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 1096; Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246-1247.) Had the contention not been waived, we would reject it. “A joint venture is ‘an undertaking by two or more persons jointly to carry out a single business enterprise for profit. . . .’ . . . [It] may be formed orally [citations], or ‘assumed to have been organized from a reasonable deduction from the acts and declarations of the parties.’ ” (Weiner v. Fleischman (1991) 54 Cal.3d 476, 482-483.) The agreement to form a joint venture “need not be formal or definite in every detail relating to the respective rights and duties of the parties but may be implied as a reasonable deduction from their acts and declarations.” (Holtz v. United Plumbing & Heating Co. (1957) 49 Cal.2d 501, 507.) In particular, “the omission of a provision for the sharing of losses in a joint venture is immaterial since in the absence of agreement, the law implies a provision that losses are to be shared among the parties in the same proportion as profits were to have been divided.” (Stilwell v. Trutanich (1960) 178 Cal.App.2d 614, 619.) Here, although respondents’ second amended complaint does not use the term “joint venture,” it alleges facts that amount to an oral joint venture agreement. Respondents alleged that the parties made an “oral, implied by conduct, and fully executed by [respondents] equity-sharing contract” to purchase property that respondents would farm. The complaint further alleged that the parties agreed, “in return for [respondents’] work on [the property] . . . each would be one-third 9 partners sharing equity . . . when all the parties agreed it would be sold or refinanced.” At trial, the parties focused on whether they had made the alleged agreement and whether it had been breached. The trial court found that the contract existed and it referred to that contract as a joint venture. In doing so, the trial court did not violate appellant’s due process rights or rely on a theory of recovery not alleged in the pleadings. Instead, the trial court assigned the correct name to the contract that was alleged in the pleadings and that was the focus of the trial. Second, the trial court’s finding was supported by substantial evidence. Respondent Powers testified to the existence of the contract and its basic terms. His testimony was corroborated by text messages and emails exchanged between the parties. These communications established that the parties worked together to acquire the property with the mutual intention that respondents would live and work there. The parties’ subsequent conduct, or course of dealing, was also consistent with the existence of a joint venture. Respondents lived on and improved the property, cultivated marijuana there, and contributed funds used by appellant to pay the farm’s operating expenses. This is substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s joint venture finding. Constructive Trust. Appellant contends the trial court’s imposition of a constructive trust is not supported by substantial evidence. Appellant waived this contention by filing a brief that does not comply with mandatory rules of appellate procedure. In any event, appellant is incorrect. Respondent Power’s testimony provided substantial evidence that the parties agreed appellant would purchase the property and hold title to it 10 for respondents’ benefit as well as his own. Respondent Powers gave appellant $12,100 in cash, to facilitate the purchase. Appellant did not use those funds for their intended purpose or to benefit respondents. In fact, he obtained 100% financing and contributed no separate funds to the purchase. In addition, income generated by respondents provided the funds appellant used to pay the mortgage and other carrying costs. As the trial court properly concluded, appellant would be unjustly enriched if he were found to hold 100% of the property when he provided none of the funds used to purchase or retain it. Imposition of a constructive trust is appropriate under these circumstances. (See, e.g., Reliant Life Shares, LLC v. Cooper (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 14, 56; Martin v. Kehl (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 228, 237-238.) Order of Proof and Case Management. Appellant contends he was denied a fair trial because the trial court required him to present his case on the unlawful detainer action before respondents were required to present theirs on the civil complaint. We are not persuaded. The trial court has broad discretion to determine the order of proof at trial. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 607, 631.7.) Here, the court determined there were many factual issues common to both actions and that it would be more efficient to hear the unlawful detainer action first. Appellant was not prevented from introducing evidence in support of his unlawful detainer complaint or from defending against respondents’ claim, nor did the trial court shift the burden of proof on respondents’ claims to appellant. He has not shown that the trial court’s decision was arbitrary or capricious, or that it resulted in a miscarriage of justice. (Mejia, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 158.) 11  For the same reasons, we reject appellant’s contention that the trial court “exceeded its adjudicative role” and “structurally mismanaged the case.” The trial court acted within its broad discretion to “control its process and orders so as to make them conform to law and justice.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 128, subd. (a)(8).) Judicial Notice. The trial court took judicial notice of statements appellant made in verified pleadings in other lawsuits relating to the property. It used those statements as evidence that appellant admitted respondents were co-owners, not tenants of the property. Appellant contends the trial court erred because judicial notice does not extend to the truth of factual assertions made in court records. (Sosinsky v. Grant (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1564-1565.) Here, however, the trial court did not take judicial notice of the truth of appellant’s statements. It took judicial notice of appellant’s admissions, made under penalty of perjury, that he believed these facts were true. There was no error. (Salazar v. Upland Police Dept. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 934, 946; Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 593, 605.) Conclusion The judgment is affirmed. Appellant shall bear his own costs on appeal. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED. YEGAN, J. We concur: CODY, P. J. HIPPACH, J. 12  Michael C. Kelley, Judge Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo ______________________________ Williams Powers, Jr., in propria persona, for Defendant and Appellant. No appearance for Respondents.